Bangladesh e-Journal of Sociology

Volume 16, Number 2.

July 2019

ISSN 1819-8465
The Official Journal of

Bangladesh Sociological Society

Committed to the advancement of sociological research and publication.
# Contents

**Note from the Editor: Bangladesh in New York**  
Page 4

**Globalization is Dead, Long Live Globalization!**  
S. Aminul Islam  
Page 16

**Impasse in Globalization Theory and Beyond**  
Page 16

**Boko-Haram and Social Identity Theory: Explaining the Enigma that is Threatening National and Regional Peace in Africa**  
O. Okafor Samuel and Raimi Lasisi  
Page 53

**A Sociological Analysis of the Medicalization Process of Pregnancy and Child Birth in Bangladesh**  
Bijoy Krishna Banik  
Page 78

**In Search of Models for Healthcare Delivery in Multi-Cultural Africa**  
Abdullahi Ali Arazeem and Moshood Issah  
Page 97

**Comparing Multi-Ethnic Countries in Providing Territorial Autonomy to Ethnic Groups**  
Mogau Petrus Sekgala and T. Isaac Mokgopo  
Page 113

**The use of Ethnicity in Ethiopia in Determining Internal Boundaries**  
T. Isaac Mokgopo  
Page 127

**The Governance, Taxation and Regulation of Beneficiary Funds in South Africa**  
Lufuno T. Nevondwe  
Page 147

**Minorities and Cultural Identity: Insights on Shia Women of Kashmir**  
M. Saleem Jehangir and Shugufa Akhter  
Page 156

**The Juxtaposition of Antagonistic Urban Landscapes: Rural-Urban Interface in South African Cities**  
N. Johannes Mokoele  
Page 167

**Breaking the Traditional Trap: Improving Food and Nutrition Security through Science Technology and Innovation in Zimbabwe**  
J Tinarwo and D E Uwizeyimana  
Page 178

**Examining Age, Pay Satisfaction and Intent to Leave in Counterproductive Work Behaviour among University Support Staff**  
Abiodun M. Lawal, Sunday S. Babalola and Uzor Friday Ordu  
Page 194

**Blowing the Anti-Graft Whistle with Rewarding Rigour and Legal Vulnerability: A Turning Point in Nigeria’s Democratic Space?**  
Mike Omilusi  
Page 206
Bangladesh e-Journal of Sociology
(Biannual e-Journal of the Bangladesh Sociological Society)

Editor
Nazrul Islam
Professor of Sociology

Associate Editor
S. Aminul Islam
University of Dhaka

Managing Editor
M. Imdadul Haque
University of Dhaka

Book Review Editor
A.I. Mahbub Uddin Ahmed
University of Dhaka

Web Master: Faridul Islam, University of Dhaka

Emails:
editor@bangladeshsociology.org
nislamsoc@gmail.com

Published on the Internet

URL: http://www.bangladeshsociology.org
http://www.bangladeshsociology.net

Published by
Bangladesh Sociological Society

From
Room No. 1058, Arts Faculty Building
University of Dhaka, Ramna, Dhaka -1000

Phone: 88-0172-717-7666. Email: muahmed@du.ac.bd

Views expressed in the articles are those of the authors and are purely academic in nature.
Note from the Editor

Bangladesh in New York

Very recently, thanks to the You Tube, I had an opportunity to listen to a debate organized by a literary society in Kolkata on a rather pointless motion which went something like this, “Kolkata is the Past of Bengali Culture while Dhaka is its Future”. I was not sure what they were actually debating about since neither culture nor the notion of the past and future were clearly defined, although it appeared that they were debating about the “richness” of culture of West Bengal as opposed to the culture of East Bengal, which may have some meaning in literature but no one either from the organizers or the six members of the two contending teams offered any definition of what that richness includes. The motion sounded as if the whole of Bengali culture began in Kolkata and its future lies in Dhaka. Two of the debaters who defended the motion were from Bangladesh, the others were from Kolkata’s cultural scene: authors, artists, literary critiques etc. But what all of them forgot was the fact that Dhaka was already about one thousand years in the past (at least from 7th century on ward) before Kolkata even became a trading post for the East India Company. This Dhaka of the past, situated in an around the present day city like in Sonar Gaon or Bikrampur, being centrally located and accessible by huge rivers connecting it directly to the Bay of Bengal, was the commercial and the industrial heart, which in the pre-British days generated over 12% of world GDP or half of the total GDP of South Asia, and often served as the political capital of the whole of Bengal, therefore, became the focal point not only of international trade but also of the culture of the region and, of course, of the Bangla language. Indeed, Bangla language and literature saw much of its growth and development during the past millennium mostly under the patronage of the Muslim rulers of Bengal residing in and around Dhaka. So the past of the Bangla language, art, literature and the culture in general does not originate in Kolkata. If anything, it was based in Dhaka.

The notion of the “past” of Bengali culture being located in Kolkata, therefore, is hugely misplaced. However, what the debaters were largely referring to was the period when the British ruled India from Kolkata and gave rise to a group of English educated Bengali people, almost totally Hindu, who wholeheartedly collaborated with the Brits in exploiting the country, particularly East Bengal. These English educated people, encouraged by Western culture, gave rise to a new brand of “high caste” Hindu culture in Kolkata primarily during the early 19th to the early 20th century, dominated the arts, music, language, literature and drama, indeed the whole cultural scene of Bengal. This culture of Kolkata originating among the upper caste Hindu traders, government servants and landlords, including the absentee landlords who resided in Kolkata but literally owned much of the then East Bengal, was known to the Brits as “Babu Culture” (Babu
being a derogatory term to the Brits) and to the Babu’s themselves as the “Bhadralok Culture”, Bhadralok, meaning refined and genteel as opposed to the rustic and vulgar culture of the common folk, particularly of the people of East Bengal, including that of Dhaka. Hence, prose, poetry, drama and the arts, and Bangla language fully dominate by Sanskrit came to be heralded as the “High Culture” of the Bhadralok, while the native culture; folk-lore, folk art, literature, music and drama, etc. got demoted as the culture of the lowly peasants of East Bengal and, therefore, Dhaka.

Indeed, this Kolkata culture was seen in sharp contrast to the culture of Dhaka, and East Bengal, infused with Arabic, Persian and Urdu, basically Islamic, elements in the language and culture in general. A derogatory term “Bangal” was coined to identify the people of East Bengal and their culture while “Chasha”, another derogatory term, was used to refer to the “lowly” peasants of this eastern region by the people of Kolkata. This notion of inferior “Bangal” is so pervasive in Kolkata culture that even in 1992 when I visited Kolkata a street vendor shouted out the word “Bangal” behind me as I walked passed his store. I was not speaking in any particular Bangla accent or interacting with anyone to be easily recognised but just my demeanour, the end result of my “Dhaka culture”, differentiated me from the Kolkata crowd to the extent that even a street vendor recognised me as coming from East Bengal\(^1\). Seventy years of separation of the two Bengals has not made much of a dent in the level of that prejudice!

