

Democratic Consolidation and Good Governance in Africa: Assessing the Incidences of Poverty and Corruption in Four African States

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Abstract: *There are exciting - yet daunting – times to assess democratic countries in Africa. After years of democratic experiment and its familiar contours, the democratic revolutions of the last decades have challenged observers to think anew about the conditions creating and sustaining democracy. Paradoxically, even as countries that have been ruled for over a decade with democratic institutions, the political-economic challenges epitomized by poverty and corruption has put their democracy on the radii of assessment. Rather than being assuaged, it has accentuated disloyalty, disunity and insurgency against the states. With countries like Zambia, Kenya, Ghana and Nigeria in focus, the democratization in Africa has been illusory than fundamental. The transition had been more of patrimonialism and confrontational than the promise of abatement of poverty and institutional corruption. With extensive review of secondary data and statistical reports from international organizations, the paper assesses the incidences of corruption and poverty in these countries through a Simple Discriminant Analysis (with Linear Regression, Correlation Co-efficient and co-efficient of determination). It helps to appreciate the sensibility of the people to their democratic institutions and framework of representative participation in governance. The paper concludes that the rising incidences of militancy and insurgency against the state are not unconnected to democratically induced poverty and public sector corruption in African countries.*

Keywords: Democracy, Good governance, Poverty, Corruption, Africa

Introduction

There are exciting - yet daunting – times to assess democratic countries in Africa. After years of democratic experiment and its familiar contours, the democratic revolutions of the last decades have challenged observers to think anew about the conditions creating and sustaining democracy. The evidence of democratic governance's usefulness, in spite of its anomalies had been prevalent through opportunities for economic transformation, self-actualization and development, as well as making these countries veritable players in the world politics because of the dominance of democracy over any other known or yet to be discovered systems of governance.

Paradoxically, even as countries that have been ruled for over a decade with democratic institutions, the political-economic challenges epitomized by poverty and corruption has put their democracy on the radii of assessment. Rather than getting the challenges assuaged, it has accentuated disloyalty, disunity and insurgency against the states. Some scholars and observers, such as Michael and Nicholas de Walle (1992), even argue that democratization in Africa “has been more illusory than fundamental”, because the

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transition had been that of neopatrimonialism, even from patrimonialism. Some inherent domestic problems and contradictions in the political economy of some of these African states had made the challenges facing this experiment tagged “democracy and good governance” project in Africa many and complex (Obi and Svard, 2006).

Even though the project was part of the gradual but concerted efforts of Africans to reverse the trend of political despair and disillusionment, which hitherto characterized political life in Africa especially in the 1980s. The despair had manifested in the long years of political misrule and bad governance, exemplified by personalized political regimes and ruthless dictatorships had left most African states politically demobilized and economically decapitated with an immiserated population ravaged by poverty, illiteracy and all sorts of evils. It would have been a welcome development if the experiment had been sustained and consolidated, but regrettably Africa continues to harbor the highest stock of the world’s poorest people and the political life of the people was not better than previously (Bratton, Mattes and Gyimah-Boadi, 2005).

Similarly, in the attempt to unravel the dynamics of democratic practice in the African states, we saw that the underlying persistence of the West’s inclinations to engage in democracy promotion in the third world nations is based more on economic and political rationales than on true devotion to democracy (Azeez, 2006a). Despite efforts by western nations to conceal ulterior motives, their deeds often give the lie to their intentions. Although official western rhetoric seems to suggest a goal of improving conditions in third world countries by striking some sort of balance between individual rights and the responsibilities of the state, the reality is baffling at best. There are grounds to doubt the sincerity of western countries that claim to want to promote good governance, aid the growth of democracy, and thereby promote economic growth, social progress and combat poverty. What matters to the western powers in the developing nations is not democracy and its potential virtues, but the policy goal of making them politically more stable, economically more secure, and safer for financial investment.

