

## Rural Intelligence Gathering and the Challenges of Counter Insurgency: Views from the Niger Delta

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### Abstract

*The work is an analytical insight into the enterprise of intelligence gathering in the predominantly rural area of the Niger Delta region of Nigeria with a view to comprehensively manage the security threats arising from insurgency in the region.*

*The study makes modest attempts to analyse the nature, scope and dynamics of intelligence gathering emphasizing the need to liberalize the intelligence gathering business in rural Niger Delta to ensure pragmatism and effectiveness. This according to the study will significantly increase the effectiveness of intelligence for security management in the Niger Delta region which is currently threatening the very foundation of the country.*

*In arriving at the above position, the study relies on extensive ethnographic surveys and analysis of intelligence gathering, the Niger Delta crisis and of course the nature of the Nigeria State.*

*Finally, some useful recommendations are given to enhance security management through co-ordinated and result oriented intelligence gathering.*

### Introduction

Intelligence for all intent and purposes is not just information; rather it is a product of evaluated information valued for its currency and relevance rather than its detail or accuracy in contrast with data which typically refers to precise or particular information or 'fact', which typically refers to verified information. Sometimes called "active data" or "active intelligence", these typically regard the current plans, decisions, and actions of people as these may have urgency or may otherwise be considered "valuable" from the point of view of the intelligence-gathering organization. Therefore, active intelligence is treated as a constantly mutable component, or variable, within a large equation of understanding the secret, covert, or otherwise private "intelligence" of an opponent, or competitor, to answer questions or obtain advance warning of events and movements deemed to be important or otherwise relevant (Wikipedia, 2002).

In the same vein, other attempts to define or explain the concept see intelligence as the act of dealing with all things which should be known in advance of initiating a course of action (Clark, 1955). It has also been seen as the product resulting from the collection, processing, integration, analysis, evaluation and interpretation of available information concerning foreign countries or areas. (Warner, 2002). Furthermore, it has been seen as information and knowledge about an adversary obtained through observation, investigation, analysis and understanding (DOD, 2001:208). Some see intelligence simply and broadly as information about things that are foreign

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- people, places, things, and events- needed by the government for the conduct of its functions (Brown –Aspin Report, 1996). Yet still, intelligence is “the knowledge and ideally, fore knowledge –sought by nations in response to external threats and to protect their vital interests, especially the well being of their own people (Kirk Patrick, 1997:365). Last but not the least is that intelligence is “information not publicly available or analysis based at least in part on such information, that has been prepared for policy makers or other actors inside the government (Council on Foreign Relations, 1996:8). Indeed the list of definitions and explanations is endless just like in all Social Science endeavours.

Although attempts to explain the concepts of intelligence are endless, certain fundamental observation are obvious. First, intelligence as evaluative information is targeted at external targets. Second, the information so gathered and evaluated are usually for the purpose of national or regional security by the state or the government of a country. These initial realities made intelligence fall strictly into the domains of the military and defence, and indeed espionage.

However, modern realities have made intelligence and intelligence gathering more comprehensive to cater for both external and internal threats. Consequently intelligence and intelligence gathering denotes the assemblage of credible information with quality analysis. It refers to the information that has been evaluated and from which conclusions have been drawn. It is data that will be used proactively for strategic and tactical purposes (Onovo, 2004). Intelligence therefore include, operational intelligence for planning and conducting campaigns and major operations, criminal intelligence – used for tracking down criminals and for crime detection, competitive intelligence – used by firms to outwit one another, and such other covert information gathering for the purpose of national or regional security. It will also include business security in a globalized and competitive world.

Furthermore, it is essential to evaluate the concept of “external threat” with regards to intelligence gathering especially when analysing criminal and business intelligence. This apparent contradiction is resolved when a criminal or suspect is seen as a deviant and ‘external’ to the basic norms of the society, and when a firm in competition poses potent threats to another in the same industry. It becomes obvious that these “external threats” within country approximates foreign threats to a state and should be subjected to intelligence gathering and analysis (see Ige, 2004; Onovo, *ibid*).

