Power in Social Organization: A Sociological Review

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Abstract:

Since power is a pervasive yet contentious feature in social organization and therefore a central concept in sociology, it necessitates an adequate sociological review. As an interactive process with no monolithic character, social power has both intended and unintended effects for either promotive or a preventive purpose. Methods of exerting social power include force, dominance, authority, attraction, ideology, and discipline, though any specific situation may include more than one form, and sometimes in an overlapping manner. This paper discerns four conspicuous perspectives of social power in modern sociology: Marxist, Elitist, Pluralist and Foucaultian. None of these are formal theories; nevertheless, these broad perspectives tend to shape the overall manner in which sociologists view the role of power in social organization.

Introduction:

“Every social act is an exercise of power, every social relationship is a power equation, and every social group or system is an organization of power” (Howley, 1963: 422).

Power is the most fundamental process of social life, and hence one of the most central concepts in Sociology. However, it was perhaps one of the least studied and least understood concepts/subjects for long time. In the 1860s, the notion of power was quite evident in the sociological writings of Karl Marx (1818-1883). In early 1900s, power was a critical factor in Max Weber’s (1864-1920) writings. After that most sociologists, especially in North America, overlooked power for several decades. As Olsen and Marger (1993) show that American sociology was for long dominated by two foci that did not involve power: (a) social psychological concerns with the behavior of individual in society, and (b) Parsonian theory with its emphasis on value consensus and normative expectations.

At last, sociology re-discovered social power. The rediscovery began in 1950s with the publication of two pivotal books: Floyd Hunter’s Community Power Structure in 1953 which demonstrates the exercise of power in communities, and C. Wright Mill’s Power Elite in 1956 that sparks a lively debate about the role of elite in modern societies. In 1960s many American sociologists began to pay attention to Marx’s writings, and tried to interpret and re-interpret his theoretical ideas. In 1960s, over race relations, poverty and other critical problems, conflict erupted in the USA which consequently laid radicalizing effort on the cohort of American

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sociologists to enter in the field of power and made them aware of the role of power in social organizations (Olsen and Marger, 1993, Lukes 1986). The understanding of power, albeit in a new form, was brought to light in western academia by the writings of Michel Foucault in 1970s and post-Foucautian authors in 1990s.

Today, the exercise and structuring of social power is a major concern not only within political sociology, but also in other areas of sociology. Recently, power becomes one of the focal points in the areas of environment and development. This paper will make a comprehensive survey and analysis, albeit concisely, on the nature of social power and its role in social organization, and different perspectives on social power.

**Nature and Characteristics of Social Power**

Power is not a monolithic concept, and hence has no universally accepted single definition. There are, however, some conspicuous problems in defining social power. Nevertheless, we can deduce the essential idea stressed by most writers while attempting to define social power that power is the ability to affect social activities. It is, as Olsen and Marger (1993) claim, a ‘dynamic process, not a static possession, that pervades all areas of social life’ (p. 1). Sociologists are usually concerned with broad and relatively stable patterns of power, mainly for analytic convenience, rather than with every isolated and minute instance of power exertion. The idea of affecting social activities logically implies overcoming whatever resistance, opposition or limitation may be encountered. Nevertheless, reference to resistance adumbrates that the exercise of power is usually a reciprocal process among all participants, and is rarely determined by a single actor no matter how unequal the situation may appear (Olsen 1986). Hence, two ideas are central

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1. As with energy in physical world, power pervades all dynamic social phenomena; yet it can not be directly observed or measured (Olsen, 1970). Secondly, English language does not contain a verb “to power”, and therefore when we discuss power in dynamic terms, we must either attach a verb to it (such as exercising social power) or use verbs as “influence” or “control” (Olsen and Marger, 1993). Thirdly, Dennish H. Wrong (1993) found five major problems in defining social power: First, there is the issue of intentionality of power, and secondly, of its effectiveness. The latency of power, its dispositional nature is a third problem. The unilateral or asymmetrical nature of power relations implied by the claim that some persons have an effect on others without a parallel claim that the reverse may also be the case is fourth problem. A final question is of the nature and effects produced by power: must they be overt and behavioral, or do purely subjective, internal effects count also?

