### Bangladesh e-Journal of Sociology

**Volume 7 Number 1 January 2010**

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**ISSN 1819-8465**

*The Official e-Journal of*

**Bangladesh Sociological Society**

*Committed to the advancement of sociological research and publication.*
Bangladesh e-Journal of Sociology
(Biannual e-Journal of the Bangladesh Sociological Society)

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Published on the Internet
URL: http://www.bangladeshsociology.org

Published by
Bangladesh Sociological Society

From
School of Liberal Arts and Social Sciences, Independent University,
Bangladesh (IUB)
Phone: 88-02-986 23486 -90, Ext. 247. Email: editor@bangladeshsociology.org
Note from the Editor

The growth of technology has inevitably been accompanied by its darker side in every field of application. The misuse of internet is only a logical expectation in that regard. Yet we do not much appreciate or care about the misuses unless or until we ourselves become the victims. BEJS over the past few months had to suffer the brunt of such misuses as the site was attacked repeatedly by some difficult to eradicate viruses. In the end we not only had to close down the site for a while but had to find an alternative server to upload the e-Journal again. Who or why would anyone target a purely academic site for their pranks is beyond our understanding. But it did happen to us and we felt violated!

It has also meant a loss of readership and submissions from authors. Fortunately, we are back online in a more secure server and hope to offer uninterrupted service in the future. Our authors and researchers everywhere are, therefore, requested to resume their submissions to this now well-known international e-Journal of sociology, the only one of its kind from the developing world. Your patronization of the BEJS, in spite of our failings, is applauded!

This issue opens with our concerns with violence towards the women and sexism. Adedeji J. Ogunleye and Sulaiman O. Adebayo focus their attention on the important dimension of sexuality, or sexual discrimination. Ogunleye and Adebayo administered the “Ambivalent Sexism Inventory” (ASI) developed by Glick and Fiske on a sample of 779 Nigerians to estimate the level of sexism, or sex discrimination, prevalent in the Nigerian society. The researchers find significant influence of age, marital status and living environment on sexism.

Syeda Tonima Hadi continues her quest to understand the nature and extent of violence in intimate relationships. This time she focuses on Bangladesh and draws on the available researches to identify patterns in such behaviours. She notes that studies in Bangladesh have dealt with intimate partner violence only within the marital relationship and have neglected the probably greater incidences of violence occurring among the non-marital intimate relationships.

The Niger Delta Region of Nigeria has been a trouble spot for long now. Insurgency and terrorism seems to be endemic to the region. Ngboawaji Daniel Nte, Paul Eke and Kinikanwo Anele in their “Rural Intelligence Gathering and the Challenges of Counter Insurgency: Views from the Niger Delta” evaluate the “nature, scope and dynamics of intelligence gathering emphasizing the need to liberalize the intelligence gathering business in rural Niger Delta to ensure pragmatism and effectiveness”. While on the other hand Otu A. Ekpenyong, Aniefiok Sunday Ukommi and Emmanuel Obiahu Agha try to identify the root causes of the troubles in the Niger Delta while exploring the extent of poverty and its impact on the society, economy and the polity of the region.

Continuing on the exploration of poverty in Nigeria, Olatomide Waheed Olowa looks into the impact of pilferage of livestock on the lives of the poor through developing a theoretical as well as using the real life situation in rural Nigeria in his “The Effect of Livestock Pilferage on Household Poverty in Developing Countries: Theoretical Evidence from Nigeria”.

M.E. Palamuleni, in the last article, analyses the “Recent Marriage patterns in South Africa 1996-2007” through the use of the 1996 and 2001 population censuses and the 2007 Community Survey. He finds that the “mean age at marriage for men and women in South Africa is high and increasing and more men and women are staying single or not marrying at all”. Also, the “percent of the population in the childbearing age groups that has never married has declined from 55% in 1996 to 54% in 2001. However, and most interestingly, “the percentage of married women has decreased from 35% to 30% whereas the percentage living together has increased from 6% to 9% over the same period”.


Influence of Age, Marital Status and Environment on Sexism in Nigeria

Adedeji J. Ogunleye and Sulaiman O. Adebayo*

Abstract
This study attempts to find out the demographic factors for the ingrained sex discrimination in Nigeria. 779 research participants completed the Ambivalent Sexism Inventory (ASI) developed by Glick and Fiske (1996). The independent t-test statistics was employed for data analysis and results showed that age, marital status and environment of living are significant factors influencing sex discrimination (sexism) in Nigeria. The findings were discussed in the light of available literature.

Introduction
The Social Dominance Theory, a major integrative framework seeking to understand and explain group-based prejudice and oppression (Pratto, 1999), postulates that every complex society can be characterized by the existence of group based hierarchy in which at least one group is dominant over others and enjoys a disproportionate share of privilege and at least one group occupies a subordinate position. The theory recognizes three basic types of group based social hierarchies which are: an age system, a gender system, and an arbitrary set system. The arbitrary set system consists of hierarchies of socially constructed groups based on any social relevant group distinctions. Such group distinctions may include, among others, marital status, employment or occupational status etc. These distinctions are environmental relative and may be different in their effects on social stratification but they, basically, influence sex discriminations.

The prevalence of sex discriminations (sexism) and its attendant gender role expectation is evident in most social institutions such as: the family, work environment, politics, the military, the Church, and even education and the milieu of the street (Connell, 1987).

Although the potential deleterious effects of sex discrimination (sexism) have been well documented the world over, less is known about the variables that affect the phenomenon (sexism) in Nigeria. Scholars (e.g. Leaper and Tenenbaum, 2002; Akrami.2005) have classified some of the variables as ‘person centered characteristics’ or as ‘contextual characteristics’. Person centered characteristics, in this context, include attributes as age and marital

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status while contextual characteristics refer to attributes of the situation or environment.

Glick and Fiske (1996, 2001b) differentiated between hostile and benevolent sexism. According to them, hostile and benevolent sexism are two forms of sex discrimination that originates and often follow from held sexist ideologies. The scholars argued that hostile and benevolent sexism are a predictable product of structural relations between men and women that is common to human societies. Whereas, patriarchy (i.e. the accord of more status and power to men than women) and competitive gender differentiation (i.e. differentiation of men from women in terms of social roles and trait ascriptions) are identified as creating and reinforcing hostile sexism (sexist antipathy towards women), benevolent sexism (i.e. subjectively favourable, yet patronizing beliefs about women) is seen as a subtle form of prejudice in which gender inequality is promoted through the appreciation of women as valuable resources’ in the areas of child bearing, nurturance, and provision of sexual and intimacy needs.

Social psychologists generally regard sexism as a social psychological problem resulting from prejudice. According to them, the building of a healthy environment devoid of crime, hatred, violence, disorderliness, war, and genocide among others is resilient in the understanding of behaviours of organisms within the environment. Behaviour (B), according to Lewin (1936), is a function of the environment (E) and the personality predispositions of individual organisms (P) in the environment \( B = f(P,E) \).

Building upon this formulation, Kelly, Holmes, Werr, Reis, Rusbult, and Van Lange (2002) posited that socialization starts from a dyad, and if social psychology studies relationships between people within a social context, then to develop a truly social psychology will require attempts at understanding that interactions between persons is mediated by needs, thoughts and motives in relation to one another and in the context of the specific social situations in which their interactions transpire. Thus, where motives, needs and thoughts are coloured and blurred by socio-cultural leanings to the extent that persons feeling for, and perceptions of one another within a social context become rather negative, most especially as a result of belonging to an opposite sex, then it spells sexism (sex discrimination) and disrupts the peaceful co-existence of people within the social context as much as it is detrimental to society.

Upon this backdrop therefore, the present sets out to find out the influence(s) of age, marital status and environment on sexism in Nigeria. Specifically, the study is set to find out whether:

i. Younger people (aged between 15-35 years) will be more sexist in their ideologies and behaviour than the older people (above 35 years).

ii. People who are single will be more sexist in their ideologies and behaviour than their married counterparts.
iii. That there will be a significant difference in the sexist ideologies and behaviours of rural and urban dwellers.

It is hoped that findings from this study will contribute appreciably to available literature sex discrimination (sexism).

Method
Participants:
The study was conducted in Ekiti State, Nigeria using a total of 779 research participants drawn from among the residents of the three senatorial districts in Ekiti State. The multi-stage random sampling technique was used to select sample localities and research participants.

Specifically, 290 research participants were drawn from Ekiti Central Senatorial District comprising of Ado, Efon, Ijero, Ekiti West and Irepodun/Ifelodun Local Government Areas. 284 research participants were drawn from Ekiti North Senatorial District Comprising of Ikole, Ilejemeje, Moba, Oye and Ido/Osi Lobal Government Areas while a total of two hundred and five (205) participants were drawn from Ekiti South Senatorial District comprising of Ikere, Ise/Orun, Gbonyin, Emure, Ekiti South-West and Ekiti-East Local Government Areas of Ekiti State.

Sample selection for this study is based on parameter of population distribution figures where total figures were 461, 686; 553, 257 and 614, 219 respectively for Ekiti South, Ekiti North and Ekiti Central Senatorial Districts (NPC, 1991).

Altogether, 427 (54.9%) of the research participants were males while 352 (45.1%) were females. Three hundred and ninety three (50.5%) were single and three hundred and eighty-six (49.5%) were married. A total of five hundred and twelve (65.8%) of the participants lived in the urban places in Ekiti State while two hundred and sixty-seven (34.2%) were rural dwellers.

Urban Centers, in this study, are the state capital and local government area headquarters in the state. These places are classified as urban because of the presence of basic amenities and infrastructures that may, in their selves, be educative to dwellers in the towns.

A total of 426 (54.74%) of the research participants are young (i.e. below 35 years old) while 353 were old (i.e. above 35 years). Participants’ mean age was 31.91 years with a range between 15 and 69 years.

Variables:

Independent Variables
The independent variables are Age, Marital Status and Environment. The influences of these variables were considered on sexism (Sex Discrimination).
Dependent variable
Sexism (the exhibition of sexist ideologies and behaviour) constitutes the dependent variable of this study. Glick and Fiske (2001) in their ambivalent alliance postulated two dimensions of sexism as being hostile and benevolent. Therefore, the effect of each of the independent variables on each of the dimensions of sexism was considered in this study.

Research Design:
The survey research design was employed to investigate the influence of age, marital status and environment of living on the acquisition of sexist ideologies and behaviour. The overall design of the research incorporates the two independent groups’ design in order to achieve the objectives of the study. Thus, it was possible to compare research participants on their sexist ideologies and behaviour along the lines of their age (young / old), marital status (married / single) and environment of living (rural /urban) using the two independent groups’ design.

Research Instruments:
A questionnaire tapping research participants’ biographic information was used to determine participants’ age (in complete years), marital status and environment of living. Standardized psychological measure was also used to measure sexism (the dependent variable).The psychological measure of sexism is the Ambivalent Sexism Inventory (ASI). This measure is a 22 item self report measure developed by Glick and Fiske (1996) to measure sexist ideologies and attitudes of men and women and their relationships in contemporary society. ASI is a Likert measure with separate eleven items each for hostile and benevolent sexism scales.

Procedure
Copies of questionnaire containing ASI together with biographic information eliciting items were given to 960 respondents to complete. Of these 960 distributed copies, 779 were properly filled and these were analyzed for this study.

Results
From the table above, it is clear that rural and urban dwellers differ significantly in hostile sexism \[ t (777) = 3.21, P<.01 \]. However, no significant differences exist between the rural and urban dwellers in benevolent sexism. A comparison of the mean (\( \bar{x} \)) scores revealed that rural dwellers are more sexist in their ideologies and behaviour (\( \bar{x} = 36.75 \) and 39.58 respectively for hostile and benevolent sexism) than their urban dwelling counterparts.
Also, it can be seen from the table above that although the married individuals are more hostile in their sexist ideologies and behaviours ($\bar{x} = 36.09$) than their single counterparts [$t (744) = -2.23, P<.05$], no significant difference exists between the two categories in their benevolent sexism [$t (744) = -1.39, P > .05$]. It is shown, however, that the married individuals are more sexist in their ideologies and behaviour than their single counterparts ($\bar{x} = 36.09$ and $39.69$ respectively).

Table 1: Independent t-test table showing the effects of environment of living, marital status, and age on sexism.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>$\bar{X}$</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>SE</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>t</th>
<th>P</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
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<td>Hostile Sexism</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>512</td>
<td>34.54</td>
<td>9.12</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>777</td>
<td>3.21</td>
<td>&lt;.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>267</td>
<td>36.75</td>
<td>9.15</td>
<td>0.56</td>
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<tr>
<td>Benevolent Sexism</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>512</td>
<td>38.89</td>
<td>8.46</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>777</td>
<td>1.07</td>
<td>NS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
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<td>39.58</td>
<td>8.90</td>
<td>0.53</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hostile Sexism</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single</td>
<td>361</td>
<td>34.59</td>
<td>8.71</td>
<td>0.46</td>
<td>744</td>
<td>-2.23</td>
<td>&lt;.05</td>
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<tr>
<td>Married</td>
<td>385</td>
<td>36.09</td>
<td>9.65</td>
<td>0.49</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Benevolent Sexism</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Single</td>
<td>361</td>
<td>38.82</td>
<td>8.09</td>
<td>0.43</td>
<td>744</td>
<td>-1.39</td>
<td>NS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married</td>
<td>385</td>
<td>39.69</td>
<td>8.94</td>
<td>0.46</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hostile Sexism</td>
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<tr>
<td>35yrs &amp; below</td>
<td>427</td>
<td>34.33</td>
<td>8.78</td>
<td>0.43</td>
<td>777</td>
<td>-3.24</td>
<td>&lt;0.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Above 35yrs</td>
<td>352</td>
<td>36.47</td>
<td>9.53</td>
<td>0.51</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Benevolent Sexism</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35yrs &amp; above</td>
<td>427</td>
<td>38.70</td>
<td>8.29</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>777</td>
<td>-1.53</td>
<td>NS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Above 35yrs</td>
<td>352</td>
<td>39.65</td>
<td>8.99</td>
<td>0.48</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Results from the table also shows that young and old people differ significantly in their hostile sexist ideologies and behaviour \([t (777) = -3.24, P<.01]\). From a comparison of mean scores, it is shown that older people (i.e. aged above 35 years) are more hostile in their sexist ideologies and behaviour than their younger (i.e. below 35 years) counterparts whose mean scores is 34.33. No significant difference exists however, between young and old people in benevolent sexism \([t (777) = -1.53, P>.05]\).

**Discussion, Conclusion and Recommendation**

Klonoff and Landrine (1995) alluded to the fact that age, marital status, ethnicity etc. could predict sexist events and Lott (1987) submitted that single women may behave in assertive and independent manner that elicit gender discrimination. Results of this study, however, showed that married people are more hostile in their sexist ideologies and behaviour \((\bar{x} = 36.09)\) than their single counterparts \((\bar{x} = 34.59)\). This result suggests that the married people, while trying to assert their gender identities and ascribe gender roles will tend to be hostile to forestall a sudden usurpation of powers by the opposite sex; most especially in marriages. That the singles are less sexist may be due to changes that are continually occurring in the society in which case the unmarried people marry more lately nowadays than it was before. These singles may have learned to be less sexist in order that they could readily get partners to marry and settle down with. After all Elder (1995) argued that adaptations change with time, changing life circumstances and role expectations.

Leaper (1994) and Tenenbaum and Leaper (2002) argued that rural-urban living affects the process and acquisition of gender stereotypes. These scholars posited that children in the urban centers become more increasingly influenced by extra familiar factors (e.g. the media) and as such they do not adopt traditional beliefs but are largely egalitarian in their beliefs and orientation. Findings from this study confirm the positions of Leaper (1994) and Tenenbaum and Leaper (2002) with regard to hostile sexism because results of the study revealed that rural dwellers are more hostile in their sexist ideologies \((\bar{x} = 36.75)\) than their urban dwelling counterparts \((\bar{x} = 35.54)\).