In the word of Lynder Chalker, the Tory British Minister of Overseas Development from 1989 to 1997:

(good governance) is not neo-colonialist or neo-imperialist. (it) cannot be imposed on developing countries, but their efforts can be sustained and helped effectively only through a just and democratic system of good governance, in a world, which interests are served by a healthy global economy and open trading environment.(Cox, 2000: 9) (emphasis mine)

Therefore, the “divine mandate” to democratize the third world countries has a troubling resemblance with the colonialism of the nineteenth centuries. According to Georg Sovensen, in his article titled ***The Impasse of Third World Democratization: Africa Revisited***, “western countries pursue their own agenda, irrespective of broader consequences for democracy.”(Sovensen, 2000: 9).

With countries like Zambia, Kenya, Ghana and Nigeria in focus, the paper looks at good governance in Africa, with emphasis on corruption and associated poverty (measured through the Human Development Index, HDI) with a view to examining the prospect of democratic consolidation in the region. It examines the rate of change and the corresponding effect of the independent variable (corruption) on the dependent variable (poverty/HDI).

- **Hypothesis 1:** *There is no corresponding rate of change between corruption and human development*
- **Hypothesis 2:** *The trend of influence of corruption on poverty is not similar in the four African countries*

With extensive review of literature to answer these hypotheses, the paper also engages the reports from both Transparency International and United Nations, to statistically quantify and assess incidences of public sector corruption and poverty, using a Simple Discriminant Analysis (with Linear Regression, Correlation Co-efficient and co-efficient of determination). The statistics examine the trends, pattern and variations in the performance of these countries on these global measuring instruments.

Conceptual Clarification

Good Governance

The term 'Governance' has three dimensions: form of political regime, the process by which authority is exercised to manage a country's economic and social resources and the capacity of government to formulate and implement its policies and to discharge its functions. Thus governance has three spheres political, economic and administrative. By saying 'Good governance' I mean a system for establishing and maintaining accountability, transparency and efficiency in all spheres of governmental and administrative machinery. Good governance is not something to be desired by the government delegating some of its powers and functions to the informal organs but a formal outcome of a new social configuration of institutions resulting in a new social contract (an ideology) and redefining the pluralistic state in the Constitution.

It is believed that these features of good governance can most effectively address the social ills of poverty and corruption. Good governance doesn't only aim to maintain economic stability and attaining higher economic growth rather it also means to take measures to provide public safety, maintenance of law and order which would make it possible to stimulate the economy to raise output and employment. Three main features of good governance can be discussed here as the remedial of poverty and corruption. Accountability and transparency are the pertinent features of good governance. Public officials should be

held accountable for poor performance or delayed actions. Such accountability ensures better performance of the officials and also the appropriate use of public resources.

Good governance also ensures transparency in government operation like how major political parties function, sources of their fund, the routes to leadership, the way in which the cabinet system works and the checks and balances containing the power of the Presidents. It is argued that greater accountability and transparency of the public sector can make the state more responsive to the needs of the poor; it enables the poor to raise their 'voice' to influence service provision. Lack of accountability and transparency also encourages corruption. Because corruption means 'abuse of public power for private gains' corruption does have a long term impact on the poor.

Democratic Consolidation

By democratic consolidation, we refer to how the practice of democracy will become so entrenched in the minds and psyche of the people that its smooth operation and effective functioning would be taken for granted. To scholars these democratic practices involves healthy competition for all governmental position of power, mass participation by the adult population in the processes and procedures for choosing leaders and governments, and enjoyment of certain fundamental freedoms that are *sine qua non* to the exercise of the right to participate in the choice of leaders and policies (Schedler, 1998; 91-107). It is this arrangement to consolidate that Diamond (1994:6) observed would "involve such political challenges as constructing strong procedural commitment to constitutionalism and the rule of law, which lead people to value democracy even when it does not perform well economically". He believes the deliberate cultivation of the requisite attitudinal disposition towards democracy can deepen it in the minds of the people and thus ensure that its operation become institutionalized to the extent that it becomes 'the only game in town' (Linz and Stepan, 1996; 16).