And as Kolkata prospered in economy, commerce and industry, along with being the capital of British India, Dhaka was robbed of its primacy and fell from a city of one million in the pre-British days to a city of as little as thirty thousand people, losing not only its grandeur but also its dominant position in the culture of the region. Positioned as the capital of British India, Kolkata dominated the Bengali culture as well as acted as the cultural capital of India in general. But things began to change after the partitions of Bengal, first in 1905 and then in 1947.

After the first partition in 1905 in which West Bengal comprising of the Hindu majority districts of Bengal (Bihar and parts of Orissa) with Kolkata at its centre was separated from and the Muslim majority eastern districts of East Bengal plus Assam with Dhaka as its capital thereby returning some of the previous prominence to the ancient city. There was a hue and cry against this partition largely from among the absentee landlords residing in Kolkata, including RabindrabathTagore, the “crowning glory” of the Kolkata culture, who personally owned huge estates in East Bengal, and the Bhadralok in general. The Brits finally conceded and reunited Bengal in 1911 but they were a bit too clever for the Bhadralok of Kolkata and they dealt a fatal blow to Kolkata by shifting the capital of the British India to Delhi depriving the “Babus” of Kolkata the pre-eminence they had over the rest of India.

\(^1\) I have written more on this in the previous issue (“Note from the Editor” in Bangladesh e-Journal of Sociology, Vol. 16 Number 1).
At the same time the Brits also began to offer some concessions to the Muslims in keeping with their divide and rule policy and opened the University of Dhaka thus allowing the “Bangals” to get some “education” and exposure to Western learning. Dhaka immediately thereafter, in December 1906, provided the setting for the establishment of the Muslim League, which within the next forty years successfully led movements for the creation of Pakistan, a state for the Muslims in India in 1947. But that was not enough or satisfying, and in the next twenty-five years Dhaka created not only a whole new nation based on its own language and culture but the independent state of Bangladesh as well, not too bad for the “Bangals” frowned upon by the Kolkata Culture.

The Second Partition in 1947 that divided Bengal into East Pakistan with Dhaka as its capital and West Bengal with Kolkata as its capital and made them parts of two new countries of south Asia, Pakistan and India, effectively sealed the fate of Kolkata as being the centre of anything. Kolkata from being the capital of British Raj turned into the provincial capital of a rather small and increasingly an impoverished state, one among many other larger and more prosperous states of India. Flight of commerce and industry followed in its wake and whatever remained got owned by investors from the other states, mostly from the west of India. The culture got intertwined with the cultures of the rest of the Indian states, and due to the onslaught of Hindi language and the Bollywood movies, Kolkata culture and even the Bangla language today can barely breathe freely. I remember in many of my visits to the city I found that the language of the streets had effectively changed to Hindi, hardly any shopkeeper, or service personnel in government and other offices addressed me in Bengali, they simply addressed me in Hindi. When language is gone, culture is gone too. Bangla as a language in Kolkata may still reside in the university campuses and its culture in Shantinikhetan but by and large the culture it supports is “gone” out of circulation. At any cultural or social gathering Hindi is freely mixed with Bangla and not owning Hindi tantamount to being “non-Indian”!

Today Kolkata is not even the dominant city in India, inspite of the much talked about recent economic growth, largely fuelled by millions of Bangladeshi tourists spending billions on medical treatments and bridal shoping. It is difficult for Kolkata culture to make it up to Delhi, let alone the world. Education, arts, literature, music, drama etc. all have a better or “higher” counterpart in other parts of India. So the high culture of Kolkata or its “glorious past” was confined to about a century between the 19th and 20th centuries during the British rule and has lost its authority long since even in India. Bengali is just one among many of the state languages of India and barely surviving from the encroachment of languages from the other parts of India and the same is true of Kolkata based Bengali culture. The high culture of Kolkata was just a flicker on a larger stage of the whole of Bengal with thousands of years of its history.

While on the other hand, Dhaka by the 1947 partition again became a provincial capital and then after 1971 the capital of a sovereign state and launched its independent path to cultural revival. Today, Dhaka is not only the centre of commerce, industry and politics but is also the cultural capital of a “country” and represents the same on a world stage. The education of the “Bangals” which began in earnest with the
setting up of the University of Dhaka has today flourished, through nearly 150 universities, in all sciences and arts, technology, medicine and commerce and, if not greater, it is definitely on equal terms with Kolkata. The partition has also set free its long suppressed culture and began to redefine itself in a new setting and soon sought to project itself to the rest of the world in ways that cannot even be dreamt of by the present day Kolkata culture. Bengali, the vehicle of this culture, is today the proud language of a country, which was fought for with blood while Dhaka culture transformed that bleeding into a fight for all mother languages of the world and February 21, the day of bloodshed, got recognised internationally as "Mother Language Day". That language, free of Kolkata culture, continues to incorporate local variations of dialects and accents, no longer encumbered by Sanskritization it freely incorporates words and definitions from other languages including retaining the previous influences of Arabic, Persian and Urdu. One speaker who defended Kolkata Culture in the debate termed this trend as detestable while he himself was open to the incorporation of Hindi into Kolkata's Bengali forgetting completely that Hindi is just a variant of Urdu, with the recent incorporation of more Sanskrit words in place of Persian and Arabic ones and written in Devanagari script instead of Arabic script.

A number of such other "trivial" issues were raised in the debate mostly misplaced or misinformed but in any case I cited this debate not to add to it or even to flame further debates. My primary objective is to show how the Bangladesh of today, the "Bangals" of the British Raj or the rustic "Chashas", have fared when it came to confront other cultures. Indeed, the strength or tenacity of a culture can be judged best when it confronts other societies and cultures. So let's look at the present of both Kolkata and Dhaka "cultures" before we predict their future. Kolkata culture today is crumbling, getting drowned, in the face of competition from others within its own doors, let alone the whole country or even the world. While the Dhaka, or the Bangladeshi, culture against all odds, including also the onslaught of Hindi and Bollywood culture through the social and mass media, is flourishing all over the world. For one thing, even the Kolkata literary society today thinks that it is appropriate to compare the cultures of the "two" Bengals!