With regard to benevolent sexism, however, no significant differences were found between the rural and their urban dwelling counterparts. These results suggest that irrespective of the environment of living, women, for example are regarded as nurturers and are expected to perform integrative, expressive and emotional roles while men are expected to be task oriented, dominant and concerned with status and independence. This position was alluded to by Aries (1996) in her reconsideration of the differences between men and women in interactions.

On the whole, both as posited by Leaper (1994) and Tenenbaum and Leaper (2002) and as is evident in the comparisons of mean scores \((\bar{x})\) of the two groups
in this study, where the rural dwellers’ scores on hostile and benevolent sexism are 36.75 and 39.58 respectively as against mean scores of 35.54 and 38.89 respectively for urban dwellers’ hostile and benevolent sexism, rural dwellers are more sexist in their ideologies and behaviour than their urban dwelling counterparts.

That the rural dwellers were more sexist can be understood on the basis of the possibility that they are more traditionalist in terms of gender roles and they are most likely to jealously guard and guide against the occurrence of role reversals as may be occasioned by western education and modernization.

That younger people (i.e. aged between 15-35 years) will be more sexist in their ideologies and behaviour was not confirmed in this study. Results from this study showed a significant difference in hostile sexist ideologies of young and old respondents; and no significant difference in the benevolent sexist ideologies of the groups.

A comparison of mean scores of both the old and young respondents showed that with regard to hostile sexism, older respondents (i.e. aged above 35 years old) are more sexist (\( \bar{x} = 36.43 \)) than their younger (i.e. below 35 years old) counterparts (\( \bar{x} = 34.33 \)).

This finding suggests that as one grows older, he acquires more knowledge and understanding of relationships between sexes. Such understanding may be more male chauvinistic and therefore tend to aggravate hostile sexism the more. One may be right to reason that sexist ideologies that were acquired in early adolescence may have become highly internalized and unchangeable at adulthood when peer influence becomes rather minimal if there were no structural changes to dissuade sexist ideologies and behaviour acquisition from adolescence.

Conclusively, results from this study have showed that age, marital status and environment of living significantly influence the process of acquisition of sexist ideologies and behaviour. It therefore becomes imperative that Nigeria government should make concerted efforts at ensuring the provision of an environment that will promote psychologically well-adjusted individuals who will be good examples to upcoming generations in terms of value judgments and moral rectitude.

References


The Face of Intimate Partner Violence in Bangladesh: Revealing Patterns from the Existing Literature

Syeda Tonima Hadi*

Abstract:

The magnitude of intimate partner violence in Bangladesh has driven many Bangladeshi researchers to examine this social problem since the early 80's. Although IPV is an issue both in marital and non-marital relationships, Bangladeshi researchers have focused mainly on marital relationships in exploring IPV. This paper reviews some important work by Bangladeshi researchers and notes a few patterns in the issues revealed by their work from rural vs. urban context. Notably, Bangladeshi researchers blame the patriarchal social, cultural, and family norms as the main factor behind IPV. Within this family system, the rural couples are influenced more by the religious beliefs, combined with patriarchal beliefs, when it comes to IPV. Although the urban couples have not received as much attention as the rural couples by researchers, evidence suggests equal prevalence of physical violence in both these contexts. The urban IPV victims, however, reveal suffering more in the form of psychological abuse compared to the rural victims. Micro-credit programs, effective in the rural context, are often observed to have positive consequences for the IPV victims. The overall help-seeking behavior of the IPV victims is similar both in urban and rural context. Regardless of where they are from, majority of the IPV victims prefer not to reveal their sufferings to anyone outside the families. IPV is considered to be private matter and thus dealt with by the members of the family.

Introduction

In Bangladesh, at almost all levels of the society, Intimate Partner Violence (IPV)¹ is recognized as a significant social problem and naturally has received due attention from researchers, social workers, and activists from non-government (NGO) and government organizations as well as the legislative bodies (Jahan & Islam, 1997; Bangladesh Women's Lawyers' Association [BNWLA], 2003; Jahan, 1994). Over the last two decades, violence against women has become one of the most visible and articulated social issues in Bangladesh (Jahan & Islam, 1997). Zaman (1999), a socialist feminist, explained that the transformation of violence against women from a non-issue to a social issue is a major contribution of feminist movement. She noted that women’s oppression in Bangladesh became real apparent at the time of liberation war during 1971 when Bangladeshis were fighting for their independence from Pakistan. During this period of war, over 30,000 women were raped. These women were labeled as ‘birangana’ (war heroines) by the then Bangladeshi Government, later used as a derogatory term against women. In the post-independence period, a period of lawlessness, indicated Zaman, violence against women continued by armed Bengali gangsters. These extreme victimizations of women brought together many middle class women to fight against the oppression. This new feminist consciousness was

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¹ One of the current working definitions of IPV in Bangladesh is: “any act of gender based violence that results in, or is likely to result in the physical, sexual or psychological harm or suffering of women, including threats of such acts, coercion, or arbitrary deprivation of liberty, whether occurring in public or private life.” (Khan, 2002, p. 13) Another definition by BNWLA (2003) identifies this violence as a violence perpetuated in the home or family environment against women of all economic strata by husbands, in-laws, and family members.
further promoted by two important developments at that time (Jahan, 1994; Zaman, 1999): 1) United Nation’s declaration of the Women’s Decade (1976-85) and 2) the publicity given by newspapers and various women’s rights groups to the abuse of young married women due to non-payment of dowry. Thus, the issue of spouse violence, mainly concentrating on dowry related violence, started being researched in the early 80s in Bangladesh (Islam, 1982).

With the attention received from social researchers and two decades of careful examination of IPV, the magnitude of this social problem draws more concern. A recent UNFPA State of the World Report (2000) noted that 47 percent of the women in Bangladesh testify to having been physically assaulted by a male partner (in Blanchet, 2001). Also, Blanchet in her research on marital violence indicated that Bangladesh ranked second on a list of twelve countries with high rate of violence against women. The contemporary studies, apart from revealing the magnitude of the prevalence of IPV in marital relationships, reveal some more patterns in the causes and consequences of IPV. The discussion that follows presents such commonly observed patterns in the Bangladeshi IPV studies.

Patriarchy - the Primary Factor behind IPV

Researchers in Bangladesh, like the U.S. feminist researchers, emphasizes upon the socio-economic and structural inequalities of women as the main factors behind IPV. Bangladesh is a society which is characterized with stark patriarchal domination of women. This domination is clearly visible through women’s positions in families and subsequently in the society. In Zaman’s (1999) words, the domination of women in Bangladeshi family context become apparent to us:

Ritualistic discrimination practices begin at the time of birth in Bangladesh. For example, the birth of a male child is announced through azan (Muslims’ call for prayer), welcoming the person to the Muslim community. In contrast no azan is given when a girl is born, and thus her arrival is not ritually recognized by the family and the community…In general boys are considered to be assets who remain in the family to carry out responsibilities in later life. In contrast, a daughter is likely to be regarded as a burden by her family. (Zaman, 1999, p. 41)

Typically, in Bangladeshi families women’s statuses are determined by their marital statuses through the husbands (Zaman, 1999). They are expected to give up any self-fulfilling ambitions and be submissive to the husband’s needs from the day they are married (Blanchet, 2001). Blanchet explained, “The selfless devotion of Bengali wives has been highly celebrated and women who excel in the role have been compared to goddesses. The myth hides the difficulty many women experience in forgetting their own needs and interests and it conceals the violence

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2 The first and most widely proposed explanation of IPV grew out of the U.S. violence against women movement in the early 1970s (Dutton & Bodnarchuk, 2005; Kilpatrick, 2004; Kanuha, 1996; Tjaden, 2004; NIJ,OJP, 1998; Yodanis, 2004). The feminist perspectives viewed patriarchy as the root cause of violence against women and therefore saw “male violence toward women” as the defined problem.
meted out to those who are unable to stand on the pedestal on which they have been placed." (p. 9) Women's vulnerability in families is enhanced/supported by Islamic laws. The precedence accorded to *sharia* (Islamic personal law) limit women's rights in every personal or family matter (Zaman, 1999; Jahan, 1994). Men are given the right to polygamy, unilateral divorce, double share of inheritance, and guardianship over wife and children.

The family law ordinance, amended in 1982, modified the *sharia* - personal laws to some extent, but women's socio-economic vulnerability and lack of knowledge about rights, prevent proper implementation of such laws (Jahan, 1994; Bhuyia, Sharmin, & Hanifi, 2003). Moreover, no matter how positively the law has been changed, religion still plays a vital role through the Islamic leaders in controlling people's rights. Till this day, in the rural areas of Bangladesh, religious leaders in their personal village courts (*shalish*) solve the family and community disputes, mostly in favor of men (Jahan, 1994, Blanchet, 2001). Thus, in Bangladesh socio-cultural-religious norms and values clearly reflect strong patriarchal views, which support domination of women at every level, starting within the family. Researchers propose the examination of these broader patriarchal values of the society reflecting within the day-to-day treatment of women in Bangladeshi families as factors behind IPV.

Jahan (1994), a prominent feminist researcher in Bangladesh, distinguished two causes that contribute to family violence: 1) the *general* context and 2) the *specific* context. She explained, "The general context of gender violence includes the socio-cultural norms, values and beliefs about family life, family structure and power hierarchy within family, gender being the most important variable." (p. 10) On the other hand, specific factors include, "class position, location, structure of the specific family, the dynamics of interactions of the couple, the personality and the world view of the aggressor and the victim, the immediate reasons leading to violent incident, the extent and volume of resources brought to the marriage by both." (p. 11) Jahan decided to emphasize on the general contextual factors more than the specifics, as according to her the specific factors originate from the general social context. In her words, "the wider socio-cultural and structural factors leading to gender violence in the family is emphasized more as such violence is regarded here mainly as a social problem and hence amenable to interventions through organized social action." (p.11) Jahan echoed the same feminist explanations behind IPV as many of her contemporaries did.

Within the general context (Jahan, 1994), a major determinant of women's position is her access to education and thus her economic independence. A prominent Bangladeshi IPV researcher, Ahmed (2005), found in her study that women's age and education is negatively related with their experience of violence within families. The younger the women enter a marital relationship the
less educated she is supposed to be and the more socio-economic vulnerabilities she is presumed to have. Moreover, with education women are empowered through social networking, increased self-confidence and capacity to use information and resources available in society. Thus, women’s socio-economic independence is considered a crucial determinant of her position in the power hierarchy within family, which has implications for the violence she will or will not face. Ahmed noted, “It is assumed that opening up economic opportunities through access to credit, awareness-raising activities, and skill-training for income-generating activities would enhance women’s self-esteem and status within households and change their relationships with their husbands, hence reduce domestic violence” (p. 96)

Although women’s education is receiving more importance in the recent times, not too long ago women’s education was the least of priorities in Bangladeshi families, especially in the rural context. Jahan in her study (1994) on rural respondents of married couples, found that the level of education of the abused women (the wives) were very low. Almost half of them had no formal education and some only knew to sign their names. A number of them were taught to recite the verses of the Holy Quran, which reflected the allegiance of the families of origin to traditional emphasis on teaching religious values to the children. The level of the husbands’ education, although not very high, reflected the parental concern with son’s education as most of them had reading and writing skills.

However, education alone cannot predict IPV in Bangladesh, since it has been found that urban women although having better educational qualifications, are almost equally vulnerable to IPV (ICDDR,B, 2007). The socio-economic dependence of women combined with the patriarchal values and beliefs of their families are crucial in women’s experience of IPV. The patriarchal views within family and its relation to women facing IPV are clearly reflected in a study conducted by Bhuiya, Sharmin, and Hanafi (2003). In their study on 190 rural women, Bhuiya et al. examined some attitudes behind wife-beating in Bangladeshi families. According to their findings, the women reported that they faced violence for the following reasons: wife questioned husband in day-to-day matters (29%), failure of wife to perform household work (11.5%) or take proper care of children (10%), not conforming to veil or other expected behavior (3%), refusal to bring money from natal family (3%), and husbands day-to-day frustrations (2%).

Moreover, false interpretations of Islamic values by religious leaders lead many Bangladeshi families to believe that women do not have the right to refuse sex with husbands at any point. This leads to many cases of marital rape or sexual abuse of women by their husbands (Hadi, 2000). Also, within Bangladeshi families women’s position is determined through her ability to produce male heir, and thus her inability to do so becomes a reason for increased violence. In a
study by Johnson and Das (2008), men who preferred to have more male children than equal number of male and female children, were about 30% more likely to report physical violence on their wives.

The findings of Jahan (1994), ICDDR,B (2007), Bhuiya et al. (2003), Hadi (2000), and Johnson and Das (2008) presented women's family status within the patriarchal Bangladeshi society. Women, in many families, are perceived as mere properties of men and so, under men's control. This huge gap in the power relations of men and women in Bangladesh is the primary factor associated with IPV.

Now that we have identified some major factors behind IPV, the broader social structural and cultural beliefs systems that reflect in the patriarchal and rigid religious values within the family systems of Bangladesh, we further our discussion with some specific data from IPV studies of Bangladesh, revealing some patterns of IPV in the rural vs. urban context.

Rural IPV Victims and Religious Dominance

The rural IPV victims are often subjected to religious decree, which is not common in urban IPV victims. Zaman (1999, p. 44, see “The case of Nurjahan, 1993, 1994) in her article presented the following case exemplifying the power of religious leaders in the rural Bangladesh, especially in case of sensitive issues related to IPV:

Nurjahan (age 21), from the village of Chatakchara in the Sylhet district, remarried after divorcing her first husband. Her parents arranged the second marriage. The local mullahs (religious leaders) alleged, however, that her second marriage was not performed in accordance with Islamic law. A local Shalish (informal village court) found the second marriage “un-Islamic” and sentenced Nurjahan and her husband to death by public stoning. According to the fatwa (religious opinion), Nurjahan was to be buried in the ground up to her chest and stoned publicly for allegedly having an adulterous relationship. Nurjahan survived the stoning but allegedly committed suicide in humiliation.

Fatwa, religious opinions of clergies based on their interpretations of the Koran, having no legal sanction in Bangladesh still holds great power to influence and add to the misery of women suffering in violent relationships, especially in rural areas (Zaman, 1999; Jahan, 1994). Although, legal efforts are increasingly attempting to address IPV issues in Bangladesh, for instance, the recent legal provisions for up to death penalty for violence against women (Bhuyia et al., 2003), the accessibility of legal services to rural women from poor economic background is questionable. Legal services are city based, lot of hassle to access, and also very costly. The deterrent provided by legal provisions is somewhat limited to extreme forms of violence or killing. Thus, Bhuyia et al. predicted that the law is unlikely to have a major impact on the reduction of IPV in the near future.
Micro-credit Programs and Involvement of Rural women

In the mid-70s credit programs were introduced in Bangladesh by nongovernmental organizations to rural women (Hadi, 2000). The type of programs included not only collateral-free credit for the rural women but also a package of support services, such as skill training, non-formal education, health and legal awareness programs etc. Hadi (2000) found negative association with participation in such credit program by rural women and the sexual violence they faced in families. He speculated that with the ability to bring home resources from the program participation reduces some of the poverty related stress and thus helps reducing some violence stemming from poverty. Similar findings by studies (Schuler, Hashemi, Riley, & Akhter, 1996; Hadi, 2005; Ahmed, 2005) among rural women respondents supported the negative association of IPV with micro-credit program participation. All these studies supported that with such participation, economic independence, and increased self-esteem empower women with the ability to negotiate their rights in the family and thus, the violence level decreases. It is not clear however, how urban married women’s participation in the labor force or their economic independence are associated with IPV. Not enough studies could be found in related field on urban married partners.