Whereas the acceptance is contingent upon the democratic system satisfying the basic needs and expectations of the people such as welfare needs, food security, provision of adequate security for life and property, provision and maintenance of essential modern infrastructure, guarantee of economic rights, and respect for fundamental human rights and basic freedoms. These, in the current African political parlance represent the dividends they expect to derive from democratic rule.

The critical question to ponder is whether Africa's current romance with democratic ideas noting its differences and incongruence with African norms and practices, has any chance of surviving or enduring beyond the level of mere infatuation. If not, then the dangers of reversal are ever present.

Corruption

It is not intrinsically useful to make qualitative distinctions between corruptions in various parts of the world. At the end of the day it often means the same thing: the abuse of public office for private gain. However, this can be broken up into petty corruption, grand corruption and looting. Petty corruption involves relatively

minor amounts of money or gifts changing hands where one of the parties is themselves a relatively minor official in the organization or system within which the transaction takes place. For example, it's a common thing to see policemen in Nigeria demanding as little as N20 from motorists to ignore the fact that their car's license has expired. Grand corruption most often involves businessmen and government officials of senior rank and the figures involved are significant. Examples of these are kick-backs paid to officials on government public works contracts.

The third type of corruption is 'looting' and has recently been described by some commentators as large-scale economic delinquency. It differs slightly from petty and grand corruption, however, and is sadly prevalent in the developing countries where institutions of governance are particularly weak. It usually involves the kind of scams whose figures are so huge that when they are successfully concluded they have macroeconomic implications fairly quickly - they cause banks to collapse, inflation to rise and the exchange rate to decline. The impetus for looting is often political and it happens under the direction or with the acquiescence of important political players in a given country. It often involves, for example, the printing of currency to fund fictitious projects, using public revenues to award enormous contracts to individuals who never supply the goods or the services. The primary movers in the companies behind these scams don't just cream off 10 or 20 percent with a cut within that for the higher-ups. In these deals the cut can be as high as 100 percent and most of the cash goes to the higher-ups. These resources fund election campaigns and pay for private militias in many African countries. Another important distinction between grand corruption and looting is that in cases of grand corruption a minister may take a kickback of \$100,000 on a government road construction contract worth a million dollars. The road is built but its quality does not reflect its cost. Looting on the other hand is a much more premeditated activity because it often entails the deliberate creation of a government project for which resources will be allocated and spent but the project is not meant to be completed from the outset.

Poverty

Although, a concise and universally accepted definition of poverty is elusive, this is largely because it affects many aspects of the human condition, including the physical, moral and physiological conditions. But different criteria have been adopted in the extant literature in order to arrive at a basic, if not intrinsic conception of poverty. To some, it is conventionally a result of insufficient income for securing basic goods and services; others view it, in part, as a function of education, health, life expectancy, child mortality etc. While to others, it has to do with the levels of consumption and expenditure (Ajakaiye and Adeyeye 2001:8-40). But, for the purpose of this work, the World Bank perception of poverty shall be appropriate because of its comprehensiveness, which sees poverty in very broad terms, such as being unable to meet "basic needs" – (physical – food, health care, education, shelter etc., and non-physical-participation, identity etc.) requirements for a meaningful life (World Bank 1996). According to the report, poverty can be the outcome of insufficient use of common resources. This may result from weak policy environment, inadequate

infrastructure, weak access to technology, credit etc. It may also in some cases be due to certain groups using certain mechanisms in the system to exclude “problem groups” from participating in economic development, including the democratic process.

Good Governance and Democratic Consolidation in Four African Countries

As earlier stated, the challenges facing democratic rule in Africa are many and complex. To Julius Ihonybere (1996) and John Mbaku (1998), these include entrenching constitutionalism and the reconstruction of the post-colonial state, preventing military intervention in politics, instituting structures for effective management of ethnic diversity, promoting sustainable development and well enforced property right regimes, nurturing effective leadership, combating the HIV/AIDS pandemic, empowering women, managing globalization, protecting the youth, safeguarding human rights and the rule of law.