Modern intelligence gathering relies essentially on both human efforts and electronic gadgets. It transcends mere stealing of some one’s secret and it is operated strategically in a competitive environment and, more often than not, covertly. While the policy making process of any nation state is supposed to be transparent, the intelligence gathering process which significantly influences state policies is usually covert and discreet – this feature separates the process from mere snooping or conducting research.

In Nigeria, the impregnable threats of national insecurity accentuated by ethnic and religious pluralism and intolerance, economic down turn and unemployment worsened by exponential corruption by the ruling class, hang over effects of repressive military regimes and an unpredictable transitional democratic regime, the challenges of national security albeit intelligence gathering and management becomes quite daunting.

To further worsen the already bad situation is the Niger Delta crisis which started as resistance to years of avoidable neglect and oppression by the Nigerian state and multinational oil firms to a

full blown insurgency, militancy and, of course, criminality. Today, the region can compete with such crisis – ridden areas like Iraq, Afghanistan, Somalia and Gaza in Palestine. Huge revenues have been lost by the federal government, foreign nationals and high profile politicians and their relations have been abducted and kidnapped. Counter insurgency efforts of the federal government through the Joint Task Force (JTF) have led to deaths on both sides.

The apparent reign of terror which started in the rural areas especially, the flow stations and rigs, moved into the urban areas as criminal terror gangs that have currently retreated again back into the Creeks and rural areas in the face of substantial effective counter attacks by the federal forces and other such security agencies. The region, currently approximate a classical case of insurgency with all the challenges and characters of insurgencies all over the world.

Today, we have a volatile region at the verge of a military implosion with devastating consequences if not properly managed. It is against this back drop that this work seeks to explore ways of evolving an effective rural intelligence gathering to contain the emerging security threats in the region. In the course of this task, efforts will be made to evaluate the intelligence fiasco which has led to marginal success so far in combating the insurgency and militancy in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria.

### **Purpose**

The work will essentially look at intelligence gathering at the rural level where the threats of insurgency, militancy and violence tend to be increasing. More so, the study will attempt to look at the possibility of new techniques that could be deployed for intelligence gathering with a view to tackling the depending insecurity in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria.

### **Methodology**

The study will rely on secondary sources from journals, books, government reports Gazettes, world fact books, archives and ethnographic surveys of events around the intelligence communities and the Nigerian polity to the extent to which they have promoted or assisted or otherwise, in curbing the threatening insecurity in the Niger Delta.

In choosing data from secondary sources, efforts was made to organized them in a randomized manner and in ways that approximates the simple random sampling method of sampling and data analysis. Although by its very nature, intelligence gathering is largely a subjective venture, efforts shall be made to ensure a reasonable level of objectivity, validity and reliability. However, whatever short comings that may arise should be seen as part of the researchers' oversight and should be accepted as such, especially if it does not alter the form, relevance and validity of the study.

### **The Nature and Dynamics of Rural Intelligence Gathering in Counterinsurgency**

Conventional intelligence gathering as a state policy predisposes a well articulated model aimed at ensuring reliability of intelligence sources. Basic intelligence gathering consists of collecting information and observation from open or clandestine sources. The information or observation is patiently and painstakingly analysed, evaluated, compared and integrated with other information and existing intelligence to arrive at conclusions relevant to the needs of the policy makers.

Trends and anomalies from the collected intelligence are processed carefully and if the incoming intelligence confirms pre-existing intelligence, the concept of 'connecting the dots' is achieved. If however, the incoming intelligence is at sharp variance with existing intelligence, the risk of "increased chatter" becomes obvious (Lowenthal, 2003; Holt, 1995; Williams and Deletant, 2001; Onovo, 2004).