Remember the "China Town" all over the world. It is the strength or the tenacity of thousands of years of Chinese culture because of which wherever the Chinese have gone they have built for themselves a niche, where Chinese culture announces itself proudly. Be it in Europe, USA, Canada or even in Kolkata there is a China Town. Now think of the people of Kolkata or of West Bengal, they have been migrating to USA and Canada for over seventy years, if not more, but have left little or no mark anywhere. They may congregate here and there as an ethnic group on social and religious occasions but identify themselves as "Indians", often shunning the Bengalis from Bangladesh as aliens amidst them even if invited. When they happen to be under one roof, say in a concert of South Asian origin, you are very likely to find the "two" Bengalis forming two distinct crowds, separated as far away from each other as possible, eyeing each other suspiciously, fearful that others (other Indians) might treat them as one group. The only impressive contribution of Kolkata culture I came across in the USA was when in the late 1970s a senior library official of Indian origin at the Syracuse University launched a half an hour long radio programme of Tagore songs.
on the university’s own radio channel on Sunday mornings. The library official was, unfortunately, a Sikh gentleman from the Punjab in love with Tagore and not a Bengali “Bhadralok” from Kolkata!

Now compare the Bangladeshis who began to migrate to the USA and Canada only during the past three decades in any major numbers. And look at the neighbourhoods where they have set roots. Each is a “Little Dhaka” or a “Mini Bangladesh”, complete with Bangla language announcing its presence through the billboards on shops and restaurants and even on street corners. The Bangladeshi flag is seen fluttering beside the flags of the USA or Canada. The New York City government recognizes Bangla as one of its state languages and will provide a translator in any government dealings if needed by a Bangladeshi. This was not achieved by Kolkata culture, it was the “Bangal” culture, the “Chashas”, from the “backward” districts of East Bengal who cannot speak Bangla with the Kolkata “purity” yet proudly carried their distinctive district accent of Noakhali, Barisal or Sylhet to New York and Toronto and celebrates 21st February as Shaheed Dibash there. Even in the 1990s the Bangladeshis in New York had their own TV channel and I counted over six Bangla newspapers published from New York then. The shops and restaurants cater for all kinds of goods, including fresh produce and fishes, often imported directly from Bangladesh. So that the “present” of Bengali culture is definitely with Dhaka, or Bangladesh, but that of Kolkata failed to make such a mark abroad while currently it is fading and getting absorbed into the larger Indian culture, I feel that speaks tonnes for the future of the “two cultures” as well.

Hence, let’s get to the topic proper, that of the “Bangladesh in New York”. Being one of the last groups to reach the shores of the USA, the Bangladeshis have begun making their presence felt in this migrant society in a big way. Though some individuals migrated to the USA during the Pakistan period, while some are said to have jumped ship even during the British times, as early as 1887, a sizable movement of Bangladeshis began after the independence in the 1970s. The first of these were groups of graduate students, including myself in 1977 (first to Canada in 1976), going for higher studies to the universities all over the USA, initiating a process of brain drain that has cost Bangladesh very dearly (but, that’s another story). Most ended up as professors or in high paid jobs outside the university. The whole of my batch of pharmacy graduates (22 out of 23, if I remember correctly) from the University of Dhaka, migrated to the USA in 1973. The day I flew out of Bangladesh in September of 1976, 41 other junior university teachers also accompanied me for their graduate studies abroad on the only available weekly flight. I returned to Bangladesh in 1982 immediately after receiving my PhD degree while, with the exception of one other, everyone else from that flight remained in the USA (and Canada).

Other professionals like doctors and engineers started to migrate to the USA by the 1980s, mostly on visitor visa, some even moved out on “farm workers’” visa. Many over-stayed their welcome on “visitor” or “student” visa, became “illegal” aliens” and at different stages got naturalized. But the number did not reach any

Read more: https://www.everyculture.com/multi/A-Br/Bangladeshi-Americans.html#ixzz5a71BqKoP
noticeable proportion until the Diversification Visa (DV lottery) programme was extended to Bangladesh by the 1990s. The DV lottery, for the first time allowed people of other socioeconomic groups, including, initially, even some uneducated working class ones, to legally migrate and they began to make a ripple right away. One of the very first persons to receive a visa under DV lottery was a street hawker selling chicken (“murgiwalla”) in Dhaka. When a news reporter asked him what he would do going to such an advanced country without any education or skills, undaunted he promptly replied, “Why? I shall vend chicken there too1.” That’s the spirit and energy that these later group of “uneducated” or less educated people from around the 1990s brought to America and succeeded in creating a niche for themselves. They were ready to start at the bottom, which was in sharp contrast to the earlier group of highly educated professionals, spread all over the US campuses and suburbs, practically in personal isolations, who never achieved any visibility but got absorbed in the larger US society and culture.

Today, according to Pew Research Center2, there are close to 200,000 Bangladeshis in the USA, other estimates put it to over half a million, perhaps including the illegal ones. The government sources list the Bangladeshi migrants as the fastest growing ethnic community in the USA, from 1990-2000 it was growing at 471% and more than two thirds of the Bangladeshis arrived during this period. As happened with other migrants to the USA, they mostly set root in New York City and today close 75% of them live in the city. Others live primarily in New Jersey, Florida, Michigan, Texas and California states, though many can be found sprinkled over in every other state of the Union. Obviously, it is in New York where they have made the greatest impact, living as a community, contributing to the economy, society and the state and standing out as a cultural entity.

It is also in New York where I have been observing the Bangladeshis grow over the last forty years. During my graduate days in late 1970s at Syracuse University in central New York, we were about 15 Bangladeshi graduate students, some of us with spouse and children. I often visited New York City but would hardly ever meet other Bangladeshis, though some scores of them were definitely living there at the time. I knew only one Bangladeshi family in the City and once in a while met a few of their Bangladeshi acquaintances, mostly students visiting from other states. Since then, fortunately for me, because of my academic programmes and later my daughter and son studying at Columbia University (they both came back to Bangladesh after completing their programmes and I am proud of that), I have been visiting the city on and off for the last forty years, as a result have been able to observe the ebb and flow of the fortunes of this community.

In the sociological literature migration is explained largely in terms of the “Pull” and the “Push” factors, pull being the attraction at the destination and the push being the hardships at the origin. But I have found the two terms severely limited in explaining the “realities” of migration. For instance, the pull of the rich and

---

1 Narrated by a friend. The incident was reported in a local newspaper then.
advanced cultures, societies, are always there for most people of the poor countries, yet not everyone migrates. While, on the other hand, often the push factors can be as desperate as a war or famine yet, most cannot migrate. To “pack up” and go to face the uncertainties at the destination requires a whole lot of other factors, including at the minimum, the cost and the sufferings of the journey itself, as are being played out on the Mediterranean and the Sahara on a daily basis these days, and even a workable community network or support base at the destination. Similarly, “setting root” at the destination is dependent on a whole other set of factors, beside the pull, including the support of the host population, politics, economy and the cultural norms at the destination. The fate of the Syrian migrants to Europe during the last couple of years is the most recent case to note. Even the “Pull” factors can hide serious “Push” factors at the destination itself and turn setting root into a nightmare. So, some years ago I proposed the “pack-up” and “setting-root” as two other factors to better explain migration. All four of these factors can be used to better understand the migration of Bangladeshi population to the USA.