Equal Prevalence of Physical Violence

Although many of the Bangladeshi studies concentrate on ever-married poor rural women, there are studies that recruit both rural and urban women. Nevertheless, the comparison of the IPV within rural and urban partners is not clear. It is however revealed in a study by ICDDR, B (2007) that rural and urban women are almost equally physically abused by their husbands. The outcomes showed, 40% urban and 41% rural women had been physically abused and about 19% of the women in both areas experienced severe forms of physical violence (hit with a fist or object, kicked, dragged, beaten up, chocked, threatened or injured with a weapon or object of some kind).

Psychological Consequences of Violence within Urban Victims

Although in the Bangladeshi studies, rural IPV victims in marital relationships are often revealed to have been facing more physical violence (Ahmed, 2005; Bhuiya, Sharmin, & Hanifi, 2003; Blanchet, 2001; Hadi, 2000; Schuler, Hashemi, Riley, & Akhter, 1996), the urban victims of violence appeared to have more symptoms of psychological violence (Naved & Akhtar, 2007). Naved and Akhtar (2007) in their study on suicidal ideation among ever-married women in Bangladesh found that more urban women (14%) reported contemplating suicide compared to
rural women (11%). Among those who contemplated suicide, 26% urban women compared to 8% rural women actually attempted suicide. The outcomes of Naved and Akhtar also suggested that better spousal communication, women’s position in the family with age, and natal family support were negatively related to respondents’ suicidal ideation.

**Lack of Help-seeking to Formal Sources within Marital Relationships**

Revealing violence even in marital relationship is a matter of shame. A study conducted by Naved, Azim, Bhuiya, and Persson (2006) found that two-fifth of the ever-married women surveyed under their study experienced some sort of physical violence. Most of these abused women (75% of the moderately abused women in the urban areas and 86% in the rural areas) never told anyone about their experiences. There were many reasons why these women did not reveal their experiences, including fear of jeopardizing family honor, stigma that will damage women’s reputation, securing child future, fear of repercussions from husband, hopelessness, expectations that things would change, threat of murder, and belief that violence is husband’s right. Women only revealed violence in cases of severe injury, murder threats, and harm caused to children.

Among the women who told someone about their experiences, according to Naved et al. (2006), mostly revealed those to informal sources such as parents, siblings, or in-laws. Most of such informal sources might not even provide any sort of help to the victims. As Jahan (1994) indicated, “The prevailing nature of non-combatant family members generally is to try to overlook the ‘disturbance of peace’ in the family caused by the violent ones and to involve non-family members as little as possible.” Yoshika and Choi (2005) rightly pointed out that culture plays a vital role in how women experience, perceive, and deal with IPV in that given context. For instance, in a collectivist culture like Bangladesh, more emphasis is given on obedience and harmony within groups and families. IPV perceived as a factor negatively influencing family harmony, especially if non-family members are involved, is often ignored by Bangladeshi community. As a result, although there are limited provisions for women to go to formal institutions (health service or legal authorities) in Bangladesh, almost none of them go to those sources for the same reasons they do not reveal their experiences of abuse in the first place and also because they are rarely encouraged by the family member or friends or the community to seek help stepping outside the home.
Concluding Remarks

From the discussion so far, we have analyzed the Socio-cultural and familial context behind IPV in Bangladesh and within that context the IPV patterns and levels in rural and urban context have been explored. Some notable patterns suggest that although IPV is a sensitive issue which both rural and urban families tend to keep within the family. The overall conservative family system in Bangladesh makes women in marital relationships, both in rural and urban context, vulnerable to health risks and lack of legal redress. Moreover, the Islamic laws that limit the rights of women, especially rural women, are also a point of concern.

With the overwhelming amount of studies among the rural married women, the Bangladeshi urban women are often not adequately represented. But, there are evidences that urban married women go through more psychological and almost equal physical violence in their relationships. Thus, there should be more studies comparing the rural vs. urban women in order to explore many unanswered questions in the context of Bangladesh.

At the end, amidst all the patterns this paper has summarized from the Bangladeshi studies, it can be concluded that we have too many issues to deal with when it comes to IPV. A change is required, in the overall socio-economic and cultural context of Bangladesh. Religious sanctions need to be analyzed carefully in light of the existing laws of the country before they are implemented. There should be many support services available to women, but, more importantly, families should be willing enough to voice their IPV complaints. More studies should be conducted comparing the situations of rural and urban women, particularly with the aim to provide them appropriate services.

IPV has just been acknowledged as a social problem in our nation, thanks to the many social workers, activists, and researchers. But, their work has just begun. The magnitude and multiple complexities surrounding this problem needs more work of perhaps many more decades. Thus, this paper ends with the suggestion of many more research in the field of IPV from various different points of views and contexts within Bangladesh.

Reference


Rural Intelligence Gathering and the Challenges of Counter Insurgency: Views from the Niger Delta

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Abstract

The work is an analytical insight into the enterprise of intelligence gathering in the predominantly rural area of the Niger Delta region of Nigeria with a view to comprehensively manage the security threats arising from insurgency in the region.

The study makes modest attempts to analyse the nature, scope and dynamics of intelligence gathering emphasizing the need to liberalize the intelligence gathering business in rural Niger Delta to ensure pragmatism and effectiveness. This according to the study will significantly increase the effectiveness of intelligence for security management in the Niger Delta region which is currently threatening the very foundation of the country.

In arriving at the above position, the study relies on extensive ethnographic surveys and analysis of intelligence gathering, the Niger Delta crisis and of course the nature of the Nigeria State.

Finally, some useful recommendations are given to enhance security management through co-ordinated and result oriented intelligence gathering.

Introduction

Intelligence for all intent and purposes is not just information; rather it is a product of evaluated information valued for its currency and relevance rather than its detail or accuracy in contrast with data which typically refers to precise or particular information or ‘fact’, which typically refers to verified information. Sometimes called “active data” or “active intelligence”, these typically regard the current plans, decisions, and actions of people as these may have urgency or may otherwise be considered “valuable” from the point of view of the intelligence-gathering organization. Therefore, active intelligence is treated as a constantly mutable component, or variable, within a large equation of understanding the secret, covert, or otherwise private “intelligence” of an opponent, or competitor, to answer questions or obtain advance warning of events and movements deemed to be important or otherwise relevant (Wikipedia, 2002).

In the same vein, other attempts to define or explain the concept sees intelligence as the act of dealing with all things which should be known in advance of initiating a course of action (Clark, 1955). It has also been seen as the product resulting from the collection, processing, integration, analysis, evaluation and interpretation of available information concerning foreign countries or areas. (Warner, 2002). Furthermore, it has been seen as information and knowledge about an adversary obtained through observation, investigation, analysis and understanding (DOD, 2001:208). Some see intelligence simply and broadly as information about things that are foreign

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people, places, things, and events—needed by the government for the conduct of its functions (Brown –Aspin Report, 1996). Yet still, intelligence is “the knowledge and ideally, fore knowledge—sought by nations in response to external threats and to protect their vital interests, especially the well being of their own people (Kirk Patrick, 1997:365). Last but not the least is that intelligence is “information not publicly available or analysis based at least in part on such information, that has been prepared for policy makers or other actors inside the government (Council on Foreign Relations, 1996:8). Indeed the list of definitions and explanations is endless just like in all Social Science endeavours.

Although attempts to explain the concepts of intelligence are endless, certain fundamental observation are obvious. First, intelligence as evaluative information is targeted at external targets. Second, the information so gathered and evaluated are usually for the purpose of national or regional security by the state or the government of a country. These initial realities made intelligence fall strictly into the domains of the military and defence, and indeed espionage.

However, modern realities have made intelligence and intelligence gathering more comprehensive to cater for both external and internal threats. Consequently intelligence and intelligence gathering denotes the assemblage of credible information with quality analysis. It refers to the information that has been evaluated and from which conclusions have been drawn. It is data that will be used proactively for strategic and tactical purposes (Onovo, 2004). Intelligence therefore include, operational intelligence for planning and conducting campaigns and major operations, criminal intelligence – used for tracking down criminals and for crime detection, competitive intelligence – used by firms to outwit one another, and such other covert information gathering for the purpose of national or regional security. It will also include business security in a globalized and competitive world.

Furthermore, it is essential to evaluate the concept of “external threat” with regards to intelligence gathering especially when analysing criminal and business intelligence. This apparent contradiction is resolved when a criminal or suspect is seen as a deviant and ‘external’ to the basic norms of the society, and when a firm in competition poses potent threats to another in the same industry. It becomes obvious that these “external threats” within country approximates foreign threats to a state and should be subjected to intelligence gathering and analysis (see Ige, 2004; Onovo, ibid).

Modern intelligence gathering relies essentially on both human efforts and electronic gadgets. It transcends mere stealing of some one’s secret and it is operated strategically in a competitive environment and, more often than not, covertly. While the policy making process of any nation state is supposed to be transparent, the intelligence gathering process which significantly influences state policies is usually covert and discreet – this feature separates the process from mere snooping or conducting research.

In Nigeria, the impregnable threats of national insecurity accentuated by ethnic and religious pluralism and intolerance, economic down turn and unemployment worsened by exponential corruption by the ruling class, hang over effects of repressive military regimes and an unpredictable transitional democratic regime, the challenges of national security albeit intelligence gathering and management becomes quite daunting.

To further worsen the already bad situation is the Niger Delta crisis which started as resistance to years of avoidable neglect and oppression by the Nigerian state and multinational oil firms to a
full blown insurgency, militancy and, of course, criminality. Today, the region can compete with such crisis – ridden areas like Iraq, Afghanistan, Somalia and Gaza in Palestine. Huge revenues have been lost by the federal government, foreign nationals and high profile politicians and their relations have been abducted and kidnapped. Counter insurgency efforts of the federal government through the Joint Task Force (JTF) have led to deaths on both sides.

The apparent reign of terror which started in the rural areas especially, the flow stations and rigs, moved into the urban areas as criminal terror gangs that have currently retreated again back into the Creeks and rural areas in the face of substantial effective counter attacks by the federal forces and other such security agencies. The region, currently approximate a classical case of insurgency with all the challenges and characters of insurgencies all over the world.

Today, we have a volatile region at the verge of a military implosion with devastating consequences if not properly managed. It is against this back drop that this work seeks to explore ways of evolving an effective rural intelligence gathering to contain the emerging security threats in the region. In the course of this task, efforts will be made to evaluate the intelligence fiasco which has led to marginal success so far in combating the insurgency and militancy in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria.

Purpose

The work will essentially look at intelligence gathering at the rural level where the threats of insurgency, militancy and violence tend to be increasing. More so, the study will attempt to look at the possibility of new techniques that could be deployed for intelligence gathering with a view to tackling the depending insecurity in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria.

Methodology

The study will rely on secondary sources from journals, books, government reports Gazettes, world fact books, archives and ethnographic surveys of events around the intelligence communities and the Nigerian polity to the extent to which they have promoted or assisted or otherwise, in curbing the threatening insecurity in the Niger Delta.

In choosing data from secondary sources, efforts was made to organized them in a randomized manner and in ways that approximates the simple random sampling method of sampling and data analysis. Although by its very nature, intelligence gathering is largely a subjective venture, efforts shall be made to ensure a reasonable level of objectivity, validity and reliability. However, whatever short comings that may arise should be seen as part of the researchers’ oversight and should be accepted as such, especially if it does not alter the form, relevance and validity of the study.

The Nature and Dynamics of Rural Intelligence Gathering in Counterinsurgency

Conventional intelligence gathering as a state policy predisposes a well articulated model aimed at ensuring reliability of intelligence sources. Basic intelligence gathering consists of collecting information and observation from open or clandestine sources. The information or observation is patiently and painstakingly analysed, evaluated, compared and integrated with other information and existing intelligence to arrive at conclusions relevant to the needs of the policy makers.
Trends and anomalies from the collected intelligence are processed carefully and if the incoming intelligence confirms pre-existing intelligence, the concept of ‘connecting the dots’ is achieved. If however, the incoming intelligence is at sharp variance with existing intelligence, the risk of “increased chatter” becomes obvious (Lowenthal, 2003; Holt, 1995; Williams and Deletant, 2001; Onovo, 2004).

To reduce this risk, incoming intelligence is usually cross checked through; ‘cross cueing’ in a style that approximates a fusion to ascertain the validity and reliability of the intelligence so gathered. In advanced democracies, tacit interoperability and collaboration is employed by the intelligence community in a multi-level arrangement (Onovo, ibid.). The above suppositions do not preclude the possibility of subjectively and manipulating intelligence to suit the whims and caprices of the operators of state power as exemplified by the United States and their regrettable war in Iraq under the apparently dubious claims of yet to be discovered Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) (Goodman, 2006).

In the same vein, effort to significantly raise the validity and quality of intelligence has led to be somewhat scientific information gathering technique, which applied to intelligence gathering can greatly assist in ensuring precision, entropy, accuracy, objectivity and completeness. These have been subjected to complex mathematical computation as shown below in multi level, collaborative intelligence management.

Consequently, in military or strategic intelligence, the concept of estimators ensures that through observations of the battle space, sensors and other information sources generate estimates for the information elements deemed critical to the decision. The uncertainty associated with the information elements is expressed in terms of probability distributions, the means of which are estimates of the ground truth values. This reality promotes the relevance of parameter estimation theory to assess the quality of the information available to the decision maker and examine how the quality of the estimates contributes to knowledge, and to reduce bias and, to ensure precision.

To test the precision and entropy, the amount of information available in a probability density is measured in terms of information entropy, denoted by $H(x)$. Information entropy is always a function of the distribution variance, and therefore we use it as the basis for developing a knowledge function. For example the bi-variate normal distribution is $H(x,y) = \log/\Sigma$, where $\Sigma$ is the co-variance matrix from this, we create a precision based knowledge function as

$$K(x,y)=1-e[\log(\Sigma/\Sigma)\max - H(x,y)]$$

Where $/\Sigma/ \max$ is the determinant of the co-variance matrix that produces the maximum uncertainty.

Based on precision above, $K(x,y)$ reflects the level of understanding within a cluster of decision makers (i.e., two nodes of the network forming a cluster) who share two pieces of information with a multivariate normal distribution, the change in knowledge is given by

$$\Delta K = \frac{P^2_{12} - 2\sigma_{12}^2}{\sigma_1^2 \max \sigma_2^2 \max}$$
While P1, 2 is the correlation co-efficient, $\sigma^2$ and $\sigma^2_2$ are the variances and $\sigma^2_1 \text{max } \sigma^2_2 \text{max}$ are the maximum or bounding values on the variance for the two pieces of information.

In testing the accuracy of information, the concepts of precision and bias are involved because they are the critical elements that are close to the ground truth. In general, if 'a' is an information element whose value $x$ is unknown with probability distribution $f(x)$ and mean is representing ground truth, then the bias associated with the estimate of the mean is $b=\mathbb{E}(\hat{\mu})-\mu$, where $\mu$ is the estimate of the mean. Because accuracy consists of both bias and precision, we therefore need a metric that combines both. One such metric is the mean square error (MSE) $\mathbb{E}[(\hat{\mu})^2 - \mu^2] = b^2 = \sigma^2$, where $\sigma^2$ is the variance of $\mu$. The MSE is an extremely useful metric because it includes both accuracy in the total and precision accounts for random errors.