To reduce this risk, incoming intelligence is usually cross checked through; 'cross cueing' in a style that approximates a fusion to ascertain the validity and reliability of the intelligence so gathered. In advanced democracies, tacit interoperability and collaboration is employed by the intelligence community in a multi-level arrangement (Onovo, *ibid.*). The above suppositions do not preclude the possibility of subjectively and manipulating intelligence to suit the whims and caprices of the operators of state power as exemplified by the United States and their regrettable war in Iraq under the apparently dubious claims of yet to be discovered Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) (Goodman, 2006).

In the same vein, effort to significantly raise the validity and quality of intelligence has led to be somewhat scientific information gathering technique, which applied to intelligence gathering can greatly assist in ensuring precision, entropy, accuracy, objectivity and completeness. These have been subjected to complex mathematical computation as shown below in multi level, collaborative intelligence management.

Consequently, in military or strategic intelligence, the concept of estimators ensures that through observations of the battle space, sensors and other information sources generate estimates for the information elements deemed critical to the decision. The uncertainty associated with the information elements is expressed in terms of probability distributions, the means of which are estimates of the ground truth values. This reality promotes the relevance of parameter estimation theory to assess the quality of the information available to the decision maker and examine how the quality of the estimates contributes to knowledge, and to reduce bias and, to ensure precision.

To test the precision and entropy, the amount of information available in a probability density is measured in terms of information entropy, denoted by  $H(x)$ . Information entropy is always a function of the distribution variance, and therefore we use it as the basis for developing a knowledge function. For example the bi-variate normal distribution is  $H(x,y) = \log|\Sigma|$ , where  $\Sigma$  is the co-variance matrix from this, we create a precision based knowledge function as

$$K(x,y) = 1 - e\{\log|\Sigma|/\max - H(x,y)\}$$

$$= 1 - \frac{|\Sigma|}{|\Sigma| \max}$$

Where  $|\Sigma| \max$  is the determinant of the co-variance matrix that produces the maximum uncertainty.

Based on precision above,  $K(x,y)$  reflects the level of understanding within a cluster of decision makers (i.e., two nodes of the network forming a cluster) who share two pieces of information with a multivariate normal distribution, the change in knowledge is given by

$$\Delta K = \frac{P^2_1 2\sigma^2_2}{\sigma^1_1 \max \sigma^2_2 \max}$$

While  $P_1, 2$  is the correlation co-efficient,  $\sigma^2, \sigma^2_2$  are the variances and  $\sigma^2_1 \max \sigma^2_2 \max$  are the maximum or bounding values on the variance for the two pieces of information.

In testing the accuracy of information, the concepts of precision and bias are involved because they are the critical elements that are close to the ground truth. In general, if 'a' is an information element whose value  $x$  is unknown with probability distribution  $f(x)$  and mean is representing ground truth, then the bias associated with the estimate of the mean is  $b = E(\tilde{u}) - \mu$ , where  $\mu$  is the estimate of the mean. Because accuracy consists of both bias and precision, we therefore need metric that combines both. One such metric is the mean square error (MSE)  $E\{\tilde{u} - (\mu)^2\} = b^2 + \sigma^2$ , where  $\sigma^2$  is the variance of  $\mu$ . The MSE is an extremely useful metric it includes both accuracy in the total and precision accounts for random errors.

This is further illustrated by continuing with the bivariate normal case. It is assumed that Bayesian updating is used to refine the location estimate based on the arriving reports. Bayesian updating is not always unbiased, and therefore there is the need to introduce systematic error. In this case the bias is the Euclidean-distance between the Bayesian estimate and the ground truth value.

$$b \sqrt{[\tilde{u}_x - \mu_x]^2 + [\tilde{u}_y - \mu_y]^2}$$

By analogy with the MSE, the accuracy of the estimate is defined as  $D(x,y) = b^2 / \Sigma$ . The effects of bias, precision and accuracy in knowledge is consequently demonstrated by replacing the distribution variance with the MSE, or accuracy measure  $D(x,y)$  in the knowledge function. Therefore, for the multivariate normal case, we get a modified knowledge function of the form:

$$Km(x) = \frac{1 - b^2 + \Sigma}{(b^2 + \Sigma) \max}$$

The maximum mean square error is a combination of the maximum bias and the maximum precision and represents the maximum in accuracy. Because bias and precision are independent, the maximum occurs when both are maximized, or  $(b^2 + \Sigma) \max = b^2 \max + \Sigma / \max$ . Like the variance, a suitable upper bound for bias can be found by searching for the largest possible measurement error, the sensors or sources might produce.