For the early migrants, the graduate students of the seventies, the professionals of the eighties, and later for many a well to do families, it was purely the “pull” factor of a better living that worked to lure them to leave the country. This is particularly true of many families today living in large cities like Toronto or LA with the children, while the husband earns and supports them from Bangladesh. There was nothing drastically wrong for most of these people in Bangladesh to “push” them to leave, other than it being a “dusty-nasty” place for their liking. More than the push, they had the means to leave, the right pack-up factors, education and skill for the professionals and money for the later families of bureaucrats, businessmen and politicians (though a few of them, indeed, were “pushed”, had to leave the country because of opposing political views).

But, in some cases, the opposite was true. The “push” was at the destination. When I reached Canada with dozens of other graduate students in 1976, the population there was rather very hostile to the migrants, to the extent of physically beating up the “Pakis”, people originating from South Asia, not being uncommon. Due to constant fear of being harassed, particularly by the local youths, it was risky to even move around in the city of Hamilton, where I resided and instead of “setting-root”, within a couple of weeks I decided to move out of Canada, though it took till the end of the academic year to move to the USA. A friend, simply failed to “adjust” and returned to Bangladesh within the month. The situation there, fortunately, improved later and unlike me, the rest of the students decided to stick it out and finally many applied for and received Canadian citizenship.

During my earlier short visits to the USA, after 1982, I was living mostly among the university graduates from the seventies and eighties and saw them struggle through student life but finally end up in well paid jobs as professors, doctors, and engineers etc., living off-campus or a sub-urban middle class life, some trying vainly to remain a Bangladeshi but meeting with unforeseen consequences. Setting roots was comparatively easy for them because of their education and skill but not free of complications. While most had Bangladeshi spouse, a few of them married into Spanish, Black or West Indian and some into Indian
and Pakistani families, facing various constraints in their family lives, many such marriages ending in divorces. The ones with Bangladeshi families were largely at odds with their children who were, often forced by the circumstances, trying to blend in with the “Western” culture. The lovely daughter of a dear friend of mine being so oppressed by the parents to carry on with the Bangladeshi culture became a total introvert while another friend’s daughter revolted at one point in time and left home never to get back to the family. Most, however, got their children through the best possible schools, allowing them certain amount of freedom, and to a good start to their lives as well.

Not until my visit in 1996 as a Fulbright Research Scholar, I had much contact with the “others”, the DV holders and many illegal aliens. The number of Bangladeshis had swelled by then and their presence was felt in places like Jackson Heights, Jamaica and Astoria in New York City, often identified as “Mini” Bangladesh” or “Little Dhaka”. They were already running offices and shops, even a TV channel, Bangla book shop and no less than six Bangla newspapers to cater to the Bangladeshi population. But the lives of these people were in sharp contrast to the earlier highly educated and well off Bangladeshi migrants, who had little or no contact with them, even looked down upon these later ones. Though there was the ever present “push” factor, it was again the opportunity, the “pack-up” factor, like winning the DV lottery or receiving the visitor or student visa and not just the “pull” of a well-set and comfortable life that got them to the USA and for some to accept the precarious “illegal alien” status and in most cases, even for graduates and Masters, to start at the lowest economic level. So the “setting-root” was a much harder process for everyone in this category.

As is true of the New York’s economy, these latest arrivals, with little education or skills and often being illegal, were at the lowest rung of the economic ladder, the cab drivers, busboys, house help and even janitors and into other low paid jobs often working three or four jobs at a time, up to 16 or 18 hours a day. In 1996 I met a busboy, hardly in his twenties, from a well-to-do family in Bangladesh, who had just landed in New York the week before, promptly threw away his passport stamped with “student visa” and became an “illegal immigrant”, through an “uncle” ended up in Cooney Island, sharing a bedroom with two other illegal Bangladeshis, finally got this job at an Indian restaurant only that morning. He could hardly speak any English and upon learning my nationality he began sobbing in front of me as his rosy dreams had already shattered by learning the plight of his roomies. But few in his position ever thought of returning and tried to fight it out till the end (to set-root). I hope he did too.

The vast majority of these later migrants, primarily the DV lottery winners, were from lower classes in Bangladesh, with little or no education or any specific skill to sell. To be sure, there were also many others who were from better economic and educational background but because of their “illegal” status were not eligible for better jobs and had to start at the lowest step. I met a few of them with Master’s degree who also started as busboys, or delivering pizza and taking up taxi driving. On numerous occasions in recent years when I took a taxi, almost every time I ended up with a Bangladeshi cabbie and got to talk to them,
some of whom were in their sixties, been in the USA for two decades or more, but did not change the job largely because it pays quite well, and they do work real hard, often 16 to 18 hours till early morning. They now had their own house and some even had their children studying in top universities or were getting into well paid jobs.

Taxi driving in New York is typically a migrants’ job and is handed down from one migrant community to another. In most cases the Bangladeshi drivers inherited their posts from Indian and Pakistani drivers and today half of the “medallions” or taxi driving licences of New York City belong to the Bangladeshi cabdrivers. On an Eid day in 2017, when I happened to be in New York, the city suffered a tremendous shortage of taxi, simply because the Bangladeshi drivers, en masse, decided to observe the religious holiday. The New York Times felt compelled to write a few columns explaining the traffic problems caused by the absence of the Bangladeshi cabdrivers.

This visibility of Bangladesh is not merely due to New York’s dependence on taxis. Many Bangladeshis with little or no other skills to move up the ladder soon got to open up shops, petrol pumps, convenience stores and street vending carts with the money they could save or bring from home selling their property. And wherever they opened a shop, they put up a sign in Bangla and Bangla language invaded America. I wrote in an earlier Note that during my first visit to the China Town in New York City in the late 1970s, I was amazed to see shop and street signs in Chinese and wondered if it would be possible for Bangla language to acquire the same position someday. Well, there you have it, in New York, Toronto, Buffalo cities, in New Jersey, Michigan, Florida or Texas states, (as also in the cities in UK) Bangla announces itself proudly, not the Kolkata Bangla, it is pure Dhaka, or Bangladeshi Bangla. So you will find a Kawran Bazar, Mannan Grocery, Star Kabab, or Sagar Chinese Restaurant beside Fatema Pharmacy, Jamuna Money Changer or Dr. Ali’s chamber, all written in bold Bangla fonts, including some in neon signs.