In this work however, attention would be given to poverty and corruption and their effects on engendering good democratic governance, popular participation of Africans with a view to achieving democratic consolidation. To the extent also that corruption in the public sectors had been the major cause of poverty among Africans (Azeez, 2006b). Luke Amadi (2012) observed that in five decades of political independence of most African countries, the major challenges of corruption in Africa became poverty, inequality and lack of economic well-being. Whereas, most countries of East Asia have transformed to developmental states (Young, 1990), it was observed that the only two African states whose macro-economic statistics come close to matching Asian norms are Botswana and Mauritius, the only countries to enjoy democratic rule and least corruption index throughout the post-independence period (Collier, 2007). Corruption, studies have revealed constitutes a major problem in most of the developing world. It tends to hamper investment and economic growth, aggravates problems of underground economies, exacerbates the difference between rich and poor, creates obstacles to economic and political reforms, and can in the long run cause very considerable losses of human welfare (Azeez, 2011). To the Transparency International, poorly equipped schools, counterfeit medicine and elections decided by money are just some of the consequences of public sector corruption. Bribes and backroom deals don't just steal resources from the most vulnerable – they undermine justice and economic development, and destroy public trust in government and leaders (<http://www.transparencyinternational.org>).

To start with, the debilitating poverty of the people accentuated by economic crisis and bad governance seems to have provided a basis and indeed, a common platform in the demand for frequent change of leadership by the people. The extent of agitation for regimes changes because of the frailties and uncertainties of a viable democratic rule and good governance had made mess any attempt to stick to democracy despite its significances. While majority of the would-be electorate live in abject poverty in the face of plenty, the leaders were busy engaging themselves in the looting and scavenging public fund to

satisfy both their selfish interests and the yearnings of their foreign sponsors. This has in many ways reduced the confidence in the leadership, and followership had degenerated into compulsion and patriotism elusive in the mind of the people. By implication good governance that democracy requires to be consolidated had in many occasion in Africa suffer company (Dike, 2005).

Researches conducted across Africa had shown lack of commitment to democratic ideals and values by Africans who ordinarily would have been jubilating for their deliverance from long years of military misrule, but as a result of poverty and corruption, they find themselves at limbo in the choice of better procedure for ensuring good governance. To the researchers, good governance requires public accountability of government officials, transparency in government procedures, rule of law and public sector management (Olukoshi, 1992; Nunnekamp, 1995). The World Bank adds that the process of evolving good governance especially in Africa require also the shrinking of the state and engendering support for non-state actors (civil society) (World Bank, 1994:2).

Reports of the studies conducted across Africa however gave a complete departure from any attempt at good governance and its attendant democratic consolidation. For example, the 1999 national opinion survey conducted in Zambia by Afro barometer (Simutanyi, 2002) to measure public attitude to democratic and economic reforms gave an indication of lack of trust in the democratic experiment, despite their little nostalgia for the former one-party regimes. The report indicated the apathy of the electorate to the electoral process due to their precarious living standard. Despite the inauguration of democratic rule in their country in the 1990s, their lives remain almost the same or even worsen. In fact, the few voters who usually turn-out to vote in elections, majority of them do so because of the fact that they have at one time or the other received "motivational payment" from the candidate(s) contesting in the election, thus, votes in favor of their 'benefactor', not minding whether such a candidate has their interests in mind or not. This is just a replica of effects of poverty on democracy in most African countries, Nigeria, Ghana, and Kenya etc inclusive.

Apart from poverty level of the Zambians, Zambians have very low levels of trust in their political institutions because of relatively high perceptions of the levels of corruption. In Zambia, democracy is frequently understood in terms of civil liberties, freedoms and participation in decision making. Zambians are fairly cynical with regard to official corruption, according to research carried out, over 50% stated that "almost all" or "most" officials in government are involved in corruption (Uslaner, 2007). Ordinary civil servants are also viewed in quite a negative light (50%), followed by Local Government officials (42%), and about 40% of Zambians, sees significant corruption among parliamentarians. Thus, sadly enough, Zambians are not very optimistic about the positive impact of voting or the importance of who holds power.