This is further illustrated by continuing with the bivariate normal case. It is assumed that Bayesian updating is used to refine the location estimate based on the arriving reports. Bayesian updating is not always unbiased, and therefore there is the need to introduce systematic error. In this case the bias is the Euclidean-distance between the Bayesian estimate and the ground truth value.

$$b = \sqrt{[(\hat{\mu}_x - \mu_x)^2 + (\hat{\mu}_y - \mu_y)^2]}$$

By analogy with the MSE, the accuracy of the estimate is defined as $D(x,y)= b^2 / \Sigma$. The effects of bias, precision and accuracy in knowledge is consequently demonstrated by replacing the distribution variance with the MSE, or accuracy measure $D(x,y)$ in the knowledge function. Therefore, for the multivariate normal case, we get a modified knowledge function of the form:

$$Km(x) = 1 - b^2 / \Sigma \text{ max}$$

The maximum mean square error is a combination of the maximum bias and the maximum precision and represents the maximum in accuracy. Because bias and precision are independent, the maximum occurs when both are maximized, or $(b^2 + \Sigma/\text{max}) = b^2 \text{max} + \Sigma/\text{max}$. Like the variance, a suitable upper bound for bias can be found by searching for the largest possible measurement error, the censors or sources might produce.

Finally, in addition to precision and accuracy, collaboration also affects the completeness of the critical information elements available within a cluster—for the entire network, it is assumed that there are a maximum of $N$ critical information elements. For a given cluster, the total number required is $C \leq N$.

However, at a given time, $t$, only $n \leq C$ might be available. If waiting for additional reports is not possible, a decision maker would be required to take a decision without benefit of complete information. Depending on his/her experience and other contextual information, the decision maker may be able to infer some likely less reliable value for the missing information. For now, we assume that it the value of completeness at cluster $i$ is

$X_i(n) = n/\xi_c$.

where $\xi$ is a shaping factor. For values of $\xi <1$, the curve is caved downwards; and for $\xi = 1$, it is a straight line. The selection of the appropriate value depends on the consequences associated
with being forced to take decision with incomplete information as well as the commander’s attitude to risk (see Perry and Moffat, 2004).

While the above illustrations demonstrate a high level of scientific approach to intelligence gathering, sharing and management, it has not insulated this craft from the impregnable threat of failure which the craft seeks to overcome from the very beginning. It did not equally remove it from the grabs of the state where the executive could manipulate it for unreasonable national security or for some covert economic interests.

More so, in rural and domestic intelligence gathering and more often in counterinsurgency, certain contradictions must be properly synthesized to achieve success. More often than not there is blurred line that separates resistance groups from domestic terrorist groups. What unites them no matter the viewpoint is the need for national security to be guaranteed. In the same vein, the constant politicization of resistance movements and sometimes its alignment with leftist’s politics tend to complicate intelligence gathering from within domestic resistance, insurgent albeit terrorist groups.

The aforesaid challenges are accentuated by the apparently increasing ‘ruralisation’ of conflicts the world over. From Afghanistan, to Iraq, from Southern Lebanon, through Somalia and from Uganda, Congo DRC to the Niger Delta region, resistance groups flourish to press home grievances and repression from the State. Most of their activities tend to concentrate in the rural areas where rugged maintains/hills, dangerous valleys, complex creeks, streams, and swamps provide safe havens for these groups. In North West Pakistan especially the Waziristan areas, natural caves and mountains are natural protection for these groups even as they blend perfectly with the rural populace, often indoctrinating the poor ruralities in their radical ideologies. In the same vein, fighting insurgency has been one of the most strategic puzzles in military science. This because, the battle is usually political waged among a cooperative or acquiescent populace in order for a group of outsiders to take over (or at least undermine) the government of a nation. This is a contest of wills, uneven resources, chosen initiatives, covert political and paramilitary operations, and sometimes very public measures. (Smith, 2006).

This scenario present daunting challenges to conventional intelligence gathering techniques and should also provide useful leads since; there is reasonable air of familiarity which can be exploited in the intelligence gathering process. However, this advantage is usually overlooked by the intelligence community apparently out of superiority complex or the feeling of knowing too much professionally to rely on local intelligence gathering process. Because this is the case, resistance, insurgent or domestic terrorist groups depend on having access to the right intelligence – knowing where, when, and how to stage an operation for best effect. The quality of the intelligence available to a resistance, insurgent or domestic terrorist group can mean the difference or failure. When a group is able to gather good intelligence, it can more readily identify potential targets, locate their vulnerabilities and understand the security measures intended to protect them. The right kinds of intelligence can also provide information to guide insurgent and domestic terrorist groups strategy development and information and inform them on how law enforcement and intelligence organizations and the public are reacting and responding to the groups’ operations. Intelligence in this situation can be obtained incidentally- “filtering up without a real system” (Bell, 1998b:472) - but such opportunist intelligence is not sufficient for consistence effectiveness.
Consequently, many groups make intelligence gathering a very high priority and develop specific learning processes and systems for this purpose. In preparing for specific operations, many insurgent and domestic terrorist groups have standardized approaches for ensuring that the right information is gathered. The intelligence processes involves most times identifies attractive targets and discerning vulnerabilities that can be exploited. Reflecting the common needs of clandestine organizations planning violent operations groups, such as MEND and such allied resistance groups in the Niger Delta defy common methods of collecting pre-attack intelligence including video and photographic surveillance (see white paper: the Jamaal Islamiya Arrests and the Threats of Terrorism, 2003:28; Gunatatna, 2002: 189-189, Leader and Probst, 2003:42).

The Niger Delta Security Realities

The story of the Niger Delta is a story of conflicts based on invasions and nationalistic counter attacks for self preservation spanning over two centuries. Over time, the only changing variables on the part of the invaders are the claims and motives which are not far from the imperialist expansion of the capitalist Europe into the colonies of Africa. The clashes between the marauding Europeans and the Itsekiris, Akassas, Nembes. Benis Opobos and all such other capitalist – oriented conflicts sowed the seed for a security threatened Niger Delta region (Mitte, 2007; Nte and Eke, 2008).

Colonialism against the wishes of the indigenes people further consolidated the security situation as Nigeria became a country of people with endemic mistrust amongst the federating peoples. More so, the nature of post-colonial Nigeria created a tiny ruling class comprising mainly representatives of the majority ethnic groups who at times taint their grip on political power with religious sentiments, all in a bid to consolidate their hold on power and by extension, the appropriation of state resources. This created a situation of a colony within a neo-colonial state with an interesting disdainful underestimation of the powers of the minorities. Protests from the minorities including the Niger Delta region were treated with levity and inconsequential to Nigeria’s national security (see Asiodu, 1980; Nte, 2005). Strategically, this attitude which is essentially a colonial hang over created insecurity in the Niger Delta region where wealth are rapaciously generated and siphoned by the central government in concert with the oil and gas multinationals in the region.

The events of the early 1990s at Umuechem, the renewed environmental consciousness stirred up by the late Kenule Saro Wiwa and the subsequent repressive military regimes in Nigeria gave teeth to an implosive security situation in the Niger Delta region, which had hitherto been resilient. Indeed the last straw that broke the camel’s back was the creation of an army of political thugs by politician to capture power, sustain power, and silence all forms of opposition. This act of omission or commission opened up a new chapter in Niger Delta’s political history. Ill-gotten wealth became copious; youths were armed, used and dumped by their political masters paving way for arms proliferation in the region as these young men retained the arms as their only means of survival. (Okaba and Nte, 2008).

Armed and frustrated youths seized the opportunity of genuine agitations to unleash illegal and criminal military expeditions to assert their relevance, make illegal wealth through pipeline vandalization, bunkering, kidnappings and hostage taking and all forms of domestic terrorist’s acts which the region is currently facing. The interesting dimension to the Niger Delta security
crisis is a near perfect fusion of genuine agitations, resistance and criminally in one whole violent social movement.

Furthermore, because of the criminal nature of Nigeria politics, the entire security quagmire in the region remains one of the most complex comparable only to those of Iraq, Afghanistan and Somalia. Intelligence gathering in this kind of scenario becomes an uphill task. The intelligence community and the information intelligence networks are usually infiltrated thereby significantly compromising the quality, credibility and reliability of intelligence. In the region today, politicians, religious leaders, security operatives all have been known to be accomplices in kidnappings operation for economic gains, further complicating genuine attempts to tackle the threats of insecurity in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria. The net effect of this unmitigated instability is that the national economy is bleeding profusely, foreign exchange from oil and gas is dipping as oil production has been out by over 30% with clear signs of further cuts.

Globally, all prices are soaring and threatening western economies especially that of the United State of America. The precariousness of energy supplies to the US prompted the setting up of AFRICOM and the Gulf of Guinea security initiative to protect off shores oil fields and guarantee steady flow of oil to the United States (Nte and Eke, forthcoming). This security arrangement, lofty as it seems may end up aggravating the security situation because similar military arrangements in the past tend to be counterproductive in the of use formal tactical and strategic solutions to solve informal problems. Post modern wars have not been able to subdue informal wars as they have succeeded in surviving scientific sophistication and precision to the consternation of strategic experts (see Nte, forthcoming).

The current crisis in the Niger Delta is therefore better understood as a long drawn out historical process, itself, propelled and animated by complex international economic and political forces, which the local inhabitants have been trying to comprehend, resist or turn to their own advantage for the past two centuries, with varying degrees of success. It is therefore a story of power an resistance to it, of alien and imposed authority and attempts to indegenise it and make it accountable to the people it purports to rule, an epic tale of ordinary men and women struggling against vastly more superior forces that are threatening to take bread from their mouths and destroy their way of life (Okonta, 2006:6). The various transmutations of this crisis are part of the internal contradictions of the political economy of the Nigeria State. For the political class in the Niger Delta, it is a potent road to class suicide as the spate of kidnappings, attacks tend to be shifting to the them in the face of mass exodus of expatriates from a significantly hostage economy.

The Challenge and Prospects of Security Management in Niger Delta Region

Located in one of the largest wetlands in the world, the Niger Delta region of Nigeria is currently one of the most insecure places on the face of the earth. The insecurity stems mainly from the insurgent activities of the militants and the counter insurgency operatives of the Joint Task Force for the Nigeria Armed Forces and the Police.

So far, only minimal success can be said to have been achieved with regards to quelling the conflict in the region. Part of the reason for the failure is poor intelligence gathering management and intelligence compromise by the intelligence community operating in the region. History demonstrates that insurgents armed in the conventional weapons (the gun, the bomb, the rocket) can sustain violent campaigns against state military over periods of time. Victory against such
insurgents rarely, comes from destruction of troops on a battlefield and, as they typically blend
into the population, the “enemy” is often more difficult to find than to neutralize (Jackson 2007). In
many conflicts resilient and adoptive insurgent, using hide-and-seek- tactics have checked
nations and, in some case, have prevented them from achieving foreign policy goal ad the current
Niger Delta insurgents have achieved so far.

The current situation has endangered both the economy of the nation and the lives of the
inhabitants of the region in ways that, there tend to be a general consensus with regards to the
management of security threats in the region. From series of political solutions advocated and
implemented such as the Niger Delta Development Master Plan, the Ogomudia report, the Niger
Delta Development Commission, the selection of Dr Goodluck Jonathan from the region to be
Vice President of the Republic and the recent creation of the Ministry of Niger Delta to
complement the development agencies in the region. However, it should be noted that these
efforts have not stemmed the tide of violence as militant groups have consolidated through the
illegal supply of arms and the territorial control and appropriation of proceeds from oil illegal
bunkering and siphoning of condensates –a low grade fuel from Petroleum waste products. They
are therefore currently armed, bold and wealthy, and from all indication capable of sustained
confrontation with the Nigerian armed forces.

In the same vein, because of the serious level of affinity between these militants who were
hitherto political foot soldiers to the politicians, it has been pretty difficult to embark on an effective
counter insurgency efforts against the militants. To most analysts, these militants can still be
mobilized for violence against the opposition during future elections by the politicians and this
explains some level of ‘soft approach’ by the political class in the region. The result of this is a
highly disorganized counter insurgency by the central and regional governments. Intelligence
gathering in this case is also ineffective because of the inherent sabotage, leakage and failure.

Be that as it may, it must be noted that any intelligence effort must be able to collect information.
However, the nature of the counter intelligence mission challenges traditional ways of thinking
about intelligence collection, especially against members of a comparatively small insurgent
organization within a larger civilian population (Jackson, 2007). Intelligence collection is generally
thought of as a distinct acuity in which intelligence specific tools are used to gather data for
analysis and application.

The counter insurgency intelligence mission has elements that fit readily within this view. For
example, developing and exploiting informers or infiltrators clearly requires the same
compartmentalization and protection that is standard intelligence practice. Informers within the
Niger Delta militants will be of critical importance in the counter insurgency effort and will play an
important part in the intelligence fight.

It is therefore instructive to note that intelligence collection efforts must diverge considerably from
“classical intelligence methods”. Limits to the available of clandestine sources mean that other
collection tools must be developed and applied the effectiveness of intelligence community with
other parts of the security force and even with the general population in the area affected by the
insurgency.

In the face of the foregoing, the following can assist to buoy up the intelligence collection effort in
the Niger Delta. Firstly, low grade intelligence can be collected. This is because, while infiltrators
or informers can provide valuable data, they might not be available in sufficient number for
success in a broad counter insurgency effort to complement for high grade intelligence that such sources provide in large amounts. Low grade information that when added together in large quantities, can provide a useful picture of insurgent operations (Bowlan, 1998). This low grade intelligence can be provided by all the security forces which should think the people first for intelligence and which relies on the public opinion’s drive for intelligence collection (Barzilay, 1975; Maguire, 1990).

Secondly, there must be specialized operations and units which in addition to broad efforts to collect intelligence can employ specialized tools; such as security check points, snap check points, observation posts, covert surveillance post (complemented by soldiers patrolling undercover) etc organized to collect intelligence for effective counter insurgency (Charters, 1997, Dewar 1985, Dillon, 1991).

Thirdly, there is need for flexible technical means which will rely on such gadgets as live-feed television, sophisticated photographic electronic devices, phone taps, hidden cameras, listening devices, infrared detection systems, motion detectors and technologies that intercept communication traffic. (Barzilay, 1933, Adams et.al., 1988). While these conventional intelligence gathering measures will greatly assist in mitigating security threats in the region which is conveniently be classified as insurgency, it is needful to add that the following are equally needed for effective rural intelligence gathering in the Niger Delta region. Firstly, there should be rapid socio-economic development of the region. Secondly, there should be sustained legal agitation for a fair share of the nation's resources. Thirdly, Education should be provided freely and compulsorily in the region. While these are preventive measures, the following are some of the remedial measures. Firstly, a rural intelligence gathering posts should be established in all the local council head quarters. Its membership should include; traditional rulers, women and youth leaders, retired security officers and respected community leaders. Secondly, there should be a weekly internal intelligence council meeting to appraise the security situation and to report same to the appropriate authorities. Thirdly, the proposed neighbour hood watch should be implemented based on sound legal frame work and controlled to guard against the transmutation of the groups into new forms of domestic terror groups or manipulated by politicians to intimidate or harass the citizens. These modest contributions will help improve the intelligence gathering efforts in rural Niger Delta.

Conclusion

This piece has strived to provide a general insight into the business of intelligence gathering and the challenges of gathering intelligence in rural environments and from insurgent groups. In doing this the study employed an evaluation of the Niger Delta region of Nigeria and the monumental security challenges caused by the military in the region. Presently, the security threats have impacted on world’s global oil prices threatened the nation’s revenues and created terror in the region.