2. Bertrand Russell, for example, defines power as ‘the capacity of some persons to produce intended and foreseen effects on others’ (cited in Olsen and Marger 1993). According to Max Weber (1993) ‘power (macht) is the probability that one actor within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his/her own will despite resistance, regardless of the basis on which this probability rests’ (p. 37), while quite similarly Robert Dahl (1986) sees ‘power as the control of behavior’ (p. 37). Weber’s and Dahl’s approaches both focus on the idea of “power over” which has been rejected by Hannah Arendt (1986) being too narrow. She speaks rather of political institutions as “manifestations and materialization of power”. Like Arendt, Talcott Parsons (1986) also rejects the Weberian view of power as ‘highly selective’. Power for Parsons is a system resource, a ‘generalized facility or resource in the society’, analogous to many, which enables the achievements of collective goals through the agreement of members of society to legitimize leadership positions whose incumbents further the goals of the system, if necessary by the use of ‘negative sanction’ (see also Lukes 1986). Therefore, Parsons’ version of power is both ‘coercion’ and ‘consensus’, which depends on ‘institutionalization of authority’.
to the notion of social power: (a) social power is a generalized rather than a narrowly limited capacity and (b) the exercise of power necessitates overcoming resistance.

The notion of “influence” and “control” are used by some writers as synonyms to “power”, while many distinguish “power” from these concepts usually on the ground that “the effects of power on the recipient are to some extent involuntary, while ‘influence’ and ‘control’ are seen as producing a motivational change within affected individuals so that they more or less willingly comply” (Olsen, 1986: 3). In this view, “influence” refers to overt participation, whereas “control” rests largely on unconscious norm internalization. The distinction may seem arbitrary, since “what begins as wholly involuntary compliance may over time shift to willing cooperation, while what seems to be voluntary compliance may be simply a decision to abide by an inescapable directive” (Olsen 1986: 3). Therefore, a more meaningful use of these terms is to keep social power as the inclusive or generic concept, with “influence” and “control” used to describe the determinateness of possible outcomes as seen from the perspective of power wielder: “the exercise of social power can vary from relatively indeterminate social influence to relatively determinate social control, depending on the type and amount of power being exerted and the relative power of the other actors involved” (Olsen and Marger, 1993: 1-2).

The actors who exercise power can be organizations (from small group to total societies) as well as individuals. In the former case, the activity is sometimes called “organizational” or “inter-organizational” power while in the later case, it is referred to as “personal” or “interpersonal” power (Olsen 1986; Olsen and Marger, 1993). Unlike social psychology, which studies interpersonal power relations, sociology views power as entirely ‘social’ and ‘organizational’. Someone might have ‘personal power’, but that is not an isolated phenomenon, rather connected with, and contingent upon, his/her location in society or social organization. “Although it is of course true that relationships among organizations are carried out by individuals enacting organizational roles, it is nevertheless the organization as a whole- not individual spokesmen for the organization- which is wielding power” (Olsen, 1986: 3).

Within the dynamics of power exertion process, if power relationship becomes an established feature of any pattern of social ordering, they can be regarded as structural characteristics of that organization. Max Weber (1978) and more recently Anthony Giddens (1984) have both referred to such structured patterns of social power as “domination” and have emphasized their perpetuation, stability and relative predictability in social life.
From the analysis and the debate around the notion of social power by different sociologists, we can discern some conspicuous characteristics of social power, as summarized from Olsen and Marger (1993: 2-3):

(a) As social power is an interactive process, it always resides within social interaction and relationships, never in individual actors. A single actor may possess resources that provide a potential basis for exerting social power, but power does not exist until it is expressed in the actions of two or more actors as a dynamic activity. Moreover, both the power attempt made by an exerter and the resistance offered by a recipient are crucial in determining the actual power exercised in any situation.

(b) The ability of an actor to exercise social power can be either potential or active at any given time. An actor exercises potential power when he or she possesses resources, is capable of employing them, and indicates that possibility to others. Power becomes active when those resources are actually converted into actions toward others.

(c) Power exertion is a purposeful activity that is intended to others in certain ways, but it may also have unintended effects. Most sociologists restrict the concept of power to actions that are intended to affect the recipient, because otherwise virtually every action by every actor could be labeled as power exertion. The issue of intentionality is clouded in many situations, however, by three features of many power actions. First, for strategic reasons, actors often attempt to hide or disguise the purpose of their power wielding, attempting to influence others without others’ being aware of it. Second, power can be exerted indirectly through intermediaries, a process that can mask the primary intentions. Third, in addition to its intended outcomes, an exercise of power can have numerous unintended (and sometimes unrecognized) consequences for others.

(d) The exercise of social power can effect the actions and ideas in either of two directions. It can enable or cause actors to do things they would not otherwise do, or it can hinder or prevent them from doing things they would otherwise do. In other words, power can be used in either promotive or a preventive manner. If we wish to emphasize the preventive use of power, we may speak of exercising power over others to control them. If we wish to emphasize its promotive use, we may speak of exercising power with others to attain common goals. The first expression often conveys the value that power exertion is undesirable because it restricts people’s freedom of action, whereas the second expression conveys the value that power is desirable for collective endeavors.