Also, a survey undertaken by Transparency International (TI) on Zambia on perception of corruption in the electoral process indicates that the level of corruption was as extremely high as was respondents' tolerance of it. Electoral corruption erodes one of the fundamental pillars of good governance – ethical leadership.

So, Zambians hold the believe that as long as politicians are allowed to bribe their way to victory, leaders will be elected for no better reason than the number of chitenges (local currency) they hand out.

Moreover, the situation in Kenya is in no way different from other African countries. Kenya had for long been an island of peace and good sense in an otherwise turbulent region. And of course this had impacted positively on its economy, although many would argue that this is still largely driven and dominated by Whites and Asians and that much of the prosperity is witnessed only in the expatriate community. Regardless of this, Kenya appeared to have organized its politics in a fairly decent manner that insulated it from the earlier epidemic of military take-over in the continent or the latter phenomenon of election-related violence, civil war and failed state (Githong, 2006).

The struggle against corruption in Kenya, like most African countries is economic because it deepens poverty, exacerbates inequalities and makes for economies whose very structure is skewed. It is also political because corruption breeds impunity and undermines vital governance institutions sustaining shadow power structures. The fight against corruption in the country is also social and cultural because where impunity with regard to corruption prevails, one finds the corrupt transformed into latter day heroes and the principles of honesty and hard-work become unattractive (ACEG, 2000).

In similar vein, poverty is endemic and corruption is widespread and very disturbing in Ghana. In Ghana, poverty has two dimensions: income poverty and non-income/human poverty. Income dimension refers to a state of earnings that are too small to buy the basic necessities of life. Non-income/human dimension of poverty includes lack of access to education, health, lack of empowerment, participation etc. The two dimensions in Ghana invariably make the people poor and unequal. Studies revealed that more than 50% of the country's total population lives below poverty line though income poverty rate has been declining modestly. In the case of human poverty also Ghana seems to have achieved impressive gains particularly in terms of mortality reduction, decline in child malnutrition, increased rate of literacy and school enrollment etc. Despite these achievements, the level of human development is still very low in Ghana. In Human Development, Ghana ranks very low. There are also notable failures in some areas such as maternal health, child nutrition, food security, access to safe water, sanitation and electricity and overall safety of the masses.

Similarly, corruption is widespread in Ghana even among the religious sector. The concern of government officials is how best they can squeeze funds for their personal benefits and it has become institutionalized. Development projects with huge funds are undertaken every year but failing to achieve the goals. Officers are more concerned about their monetary gains from the projects than the greater benefit to the nation. Corruption also manifested through bribery, loan default, evasion of taxes and customers duties, nepotism in appointments, negligence of duties, and politicization of administration. The country is being seen as one of the corrupt countries of the world. Causes of such widespread corruption include low wages of public

servants, centralized decision making, inefficient rule application, misuse of power by the political and administrative elites and non-transparent administration.

Expectedly, the country has a bright future with its potentialities if poor governance could be replaced by good governance, massive corruption and poor management skill as well as dysfunctional leadership could be replaced by transparent and skilled management, 'out of control' law and order situation could be replaced by a controlled one. What the conscious people still see: politics and political practices are of wonder: deteriorating law and order situation, insecure public life, first in corruption for some years in row, politicized campus and distressful education situation, disappointing human rights and human development, incapability of economic policy and development infrastructure to alleviate mass poverty, unfriendly tax policy hindering industrialization, indiscipline in the industrial sector has made the most of the industries sick or closed, pretends and neglected agricultural sector and slow trend of its modernization, lack of investment friendly environment, massive bribery in the government offices, absence of a pro-poor health policy, arsenic contamination in ground water etc.