By now a sustainable community support or network base has developed to make setting roots easier for the fresh migrants. And, as happens with other migrant communities, Bangladeshi migrants, these later ones, tend to congregate in the same neighbourhoods as well, like in Jamaica, Jackson Heights, Astoria etc. Most live in rented apartments often within the same complex, though, increasingly, as they move up the economic ladder, some are buying houses in the suburbs and moving out. A few Bangladeshi real-estate companies have also sprung up catering to the needs of these migrants. Besides shops, groceries, offering all kinds of vegetables and fishes, often better than what you can get in Dhaka bazars, restaurants, doctors, pathology, travel agencies, financial institutions, schools, mosques, haircutting saloons and even mortuary are all found within such neighbourhoods. This is in such a sharp contrast to my 1970s living, when even to buy a few spices I had to depend on the Chinese shops, the Indians were then just setting up shops in some places. But a fresh Bangladeshi migrant today will not even feel that she is in a foreign land, to the extent that living in Jamaica, or Jackson Heights one can get by, as does the seventy year old
mother of one of my students, without knowing even a single word of English, Bangla is good enough to live in “America”!

Last summer (of 2018), I had a rare opportunity to live among these pioneers and see how they suffered and fought, as all pioneers do, to get to where they are today. Our host couple, friends of my wife, both left well paid jobs in Bangladesh and migrated in the late 1980s. I never got to ask the sensitive question of how they got to become citizens of the USA, I assume that like most other Bangladeshis at about this time they too may have passed through a period of “illegal alien” situation since the wife, Fatema Kamal¹, was on a training program through a Bangladeshi scholarship and the husband, Kamal Ahmed, tagged along on a spouse visa. Fatema at some point took up a training programme on nursing while Kamal opened a small shop with all their savings that they could take from home, selling knick knacks in Manhattan, living in a small dilapidated rented apartment in Jamaica. Today, the wife is a senior nurse and in hospital administration while the husband owns a large business establishment importing goods from China, employing half a dozen workers, live in a huge one acre Long Island mansion. The Manhattan shop is still there though. Their daughter is a specialist doctor and married to another specialist doctor of Bangladeshi origin and the son just graduated from a business school and is married to a young lawyer of Bangladeshi origin. The children have left the nest and the couple are alone again in a large house. At some point the couple sponsored their parents, who in turn sponsored their other children and as of last summer, they are now a family of 50 plus a set of twins just born to the daughter. Not bad for a migrant couple in 30 years! The last to reach the US is Fatema’s eldest brother with four of his sons living in a ramshackle one bedroom apartment in Jamaica just entering the battle to meet ends but with examples of success within the family, full of dreams.

We arrived just before the 4th of July celebrations and along with our hosts were invited to a day-long party in a park by the bay north of Jamaica. There we found a number of Bangladeshi families with parents, children and even grand children in festive dress and mood. Some were wearing shorts or shirts imitating the US flag, preparing a lunch of hotdogs, hamburgers and stakes. A few of them were throwing around the American “football” while some children were playing baseball. How American can you get! These Bangladeshis, particularly the children, had no illusions about their nationality, they are all Americans. All around the park there were dozens of such groups, many of other nationalities in origin, but were all relishing their American-ness.

Kazi Arif, a young man in his forties, I met at the park, invited us to the house warming party he had organized. As it happened, the house, a newly built one in a newly opened up high-end residential area, was in a far end of New Jersey and took a couple of hours to reach. There I got to meet his mother in her late sixties who had just arrived in the USA under his sponsorship. I had already met his wife Mina and their

¹ All names are fictitious ones.
two lovely daughters earlier at the park. Arif was preparing for his university admission test in Bangladesh in 1993 when he won the DV lottery. He was only 19 at the time and his middle class family lacking in fund was somewhat reluctant to let him go off all alone. Fortunately for him a distant cousin also won the lottery and the two set off for the USA, the families having to sell part of their property to fund them. On reaching the US, Arif moved from odd job to odd job, working ten to twelve hours but kept to his promise of university education and started to take courses in computer and business, finally graduating after ten hard years he immediately got a well-paid job in a reputed IT firm. He is now a success story by any standard.

I met a few other migrants in their 30s to 60s in various stages of economic success including a couple of them still driving taxis but not all is rosy in their lives. The daily hardships of making ends meet, get the children to the school and back, put dinner on the table comes at tremendous price and working two or three jobs till early morning and then setting aside a few bucks for the future seem to be the key to the treasure trove they are dreaming off. I often keep asking myself whether they could have put themselves through the same hardship in Bangladesh. But here in Bangladesh, perhaps, none of them would have worked that hard\(^1\) or started at such low-level jobs, nor are there so many alternative jobs available. More importantly, here the game is stacked against them, there are very few legal ways of getting ahead, definitely not as quickly or as surely as they will in the USA, often well within one generation and be able to enjoy the retirement as well. Some obviously do make it big here in Bangladesh too as I look around, but I am yet to find out how, in what legal ways, that is. Many, therefore, fearing a dead end, begin looking for alternatives even before they pass high school and are in constant pursuit of ways of getting out of this country. The news of young Bangladeshis among the dead on the Mediterranean or arrested at the European borders is, hence, a stark reminder of the failure of the legal ways to succeed.

However, the current story of these migrants in New York is one of the other two generations. Children from prams to driving racing cars abound in the Bangladeshi migrant families. Though the numbers of children per family is much lower than what is the norm for a migrant family, mostly restricted to two to three children at best, they all are getting the best possible education their parents can afford, and most are the pride of the community as they excel in their class, school and often in the whole State. Like Fatema’s children, they are graduating and entering the job market at the high ends. Doctors, engineers, IT, law and business are the most competitive and highest paid jobs and have drawn these children in their hordes. Though, perhaps, starting at a lower level with fewer advantages than the earlier educated professional families’ children, these ones are never too far behind and are competing on equal footing with the children of the various other successful migrant communities like the Indians and the Chinese. Though some are also doing part-time odd jobs to help out the family few, if any, will be stuck at the economic level of their parents. Very likely they will leave the nest with much better paid jobs and move into the suburbia, as Fatema’s children haver done.

\(^1\) Though many, many other unfortunate ones here actually do, even more, but we, from our middleclass position do not “see” them.
The other interesting generation is of the geriatrics. Most of the Bangladeshi migrants since around 2010 have become eligible to sponsor other family members and they have brought in their parents, who may later sponsor their other children. It is easier this way than sponsoring siblings directly. Most such parents are retired from whatever they were doing in Bangladesh and are doing practically nothing in the USA other than, perhaps, babysitting their grandchildren while the children go out to earn a living. However, a few physically able ones may be seen doing some odd job. In my forty years of visiting the USA I never saw so many gray-haired people from Bangladesh as during the summer of 2018. I often found whole dozens of them sitting around in the small street corner parks in their pyjamas or “lungi” dozing for hours or, to break the boredom, getting into loud chattering criticising politics, economy and society in Bangladesh. Many are also to be found at the local mosques and repeating the same Bangladesh bashing as they leave the place of worship and head back to, guess where, the park.