(e) The interactions and exchanges that occur between participants when power is exerted can vary from evenly balanced to grossly unbalanced. In relative balanced situations, each actor exerts approximately the same amount of influence or control on the other actor(s), so that everyone receives approximately equal benefits. In a highly unbalanced situation, one, or a few actors, exerts much greater influence or control than everyone else and consequently
receives most of the benefits. Relatively balanced power is usually more stable and is viewed as more desirable than highly unbalanced power conditions, although, for various reasons, the latter often occur.

**Forms of social power**

There are various ways in exerting social power. Six fairly distinct types or forms of social power are frequently discussed by sociologists: force, dominance, authority, attraction, ideology, and discipline, though any specific situation may include more than one form, and sometimes in an overlapping manner.

(a) **Force**: According to Olsen (1993), force is a form of social power that involves "the intentional exertion of social pressures on others to achieve desired outcomes" (p. 29). Olsen and Marger (1993) add that when exerting force, an actor brings pressures to bear on the intended recipient by giving or withholding specific resources to threatening to do so. The actor must therefore commit particular resources to that interaction and expend them to whatever extent is necessary to obtain the intended outcomes. Amita Etzioni (1964, 1993) identified three different forces to exert social power. (i) With *utilitarian* force (also called 'inducement' or 'compensation'), the recipient is given desired benefits in return for compliance; (ii) with *coercive* force (also called 'constrain' or 'deprivation'), punishments are meted out or benefits are suspended to obtain compliance; (iii) with *pervasive* force (also called 'information' or 'communication') messages are conveyed that alter the recipient's beliefs, values, attitudes, emotions, or motivations in an attempt to produce compliance.

(b) **Dominance**: Dominance is a "form of social power that results from the performance of established roles or functions" (Olsen 1993: 31). While exerting dominance, an actor effectively carries out a set of established activities or social roles on a regular basis. To the extent that others depend on performances of those activities, they are vulnerable to being enforced or controlled by that actor. This form of power, as Olsen and Marger (1993) explains, does not require the commitment of any additional resources to the interaction, but relies entirely on the successful performance of the dominant actor's usual activities or roles. The ability to exert dominance depends heavily on one's position in a social network or organization, so that the closer an actor's position to the top or centre of the social structure, the greater the possibility of dominance.

(c) **Authority**: "When exerting authority, an actor draws on a grant of legitimacy made by the recipient as a basis for using authoritative directives" (Olsen and Marger 1993: 4). As the legitimacy has been voluntarily granted by those subject to the directives, they are
expected to comply with them. Olsen (1993) explains that legitimacy is sometimes granted to an actor through direct procedures such as formal votes or informal agreements, but more commonly it is indirectly expressed as one joins an organization, remains a member of it, and supports the action of its leaders who claim legitimacy.

Max Weber (1947: 324-325; 1993: 39-47) identified four bases on which legitimate authority often rests within societies: rational knowledge or expertise relevant to specific situations; legal rights based on formal arrangements; traditional beliefs and values sanctified by time; and charismatic appeal of revered leaders to their followers. In addition to this, Olsen (1993) mentions another form of authority, which rest on passive acceptance. It comes from established customs and conventions. The recipients do not overtly grant legitimacy to the authority wielder but simply follow his/her directives out of habit, an act that constitutes an implicit grant of legitimacy. Authority is by far the most stable form of power exertion.

(d) Attraction: Olsen (1993) defines attraction as a “form of social power that lies in the ability of an actor to affect others because of who he or she is” (p. 33). When exercising attraction, an actor draws on diffuse appeal that he or she has for others in order to influence them. That appeal, unlike a grant of legitimacy, may have no connection with social power. A skillful actor may be able, nevertheless, to transform that appeal into power exertion with which others voluntarily comply. Olsen (1993) identifies three common sources of appeal/attraction, which are cognitive identification with, positive feelings toward, and attribution of charisma to an individual or an organization. Attractive power is often unstable and transitory, but at times becomes extremely compelling.

(e) Ideology: Karl Marx is credited for uncovering and theorizing the concept of ideology, albeit different from what we conventionally understand what ideology is. Ideology, to Marx, is a reified cover – used by the Bourgeoisie, the dominant class in the society who control the means of production and hence difference sources or resources of power –
that obscures the power relation between bourgeoisie and the proletariat, and mask the exploitation of the latter class. Ideology is put forward as not only what is believed in as a form of doing a certain kind of thought or belief, “an active epistemological gesture” (Himani 2001: 27), whose method of production is uncovered by the “three tricks” that have been paraphrased by Dorothy Smith (1990) from Karl Marx:

Trick 1: Separate what people say they think from the actual circumstances in which it is said, from the actual empirical conditions of their lives, and from the actual individuals who said it.