On the political scene in Nigeria, the supposed giant of Africa, the situation is worse. In fact Nigeria has been wracked by sporadic, often very sadly, economic crises even in the face of abundance owing to corruption and mismanagement of public fund by public servants; the electoral process which should ordinarily open up the democratic space to the vast majority of the people so that they can control and influence their own political destinies is actually deliberately configured to marginalize them. What is foisted on Nigerians in the name of democracy was a version of liberal democracy reduced to the crude simplicity of multi-party elections, (and) voting that never amounts to choosing, freedom which is patently spurious and political equality which disguises higher unequal power relations (Smith, 2006).

The entire electoral process in Nigeria, is manipulated through a plethora of ingenious and less than subtle devices such as outright and bare-faced rigging, pre-election ballot stuffing, ballot box disappearance or substitution, destruction of ballot boxes and disruption of voting in opponents' strongholds, intimidation of voters, bribing of electoral officials, deployment of terror tactics and violence (Fawole, 2005: 150). It is not surprising however, that many of these electoral irregularities are addressed by the Courts and the outcome mostly overturned by the tribunals.

In terms of poverty and corruption, Nigeria is prominent. In fact, it is extremely difficult if not impossible to conduct any election in Nigeria without manipulation, because of the benefits accrue to various political offices which no other civil endeavor or occupation in the country enjoy. Once somebody securely ascend to the corridor of state power through whatever means, the holder operates arbitrarily without much input from or even consideration for the wishes, sentiments and aspirations of the electorate, and without ever being accountable to them, it is an opportunity to get rich quickly and escape the scourge of poverty that pervades the entire nooks and crannies of the country; enjoy the sharing of the national cake which 'ordinary' citizen do not have access to. Asuquo (2011) established in his study that poor governance,

mismanagement of resources, corruption as well as poor execution of economic development policies and plans were all linked to political leadership in Nigeria. For instance, Nigeria's very poor governance standards of the Jonathan's administration stands alone and apart. The problem was monumental corruption which robs vital actors of funding, and also incompetence in governance. It is the type of corruption that allows as much as N2.6 trillion to be stolen from a single sub-head in a single year that has deprived the nation of funds to tackle the insecurity in the country (Mo Ibrahim, 2013). With failure in security due to corruption, it has prevented the country from making any meaningful progress in education, provision of healthcare services, development of infrastructure as well as all aspects of human and material developments.

Corruption Perception Index

Country	2005		2006		2007		2008		2009		2010		2011		2012		2013		2014	
	Rank	Score	Rank	Score	Rank	Score	Rank	Score	Rank	Score	Rank	Score	Rank	Score	Rank	Score	Rank	Score	Rank	Score
Ghana	65	35	70	33	69	37	67	39	69	39	62	41	69	39	64	45	63	46	61	48
Zambia	107	26	111	26	123	26	115	28	99	30	101	30	91	32	88	37	83	38	85	38
Kenya	144	21	142	22	150	21	147	21	146	22	154	21	154	22	139	27	136	27	145	25
Nigeria	152	19	142	22	147	22	121	27	130	25	134	24	143	24	139	27	144	25	136	27

Source: Transparency International

Human Development Index Trends, 2005 – 2013

Country	HDI Value 2005	HDI Value 2008	HDI Value 2010	HDI Value 2011	HDI Value 2012	HDI Value 2013
Ghana	0.511	0.544	0.556	0.566	0.571	0.573
Zambia	0.471	0.505	0.530	0.543	0.554	0.561
Kenya	0.479	0.508	0.522	0.527	0.531	0.535
Nigeria	0.466	0.483	0.492	0.496	0.500	0.504