The region is currently militarized in a counter insurgency mission which so far has achieved marginal success. Part of this unimpressive performance stems from poor intelligence gathering and management efforts. In the same, vein, the political nature of the crisis and nature of Nigeria post colonial state has also undermined security management in the Niger Delta.
In the face of these realities, the work has strongly suggested measures that could be taken to improve the efficiency of intelligence gathering and by extension the security management in the region. While these suggestions are not intended to be supplanted with the legitimate responsibility to ensure justice and equity in the Niger Delta region, it is also the responsibility of the Nigerian State to effectively combat the raging insurgency in the Niger Delta region through result oriented intelligence gathering and administration.

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Poverty: A Potent Conflict Escalator in Nigeria’s Niger Delta

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Abstract

In recent years, the Niger Delta region of Nigeria has been characterized by escalating conflicts which several scholars have attributed to widespread absolute poverty that is prevalent in the region. This study was therefore designed to examine poverty as a potent conflict escalator in Eleme local government area of River State, a Niger Delta community. The quantitative research design, which made use of survey method, was employed to accomplish the purpose of the study. A structured questionnaire was used to obtain data for the study from 516 respondents drawn from multi-stage sampling procedures. Results obtained revealed that multiple factors are responsible for poverty in Niger Delta: neglect (91%), inadequate social amenities (80%), environmental degradation through oil exploration (68%), and mass unemployment (62%). Furthermore, the results showed that poverty is a major cause of conflict in the region (87%) and that conflict, in turn, has severe consequences on Niger Delta. These consequences include wanton destruction of lives and property (86%), impoverishment of the people or poverty (75%), investment – unfriendliness (75%), disruption or halting of oil exploration (71%), and kidnapping or killing of expatriates and top oil company workers (82%). The study recommended that the problems of poverty and conflicts in Niger Delta can be drastically reduced or mitigated through effective poverty alleviation programmes, involvement of the Niger Delta people in their development strategies, creation of employment opportunities, human capital development, adequate infrastructural development, and involvement of the academic community in researches on Niger Delta problems.

Introduction

Nigeria’s Niger Delta occupies a strategic position in the world economy because of its rich and abundant natural resources. It is the centre of oil and gas production in Nigeria, according Nigeria the status of a leading oil producing country the world over. However, despite it abundant resources and oil wealth, poverty is widespread in the Niger Delta region. The situation has worsened since the late 1990s, to the extent that communities in the region are considered among the poorest in the country. A World Bank report (2007:2) indicated that over 70 percent of the populations are poor, with 35 percent living in absolute poverty.

The Niger Delta region is considered as the most exploited and marginalized region in the country, owing to the fact that the major resources upon which the nation’s economy depends is got from the region without corresponding infrastructural and human development to show for it. The oil multinationals such as SHELL, EXXON Mobil, Chevron, Texaco, AGIP, and ELF, among others, that carry out oil exploration and exploitation in the region damage its eco-system and degrade the environment which is the economic livelihood of the people but fail to provide adequate infrastructure to the host communities. Rural infrastructure in the Niger Delta region has long been neglected and investments in health, education and other indices of real development have largely been focused on the cities outside the region. Consequently, a significant population of the Niger Delta region has extremely limited access to improved living conditions (including basic education, health care services, and safe drinking water). Limited infrastructural development perpetuates poverty in the region.

In the Niger Delta, there has been escalating conflicts caused by perceived exploitation and environmental degradation caused by the multinational oil companies. High incidences of

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unemployment, poverty and exclusion of the people from their wealth, have sparked off youth violence and restiveness (Akpan, 2005:162). As the population of the region continues to increase and mount pressure on diminishing resources, escalating environmental problems further threaten food production and the rural economy. Thus, agriculture and other economic activities of the people (such as fishing) suffer greatly, thereby increasing the poverty of the people.

Poverty and violence or conflicts are often closely interconnected. Ethnic tensions continue to brew in different communities in the Niger Delta and in turn lead to escalating poverty. The move towards political liberalization has allowed militants in the region to express their frustration in an increasing violent ways. Thousands have died over the past years in clashes between different ethnic groups and separatist bids for independence. A vigorous trade in stolen oil (illegal oil bunkering) has led to a serious breakdown of law and order in the region. Also, a number of acts of sabotage, including kidnapping, hostage taking and vandalism, has been carried out against the multinational oil companies by groups (militants) seeking a greater share of the oil resources for the development of Niger Delta (and perhaps for their selfish interest). The poverty of the Niger Delta region has been triggered by marginalization, neglect, environmental degradation, alienation of the host communities, inadequate infrastructural development, and unemployment. Then, the increasing height of poverty has sparked off different forms of conflicts including youth violence and restiveness, kidnapping, hostage taking, militancy, and communal clash, thereby threatening security in the region and the country as a whole. This paper therefore examines the relationship between poverty and conflicts in the Niger Delta region. To achieve this successfully, we shall be guided by the following research questions:

(i) What are the factors responsible for the alarming rate of poverty in the Niger Delta region?
(ii) What is the relationship between poverty and conflict in the region?
(iii) What are the effects of conflict in the region?
(iv) How can poverty and conflict in the region be reduced or combated?

Conceptual Issues on Poverty and Conflict

Sociologists conceive of poverty in either absolute or relative terms. Absolute poverty means the inability to provide the minimum requirements of life. It refers to a minimum level of subsistence. By contrast, relative poverty means the inability to maintain what ones society regards as a decent standard of living. It is a floating standard of deprivation by which people at the bottom of a society, whatsoever their lifestyles, are judged to be disadvantaged in comparison with the nation as a whole (Brinkerhoff and White 1988:239; Schaefer 2001:213). Mostly, poverty is viewed in relative terms rather than in absolute terms. Lebergott (1975:34) has succinctly pointed out that people are poor only in terms that they are below average. Viewing poverty in relative terms by most people does not negate the fact that absolute poverty exists. In the Niger Delta region, for instance, a lot of households are absolutely poor; they cannot even afford their daily bread.

One commonly used measure of relative poverty is the federal or national government’s poverty line, a money income figure adjusted annually to reflect the consumption requirements of families based on their size and composition. The poverty line serves as an official definition of which people are poor. In 1998, for example, any family of four with a combined income of $16,660 or less fell below the poverty line. This definition determines which individuals and families will be eligible for certain government benefits (Dalaker 1999:17). The World Bank in 1990 established two poverty lines:

(i) Any household in 1985 whose purchasing power parity (PPP) was below $275 was considered “extremely poor,” while

(ii) Those below $370 were classified as “poor”
In 1997, the vision 2010 Committee established for Nigeria a poverty line of #3,290 per head per month at 1997 current prices, implying that an average family size of five required #13,462 per month to live above the poverty line (Eminue, 2005:507).

Current thinking increasingly views poverty as multidimensional and as involving both income and non-income factors. Thus, poverty refers to a general condition of deprivation which comprises social inferiority, isolation, physical weakness, vulnerability, powerlessness and humiliation. This means that the poor have no access to basic needs of life such as food, clothing, decent shelter, and are unable to meet social and economic obligations (Chambers, 1995:4). Using the “basic needs approach,” the World Bank sees poverty as a situation in which people are unable to fulfill their basic needs as well as lack of control over resources, lack of education and skills, poor health, malnutrition, lack of shelter, poor access to water and sanitation, vulnerability to shocks, violence and crime, and the lack of political freedom and voice. These definitions suggest the vicious circle of poverty: the nucleus of poverty is low income which engenders poor diet, poor health, indecent shelter, low or poor education, low skills, limited job opportunities, and low productivity which bring the household or the individual back to poor income (Dipholo, 2002:65).

Poverty could be expressed in three ways: by the inability of an economic unit (an individual or a family) to satisfy his or its basic needs due to lack of adequate income or property; by lack of opportunities, for the economic unit to generate adequate income with which the basic needs could be met; and by lack of means to change this condition of lack (Repink 1994:46). One simple truth lies behind different approaches to the explanation of poverty: the poor are poor because they do not have good jobs. The crux of poverty is lack of jobs that provide steady work at a decent wage, a wage that would enable people to support themselves and their families (Brinkerhoff & White 1988:242). Implicit in the notion is that poverty reflects glaring defects in the economy and manifests itself in the forms of mass penury, mass unemployment, and poor welfare services, among other things. The poverty of the Niger Delta region is evident because of mass unemployment and the inability of the oil multinationals and the Nigerian government to provide adequate welfare services and infrastructural and human development.

Conflict
Conflict is a struggle over scarce resources that are not regulated by shared rules; it may include attempts to neutralize, eliminate, or destroy one’s rival (Coser, 1956:8). It is a product of antagonistic interest between two or more opposing forces or groups within the society and may manifest itself on a continuum range from early warning signals to violent crises or wars (Alamika, 2000:4). It arises when actors or groups are dissatisfied with existing social conditions and thus seek the same goal or mutually incompatible goals (Agha, 2004:66). Conflict could be viewed as a triangle with structure, attitudes and behavior at its vertices. The structure embodies the conflict situation, the parties and their conflicting interests, values and goals; attitudes refer to the tendency for the parties to see conflict from their own point of view, to identify with one side, and to diminish the concerns of others; behavior include gestures and communications which can convey either a hostile or a conciliatory intent (Galtung, 1996:47).

A certain amount of conflict is always present in society. It may even have positive consequences. When a group experiences conflict with outsiders, group members often draw closer together and achieve a greater sense of solidarity (Coser, 1956:8; Simmel, 1955:31). When it takes place within a group, however, conflict creates divisiveness rather than solidarity. The result is usually destruction of the group or significant change in internal relationships (Brinkerhoff & White 1988:88). The above definitions have undeniable truth in them: conflict is inevitable in every social relationship; it occurs between individuals, families, communities, states, countries, organizations or groups at varying degrees; the chief causal factor of conflict is incompatible interest; and conflict can be associative or dissociative.

The Poverty – Conflict Nexus
Scholars disagree on the specific connection between poverty and conflict while one camp thinks that poverty causes conflict, the other camp argues that the reverse is the case. This really
makes the connection between poverty and conflict to seem blurring. Draman (2003:4) has argued that poverty is both a cause and a consequence of conflict. Thus, the relationship is two-way. With the end of the Cold War; the relationship between poverty and conflict has become more evident as the World Bank Group Data and Statistics (2003:4) demonstrates in 2002, of 63 low income countries, 38 were located in Sub-Saharan Africa and were associated with conflict.

Those who dismiss the poverty-conflict nexus generally argue that poverty may lead to conflict when other factors are present. To them, poverty is not a sufficient condition for the occurrence of conflict. According to Nelson (1998), the precise links between economic grievances and ethnic conflict are exclusive, variable, and strongly conditioned by a wide range of non-economic factors. Justine (2002:39) argues that the effort to establish a link between poverty and conflict has been undermined by the difficult and, sometimes, inappropriate country comparisons based on cross-sectional analyses.

However, there are a number of theoretical and empirical studies establishing the poverty-conflict link. These studies show that poverty, inequality, scarcity of resources and external economic factors all combine to have a destabilizing impact on political stability. These studies can be classified into psychological and economic arguments. The frustration aggressive and the relative deprivation theories suggest that individuals become aggressive when there are obstacles (perceived and real) to their success in life (Van de Gore et al, 1996:8). The relative deprivation theory stresses that sometimes people perceive themselves to be deprived relative to others. It is the perception that creates the inter-group hostility, rather than the actual relative status of the two groups (Draman, 2003:6). These theories are relevant in explaining the poverty-conflict nexus in Nigeria’s Niger Delta. Poor governance and unequal access to and distribution of economic resources ensure that some segments of the population aim to have better opportunities than others. This inevitably leads to persistence of poverty amongst certain groups with very serious consequences for social stability. The economic argument has it that conflicts in Africa and most of the developing countries are fuelled by greed rather than grievance. Also, rebels in most conflict situations do not advance coherent political agenda but are only interested in looting the resources of the state and enriching themselves and their disciples (Berbal & Malone 2000:97). This means that such rebel movements in Africa as the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), Movement Patriotic de la Cote d’Ivoire (MPCI), Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta of Nigeria (MEND) and Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone (RUF) are more business executives than political leaders. Such economic argument cannot explain the poverty-conflict nexus very well because of its assumption that governments in Africa are responsible and democratic.

There is no denying the fact that conflict in turn has negative impact on poverty. During severe conflicts, there is always wanton destruction of lives and property (private and public). Such environments become investment-unfriendly and thus poverty becomes the order. However, a number of methodological issues obstruct the effort to demonstrate that poverty is a consequence of conflict, Luckham, et al (2001:7) has identified three key problems. First, there is lack of reliable data. When war begins, data is usually one of the first casualties. And eventually because of insecurity and uncertainty, data collection becomes difficult. Second, even where data are available, they tend to be aggregate countrywide figures, but since most conflicts are localized, such data may not provide the desegregation required to analyze the economic and social costs of conflict. Third, there is the problem of establishing the appropriate counter facts: what would have been the situation without conflict? How different are countries torn by war from those without conflict? In spite of these difficulties, many analysts have clearly demonstrated how conflict is linked to poverty in a variety of ways (See Etuk, 2004:139; Akpan, 2005:162; Onwuka, 2005:266, Iheriohanma 2007:175).

Methodology
The study was carried out in Eleme local government area of Rivers State, a Niger Delta Community. Eleme was purposively selected because of the dominance of poverty and conflicts
Survey study design was used in carrying out the investigation. The sample consisted of 516 respondents. The multi-stage sampling technique was used for the selection of respondents. The first stage was random selection of seven (7) primary sampling units (PSUs) out of the fourteen (14) towns that make up Eleme. The second stage was the selection of respondents in each of the PSUs through the stratified sampling method (the community was stratified into clusters of dwelling units). Finally, the systematic sampling technique was used to select housing units at an interval of five (5). The three (3) members of the household who were above seventeen (17) years of age were selected as the actual respondents for the study. Thus, one hundred and seventy-two (172) households were selected and three (3) members used as respondents in each, resulting in the 516 respondents used in the study.

A structured questionnaire was used to obtain information for the study. The researchers and seven research assistants administered and retrieved the questionnaire to the respondents in their residences. One month was spent on the administration and the retrieval of the questionnaire. Percentage of frequencies and student’s t-statistics were used as analytical tools for the study.

Result and Discussion
A total of 91% of the respondents agreed that the wealth generated from oil production in the Niger Delta region is not used for the development of the region. This response generated a mean score of 4.43 and standard deviation of 0.66. The effect of not using the wealth from the region for its development is evident from the response about the availability of social amenities in the region. About 80% of the respondents agreed that basic social amenities are not adequate to cater for the needs of the people. This response has a mean score of 3.36 on a scale of 5.00 and standard deviation of 1.06. About 68% of the respondents agreed that environmental degradation resulting from oil exploration in the region is a causal factor of poverty in the region. Similarly, 62% of the respondents were of the opinion that mass unemployment in the region perpetuates poverty. This response had a mean score of 3.66 on a scale of 5.00, standard deviation of 0.83 and coefficient of variation of 23%. (See Tables 1 and 2 for the above data).

Implicit in the above responses is the fact that the respondents are strongly unfavourably disposed towards their social relationships with the multinational oil companies in the Niger Delta region. In other words, the corporate social responsibility of the oil multinationals is not enough to lift the people of Niger Delta out of poverty.