Trick 2: Having detached the ideas, arrange them to demonstrate an order among them that accounts for what is observed. (Marx and Engels describe this as making “mystical connections”).

Trick 3: Then change the ideas into a “person”, that is, set them up as distinct entities (for example, a value pattern, norm, belief system and so forth) to which agency (or possible causal efficacy) may be attributed. And redistribute them to “reality” by attributing them to actors who can now be treated as representing the ideas.

A clear analysis of Marxist notion of power will be discussed in the coming section.

(f) Discipline, Discourse and Knowledge: There is a dialectical relation between knowledge and power: Knowledge is power and power produces knowledge. The notion of governmentality, as propounded by Michel Foucault, is particularly important here. In the coming section, it will be discussed in detail.

Theoretical Perspectives on Social Power

Up to 1970s, three principal theoretical perspectives on social power pervade sociological thought: Marxian (or class) theory, elite theory, and pluralist theory. After 1970s, with the writings of Michel Foucault, a novel understanding of power has been added to the sociological thought. None of these are formal theories; nevertheless, these broad perspectives tend to shape the overall manner in which sociologists view the role of power in social organization. A brief illustration of each theory has been given below:

I: The Marxian Perspective

Political philosophers from Plato onward have written extensively on the exercise of power, and most of them linked their discussion of power to the state, seeing government, and related organizations like military as the main foci of power in society. Karl Marx (1818-1883) must be singled out as he broke sharply with this tradition. He argued instead that power originates
primarily in economic production, that it permeates and influences all aspects of society, that the principal units within power dynamics are social classes, the main wielder of social power in society, and the government is largely a servant of the dominant social class (Bottomore and Rubel 1956; Olsen 1970). Marx thus expanded the concept of power from an especially political phenomenon to a ubiquitous social process and offered a theory of societal development based on the exercise of power.\(^5\)

There are three major components of Marxian theoretical perspective as identified by Dahrendorf (1962) and Schumpeter (1962): a sociological model based on the primacy of economically generated social power; a historical model describing the process of dialectical social change; and a connecting thesis, that is, social classes in conflict.

The sociological model that underlies all Marxian theory is often called “materialistic” conception of history (Heilbroner, 1980), or “base-superstructure” model (Wacquant, 1985). When we relate them to social power, both of them carry inappropriate connotations. Olsen and Marger (1993) use a more precise term “economic-base power model” of society. This model contains two principal arguments.

First, all societies rest on an economic foundation or base. Mankind’s need for food, shelter, housing, and energy are central in understanding the socio-cultural system. “The first historical act is”, Marx writes, “the production of material life itself.” Unless men and women successfully fulfill this act there would be no other. All social life is dependent upon fulfilling this quest for a sufficiency of eating and drinking, for habitation and for clothing. The quest to meet basic needs was human’s primary goal.

As people must produce goods and services in order to survive and attain any goals, the economic production processes – which Marx calls “modes of production”- that prevail in a society constitute the foundation on which other aspects of social life rest. Societies may contain several modes of production; nevertheless, one of them, at any given time, tends to dominate the economy and hence is the society’s “dominant mode of production”. Thus feudal society is dominated by a ‘feudal mode of production’ (agriculture) in which the class of landlords extracts a surplus from a rural population bound to the land; in modern capitalist

\(^5\) It’s important to mention here that Marx’s ideas have been expanded, modified, altered, and to some extent fabricated by different Marxist theorists in countless ways. Consequently, several competing schools of Marxist theory presently exist. The fundamental tenets of Marxist thought expounded here are generally accepted by most Marxists.
society the mode of production is manufacturing. The economic base and its dominant mode of 
economic production shapes and influences other features of society – known as 
“superstructure” – that includes all other social institutions such as government, education, 
culture, ideas, beliefs, and values. It does not mean that the rest of the society is determined by 
economic base; however, other parts of the society may contain some functional autonomy, 
and may, to some extent, influence the economic base (Botomore and Rubel 1956; 
Schumpeter 1962; Olsen and Marger 1993).