With the parents near them and the children all set for a brighter future, the life of most of the migrant Bangladeshi families seem to be “made”. Though some are still driving taxis, in most cases they have moved up from the lowest rung of the economy. They are no longer busboys or janitors these have now been inherited by the newly coming Nepalese migrants who are now working in the shops and restaurants owned by the Bangladeshi migrants. Many Bangladeshis find secure jobs in the state and federal governments and a number of them have enrolled in the police and even the military. While the earlier educated ones started high up at the professional level, these lower class and later migrants are ascending the ladder too, step by step, slowly but surely, and are eventually likely to reach the same heights, the hard way.

Nonetheless, many migrants have undeniably succeeded far beyond what they could have dreamt of in Bangladesh and as they move up the economic ladder they also move out of the crowded lanes of Jackson Heights and the dilapidated apartments in Jamaica and on to the middle to upper class suburban life, definitely the children are getting there, faster. Soon, perhaps in another 20 years, unless there is continuous replenishment of lower class or illegal migrants, they will also relinquish the “medallions”, the shops and restaurants to the Nepalese or some other fresh community of migrants to New York City. The Bangla billboards and store names will also get replaced by some other language or along with the Bangladeshi community will get dispersed, as they have already started moving out of New York, to cities like Buffalo, Detroit and Huston and into the suburbia all over the USA. The community too will get absorbed by the larger American society and like the earlier professional groups, largely into oblivion. But some of their children and grandchildren will make names for themselves, become scientists, doctors, or millionaire businessmen while a few will run for the Congress, even the Presidency someday.

Nazrul Islam
Globalization is Dead, Long Live Globalization!
Impasse in Globalization Theory and Beyond*

S. Aminul Islam¹

Abstract: The paper provides a critical summary of the existing discourse of globalization and finds it totally lacking any logical coherence or empirical support which has prompted scholars to suggest that globalization is dead and so also the discourse that produced it. The objective of this paper is to show that globalization is not dead and it is the failure of the globalization discourse that has made it impossible for us to understand the contradictory dynamics of the process. In this paper, I argue for the development of a new metaparadigm of globalization through combining different theoretical perspectives and within the broader process of social change. I present an elementary outline of it. This outline provides revised definition of globalization and delineation of its nature in the post-global era as consisting of four different worlds—global village, McWorld, world on fire and lonely planet. I argue that globalization is a contradictory process of punctuated evolution consisting of waves and counter waves of globalization showing two fundamentally different processes—proto-globalization and modern globalization. The distinctive feature of modern globalization is its ceaseless continuity. I also provide an outline of its historical forms of globalization over time viewing it as a process of globalization and de-globalization. I argue that the well-spring of modern globalization is violence on a vast scale and incarcerating plantation regimes, in particular, that contributed to a great deal to the expansion of international trade in the 18th century and acted as a motor for the Industrial Revolution. The current US protectionism is the policy response of a receding core of the world system. China’s Belt and Road Initiative and new developments in communication technology, such as, robotization is likely to herald a new process of globalization that I call segmented globalization as it will be dispersed over different geographical regions in a multi-polar world without hegemonic core.

Keywords: globalization, proto globalization, post globalization, segmented globalization, metaparadigm, global melange, multi polar world, global violence, imperialism

* The title is borrowed from Andre Gunder Frank (1974) and FJ Schuurman (1993). An earlier version of this paper was presented at the University of Kobe under the title ‘Globalization, Long live Globalization!’ in 2009 when I was a visiting Professor at the University of Nagoya. I am deeply indebted to Professor Kazuhisa NISHIHARA of the University of Nagoya for arranging the lecture and the concerned dean and authorities of the University of Kobe for hosting the lecture and their appreciation of my presentation. A shorter version was presented in the department of sociology, Independent University Bangladesh on 27 June, 2019. I express my gratitude to Dr. Milan Pagon, the Acting Vice-Chancellor of the university and Ms. Sharineen Ahmed, Acting Chairman of the department for giving me this opportunity. I am deeply grateful to my long-term friend and colleague Professor Nazrul Islam for reviewing the paper and for his feedback. I am happy to acknowledge the help of Md. Rasel Patuary, my research assistant for preparing the graphics of this paper.

¹ Honorary Professor, Department of Sociology, University of Dhaka. Email: aminulisam2002@gmail.com
“We reject the ideology of globalism.” - President Donald Trump’s address to UN General Assembly

“First and foremost, we need to recognize that economic globalization, which is a natural requirement and outcome of social productivity growth and scientific and technological progress, has broadened the markets for producers, offered more choices to consumers, and brought about more efficient allocation of resources and factors of production.”

- Chinese Premier Li Keqiang’s address to the World Economic Forum in China, 2019.

Part 1

Introduction

On June 28, 2019, The Economist carried a feature story “Globalisation is dead and we need to invent a new world order” with reference to the interview with O’Sullivan, author of The Levelling, a new book on globalization. In the author’s his view, rising debts and inequality had killed globalization and now it was necessary to build a new world order in the post-global era. Yet what may be equally necessary is to critically analyse what went wrong with the globalization discourse that led to the emergence of such vast literature within the shortest time, possibly unlike any other term in social sciences. Yet if we look back, it will be apparent that the sound of death –knell began much earlier –at the end of 1990s. From the beginning of this century, the discourse of globalization has been characterized by the signifier of the end as can be glimpsed from how the major practitioners of the field viewed it.

Table 1: Death of globalization discourse

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rosenberg (2000)</td>
<td>‘follies of globalization’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Grey (2002)</td>
<td>‘the era of globalization is over.’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saul (2005)</td>
<td>‘the collapse of globalization.’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rosengren (2005)</td>
<td>‘intellectual bankruptcy of globalization as a description, explanation and ideology of world order.’</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In the eloquent words of Held and McGrew (2007:2): “Today borders and boundaries, nationalism and protectionism, locality and ethnicity appear to define an epoch of radical de-globalization: the disintegration and demise of globalization.” In fact, “…globalization rhetoric appears rather hollow” (Held and McGrew, 2007:2). Yet, we have very little scholarly work on what went wrong. The objective of this paper is two-fold. First it reviews the current state of discourse on globalization by critically reviewing the major theories and propose a new integrated metaparadigm for the study of globalization stressing that it should be viewed as part of broader theory of social change and civilizational analysis involving rise and fall of hegemonic cores that increases connectivity among people and cultural homogenization or multiple hybridites which are disrupted as the core region suffers from decline. The whole history of globalization, which is as old as mankind, manifests the contradictory processes of globalization and de-globalization as empires and civilizations rise and fall.