In all, 98% of the respondents agreed that people protest when they are poor, hungry and unemployed. The mean score for this response is 4.48 on a maximum scale of 5.00 and standard deviation of 0.65. 69% of the respondents were of the opinion that unemployed youths easily indulge in militancy. This response has a mean score of 3.63 on a scale of 5.00 and coefficient of variation of 28%. Poverty has been identified as a major cause of conflict in the

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<th>S/No</th>
<th>Factors</th>
<th>Responses (%)</th>
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<td></td>
<td>Wealth from oil exploration in the region is not used to develop the region (Neglect).</td>
<td>A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Basic social amenities are inadequate.</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Environmental degradation results in poverty.</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>High unemployment in the region perpetuates poverty.</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td></td>
<td>62</td>
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Table 1: Factors responsible for poverty in Niger Delta
Table 2: Mean scores of responses on factors responsible for poverty in Niger Delta

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<tr>
<th>S/No</th>
<th>Factors</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Standard Deviation</th>
<th>Coeff. of Var. %</th>
<th>T-Stat. Calculated value</th>
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<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Wealth from oil exploration in the region is not used to develop the region.</td>
<td>4.43</td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>25.49</td>
<td>1.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Basic social amenities are inadequate.</td>
<td>4.11</td>
<td>0.78</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>17.99</td>
<td>1.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Environmental degradation results in poverty.</td>
<td>3.71</td>
<td>1.07</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>9.86</td>
<td>1.99</td>
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<td>4.</td>
<td>High unemployment in the region perpetuates poverty.</td>
<td>3.66</td>
<td>0.83</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>8.18</td>
<td>1.99</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Niger Delta region by 57% of the respondents. This response has a mean score of 4.06 on a scale of 5.00, standard deviation of 0.62, and coefficient of variance of 15%. In the view of 94% of the respondents, economic empowerment of the Niger Delta people will ensure drastic reduction in conflict and violence in the region. The mean score and standard deviation of this response are 4.30 and 0.62 respectively. These data show that there is a strong relationship between people’s socio-economic conditions and their tendency to be involved in conflicts (See Tables 3 and 4). In other words, poor people are more likely to indulge in conflicts and violence so as to change their situation than their wealthy counterparts. This is evident in the Niger Delta region; those who were favoured by the activities of the oil multinationals (politicians and chiefs, among few others) were not bothered about the poor conditions of the masses, but the

Table 3: Relationship between poverty and conflict

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S/No</th>
<th>Factors</th>
<th>Responses (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>People protest and destroy social order when they are poor, hungry and unemployed.</td>
<td>98 1 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Unemployed youths easily join militants.</td>
<td>69 16 15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Poverty is a major cause of conflict in Niger Delta.</td>
<td>87 12 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Economic empowerment of the Niger Delta people will ensure drastic reduction in conflict and violence in the region.</td>
<td>94 5 1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 4: Mean scores of responses on the relationship between poverty and conflict

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S/No</th>
<th>Factors</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Standard Deviation</th>
<th>Coeff. of Var. %</th>
<th>Calculated value</th>
<th>Table value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>People protest and destroy social order when they are poor, hungry and unemployed.</td>
<td>4.48</td>
<td>0.65</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>27.42</td>
<td>1.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Unemployed youths easily join militants.</td>
<td>3.63</td>
<td>1.01</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>10.07</td>
<td>1.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Poverty is a major cause of conflict in the Niger Delta.</td>
<td>4.06</td>
<td>0.62</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>22.65</td>
<td>1.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Economic empowerment of the Niger Delta people will ensure drastic reduction in conflict and violence in the region.</td>
<td>4.30</td>
<td>0.62</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>26.13</td>
<td>1.99</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

About 88% of the respondents agreed that conflict in the Niger Delta has led to wanton destruction of lives and property. This response has a mean score of 4.33, standard deviation of 0.76 and coefficient of variation of 18%. The inference here is that armed conflict has been an extensive occurrence in the Niger Delta region. Also, a large percentage of the respondents (75%) agreed that conflict impoverishes the people and that conflict makes the region investment-unfriendly. About 71% of the respondents were of the opinion that oil exploration is usually halted during intense conflict.

Table 5: Effect of conflict in Niger Delta

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S/No</th>
<th>Factors</th>
<th>Responses (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>Conflict in the Niger Delta region has led to wanton destruction of lives and property</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>Conflict impoverishes the people.</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.</td>
<td>Conflict makes Niger Delta investment unfriendly.</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.</td>
<td>Oil exploration is usually halted during intense conflict.</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.</td>
<td>Expatriates and top oil company workers are usually kidnapped, taken hostage, or killed during intense crises.</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 6: Mean scores of responses on the effects of conflict in Niger Delta

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S/No</th>
<th>Factors</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Standard Deviation</th>
<th>Coeff. of Var. (%)</th>
<th>Calculated value</th>
<th>Table value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>Conflict in the Niger Delta region has led to wanton destruction of lives and property.</td>
<td>4.33</td>
<td>0.76</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>21.67</td>
<td>1.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>Conflict impoverishes the people.</td>
<td>4.00</td>
<td>0.97</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>13.48</td>
<td>1.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.</td>
<td>Conflict makes Niger Delta investment unfriendly.</td>
<td>3.82</td>
<td>0.89</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>12.93</td>
<td>1.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.</td>
<td>Oil exploration is usually halted during intense conflict. Expatriates and top oil company workers are usually kidnapped, taken hostage, or killed during intense crises.</td>
<td>2.86</td>
<td>1.03</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>11.51</td>
<td>1.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.</td>
<td></td>
<td>4.18</td>
<td>1.04</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>14.08</td>
<td>1.99</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This response has a mean score of 3.86, standard deviation of 1.03 and coefficient of variation of 27%. Also, 88% of the respondents agreed that conflict in the Niger Delta region has led to wanton destruction of lives and property. The mean score for this response is 4.18, standard deviation 1.04, and coefficient of variation 25%. The foregone are an indication that conflict has severe consequences in Niger Delta (See Tables 5 and 6 for details).

Conclusion and Recommendations

This study has examined the relationship between poverty and conflict in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria. The analysis shows that multiple factors are responsible for poverty in the region. These include: neglect (91%), inadequate social amenities (50%), environmental degradation (68%), and unemployment (62%). The poverty of the Niger Delta region is strengthened by the inability of the oil multinationals and Nigerian government to prioritize and treat poverty as a major social problem of the region. The analysis further shows that poverty is a major cause of conflict in the region (87%). In turn, conflict in the Niger Delta region wanton destruction of lives and property (88%), impoverishes the people (75%), makes Niger Delta investment-unfriendly (75%), halts oil exploration (71%), and leads to kidnapping or killing of expatriates and top oil company workers (82%). The findings of this study support the argument of Draman (2003:4); that poverty is both a cause and a consequence of conflict. While poverty causes conflict, conflict further perpetuates poverty. Thus, the relationship between poverty and conflict in the Niger Delta region is two-way.

Poverty and conflict are complex social problems in the Nigeria’s Niger Delta. However, they can be reduced through drastic measures to improve the living conditions of the people of Niger Delta. We therefore recommend the followings as panacea to the problems of poverty and conflict in the region:

(i) Poverty alleviation or reduction programmes should be vigorously and truly pursued in the region. True poverty alleviation in this case should target the reduction of the poverty of the poor and not enriching the rich to the detriment of the poor.

(ii) Participation of the Niger Delta people in the planning and implementation of their development strategies should be prioritized and strengthened,
(iii) The economy of the Niger Delta should be diversified. Non-oil sectors of the Niger Delta economy, such as agriculture, fishing, and small scale industries, should be given prior attention by the Nigerian government, oil multinationals, and other development agencies. This will help to diversify people’s interest on the benefits of oil exploration, thereby reducing conflicts in the region.

(iv) Government and oil multinationals should create mass employment opportunities in the region. When the people are working, they will find less time to indulge in activities that threatens the security of the Niger Delta region.

(v) Human capital development should be prioritized by the government and the oil multinationals. Skill acquisition programmes and scholarship opportunities should be provided for the youths of Niger Delta.

(vi) Government and oil multinationals should provide adequate social amenities in Niger Delta. This will definitely stimulate economic growth and development scale enterprises in the region and improve the people’s living standards.

(vii) More importantly, adequate support should be given to scholars or agencies to carry out researches on issues of poverty and conflicts in Niger Delta.

References
The Effect of Livestock Pilferage on Household Poverty in Developing Countries: Theoretical Evidence from Nigeria

Olatomide Waheed Olowa*

Abstract

While livestock pilferages in Nigeria primarily caused by increased poverty among unemployed workers and drought stricken crop farmers, its effect on stock farmers can be devastating. It reduces the affected households' own consumption of both the "returns" on their wealth, e.g. milk and wool, and of wealth itself, e.g. meat and hides. In addition, it restricts their ability to sell their returns and wealth in the market place and use the proceeds to acquire other food and non-food products. Some policy implications are also highlighted.

1. Introduction

Pilfering is petty theft or stealing in small quantities of variable items (Olubanjo, 1995). It is a predatory crime in which a person deliberately takes someone else's property in a clever way on a continuous basis with a view of making the owner unsuspecting of the loss (Laseinde, 1994, Olusanya, et al, 1995). Pilfering could be in different forms based on the place of occurrence, the extent of occurrence, the background and status of the pilferers and the extent on the victims (Torimiro, 1995).

Livestock contributes significantly to the livelihoods of people living in the rural areas of developing countries (Cornelis et al, 2001). Nigeria is no exception. Majority of stock owners reside in the rural areas, while only few stay in urban areas. Since poverty is a rural phenomenon it is also not totally wrong to say that rural people earn substantial proportion of their incomes from livestock, while the opposite is true of the rich. This suggests that stock pilferage presents a much more serious poverty related challenge for the poor than for the rich. Stock theft has been a problem in Nigeria for some decades but it has recently intensified, this triggered the first National seminar on pilferage in agriculture at the then Ogun State University, Nigeria November 13th-16th, 1995. The outcome of this seminar revealed that livestock theft has become a national crisis in Nigeria. Stock theft occurs more frequently than other types of crime. Possible causes of pilfering include protests from aggrieved relation or workers, hunger or economic depression, attempt to seek compensation or redress for some perceived loses like underpayment, wage deduction or deprived rest or a tendency for wilful damage, unemployment, laziness, greed, bad company, in-born traits/kleptomania. The major reason behind the increase in livestock pilferage thus appears to be poverty (Olusanya et al, 1995; Olubanjo, 1995; Anonguku et al, 2008). It was also pointed out that some of the stock pilfering cases involve a high degree of organization coupled with sound financial and asset backing. For example, there are instances where trucks were used to move the stolen animals. Stock pilferage is also encouraged by the ease with which stolen animals can be traded. Stolen stock is sold without the necessary documentation to individuals for immediate use in communal celebrations as well as funerals and to butchers at very low prices (Nasir, 1995). Whilst stock theft is mainly caused by poverty, as indicated above, it also has the effect of impoverishing livestock farmers. It thus involves a redistribution of poverty

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insofar as those who commit stock pilfering enrich themselves (illegally) in the process. Most instances of crime naturally have a similar redistributive effect, irrespective of whether the losers and beneficiaries are rich and poor people respectively, or whether they are all either relatively poor or relatively rich. In this paper we focus on the economic effects of livestock theft on rural households in Nigeria. Apart from section 1 which is introductory, Section 2 discusses the role of agriculture, particularly livestock farming, in boosting the livelihoods of relatively poor rural households. Section 3 uses a simple microeconomic model to illustrate the impact of livestock theft on household poverty, and gives several examples from the Nigerian experience. Section 4 raises a few policy implications, while section 5 concludes.

2. The Role of Livestock in Household Poverty

There are different ways in which livestock farming contributes to the livelihoods of poor households. It can be a significant source of nourishment and protection against nature as households consume (part of) the returns on their livestock wealth, e.g. milk and its derivative products, wool and mohair. They may also replenish part of their wealth to satisfy their need for meat and hides. Part of the returns on stock wealth, and livestock itself, may also be sold for cash that can be used to purchase other food and non-food goods and services. The standard household utility function can thus be extended as follows:

\[ U = U( C^o, F^t, N^t, W) \]  

Where \( C^o \) represents goods consumed from the household’s own resources, or wealth; \( F^t \) and \( N^t \) are the quantities consumed of food and non-food products acquired in the market place; and \( W \) is a measure of the household’s wealth. \( W \) is assumed to enter the utility function both as an independent variable and indirectly through its impact on other independent variables, as we show below. Own consumption, \( C^o \) can be further specified as follows:

\[ C^o = \pi W + W(1 - \sigma) = (\pi + 1 - \sigma) W \]  

Where \( \pi \) is that part of the return to household wealth used for own consumption (e.g. milk, wool, vegetables and fruit); and \( \sigma \) is the percentage of the prevailing wealth used for consumption purposes (e.g. meat and hides). Whereas \( \pi W \) does not reduce household wealth, \( \sigma W \) evidently does. The corresponding budget constraint is given by:

\[ Y + \alpha W + W(1 - \beta) = Y + (\alpha + 1 - \beta) W = P^t F^t + P^n N^t \]  

where \( Y \) is wage income and transfers; \( \alpha \) is that part of the return on household wealth that is sold in the market place, with the total return being \( (\pi + \alpha)W \); \( \beta \) is the percentage of wealth sold in the market place; and \( P^t \) and \( P^n \) are the market prices of food and non-food products. As implied by equation [2], the value added by livestock farming goes beyond the consumption and sale of animal products. In some part of Nigeria, cow dung is used as fuel for cooking and warming the house, particularly by poor households residing in the rural areas. Horses, donkeys and mules are used for transport in the northern part of Nigeria. This is particularly the case in the Sudan Sahel Zone where modern transportation goes pari passu with traditional ones. Similarly, livestock provides non-human power to poor farmers who cannot afford modern means of ploughing their fields (Otte et al, 2005). Stocks, especially cattle, are used for ploughing the fields and livestock manure is still very much used to enhance soil fertility by farmers who cannot afford expensive chemical fertilizers. Utilising livestock in this manner enables farmers to plant vegetables, fruit and other food products, thus diversifying their farming activities.

Livestock is also a source of both physical and human capital investment. Households may sell livestock and use the proceeds to build or extend a dwelling and acquire capital equipment for
farming purposes. Livestock can thus be viewed as a capital asset that provides insurance to poor households who for various reasons do not have access to formal financial services. Finally, there is evidence showing that the proceeds from selling livestock are often used to pay for health expenses (Holmann et al, 2005) and school fees (Cornelis et al, 2001). In these instances livestock clearly serves as a source of human capital investment.

3. The impact of Stock Theft on Household Poverty

From the previous section on the role of livestock in the livelihoods of rural households it is quite apparent that stock theft could affect the poor very adversely. Adding a conventional budget line to the above model,

\[
F_t = \frac{Y + (\alpha + 1 - \beta)W}{P_f - P_n N_t / P_f}
\]  

[4]

A stock theft will reduce wealth from \(W_2\) to \(W_1\) in Figure 1 below, and also the monetary return on wealth from \(\alpha W_2\) to \(\alpha W_1\), shifting the budget line inwards as indicated. Similarly, the fall in utility from \(U_2\) to \(U_0\) is caused by both the loss of wealth and the drop in own food consumption from \(C_2\) to \(C_1\).