Second, a mode of production contains two components – forces of production and means of 
production. *Forces of production* includes all those factors that determine how that kind of 
economic production is preferred: it’s necessary resources, relevant technology, production 
techniques, labour force, organizational structures, division of labour, and so on. All these 
forces are important within the economy; nevertheless, their effects are limited to their own 
realm of activity. *Relations of Production* consists of the social, economic, political, and legal 
arrangements that define who owns and/or controls that mode of economic production process. 
In addition to linking a mode of production with the rest of the society, *the relations of 
production constitute the primary source of social power*. Because of the functional primacy of 
the economic base in any society, whoever owns or controls its dominant mode of economic 
production will have access to its major resources and hence will become the principal wielder 
of social power in that society. In other words, whoever controls the dominant mode of 
economic production in a society will determine how the existing technology will be utilized and 
how the resulting resources will be distributed, with the consequences that these persons will 
exercise power throughout the total society (Botomore and Rubel 1956; Schumpeter 1962; 
Olsen and Marger 1993).

This theoretical perspective gave Marx a key to understanding the power dynamics of all 
societies, but it did not explain long-term trends in human history. For this, he turned to the idea 
of dialectic social change that Olsen and Marger (1993) calls “dialectic social evolution” (p. 76). 
From philosopher G.W.F. Hegel, Marx took the dialectic model and applied it to historical social 
change. This model consists of three stages: (a) An initial thesis, or existing set of social 
condition; (b) An alternative anti-thesis, or radically different set of conditions that develop from 
the initial conditions, but not necessarily the complete opposite of the first stage; and (c) An 
integrating synthesis, or wholly new set of conditions that emerges from both the thesis and 
antithesis conditions, contains portion of both of them, and resolves the fundamental 
contradictions inherent in each of them. That synthesis then becomes the thesis for a 
succeeding dialectic, so that, theoretically, the process can continue indefinitely (Marx et al
The dialectic process was for Marx not an inherent tendency within human society, but rather an analytical tool with which to explain broad sweep of human history – at least in Western Europe. In other words, dialectic change is never inevitable, but when major social changes do occur, they tend to follow the dialectic process (Zeitlin 1976).

Marx would have left two fundamental questions unanswered if he had ended his analysis at this point. First, what are the segments of society, which compete for the control of the means of production and how do they relate to one another? Second, why won’t socialism become the thesis for further dialectic change? He answered both questions by bridging the theoretical gap between his sociological perspective and his philosophy of history with the thesis of conflicting social classes. This thesis consists of a definition of classes, an analysis of the nature of capitalism, and an argument for class conflict and revolution. The opening line of The Communist Manifesto states: “The history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles” (Marx 1998). Marx believed that the real struggles within any society were between the different classes with every class struggling for mastery. This is true even among the dominant class which must continually conquer for itself the political mastery of its country. The prevailing class must subjugate the working class, while the middle class tries to maintain its precarious position above the lower class. All the while the lower class is trying to climb up to a higher level. He analyzed the capitalist economic system in great depth to discover why it produced the extreme exploitation of workers he observed in all industrialized societies. He concluded that the dialectic social change would end only if social classes were completely abolished (Olsen 1970).

II: The Elitist Perspective

As a response to Marx’s economic-based power model, a new outlook of power, elitist perspective, emerged. Many of the ideas of this power model, however, can be found in the writing of Plato, Machiavelli, and many other philosophers. As a theoretical perspective on social power, elitism was formulated by Vilfredo Pareto (1935), Gaetano Mosca (1939[1986]), and Robert Michels (1962[1911]). The common thesis among these scholars is that the concentration of social power in a “small set of controlling elite” is inevitable in all societies, a thesis that negates the Marx’s vision of evolutionary change toward a classless society with power equality. At the same time they held that some social change can occur through gradual circulation of elites without overt class conflict or societal revolution. The basic principles of elitism, as summarized from Michels’s (1962[1911]) famous “Iron Law of Oligarchy”:

- Within all societies and other larger organizations that function beyond the subsistence level, there have been – and presumably always will be – one or a few set of powerful controlling elites. Regardless of the nature of the government or the economy, there is
always oligarchy, or rule of the few over many. The masses can not and do not govern themselves.

- Although the elites are always a tiny minority of the population, they control a large proportion of the available resources, are usually well-organized, and are quite cohesive. Consequently, the elites are highly effective in wielding power throughout society.

- Elites commonly employ all available means to protect and preserve their power and to enhance it whenever possible. They share power with others only it is their self-interest, and they never voluntarily surrender power.

- To rule their society, elites employ a wide variety of techniques. These include controlling the government, dominating the economy, using police and military force, manipulating the educational system and the mass media, sanctioning or eliminating those who oppose them, and creating ideologies (beliefs, values, myths, etc.) that legitimize their power and rule.

- Elites may permit or even encourage limited social change, but only to the extent that they see it as contributing to the goals they seek and not threatening their power. Major social transformations are strongly resisted by the elites.