Finally, in addition to precision and accuracy, collaboration also affects the completeness of the critical information elements available within a cluster-for the entire network, it is assumed that there are a maximum of  $N$  critical information elements. For a given cluster, the total number required is  $C \leq N$ .

However, at a given time,  $t$ , only  $n \leq C$  might be available. If waiting for additional reports is not possible, a decision maker would be required to take a decision without benefit of complete information. Depending on his/her experience and other contextual information, the decision maker may be able to infer some likely less reliable value for the missing information. For now, we assume that it the value of completeness at cluster  $i$  is

$$X_i(n) = \frac{n}{\xi^c}$$

where  $\xi$  is a shaping factor. For values of  $\xi < 1$ , the curve is caved downwards; and  $n$  for  $\xi = 1$ , it is a straight line. The selection of the appropriate value depends on the consequences associated

with being forced to take decision with incomplete information as well as the commander's attitude to risk (see Perry and Moffat, 2004).

While the above illustrations demonstrate a high level of scientific approach to intelligence gathering, sharing and management, it has not insulated this craft from the impregnable threat of failure which the craft seeks to overcome from the very beginning. It did not equally remove it from the grabs of the state where the executive could manipulate it for unreasonable national security or for some covert economic interests.

More so, in rural and domestic intelligence gathering and more often in counterinsurgency, certain contradictions must be properly synthesized to achieve success. More often than not there is blurred line that separates resistance groups from domestic terrorist groups. What unites them no matter the viewpoint is the need for national security to be guaranteed. In the same vein, the constant politicization of resistance movements and sometimes its alignment with leftist's politics tend to complicate intelligence gathering from within domestic resistance, insurgent albeit terrorist groups.

The aforesaid challenges are accentuated by the apparently increasing 'ruralisation' of conflicts the world over. From Afghanistan, to Iraq, from Southern Lebanon, through Somalia and from Uganda, Congo DRC to the Niger Delta region, resistance groups flourish to press home grievances and repression from the State. Most of their activities tend to concentrate in the rural areas where rugged maintains/hills, dangerous valleys, complex creeks, streams, and swamps provide safe havens for these groups. In North West Pakistan especially the Waziristan areas, natural caves and mountains are natural protection for these groups even as they blend perfectly with the rural populace, often indoctrinating the poor ruralities in their radical ideologies. In the same vein, fighting insurgency has been one of the most strategic puzzles in military science. This because, the battle is usually political waged among a cooperative or acquiescent populace in order for a group of outsiders to take over (or at least undermine) the government of a nation. This is a contest of wills, uneven resources, chosen initiatives, covert political and paramilitary operations, and sometimes very public measures. (Smith, 2006).

This scenario present daunting challenges to conventional intelligence gathering techniques and should also provide useful leads since; there is reasonable air of familiarity which can be exploited in the intelligence gathering process. However, this advantage is usually overlooked by the intelligence community apparently out of superiority complex or the feeling of knowing too much professionally to rely on local intelligence gathering process. Because this is the case, resistance, insurgent or domestic terrorist groups depend on having access to the right intelligence – knowing where, when, and how to stage an operation for best effect. The quality of the intelligence available to a resistance, insurgent or domestic terrorist group can mean the difference or failure. When a group is able to gather good intelligence, it can more readily identify potential targets, locate their vulnerabilities and understand the security measures intended to protect them. The right kinds of intelligence can also provide information to guide insurgent and domestic terrorist groups strategy development and information and inform them on how law enforcement and intelligence organizations and the public are reacting and responding to the groups' operations. Intelligence in this situation can be obtained incidentally- "filtering up without a real system" (Bell, 1998b:472) - but such opportunistic intelligence is not sufficient for consistence effectiveness.