Livestock pilfering has recently become one of the major factors resulting in poverty in the rural areas of Nigeria (Anonguku, 2008). The entire wealth and livelihood of a household could be wiped out in one attack and experience has shown that chances of recovery are quite minimal, if not non-existent (Olubanjo, 1995). In terms of the above model, a loss of livestock through theft means that the affected household loses the benefits from own consumption as well as the earnings that it used to get from the sale of animal products, livestock and other agricultural products partly produced by livestock. Many of the relatively rich households have been impoverished as thieves have stolen a large part of their livestock. This suggests that stock theft affects poor households in two different ways: firstly, poor households lose the stock that they have to the thieves; and secondly, they are no longer able to accumulate livestock by hiring out their services to the rich as the thieves have also left many of the formerly rich with none.
(Anonguku et al, 2008) show that rural-urban migration has increased as affected household members have to find jobs. This is in response to the increase in agricultural unemployment, which is attributable to stock theft among other factors. As a result of stock theft many children leave school early because parents cannot afford to pay for their schooling. Due to the implementation of the policy of free primary education in Nigeria, which now covers the entire primary school system, every Nigerian child can complete primary education. The problem is at the secondary, high school and University levels, where government subsidizes a significant portion of the school fees but parents still bear a relatively substantial share of the total costs. Those whose parents cannot afford paying for their secondary and high school education are not able to benefit from this opportunity. The free primary education could have certain benefits. As argued by Black (2004) it may provide children with the necessary skills to get employment in the informal sector or to carry out essential household activities when they leave school. Informal employment could reduce poverty levels to a certain extent. Those working in the informal sector are highly likely to be better off compared to those who are not employed at all. However, some of the unemployed may not be able to enter the informal sector. Kingdon and Knight (2004) contend that entry into the informal sector by the poor could be deterred by such factors as a lack of skills, experience and the necessary capital, and in some cases a lack of government support in providing infrastructure and preventing crime. The implication is that a lack of resources to educate children due to stock pilferage could have the effect that affected children cannot get employed at all.

The loss of income is likely to increase the consumption of inferior as opposed to normal goods by the affected household. Coupled with the loss of milk and meat for family consumption due to stock theft, such a loss of income implies deterioration in the nutritional status of the household. This could in turn affect the health status of the household. According to Black (2004), the household’s level of health may deteriorate as a result of an exogenous decrease in household income and thus consumption, coupled with the simultaneous Substitution of low for high nutrition food and other necessities. Holmann et al (2005) point out that households sometimes sell their animals to raise money to pay medical bills of sick household members. This is relevant to HIV/AIDS stricken developing countries and Nigeria in particular. Booysen (2002) finds that in South Africa, to cope with increased medical care expenses, HIV/AIDS affected households use their savings following the depletion of which they resort to selling their assets. When the assets are finished they borrow from friends and relatives. It makes sense to assume that the same thing would apply to poor rural households in Nigeria, with relatively low income and where the main assets are livestock. Wason and Hall (2004) indicate that very few households in the rural areas of Nigeria own physical assets such as radios, televisions, stoves, agricultural equipment and vehicles. Thus stock pilferage leaves these households with limited strategies for coping with the effects of the HIV/AIDS pandemic.

4. Policy Implications
Evidence suggests that livestock pilfering is largely caused by poverty, e.g. among the unemployed and drought stricken crop farmers, while we have argued that it also has the effect of (further) impoverishing stock farmers. Policy should thus ideally be directed at both the cause(s) of the problem and its consequences. Attacking the source of the problem calls for an intensification of government’s efforts at addressing the problem of poverty in the country as a whole. Rapid and sustainable growth that could lead to increased employment is essential for poverty reduction and its ultimate eradication. But this is clearly easier said than done, especially in a time of prolonged recession. Sustained economic growth can at best be viewed as a long term objective. Thus some short to medium term measures for enabling households to survive
should be considered. These could include increased state unemployment benefits and other forms of social security; an increase in the subsidy on secondary, high school and university education, or providing it freely to the poor through an appropriate means tested system; and better policing of the rural areas generally and livestock farming in particular. Given Nigeria’s level of economic development, however, such measures are bound to be too costly and difficult if not impossible to implement. A case may thus be made for securing foreign aid aimed specifically at eliminating livestock pilfering in Nigeria.

5. Conclusion

The literature indicates that livestock plays a significant role in the livelihoods of the rural poor in developing countries. Thus stock pilfering, which has taken on alarming proportions in Nigeria, has exacerbated the problem of poverty, especially among rural households. The effects of stock pilfering on households include an enforced cut back in the own consumption of and the sale of animal products – defined here as (part of) the returns to household wealth. It also removes their ability to sell livestock itself and use the proceeds to acquire other food and non-food products or expand and diversify their farming activities. Alarmingly, livestock pilfering often prevents household heads from investing in the human capital development of their children, and may also result in a deterioration of the household’s nutritional status adding to health expenses. The loss of livestock limits the coping strategies available to HIV/AIDS affected households.

References


Recent Marriage patterns in South Africa 1996-2007

M.E. Palamuleni*

Abstract

Marriages in South Africa, like elsewhere in the world, are undergoing changes. Early and universal marriages if they ever existed are no longer the norm. The aim of this study is to examine emerging marriage patterns in South Africa using the 1996 and 2001 population censuses and the 2007 Community Survey. The study indicates that mean age at marriage for men and women in South Africa is high and increasing and more men and women are staying single or not marrying at all. The percent of the population in the childbearing age groups that has never married has declined from 55% in 1996 to 54% in 2001. The percentage of married women has decreased from 35% to 30% whereas the percentage living together has increased from 6% to 9% over the same period. These changes are attributed to social and economic conditions such as increasing education levels, employment of women, urbanisation and modernisation. More studies should be undertaken in order to understand the causes and consequences of the changing marriage patterns in South Africa.

Introduction

In traditional societies, marriage marks the beginning of socially sanctioned exposure to pregnancy and sets the course of subsequent childbearing. In Sub-Saharan Africa marriage has been described as early and universal (van de Walle, 1968; Lesthaeghe, 1971). Early and virtually continuous marriage throughout a woman's reproductive years is also maintained by several related marriage customs including polygyny, levirate marriage, and bride wealth or bride price (van de Walle, 1968; Goldman and Pebley, 1986). However, this is not the case with marriage patterns in South Africa where some researchers have lamented, “marriage has lost its value” (Chimere-Dan, 1999).

Furthermore, in most traditional societies, the age at first marriage, especially age of a woman at first marriage, is one of the most important proximate determinants of the aggregate level of fertility (Bongaarts and Potter, 1983). Age at first marriage is also an important indicator of women's status (Safilios-Rothschild, 1986). Early entry into marriage exposes women to the risks of early childbearing and may also impede improvements in their educational, economic, and social status. Where young females marry older males, large age gaps between spouses could contribute to marginalization of females and low status of women. Other things being equal, in societies where childbearing takes place within marriage, an increase in the age at marriage also means minimizing first births to teenage mothers, which is known to carry a higher risk for the mother and child (Hobcraft, 1987). Because of its role in determining the fertility level, improving women's and children's health, and enhancing women's status, increasing age at first marriage has been an important domain of public policy-making (Henry and Piotrow, 1979). Most countries, for example, have imposed legal sanctions on age at first marriage. The identification of factors affecting the age at marriage is therefore of paramount interest for multiple reasons.

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South Africa has experienced very rapid socioeconomic development in recent years. This has contributed to a significant improvement in the status of women through expanding education and participation in the modernized sectors of the labour force. Such changes have affected attitudes towards marriage and divorce, patterns of marriage, marital dissolution and remarriage, and the roles and status of women in the family.

This paper examines the changes in the incidence of marriage patterns in South Africa and suggests reasons for the observed trends.

Sources of Data

Data on the population by age, sex, and marital status collected in the South African censuses of 1996 and 2001 are used in this study (Statistics South Africa, 1999, 2002). The 1996 and 2001 population censuses are the first and second censuses to be conducted in the country after the first democratic elections in 1994. However, given the high costs associated with population censuses, quinquennial censuses have been abandoned in favour of decennial ones, as is the case in most developing countries. This means that the next census is expected in October 2011.

In order not to have a gap in the availability of demographic data in the country a community survey was conducted in 2007 (Statistics South Africa, 2008). Both censuses and the community survey collected information on current marital status that is useful in the analysis of marriage pattern.

Data on current marital status should be considered in the context of potential problems raised for data collection by differences in the definition of marriage in various South African cultures.

There are differences between marital status tabulations based on the 1996 and 2001 censuses that make comparisons between the two data sets difficult. First, the 1996 census collected information on “Divorced/separated” whereas the 2001 census and 2007 Community Survey separated the two marital status categories. Given that divorced and separated as responses to the question on marital status were combined in 1996 may result in an exaggerated picture of marital dissolution since all separations may not end in divorce. Second, the 2001 census included a category on “polygamous marriage” in a bid to collect information on polygyny. Surprisingly no females reported that they are in polygamous marriage. This may stem from the fact that those female respondents may not be aware of the fact that their husbands have other wives apart from themselves. Also, it is possible that female respondents are reluctant to reveal that they are sharing their husbands.

Evaluation of age and sex distributions has been done elsewhere (Palamuleni, 2003; Simelane, 2002). Thus, no attempt has been made in this study to correct the reported ages. It suffices to mention here that, generally speaking, the South African age-sex data are of good quality and fairly acceptable and compared favourably to data from countries in Sub-Saharan Africa.
Methods of Analysis

Among the measures used to describe marriage patterns in South Africa are percentages single, married, divorced and separated and widowed. These percentages were calculated for each five-year age group for women and men in the childbearing age range, 15 to 49, and for all women and men aged above the age 15 years.

The measure of the timing of family formation used in this analysis is singulate mean age at marriage (SMAM). SMAM refers to the mean number of years spent in the single (never married) state by those in the hypothetical cohort who marry by age 50 (Hajnal, 1953). The SMAM values are computed by applying Hajnal's technique to data obtained from the 1996 and 2001 censuses for each of South Africa's nine provinces and four population groups (African, Coloured, Asian and White). Udjo (2002) calculated SMAM for South Africa and its provinces using the 1996 census. SMAM is based on the assumption that no marriage occurs before age 15 or after age 50 and that sex only occurs in marriage. These assumptions can be misleading in societies where abstinence until marriage is not adhered to, because high estimates of SMAM are likely to be estimated thus portraying a false picture. In the sense that it will be saying that exposure to sexual intercourse begins at a late stage though it starts earlier in actual fact but SMAM fails to capture this.

Results

In this section, results of the analyses described in the preceding section are presented and discussed. These are presented in terms of proportion never married and SMAAM, proportion married; proportion living together; proportion separated/divorced and proportion widowed.

Proportion Never Married

The percentages of never married women and men obtained from the 1996 and 2001 censuses and the 2007 Community Survey are presented in Table 1 and illustrated in Figures 1 and 2. As expected, for both males and females population never married declines with increasing age. For South Africa as a whole, the proportion of never married women have increased for all age groups with exception of age group 15-19 where it has slightly decreased.

Overall for women of reproductive age group the proportion of never married has increased from 54% in 1996 to 55% in 2001 and 58% in 2007. These figures indicate that more than half of women in childbearing are never married.

For population groups, the proportions never married indicate that there is a high proportion of single at all ages among Africans and colored as opposed to Asians and Whites. For the male population aged 15 years and over, proportion never married is highest among the African population (57.5 %), followed by Coloured (46.3%), then Asian (35.0%) and lowest among the White population (27.8%). Similar proportion for the female population are 50.5%, 41.4%, 27.9% and 21.4% respectively.
In addition, there are high proportions single at young ages and relatively low proportions single at middle and old ages.

At provincial level, the male population indicates a high proportion of never married in Kwazulu-Natal, Eastern Cape, Limpopo, Mpumalanga, North West, Northern Cape, Gauteng, Free State and Western Cape. The female population indicates a high proportion of never married in Kwazulu-Natal, North West, Mpumalanga, Eastern Cape, Limpopo, Northern Cape, Gauteng, Western Cape and Free State.

### Table 1: Percentage Never Married by Age Group for South Africa 1996, 2001 and 2007

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>15-19</td>
<td>96.6</td>
<td>95.6</td>
<td>96.9</td>
<td>99.2</td>
<td>98.1</td>
<td>99.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-24</td>
<td>77.7</td>
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</table>

With exception for 2001 censuses, the proportion never married for males are higher for all age groups below 40 years whereas the opposite is true for age groups above 40.
For South Africa as a whole, the proportion of never married women have increased for all age groups with exception of age group 15-19 where it has slightly decreased.
The percentage never married for age group 20-24 for female population increased from 77.7% in 1996 to 79% in 2001 and 82.5% in 2007. For the male population, the percentage never married for age group 20-24 increased from 91.4% in 1996 to 91.9% in 2001 and 93.9% in 2007.

The changes may imply that both men and women in South Africa are postponing the onset of marriage.

**Age at First Marriage**

The postponement of marriage is also reflected by the increase in age at first marriage. Table 2 shows singulate mean age at marriage (SMAM) for South Africa, Regions and population groups for 1996 and 2001 censuses and 2007 Community Survey.

Table 2 indicate that SMAM for South African males was 31.0 years in 1996 remaining unchanged in 2001 and increasing to 32.5 years in 2007. Similar values for South African females are 28 years in 1996 and remaining unchanged in 2001 and increasing to 30 years in 2007.

In South Africa, the legal age for individuals to marry (enter into marriage or civil union) is 18, but most girls marry between 25 and 30 years of age and men between 27 and 33 years of age (see Table 2). This means that marriage does not take place at very early ages (say ages below 20 years) as it is the case with traditional societies. In general Table 2 indicates that on average South African men marry around age 30 whereas women marry around age 28. These are very high mean age at first marriage by any standard. Commenting on median age at first marriage, Udjo(2002) observed that the SMAM values for 1996 “give the impression that South Africa has about the highest mean age at first marriage in the world”. However, it should be pointed out that SMAM values for South Africa compare favorably with those of neighboring countries. For instance, Rakgoasi and Gaise(1999) found out that SMAM for Botswana in 1991 was 28 years for females and 30.8 years for males. Shemeikka, Notkola, and Siiskonen (2005) reported that the mean age at first marriage for females in Namibia in 1990s was around 30 years and median age at first marriage for females was around 29 years. The mean age at first marriage for males in Namibia in 1990s was around 34 years. Garenne (2004) noted, “late marriage (above age 25) seems to be a common feature of modern societies as well as some atypical South African societies (South Africa, Namibia, Botswana)

There are variations in SMAM by province and population groups. Table 2 indicates that Kwazulu-Natal has the highest mean age at marriage whereas Gauteng has the lowest mean age at marriage. In fact from highest to lowest the provinces can be ranked as follows: Kwazulu-Natal, North West, Eastern Cape, Mpumalanga, Northern Cape, Limpopo, Western Cape, Free State and Gauteng. However, one should be cautious in interpreting the observed provincial differentials. As Udjo(2004) pointed out the observed differences by province “may partly be a reflection of varying degrees of inaccuracies in the interpretation of the marital status question in these provinces during the census”.

Furthermore, Table 2 indicates that mean age at first marriage is very late among African and coloured males and females (above 27 years), and a moderately high mean age at first marriage among Indians and whites (24-27 years). Since Africans constitute over three quarters of the population and the observed mean age at first marriage among Africans is very high, the national average is high (31 years for males and 28.7 years for females). In addition, the observed mean ages at first marriage suggest that on average among Africans, Indians and Whites, males tend to be 2-3 years older than their spouses while among Coloureds, the difference in age at first marriage among spouses tends to be 1 year on average. Overall, compared to other African countries the difference in mean age at first marriages between spouses is minimal in South Africa. Among other things, this is a good thing as it may be seen to influence better communication between spouses which in turn lead to more stable marriages. Indeed, Amoateng (2004) noted that “even though South African women may be relatively slower to marry, once they tie the knot they tend to be committed to the institution of marriage”. Amoateng(2004) further notes that in South Africa, marriage is much more likely to be dissolved through death than through divorce.