- As societies are getting increasingly large and complex, the power of the elites tends to be less visible, because it is embedded within numerous organizational social structures. As consequence, however, their rule becomes more pervasive and effective.

In short, the elites exercise most of the power in a society; the masses do not. Therefore, to understand any society, we must examine its powerful elites, the bases of their power, the manner in which they exercise it, and the purpose for which they exert power. Apparently, many tenets of the elitism may seem similar to what Marx said about the “bourgeoisie” class who are minority yet control the whole means of production in a given society. However, two clear differences can be drawn between these two theoretical perspectives. First, Marx views that the rule of the few, the bourgeoisie power, is not an essentialized feature of society, exploitation of the powerless, he calls “proletariat” is inherent in this rule, and there is prospect for social change through revolution. To the proponents of elitism, oligarchy is a necessary condition for, and a common feature of, all societies, and hence they do not see any prospect for revolutionary social change. Secondly, none of the proponents of elitism make explicit reference to the central Marxian concern with economic production and economically based power. Elitists generally focus primarily on the polity and give little or no attention to the economy as a source of social power.
III: The Pluralist Perspective

Despite differences between Marxian and elitist model of social power, both hold a common view that the few elite in a society or organization are the one who exercise the optimum power. The theory of social pluralism rejects that idea, and holds that in modern industrialized democratic societies, power is at least moderately dispersed – and could be extensively decentralized if the pluralist model were fully implemented. “Pluralism is, thus, partially an empirical-descriptive model of what is and partially a theoretical-ideal model of what might be” (Olsen and Marger, 1993: 83).

The idea of a division of power in a political system, as a means of presenting tyranny, has been discussed by political philosophers since antiquity. Aristotle pointed out the benefits to be gained from differentiating various governmental activities, and Montesquieu in the eighteenth century stressed the desirability of embodying legislative, executive, and judicial functions in separate bodies. In addition, the federal type of government divides political power along geographical lines, with the national state sharing sovereignty with one or more levels of local government (Olsen 1971).

The pluralist model goes far beyond political system, however, to encompass the entire society. James Madison’s The Federalist, Number 10, sketched the main features of this model, but it was Alexis de Tocqueville’s Democracy in America, Volume 2 (1961[1835]), written in 1930s, that fully developed pluralism as a societal model of power structuring. Tocqueville saw mass equality, created by the breakdown or the absence of traditional hierarchies of feudal authority, as providing fertile ground for the emergence of a “tyranny of the majority” in place of a tyranny of the kings or other elites. His conception of socio-political pluralism was intended to prevent from both forms of tyranny in modern societies (Olsen 1971; Olsen and Marger 1993). As pluralism model has evolved, it has taken three somewhat different forms: elite pluralism, mediation pluralism, and mobilization pluralism.

Elite pluralism, presented by Robert Dahl (1956) and his colleagues, acknowledges the numerous sets of competing elites in modern communities and societies. It asserts, however, that in most settings, “no single set of elites is powerful enough to dominate critical decision making or exert control over the entire community or society” (Olsen and Marger 1993: 84). The power remains moderately dispersed, though various sets of elites may compete with one another for dominance.
Mediation pluralism, which was propounded by Toqueville and later by William Kornhauser (1959) and Robert Presthus (1964), also acknowledges the existence of numerous sets of elites, but allows for the fact that, in many settings, one set of elites may largely dominate the others. Empirically it is close to the Marxian and elitist model of social power; however, it differs sharply from them – in its insistence that “power can be structured to allow non-elites to exert some influence on both competing and dominant elites” (Olsen and Marger 1993: 84). In practice, the extent of this non-elite involvement varies widely, but in theory it could come quite influential. To disperse power and involve non-elites in power processes, the pluralist model calls for “a proliferation of autonomous groups, associations, and other organizations” (p. 84) located throughout a society. These are sometimes called “special interest” associations, or “intermediate” organizations. The intermediate organizations must possess several characteristics if pluralism is to operate effectively, such as,

- The overall network they compose, but not each association, must extend from grassroots up to national government.
- Each organization must also have sufficient resources to exert some amount of influence upward, and those that operate at the national level must wield sufficient power that governmental and other elites pay attention to them and involve them in decision-making processes.
- Each organization must be relatively specialized in its concerns and limited in its power exertion, so that none of them becomes so large and powerful that it can dominate the others. In other words, there must be a rough balance of power among all these organizations.
- The organization must have cross-cutting or overlapping memberships that link them together and prevent individuals from becoming too strongly attached to any single organization.
- The organization must be functionally independent and interrelated so that they need to cooperate as well as compete with one another.
- Finally, there must be widespread acceptance of a set of rules specifying how the organizations will operate in their effects to wield power and influence the government (Olsen and Marger 1993: 84-85).