The state of globalization discourse and its limitations

From the very beginning four issues have plagued the study of globalization:

- First, there is no consensus about what the term means.
- Secondly, there is no consensus about when it began.
- Thirdly, there is no consensus about its causes.
- Fourthly, there has been no systematic analysis of its impact, in general, and ravages that it has caused in the global south.

In fact, globalization has remained a mere metaphor, buzz word. In spite of a vast literature on the issue, theories are thin. There are only four theoretical perspectives for the study of globalization and all of them are extremely inadequate. The 1990s marked the age of hyperglobalization which by the end of the decade had fizzled out. It gave way to despair and most studies focused on the endgame addressing either its historic form or dynamics of its death.

Origin and growth of the discourse of globalization

Malcom Waters (1995) traces the origin of the word globalization back to 1961. In the social sciences, the term was first used by Ronald Robertson in early 1980s. A new and comprehensive study of the career of the concept by James and Steger(2014) show that the term can be traced back to 1921 in the writing of a Scottish educationist Boyd who borrowed it from Belgian educational psychologist Decroly and used it in the context of a holistic view of education that encompassed “Wholeness, ... integration, globalization.....” (cited in James and Steger, 2014:425). The term was again used by a sociologist Meadows who wrote in
1951 that ‘westernization that replaced medieval world view manifested a new cultural pattern a process of globalization’ (cited in James and Steger, 2014:429).

The excellent survey of James and Steger, however, misses that the idea of globalization was expressed under the concept of societal convergence that many exponents of 19th century sociology and of modernization theories of 1950s and 1960s expressed. Even today nothing can match Marx’s description of globalization that he put so eloquently in 1848. As Weinberg (1969) and Baum (1974) put it, a host sociologists from Tocqueville, Tonnies, Maine, Spencer, Weber, and Durkheim delineated the common features of a modern society. This view was carried forward in 1950s and 1960s by modernizations theorists like Inkeles and Ross (1956), Lerner (1958), Levy (1966), Sorokin (1964), Kerr et al. (1962), Aron (1967), Adams (1965) and many others who espoused the concept of convergence as was the idea of ‘global village’ that came from McLuhan (1960). Daniel Lerner (1958) in 1950s approvingly quoted Marx from Capital that the advanced countries hold the image for backward countries to emulate. Modernization theory predicted that technology was a universal solvent that was destined to flatten the earth. Sociologist Levy asserted “[W]e are confronted—whether for good or bad—with a universal solvent. The pattern of the relatively modernized societies, once developed have shown the tendency to penetrate any social context whose participants have come in contact with them…” (Levy, 1966:190). “The world,” declared,” Kerr and his associates, is entering a new age—the age of total industrialization. Some countries are far along the road, many just beginning the journey. But everywhere, at a faster or slower pace, the people of the world are on the march towards industrialism (Kerr et al., 1960:29).

Globalization theory, in fact, is nothing but a more captivating reincarnation of modernization theory. When modernization theory lost its legitimacy and appeal in the face of mounting criticism, it was replaced by an even less conceptually clear metaphor of globalization and the architect of it was an important modernization theorist Ronald Robertson. Although sociologist Lamy in 1976 published an article entitled ‘The Globalization of American Sociology: Excellence or Imperialism?’ (James and Steger, 2014), it did not make a stir. It took nearly a decade for the term to get currency. It was in the 1980s that Robertson reinvented it. As Robertson notes, the crucial period was between 1980 and 1984 when he found that the study of modernization and religion that he was pursuing has to be viewed in the global context as Weber had done long before. It led to the coining of the term globalization (Robertson, 1992). “Consciously, I first heard it from my own mouth…I said to myself; ‘Modernization is not just about a particular society—it’s the modernization of the world’: So if it is clumsy to call it ‘modernization of the whole world’, so what should I call it? So I called it ‘globalization,’ and that’s how it all began” (Robertson cited in James and Steger, 2014:429).

The decade of 1990s found the most favourable landscape for the proliferation of the term which beginning with a flame soon turned into forest fire. James and Steger (2014) show the rapid spread of the term can be found from the fact that Factiva database listed 355,838 publications under the term ‘globalization’. The
ASAP database referred to 5,976 journal articles with the title globalization dating from 1986, while Proquest Newspaper Database listed 25,856 articles beginning from 1971 (James and Steger, 2014). The Sociological Abstracts alone had listed before 2007 more than 7,000 texts that used globalization as a key term (Connell, 2007).

Definitions of Globalization: A review

One of the key efforts of the globalization theorists has been how to define it and since the beginning of the discourse, it has turned into an area of controversy and polemic. The main reason for this has been the deep ideological divide that has characterized the study of globalization. Various authors from different disciplines have attempted to define it and as a consequence, definitions have proliferated. In 2006, one study (Al-Rodhan, 2006) found 114 definitions of the term globalization. As many as 67 of these definitions refer exclusively to the economic dimension of marketing or sale. Yet scholars have failed to reach a consensus about what the ‘beast’ is.

One type of definitions has viewed it as a new kind of social order. Thus according to Beck, it is a new form of society.

A new kind of capitalism, a new kind of economy, a new kind of global order, a new kind of society and a new kind of personal life are coming into being, all of which differ from earlier phases of social development. Thus, sociologically and politically, we need a paradigm-shift, a new frame of reference (Beck, 2002:2).

Globalization is defined in terms of the key features of this new type of society. Beck holds that the world today is approaching a global stage beyond society without borders, without territories and characterized by ceaseless flow of social and spatial mobility and homogenous culture. Scholte (1996: 1968) finds “[G]lobal space is placeless, distanceless and borderless—and in this sense ‘supranational’.” In the words of Waters (1995:5); “[T]erritoriality will disappear as an organizing principle of social and cultural life; it will be a society without borders and spatial boundaries....” Robertson (1992) views it as a process of compression of the world into an interdependent totality and consciousness of living in such a society. Albrow (1990) defines it as those processes that integrate peoples of the world into a single society. According to Giddens (1990; Giddens and Sutton, 2013), Globalization refers to the intensification of social relations across the world and growing interdependence of individuals and groups. Held (1999) views it as transformation of spatial organizations leading to “transcontinental or interregional flows and networks of activity, interaction, and the exercise of power” (Held et al, 1999: 16). Sociologist Manuel Castells (1996:92) defines it as “…an economy with the capacity to work as a unit in real time on a planetary scale.”