Consequently, many groups make intelligence gathering a very high priority and develop specific learning processes and systems for this purpose. In preparing for specific operations, many insurgent and domestic terrorist groups have standardized approaches for ensuring that the right information is gathered. The intelligence processes involves most times identifies attractive targets and discerning vulnerabilities that can be exploited. Reflecting the common needs of clandestine organizations planning violent operations groups, such as MEND and such allied resistance groups in the Niger Delta defy common methods of collecting pre-attack intelligence including video and photographic surveillance (see white paper: the Jamaal Islamiya Arrests and the Threats of Terrorism, 2003:28; Gunatnatna, 2002: 189-189, Leader and Probst, 2003:42).

### **The Niger Delta Security Realities**

The story of the Niger Delta is a story of conflicts based on invasions and nationalistic counter attacks for self preservation spanning over two centuries. Over time, the only changing variables on the part of the invaders are the claims and motives which are not far from the imperialist expansion of the capitalist Europe into the colonies of Africa. The clashes between the marauding Europeans and the Itsekiris, Akassas, Nembes. Benis Opobos and all such other capitalist – oriented conflicts sowed the seed for a security threatened Niger Delta region (Mitte, 2007; Nte and Eke, 2008).

Colonialism against the wishes of the indigenes people further consolidated the security situation as Nigeria became a country of people with endemic mistrust amongst the federating peoples. More so, the nature of post-colonial Nigeria created a tiny ruling class comprising mainly representatives of the majority ethnic groups who at times taint their grip on political power with religious sentiments, all in a bid to consolidate their hold on power and by extension, the appropriation of state resources. This created a situation of a colony within a neo-colonial state with an interesting disdainful underestimation of the powers of the minorities. Protests from the minorities including the Niger Delta region were treated with levity and inconsequential to Nigeria's national security (see Asiodu, 1980; Nte, 2005). Strategically, this attitude which is essentially a colonial hang over created insecurity in the Niger Delta region where wealth are rapaciously generated and siphoned by the central government in concert with the oil and gas multinationals in the region.

The events of the early 1990s at Umuechem, the renewed environmental consciousness stirred up by the late Kenule Saro Wiwa and the subsequent repressive military regimes in Nigeria gave teeth to an implosive security situation in the Niger Delta region, which had hitherto been resilient. Indeed the last straw that broke the camel's back was the creation of an army of political thugs by politician to capture power, sustain power, and silence all forms of opposition. This act of omission or commission opened up a new chapter in Niger Delta's political history. Ill-gotten wealth became copious; youths were armed, used and dumped by their political masters paving way for arms proliferation in the region as these young men retained the arms as their only means of survival. (Okaba and Nte, 2008).

Armed and frustrated youths seized the opportunity of genuine agitations to unleash illegal and criminal military expeditions to assert their relevance, make illegal wealth through pipeline vandalization, bunkering, kidnappings and hostage taking and all forms of domestic terrorist's acts which the region is currently facing. The interesting dimension to the Niger Delta security

crisis is a near perfect fusion of genuine agitations, resistance and criminality in one whole violent social movement.

Furthermore, because of the criminal nature of Nigeria politics, the entire security quagmire in the region remains one of the most complex comparable only to those of Iraq, Afghanistan and Somalia. Intelligence gathering in this kind of scenario becomes an uphill task. The intelligence community and the information intelligence networks are usually infiltrated thereby significantly compromising the quality, credibility and reliability of intelligence. In the region today, politicians, religious leaders, security operatives all have been known to be accomplices in kidnappings operation for economic gains, further complicating genuine attempts to tackle the threats of insecurity in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria. The net effect of this unmitigated instability is that the national economy is bleeding profusely, foreign exchange from oil and gas is dipping as oil production has been cut by over 30% with clear signs of further cuts.