Source: United Nation, Human Development Index

Data Analysis

GHANA

X	Y	X- \bar{X}	Y- \bar{Y}	(X- \bar{X}) (Y- \bar{Y})	(X- \bar{X}) ²	(Y- \bar{Y}) ²
35	0.511	-5.8333	-0.0425	0.2479	34.0273	0.001806
39	0.544	-1.8333	-0.0092	0.0174	3.3609	0.000085
41	0.556	0.1667	0.0025	0.0004	0.0277	0.000006
39	0.566	-1.8333	0.0125	-0.0229	3.3609	0.000156
45	0.571	4.1667	0.0175	0.0729	17.3614	0.000306
46	0.573	5.1667	0.0195	0.1008	26.6947	0.000380
245	3.321			0.4165	84.8329	0.002739

$$\bar{x} = 245/6 = 40.83$$

$$\bar{y} = 3.321/6 = 0.55$$

$$b = \frac{\sum(x - \bar{x})(y - \bar{y})}{\sum(x - \bar{x})^2}$$

$$= 0.4165/84.83 = \underline{\underline{4.91}}$$

$$r = \frac{\sum(x - \bar{x})(y - \bar{y})}{\sqrt{\sum(x - \bar{x})^2 \sum(y - \bar{y})^2}}$$

$$= 0.4165/\sqrt{84.8329 \times 0.002739} = 0.4165/\sqrt{0.2324} = \underline{\underline{0.86}}$$

$$r^2 = \underline{\underline{0.74}}$$

ZAMBIA

X	Y	X- \bar{X}	Y- \bar{Y}	(X- \bar{X}) (Y- \bar{Y})	(X- \bar{X}) ²	(Y- \bar{Y}) ²
26	0.471	-5.83	-0.06	0.35	33.99	0.0036
28	0.505	-3.83	-0.03	0.12	14.67	0.0009
30	0.530	-1.83	0	0	3.35	0
32	0.543	0.17	0.01	0.002	0.03	0.0001
37	0.554	5.17	0.02	0.10	26.73	0.0004
38	0.561	6.17	0.03	0.19	38.07	0.0009
191	3.164			0.762	116.84	0.0059

$$\bar{x} = 191/6 = 31.83$$

$$\bar{y} = 3.164/6 = 0.53$$

$$b = \frac{\sum(x - \bar{x})(y - \bar{y})}{\sum(x - \bar{x})^2}$$

$$= 0.762/116.84 = \underline{\underline{6.52}}$$

$$r = \frac{\sum(x - \bar{x})(y - \bar{y})}{\sqrt{\sum(x - \bar{x})^2 \sum(y - \bar{y})^2}}$$

$$= 0.762/\sqrt{116.84 \times 0.0059} = 0.762/\sqrt{0.689} = \underline{\underline{0.92}}$$

$$r^2 = \underline{\underline{0.85}}$$

KENYA

X	Y	X- \bar{X}	Y- \bar{Y}	(X- \bar{X}) (Y- \bar{Y})	(X- \bar{X}) ²	(Y- \bar{Y}) ²
21	0.479	-2.17	-0.041	0.09	4.71	0.001681
21	0.508	-2.17	-0.012	0.03	4.71	0.000144
21	0.522	-2.17	0.002	-0.01	4.71	0.000004
22	0.527	-1.17	0.007	-0.01	1.37	0.000049
27	0.531	3.83	0.011	0.04	14.67	0.000121
27	0.535	3.83	0.015	0.06	14.67	0.000225
139	3.102			0.20	44.84	0.002224

$$\bar{x} = 139/6 = 23.17$$

$$\bar{y} = 3.102/6 = 0.52$$

$$b = \frac{\sum(x - \bar{x})(y - \bar{y})}{\sum(x - \bar{x})^2}$$

$$= 0.20/44.84 = \mathbf{0.004}$$

$$r = \frac{\sum(x - \bar{x})(y - \bar{y})}{\sqrt{\sum(x - \bar{x})^2 \sum(y - \bar{y})^2}}$$