The pattern described above regarding differentials in age at marriage is different from the picture presented by other researchers for early 1990s. For instance Chimere-Dan (1998) observed “whites marry latest at an average age of 20.9 while Africans marry youngest at an average age of 18.9 years”. Accepting these estimates leads on to conclude that age at first marriage is increasing for all the population groups in the country with Africans and colouresd having the largest increase and whites and Asians the smallest increase. The factors responsible for such observed patterns remain to be established.
The estimated SMAM for South Africa have important demographic consequences. Women who marry late will have on average shorter exposure to the chance of becoming pregnant implying late age at childbirth and lower fertility for a society. However, the cases of early motherhood are found abundantly. The phenomenon of early motherhood has been causing fatal impact on the health of both mother and infant causing higher infant and maternal mortality.

Another aspect observed in Table 2 is that the difference between male and female mean age at marriage is about 2-3 years, which is considered small by African standards. The demographic consequences of this are many and include better spouse communication and more stable relationships. It can be argued that since the age differentials of the partners is small, couples are able to discuss such issues as contraceptive use and the number of children they should have. In addition, because South African men and women marry when they are relatively mature they tend to be committed to marriage. On this aspect, Amoateng(2004) observed that “even though South African women may be relatively slower to marry, once they tie the knot they tend to be committed to the institution of marriage”.

**Proportion Married**

In most traditional societies, marriage not only signals the onset of a woman’s exposure to the risk of childbirth, but also determines the length and pace of reproductive activity. Although this may not be the case in most modern societies, where an increasing proportion of childbirth takes place outside formal unions, a substantial amount of childbirth still takes place within marriages. In South Africa for example nearly two-thirds of all birth occurs to married women (Amoteng, 2004). In most countries in Africa, marriage takes place at an early age and is universal. On the one hand, early and universal marriage practice leads to, among other consequences, higher fertility. On the other hand, late marriages and non-universal marriages lead to lower fertility.

In the case of South Africa, although motherhood begins early, marriage takes place later in life. Available statistics indicate that adolescent fertility is very high in South Africa (Department of Health, 1998). According to 1998 DHS one-sixth of the more than 26000 children born to African women in the 36 months preceding the survey were to women younger than 20 years at the time of birth (Department of Health, 1998).

The proportion of married women and men obtained from 1996 and 2001 censuses and 2007 community survey are presented in Table 3 and displayed in Figures 3 and 4.

According to the information presented in Table 3 the proportion of married women has decreased for all age groups in the childbearing period. Overall for women of reproductive age group the proportion married has decreased from 35% in 1996 to 31% in 2001 and to 28% in 2007. Similar percentages for males are 33%, 26% and 25% respectively.
Table 3 Percentage Married by Age Group for South Africa, 1996 2001 and 2007

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</table>

Several factors could be suggested for the observed decline in the percentage married. First the recent declines in marriage could be a reflection of the improvement of women's economic independence that has made marriage less attractive to them. This is in line with the argument advanced by Gary Becker an American economist. According to Becker, individuals marry because each individual gains from the other party's specialized investments in skills. In traditional societies, married women tend to specialize in childbearing and other domestic activities and participate in long-term "contracts" with husbands who have specialized in market activities. In modern societies however both men and women are involved in domestic and economic activities.

It is this gender-based division of labour and the comparative advantage that men and women were believed to have in market work and home production, respectively, that constitute the primary gains from marriage. Other economic disincentives exist for women. A rising wage rate creates increasing foregone opportunities.

In the South African context the establishment of migrant labour system, which meant that there was long absence of men from their homes and in some cases, desertion,

Proportion Living Together

In South Africa, cohabitation (commonly known as living together), is defined by Statistics South Africa as unmarried couples of the opposite sex living together as husband and wife in the same household. Some social scientist argue that the movement towards late marriages or the decreased proportion of married lie in the ever-increasing proportion of individuals reporting that they are living together (cohabitation) especially, amongst the younger generation of South Africans. In other words, cohabitation is no longer viewed as just a prelude to, but increasingly as a substitute for legal marriages.

The available statistics indicate that more males than females reported that they are cohabiting. Looking at the population aged 15 years and over, 8.1% of the males reported that they were
cohabiting as opposed to 7.2% of the females. Similar percentages were 8.1% and 7.1% in 2001 and 5.1% and 4.9% in 1996 respectively (see Appendix 1).

Appendix 2 indicates that 9 percent of the African men aged 15 years and over reported that they were cohabiting, closely followed by the coloured men at 8 percent, then the White men at 4 percent and the Asian men at almost 2 percent. Similar proportions cohabiting were 8 percent, 8 percent, 4 percent and 2 percent for African, Coloured, White and Asian women population. Furthermore, Figures x-x shows that proportion living together is lowest for the Asian population in all age groups, is more or less the same for all population groups for age groups 15-19 and 20-24 and is highest for the Africans and coloureds after age group 20-24. These figures suggest that the proportion cohabiting is higher amongst the African population, closely followed by the coloured, then the white and least amongst the Asians.

For the male population aged 15 years and over, proportion living together is highest among the African population (9.0%), followed by Coloured (7.9%), then White (4.4%) and lowest among the Asian population (1.6%). Similar proportion for the female population are 8.2%, 7.8%, 4.1% and 1.7% respectively.

At provincial level, the proportion cohabiting among the male population is highest in Northern Cape, Kwazulu-Natal, Mpumalanga, North West, Gauteng, Free State, Western Cape, Eastern Cape and Limpopo. Similar values for the female population range from Northern Cape, Mpumalanga, Kwazulu-Natal, North West, Gauteng, Free State, Western Cape, Eastern Cape and Limpopo.

At provincial level, the male population indicates a high proportion of living together in Northern Cape, Gauteng, Mpumalanga, Kwazulu-Natal, North West, Free State, Western Cape, Limpopo, and Eastern Cape. The female population indicates a high proportion of living together in Northern Cape, Gauteng, Mpumalanga, Kwazulu-Natal, North West, Free State, Western Cape, Limpopo and Eastern Cape.

Cohabitation is not just popular among young people. Statistics in Table 4 (and Figures 5 and 6) appear to suggest that cohabitation is also a popular life-style among young adults above the age of 35 years. As American demographer Robert Schoen pointed out, cohabitation poses a greater challenge to the institution of traditional marriage than does divorce. This is because although both events undermine the permanence of the marriage as an institution, only cohabitation can replace marriage with an alternative institutional form. The South Africa data seem to provide some evidence to support this argument.
Figure 5: Percentage Living Together for South Africa (Female), 1996-2007

Figure 6: Percentage Living Together for South Africa (Male), 1996-2007
Table 4: Percentage Living Together by Age Group for South Africa, 1996 2001 and 2007

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</tr>
<tr>
<td>15-49</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Proportion Separated and/or Divorced

An indication of marital instability and dissolution in any population could be obtained by examining the proportions separated and/or divorced. On the one hand, if re-marriage commonly takes place soon after divorce, this would understate the magnitude of marital instability and dissolution at any point in time. On the other hand, in addition to frequent re-marriage, the magnitude of marital dissolution may be under-stated from census or survey data due to cultural factors.

Table 5 shows that the proportion of women divorced and separated has decreased for all age groups in the childbearing period. Overall for women of reproductive age group the proportion divorced and separated has decreased from 3.2% in 1996 to 3.0% and 2.5% in 2001 and 2007 respectively.

In addition, a closer look at Table 5 and Figures 7 and 8 suggest that divorce is more prevalent during the prime reproductive (age 20-39). It rises with age until late 30s, then levels off thereafter. The reasons for this are many and include the fact that at men and women in age groups above 39 years would have been in marital union much longer and would have had more children than younger women. Children may be a binding factor in long marital unions hence the seemingly more enduring marriages among those over 39 years of age. There have been stories of couples who are separated or divorced and living apart. However, because of the need to visit children, after sometime reconcile and start living together once more.

The table and graphs suggest that in each population group there are proportionately more divorced or separated women than men (except among Africans and Indians in the first reproductive age group). This pattern may be due to two factors: (1) at any age and relative to females, some men may have reported they were single when in fact they were divorced. (2) Due to the preponderance of females in the population in adulthood as evident from age-sex ratios, men are more likely to re-marry sooner than women are after a divorce.

At provincial level proportion divorced for the population aged 50 years and over is highest in Gauteng, followed by Western Cape, Limpopo, Free State, North West, Northern Cape,
Mpumalanga, Eastern Cape and Kwazulu Natal. These findings are similar to those published by Statistics South Africa (2005) based on recorded marriage statistics that showed that “Gauteng had the highest modified divorce rate (for married couples) in 2003 (797 per 100 000 married couples), followed by Western Cape (726 per 100 000 married couples)”.

![Figure 7: Percentage Separated and Divorced (Female) for South Africa, 1996-2001](image)

![Figure 8: Percentage Separated and Divorced (Male) for South Africa, 1996-2001](image)
Table 5: Percentage Separated/Divorced by Age Group for South Africa, 1996 2001 and 2007

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<td>30-34</td>
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<td>2.5</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>1.9</td>
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</table>

For the male population the observed pattern is not very clear. First, the proportion separated and divorced for the male population are lower than those of the females. Second, the proportion separated and divorced for males increased slightly from 1.7% in 1996 to 1.9% in 2001 and declined to 1.2% in 2007. This pattern among the male population could be due to high incidence of remarriage rates for the males as opposed to the females.

For the male population aged 15 years and over, proportion separate/divorced is highest among the white population (4.4%), followed by Coloured (2.6%), then Asian (2.3%) and lowest among the African population (1.7%). Similar proportion for the female population are 6.9%, 4.8%, 4.1% and 2.9% respectively.

Proportion Widowed

Widowhood refers to the status of a person whose spouse has died and who has not remarried. Women in this situation are referred to as widows, and men as widowers. Widowhood is similar to divorce in that it signifies the end of a marriage, but widowhood differs from divorce in some important ways. Death is often an unexpected ending of a marriage whereas divorce is usually the mutually agreed upon conclusion of a troubled relationship and the result of a long series of events. Death is also final, whereas many divorced persons maintain at least a superficial relationship with each other.

In the United States and other Western nations, approximately 6 percent of the total population is widowed and this proportion increases to about one-third of the population sixty-five years of age or older (UN Division for the Advancement of Women, 2001). Recent trends indicate that widowhood is becoming less common, largely because more people either never marry or are separated or divorced (UN Division for the Advancement of Women, 2001).

Table 6 presents the percentage widowed for South Africa for childbearing age groups for 1996 and 2001 censuses and 2007 Community Survey. Table 6 shows that the proportion of women widowed has slightly increased for all age groups in the childbearing period with the exception of
age groups 20-24 and 25-29 where it has remained constant. The highest increase is observed in age group 45-49. Overall for women of reproductive age group the proportion widowed has increased from 2.1% in 1996 to 2.4% in 2001. The slight increase in number of widowed may be due to rise of mortality among adults probably arising from HIV/AIDS.

For the male population aged 15 years and over, proportion widowed is highest among the coloured population (2.3%), followed by Africans (2.2%), then Asian (2.0%) and Whites (1.6%). Similar proportions for the female population are 11.4% and 11.4% for whites and Asian, 9.4% for African and 8.2% for coloured population.

There are differences in proportion widowed by province. For the female population proportion widowed is highest in Limpopo, followed by Eastern Cape, Free State, Kwazulu-Natal, Mpumalanga, North West, Northern Cape, Gauteng and Western Cape. For the male population, proportion widowed is highest in Free State, Northern Cape, Eastern Cape, Mpumalanga, North West, Limpopo, Western Cape, Gauteng and Kwazulu-Natal.

The available statistics indicate that there are noticeable differences between males and females within each population group and province. The differences are more marked after age group 20-24 years. Within each age group and population group, relatively more females are widowed than are males. This observation may be due to the fact that mortality is usually higher among males than female at any given age in most human populations. Moreover, since women are generally younger than their spouses, and mortality increases with age, one would naturally expect a higher proportion of widowhood among females than males.

![Figure 9: Percentage Widowed (Female) for South Africa, 1996-2007](image-url)
Table 6: Percentage Widowed by Age Group for South Africa, 1996 2001 and 2007

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<thead>
<tr>
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</thead>
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</table>

Most studies on widowhood have focused on women, partly because widows outnumber widowers by nearly five to one. It is estimated that half of all marriages end with the death of the husband, whereas only one-fifth end with the death of the wife in Western societies, and women generally outlive men and men usually marry women who are younger than they are. Further, while older widowed people do not remarry, widowers have remarriage rates over eight times as high as those of widows.

Different societies attach very different customs and values to widowhood, and these have a strong influence on how it is experienced. Most widows go through an intense grieving process early in widowhood, marked by feelings of depression, mood changes, disrupted sleep patterns,
obsessive thoughts about the deceased, and disorientation. However, the intensity of grief usually decreases significantly within a year. Many widows and widowers begin to develop new strengths and talents and remake their social networks to include new friends and contacts. Intense grief is not required for recovery from widowhood.

Discussions and conclusion

Based on data from the 1996 and 2001 population censuses and 2007 community survey, statistics on current marital status were examined. These sources of demographic data reveal some salient features regarding nuptiality patterns in South Africa. First, for South Africa as a whole age at marriage for males has increased from 31 years in 1996 to 33 years whereas for females’ age at first marriage has increased from 29 to 30 years over the same period. The age differences between spouses have remained almost unchanged during the period under study. Second, there has also been an increase in the proportions never married and living together and a decline in proportion married.

Like with other aspects of South African demography, marriage patterns presented in this study show variations by population group and province. Notwithstanding the problems of data quality, the data indicate a higher incidence of formal marriage among Whites and Indians than among Africans and Coloureds. More Africans and coloureds tend to cohabit than whites and Indians. Marriages for Asians and whites are more stables than those of Africans and coloured. The percentages of the white population that are widowed and divorced are the highest for all racial groups. The rate of divorce is highest among whites and lowest among Indians. The available data indicate that fundamental changes are in progress in the South African nuptiality. Many marriageable African adults are postponing marriage and the percentage of African people who have not married by the end of their reproductive lives appears fairly high.

The aforementioned changes could be linked to a multitude of social and economic changes including long lasting effects of colonization and apartheid system that are taking place in the country. Increasing educational opportunities for young women, urbanization and modernization and a greater participation of women in the labour force have played a major role in raising age at marriage and will continue to do so in the near future. However there is need to establish by further research the changes that are taking place and how these affect marriage patterns.

The above discourse has presented a lot of facts that need to be tested with actual data. There is, therefore, need to conduct large-scale demographic studies in and well-conducted in the country as well as in other regions of Africa. Data from these studies will help to model demographic and nuptiality transitions and execute relevant policy programmes.

Changing marriage patterns have had important effects on fertility and population growth among South Africans. Fertility has declined steadily in the last 30 years or so. The changing marriage patterns such as declining proportion married in the younger age groups has been one of the main reasons for declining fertility among the various population groups in South Africa. There is also some evidence that marital dissolution has only a minor depressing effect on the overall level of marital fertility. The available demographic research in the country appears to focus on the role of family planning and not changing marriage patterns.
The increase in the percentage of men and women remaining single and the increasing pattern of age at marriage may, in part, reflect changes in social attitudes and structures related to marriage and singlehood. The lives of the never married are varied and complex. Similarities and differences that exist between the never married and other marital groups are more likely to be influenced by individual characteristics such as gender, age, social class, ethnicity, sexual orientation, and level of education, than by marital status group membership. Further research that examines how these and other factors intersect to shape the lives of the never married within and across different cultures and social contexts will help us to learn more not only about those who remain single, but also about the structure and experiences within marriage, families, and social roles and relationships more broadly.

References


Palamuleni, M.E. (2003) "Age reporting in the North West Province, South Africa, 1996-2001" paper was presented at Demographic Association of Southern Africa (DEMSA) conference which was held in Potchestroom in October 2003.


## Appendix 1: Population aged 15 years and over by marital status, province and sex, 1996

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Appendix 2: Population aged 15 years and over by marital status, province and sex, 2001

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