Globally, all prices are soaring and threatening western economies especially that of the United State of America. The precariousness of energy supplies to the US prompted the setting up of AFRICOM and the Gulf of Guinea security initiative to protect off shores oil fields and guarantee steady flow of oil to the United States (Nte and Eke, forthcoming). This security arrangement, lofty as it seems may end up aggravating the security situation because similar military arrangements in the past tend to be counterproductive in the use of formal tactical and strategic solutions to solve informal problems. Post modern wars have not been able to subdue informal wars as they have succeeded in surviving scientific sophistication and precision to the consternation of strategic experts (see Nte, forthcoming)<sup>28</sup>.

The current crisis in the Niger Delta is therefore better understood as a long drawn out historical process, itself, propelled and animated by complex international economic and political forces, which the local inhabitants have been trying to comprehend, resist or turn to their own advantage for the past two centuries, with varying degrees of success. It is therefore a story of power and resistance to it, of alien and imposed authority and attempts to indigenise it and make it accountable to the people it purports to rule, an epic tale of ordinary men and women struggling against vastly more superior forces that are threatening to take bread from their mouths and destroy their way of life (Okonta, 2006:6)<sup>29</sup> The various transmutations of this crisis are part of the internal contradictions of the political economy of the Nigeria State. For the political class in the Niger Delta, it is a potent road to class suicide as the spate of kidnappings, attacks tend to be shifting to the them in the face of mass exodus of expatriates from a significantly hostage economy.

### **The Challenge and Prospects of Security Management in Niger Delta Region**

Located in one of the largest wetlands in the world, the Niger Delta region of Nigeria is currently one of the most insecure places on the face of the earth. The insecurity stems mainly from the insurgent activities of the militants and the counter insurgency operatives of the Joint Task Force for the Nigeria Armed Forces and the Police.

So far, only minimal success can be said to have been achieved with regards to quelling the conflict in the region. Part of the reason for the failure is poor intelligence gathering management and intelligence compromise by the intelligence community operating in the region. History demonstrates that insurgents armed in the conventional weapons (the gun, the bomb, the rocket) can sustain violent campaigns against state military over periods of time. Victory against such



insurgents rarely, comes from destruction of troops on a battlefield and, as they typically blend into the population, the “enemy” is often more difficult to find than to neutralize (Jackson 2007). In many conflicts resilient and adoptive insurgent, using hide-and-see- tactics have checked nations and, in some case, have prevented them from achieving foreign policy goal ad the current Niger Delta insurgents have achieved so far.

The current situation has endangered both the economy of the nation and the lives of the inhabitants of the region in ways that, there tend to be a general consensus with regards to the management of security threats in the region. From series of political solutions advocated and implemented such as the Niger Delta Development Master Plan, the Ogomudia report, the Niger Delta Development Commission, the selection of Dr Goodluck Jonathan from the region to be Vice President of the Republic and the recent creation of the Ministry of Niger Delta to complement the development agencies in the region. However, it should be noted that these efforts have not stemmed the tide of violence as militant groups have consolidated through the illegal supply of arms and the territorial control and appropriation of proceeds from oil illegal bunkering and siphoning of condensates –a low grade fuel from Petroleum waste products. They are therefore currently armed, bold and wealthy, and from all indication capable of sustained confrontation with the Nigerian armed forces.

In the same vein, because of the serious level of affinity between these militants who were hitherto political foot soldiers to the politicians, it has been pretty difficult to embark on an effective counter insurgency efforts against the militants. To most analysts, these militants can still be mobilized for violence against the opposition during future elections by the politicians and this explains some level of ‘soft approach’ by the political class in the region. The result of this is a highly disorganized counter insurgency by the central and regional governments. Intelligence gathering in this case is also ineffective because of the inherent sabotage, leakage and failure.

Be that as it may, it must be noted that any intelligence effort must be able to collect information. However, the nature of the counter intelligence mission challenges traditional ways of thinking about intelligence collection, especially against members of a comparatively small insurgent organization within a larger civilian population (Jackson, 2007). Intelligence collection is generally thought of as a distinct acuity in which intelligence specific tools are used to gather data for analysis and application.