Mobilization pluralism, as outlined by Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba (1963) and Marvin Olsen (1982), is essentially an extension of the mediation form of pluralist model. It addresses the question of how individual citizens can be mobilized to participate in political system through voting and other political activities. The thesis of mobilization pluralism argues that “citizens can
be mobilized for active political participation through involvement in all kind of non-political organizations and activities" (Olsen and Marger 1993: 86). These include not only voluntary-special interest associations, but also neighborhood and community affairs and decision-making processes within one’s workplace. Two features of this mobilization process are especially noteworthy:

- Mobilization can occur even when the level of social involvement is not extensive; non-active membership in one or two local associations will often lead to greater political activity.
- The mobilization process operates at all social class levels and hence can overcome the political apathy and feelings of powerlessness that are widespread among people with low socio-economic status (p 86).

**IV: The Foucaultian Perspective**

Much of Foucault's works demonstrate the constructed nature of some of our most established assumptions. Our notions such as power, selfhood, sexuality and reason are shown in his work to be historically contingent cultural products. His studies challenge the influence of German political philosopher Karl Marx and Austrian psychoanalyst Sigmund Freud. Foucault offers new concepts that challenge people’s assumptions about prisons, the police, insurance, care of the mentally ill, gay rights, and welfare. The main influences, I found, on Foucault’s thought are German philosophers Frederick Nietzsche and Martin Heidegger. Foucault’s thought explores the shifting patterns of power within a society and the ways in which power relates to the self. He investigated the changing rules governing the kind of claims that could be taken seriously as true or false at different times in history. He also studies how everyday practices enabled people to define their identities and systematize knowledge; events may be understood as being produced by nature, by human effort, or by God. Foucault argues that each way of understanding things had its advantages and its dangers. In all the books of his last period Foucault seeks to show that Western society has developed a new kind of power he calls bio-power, that is, a new system of control that traditional concepts of authority are unable to understand and criticize. Rather than being repressive, this new power enhances life.

Foucault's historical studies that reveal the power relations inherent in social practices may seem sometimes morally disturbing to many people. However, the intellectual sophistication in his writing, the discovery of power in every facet of society, and creation of a new stream between broad conflict and functional paradigms of Sociology are really astounding.
His notion of governmentality is important to understand the prevalence, continual extension and complexity of power in societies. The term ‘governmentality’ (‘gouvernementalité’) is a neologism Foucault presented and explored at the end of the 1970s (Foucault 1979; 1991 and 1984) that implies the establishment of complex social techniques and institutions to intensify and expand the mechanism of control and power over the population in the name of what became known as the ‘reason of state’. Governmentality, for Foucault, referred famously to the “conduct of conduct” (2000: 211), a more or less calculated and rational set of ways of shaping conduct and securing rule through a multiplicity of authorities and agencies in and outside of the state and at a variety of special levels, which he calls "art of government" (1979: 5), albeit negatively.

There are two aspects to governmentality in the Foucault’s writings. First, it is a concept based on the European historical context. Secondly, it implies a novel definition of power, which has profound implications for our understanding of contemporary political power and in particular public policy. For Foucault, the governmentality is the unique combination of three components: institutional centralization, intensification of the effects of power, and power/knowledge (Foucault 1979; Pignatelli 1993), that denotes “governmental rationality” (Gordon 1991). In speaking of governmentality, Foucault was referring not only to the domain of civil/political government as it is conventionally understood but to a broader domain of discourses and practices that create and administer subjects through the presence of a variety of knowledge-making apparatuses. Most significantly, the focus of a Foucaultian study of policy is on the broader impact of state policy or more exactly on the power effects across the entire social spectrum (macro level) down to individual’s daily life (micro level). Governmentality for Foucault refers not to sociologies of rule, but to quote Rose (1999: 21), to the:

  studies of strataums of knowing and acting. Of the emergence of particular regimes of truth concerning the conduct, ways of speaking truth, persons authorized to speak truth... of the invention and assemblage of partitcular apparatuses for exercising power... they are concerned with the conditions of possibility and intelligibility for ways of seeking to act upon conduct of others.

For Foucault, governmentality is a fundamental feature of the modern state. Most significantly, Foucault sees state authorities and policies as mobilizing governmentality which tries to incorporate the economy and the population into the political practices of the state in order to be able to govern effectively in a rational and conscious manner (Foucault 1991; Luke 1999). Governmentality, then, applies techniques of instrumental rationality to the arts of everyday management exercised over the economy, the society and the environment.