$$= 0.20/\sqrt{44.84 \times 0.002224} = 0.20/\sqrt{0.0997} = \mathbf{0.63}$$

$$r^2 = \mathbf{0.40}$$

NIGERIA

X	Y	X- \bar{X}	Y- \bar{Y}	(X- \bar{X})(Y- \bar{Y})	(X- \bar{X}) ²	(Y- \bar{Y}) ²
19	0.466	-5.33	-0.02	0.107	28.41	0.0004
27	0.483	2.67	-0.007	-0.019	7.13	0.000049
24	0.492	-0.33	0.002	-0.001	0.11	0.000004
24	0.496	-0.33	0.006	-0.002	0.11	0.000036
27	0.500	2.67	0.01	0.027	7.13	0.0001
25	0.504	0.67	0.014	0.009	0.45	0.000196
146	2.941			0.121	43.34	0.000785

$$\bar{x} = 146/6 = 24.33$$

$$\bar{y} = 2.941/6 = 0.49$$

$$b = \frac{\sum(x - \bar{x})(y - \bar{y})}{\sum(x - \bar{x})^2}$$

$$= 0.121/43.34 = \mathbf{0.003}$$

$$r = \frac{\sum(x - \bar{x})(y - \bar{y})}{\sqrt{\sum(x - \bar{x})^2 \sum(y - \bar{y})^2}}$$

$$= 0.121/\sqrt{43.34 \times 0.000785} = 0.121/\sqrt{0.034} = \mathbf{0.66}$$

$$r^2 = \mathbf{0.44}$$

Summary of Findings

Country	b = Regression	r = correlation	r ² = determination
Ghana	4.91	0.86	0.74

Zambia	6.52	0.92	0.85
Kenya	0.004	0.63	0.40
Nigeria	0.003	0.66	0.44

Interpretation

The rule of thumb for co-efficient of determination is 60:40, such that 0.6 (60%) determination co-efficient is the minimum acceptable r^2 (co-efficient of determination) for high value of r^2 , which is suggestive of the fact that the independent variable (X) is the real, actual or main inducer or determinant of the dependent variable (Y). Also, 0.4 (or 40%) and below determination co-efficient interpret low value of r^2 , meaning that the independent variable (X) is not the real or actual inducer of the dependent variable (Y). So, to this extent, the researcher should consider some other factors to ascertain the actual inducer of the dependent variable. Not only that, r^2 of 0.5 (or 50%) suggests that the independent variable may or may not be the inducer of the dependent variable.

Consequent upon this, the determinant co-efficient of 0.74 and 0.85 for Ghana and Zambia respectively suggest that in both countries, corruption (independent variable - X) is the main inducer of poverty, measured through Human Development Index (HDI) (dependent variable – Y). This is supported by the strength of relationship between corruption (X) and HDI (Y) of r equals 0.86 and 0.92 respectively in the two countries. Furthermore, it was revealed that the rate of change between corruption and HDI in both countries are 4.91 and 6.52 respectively, which imply that a unit change in corruption will produce 4.91 and 6.52 unit change in HDI for Ghana and Zambia respectively. By the positive nature of the correlation co-efficient and the rate of change (b), it shows that the nature of relationship between corruption and poverty in both countries is positive. Hence, the higher the corruption rate, the higher the poverty level and the lower the human capital development, and vice versa.

However, the determinant co-efficient of 0.40 and 0.44 determines that corruption is not the main inducer of poverty or lower HDI in Kenya and Nigeria respectively. This does not mean that there is no relationship between the two variables, as their correlation co-efficient 'r' suggests a high strength of relationship of 0.63 and 0.66 respectively. But, that corruption is not the main inducer of poverty is clearly evident by the rate of change between corruption index and HDI in both countries, which show that a unit change in corruption rate will produce 0.004 and 0.003 unit change in HDI of both countries respectively. That is, it is only 1,000 unit change in corruption index that can bring about 4 and 3 units change in HDI of Kenya and Nigeria respectively.

Conclusion

It is obvious from the preceding analysis that there is a relationship between corruption and poverty. Like in most other countries in Africa, the study has clearly revealed that corruption has been the cankerworm that has bedeviled democratic governance and development in these four African states. However, it was discovered that, though corruption is prevalent, some other variables had to be factored

in to determine the actual determinant of poverty and its associated malaise in some of the studied countries.

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