The counter insurgency intelligence mission has elements that fit readily within this view. For example, developing and exploiting informers or infiltrators clearly requires the same compartmentalization and protection that is standard intelligence practice. Informers within the Niger Delta militants will be of critical importance in the counter insurgency effort and will play an important part in the intelligence fight.

It is therefore instructive to note that intelligence collection efforts must diverge considerably from “classical intelligence methods”. Limits to the available of clandestine sources mean that other collection tools must be developed and applied the effectiveness of intelligence community with other parts of the security force and even with the general population in the area affected by the insurgency.

In the face of the foregoing, the following can assist to buoy up the intelligence collection effort in the Niger Delta. Firstly, low grade intelligence can be collected. This is because, while infiltrators or informers can provide valuable data, they might not be available in sufficient number for

success in a broad counter insurgency effort to complement for high grade intelligence that such sources provide in large amounts. Low grade information that when added together in large quantities, can provide a useful picture of insurgent operations (Bowlan, 1998). This low grade intelligence can be provided by all the security forces which should think the people first for intelligence and which relies on the public opinion's drive for intelligence collection (Barzilay, 1975; Maguire, 1990).

Secondly, there must be specialized operations and units which in addition to broad efforts to collect intelligence can employ specialized tools; such as security check points, snap check points, observation posts, covert surveillance post (complemented by soldiers patrolling undercover) etc organized to collect intelligence for effective counter insurgency (Charters, 1997, Dewar 1985, Dilon, 1991).

Thirdly, there is need for flexible technical means which will rely on such gadgets as live-feed television, sophisticated photographic electronic devices, phone taps, hidden cameras, listening devices, infrared detection systems, motion detectors and technologies that intercept communication traffic. (Barzilay, 1933, Adams et.al., 1988). While these conventional intelligence gathering measures will greatly assist in mitigating security threats in the region which is conveniently be classified as insurgency, it is needful to add that the following are equally needed for effective rural intelligence gathering in the Niger Delta region. Firstly, there should be rapid socio-economic development of the region. Secondly, there should be sustained legal agitation for a fair share of the nation's resources. Thirdly, Education should be provided freely and compulsorily in the region. While these are preventive measures, the following are some of the remedial measures. Firstly, a rural intelligence gathering posts should be established in all the local council head quarters. Its membership should include; traditional rulers, women and youth leaders, retired security officers and respected community leaders. Secondly, there should be a weekly internal intelligence council meeting to appraise the security situation and to report same to the appropriate authorities. Thirdly, the proposed neighbourhood watch should be implemented based on sound legal frame work and controlled to guard against the transmutation of the groups into new forms of domestic terror groups or manipulated by politicians to intimidate or harass the citizens. These modest contributions will help improve the intelligence gathering efforts in rural Niger Delta.

## **Conclusion**

This piece has strived to provide a general insight into the business of intelligence gathering and the challenges of gathering intelligence in rural environments and from insurgent groups. In doing this the study employed an evaluation of the Niger Delta region of Nigeria and the monumental security challenges caused by the military in the region. Presently, the security threats have impacted on world's global oil prices threatened the nation's revenues and created terror in the region.

The region is currently militarized in a counter insurgency mission which so far has achieved marginal success. Part of this unimpressive performance stems from poor intelligence gathering and management efforts. In the same, vein, the political nature of the crisis and nature of Nigeria post colonial state has also undermined security management in the Niger Delta.

In the face of these realities, the work has strongly suggested measures that could be taken to improve the efficiency of intelligence gathering and by extension the security management in the region. While these suggestions are not intended to be supplanted with the legitimate responsibility to ensure justice and equity in the Niger Delta region, it is also the responsibility of the Nigerian State to effectively combat the raging insurgency in the Niger Delta of region through result oriented intelligence gathering and administration.

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