Recently there have been attempts to extend the concept of governmentality into the realm of development (for example, Watt 2003) and environment (see Luke 1999; Brosius 1999; Escobar
1995; Agrawal 2003; Darier 1999). Éric Darier, for example, deploys Foucault’s analytic tools to deconstruct contemporary environmental discourses, specifically the relations and technologies of power/knowledge that underpin them and the effects they have on individual conduct in private, daily life (cf. 1996a, b; 1999). He applies Foucauldian frame to the deployment of citizenship in Canadian environmental discourse to theorize what he calls “environmental governmentality”⁶:

Environmental governmentality requires the use of social engineering techniques to get the attention of the population to focus on specific environmental issues and to instill, in a non-openly coercive manner, new environmental conduct… [T]he challenge for the state is to find ways to make the population adopt new forms of environmental conduct. If coercion is not the principal policy instrument, the only real alternative is to make the population adopt a set of new environmental values, which would be the foundation of new widespread environmental ways of behaving. These new environmental values will be promoted by the establishment of an “environmental citizenship” (Darier, 1996b: 595).

The vision of “power-as-repression-and-production” presented in Foucault’s *Discipline and Punish* has been both embraced and rejected by many scholars. Foucault himself rejected this vision of power at the end of his life. Lukes (2005) calls it both extreme and misleading. However, Foucault’s knowledge/power regime propounded in his theory of governmentality is still a powerful framework for many post-modern scholars.

Conclusion:

Based on our sociological understanding of different model of social power, we can discern the following taxonomy of power in social organization:

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⁶ The term “Environmental/ Green Governmentality” or “Environmentality” has first been used by Luke (1995, 1997) who views it as an attempt by transnational environmental organizations to control and dominate environmental policy and activities around the world, but especially in developing countries. See also the collection of essays in Darier (1999). Agrawal’s (2003) use of the term is indebted to Luke for the coinage, but is different both in intent and meaning. He attempts to examine more insistently the shifts in subjectivities that accompany new forms of regulation rather than see regulation as an attempt mainly to control or dominate.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Models</th>
<th>SOURCE(S) OF POWER</th>
<th>POWER DYNAMICS</th>
<th>METHODS OF POWER EXERTION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Marxist | • Power emanates from Economic production  
• Relations of production: the class that control the key means of production | • Minority class (bourgeoisie) exerts power over the majority (proletariat)  
• Constant conflict towards social change  
• Prospect for a society for power-equity | Ideology (by Bourgeoisie) and force or violent revolution (by proletariat) |
| Elitist | • Focus primarily on polity, and give little attention to the economy as a source of power  
• Small set of controlling elite, oligarchy | • Oligarchy is necessary/inevitable for social organization  
• Hence, no need for social change towards power equity  
• Masses do not govern themselves, rather need to be governed | All means: force, dominance, authority, ideology and knowledge |
| Pluralist | • Many actors (power is not centralized to a few, but decentralized so as to be exerted by many)  
• Space for everyone to be of power, non-elite, many interest groups involve in power exertion. | • Elite pluralism: more than one elites compete for power  
• Mediation pluralism: among many elites, one set of elite tend to dominate  
• Mobilization pluralism: to mobilize individuals to participate in decision-making process | Decentralization, mobilization, cross-cutting membership etc. |
| Foucaultian | • Knowledge  
• Discipline  
• Institutions | • Bio-power: a new system of control that traditional concepts of authority are unable to understand and criticize  
• Rather than being repressive, this new power enhances life | Problematization, institutionalization, and normalization of power |

Power is one of the most pivotal as well as contentious concepts in sociology. Despite having contested and ambiguous nature, power remains a useful analytic tool in sociology as well as other disciplines of social sciences. Discourse of development is, for instance, comprised of, among many other sub-schools, four conspicuous paradigms: Marxist/dependency, liberal/modernization, community-based resource management (CBRM), and post-modern critique of development, drawn from the understanding of power from different perspectives discussed in this article. Dependency paradigm of development (see, Martin Khor 2001, Hoogvelt 2001) is based on the Marxist understanding of power; modernization paradigm embraces the elitist vision of power (e.g., Rostow 1960, Hunt 1989) while CBRM is drawn from pluralist model of power (Brosius et al 1998; Lynch and Talbot 1995; Li 2002). Post-modern critique of development (development as knowledge/power apparatus) propounded by Ferguson (1990), Escobar (1995), Luke (1999), Brosius (1999), Islam (2005), McMichael (2000) and some others is based on Foucaultian understanding of power. A comprehensive analysis of, and debate around,
all perspectives of power has a good possibility to provide us with a better understanding of this important yet complex and contentious concept in social organization.

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