A sample of key theorists of the field shows that like every buzz word there is hardly any clear meaning of the term globalization. Rosenberg (2005) has argued that the term has not been able to provide an adequate framework for empirical analysis and thus has become redundant. Scholte (2006) has shown that most of these definitions are faulty and redundant. “The notion of globalisation does not adequately capture
this transformation” which is undergoing now (Sassen in Sutherland, 2006). The authoritative Oxford Dictionary of Sociology (Scott and Marshall, 2009) does not provide a formal definition concluding that the concept has become largely useless.

**When did it begin?**

There is equally no agreement about when globalization started and dating of its onset differs so much from scholar to scholar that it varies from now and eternity! Lechner and Boli (2008) point out that one view holds that it began in the 16th century. A second view regards late 19th century as the starting point. A third view (their own) fixes it in the late 20th century. Thus Mazlish (1993) dates the beginning from 1519-1521 when geographical exploration of the world began. Mcneil shares the same view. ‘The year 1500 marks an important turning point in world history . . . The European discoveries made the oceans of the earth into highways for their commerce . . .’ (McNeill, 1999:295). Jameson (2009) affirms that globalization may not be new and he refers to Eric Wolf’s study to indicate that “neolithic trade routes have been global in scope” (Jameson 2009:54). But he moves to the study of multinational capitalism which embodies globalization as the ‘intrinsic feature’ (Jameson 2009:54). To Frank(1998) global capitalism has existed for 5000 years and several archaeologists and anthropologists have located it within early Neo-lithic societies (Chase –Dunn, 1998).

Robertson (1992: 179) dates the take-off of globalization during 1875 –1925 when time-zoning, international dateline, world-wide telegraphic network and adoption of Gregorian calendar by most nations occurred. Ross and Trachte (1990:230) concluded that: “[W]e are only at the beginning of the global era.” Gilpin (1987). Kennedy (1993), and McMichael 1996) argue that it began after the Second World War. Manuel Castells (1996) dates it from 1970s. One recent study holds: “We contend that in a certain sense almost the whole World History can be regarded as a history of advancement toward the increasing size of social systems, their integration, and globalization in general” (Grinin and Korotayev, 2015:39). In short, the dating of the onset of globalization differs by millennia! It highlights the total lack of consensus among theorists about the periodization of the process. So, one of fundamental issues in globalization studies remain unsolved. Is the age of globalization, to paraphrase O’Rourke and Williamson (2002: 24) 20, 200, or 2000 or several millennia (Grinin and Korotayev, 2014).

**Why did globalization happen?**

Scholars of globalization also disagree about the causes of globalization. Technological determinism has been found by many scholars as the crucial determinant of globalization. A second view has given emphasis to trade liberalization and flow of FDI across the world. A third view holds that government policies and neo-liberalism, in particular, are responsible for globalization (Garret, 2000).
Held and McGrew (2007) hold the following factors as the ‘deep drivers’ of globalization:

- IT revolution
- Development of global markets
- New division of labour by MNCs
- Spread of democracy all over the world
- Spread of consumer values

But they also point out that if capitalism is held to be the cause of globalization, “then it has no independent causal power” (Held and McGrew, 2007:2). Economic historians have given emphasis to lowering of the cost of transportation and opening of markets as key determinants of globalization (O'Rourke and Williamson, 2002).

The listing of the drivers creates problems. The global market began with capitalism or even before and there is a vast time gap between IT revolution and the beginning of international trade. The gaps are enormous and the basis of dating is often fuzzy. As Guillén point out (2001:255), “[W]e still know very little about what exactly causes it and what are its consequences on such key sociological variables as organizational patterns, authority structures, social inequality, and social movements, to name but a few. …it is contended that many accounts of globalization confuse cause and effect.”

**Theories of globalization**

A crucial area of controversy is again the theoretical perspectives of globalization. Let us take, for example, Frank J. Lechner and John Boli’s review (2008) deal with four theories: world-system theory, neorealism/neoliberal institutionalism, world polity theory and world cultural theory. Sklair (1999;2008) identified four approaches to the study of globalization

1. The world-systems approach;
2. The global culture approach;
3. The global society approach;
4. The global capitalism approach

**World culture theory**

The World culture theory, according Lechner and Boli (2008), is a theory that attempts to capture the configuration and processes through which individuals and groups become conscious of world as a single
global village in which they are all inter-dependent. Ronald Robertson is a key figure who has contributed mostly to development of this perspective. According to him, globalization constructs world culture and it consists of four components: nation state–based societies, system of societies, individuals and human kind. It undergoes four inter-related processes: societalization, internationalization, individuation, and generalization of consciousness about humankind (Robertson 1991: 215-6; 1992: 27). These processes produce global unity through the mechanism of relativization, emulation, glocalization, Interpenetration and contestation. Relativization arranges local cultures in a relative order that sets common patterns of behavior relative to others. The existence of a common cultural arena allows emulation to take place allowing people to borrow from other cultures. Glocalization triggers continuous interaction between local and global cultures linking them in a dynamic process. Interpenetration produces interaction between universalism and particularism—"a form of institutionalization of the two-fold process involving the universalization of particularism and the particularization of universalism" (1992: 102). Contestation refers to co-existence and clash of different ideologies. The theory holds that globalization possesses has built-in dynamism and manifest both conflict and cooperation, yet its causality remains multiple and indeterminate. Historically, the global culture has developed through five stages. He calls the first phase germinal phase that began in Europe in the early 15th century and continued until the middle of 18th century. The Incipient phase that followed it lasted from the middle of 18th century to 1870s. The take-off phase of globalization covered a period of half a century from the 1870s to the middle of 1920s. The Phase four constituted the struggle-for-hegemony during the four decades between 1920s and late 1960s. The final phase is called uncertainty phase that lasted until early 1990s.

**World-system theory**

The world-system theory, it is necessary to point out, came originally as a theory of uneven development of the capitalist system that embraced the world. It is not clear in the review how it is related to globalization. Wallerstein, the father of the world-system theory himself showed downright scorn for the concept. "The current buzz-word to describe the contemporary situation is "globalization. . . . Personally, I think it is meaningless as an analytic concept" (cited in Robinson, 2001:12). It is, however, to be noted that Chase-Dunn and his associates (1998) have developed a world system theory of globalization which is both rich and stimulating and which I have not covered as standard reviews of theories of globalization do not include his version of globalization theory.

**World polity theory**

The world polity or world society theory spearheaded by John W. Meyer which has developed an impressive body of literature over the last three decades is grounded in neo-institutional theoretical perspective of sociology. It gives emphasis to the rational capability of actors and institutions which have assumed global patterns and configurations in modern times which calls for a distinct perspective for understanding their structure and activities. Meyer finds that the modern world is filled with associations, supranational
associations, world-wide social movements which penetrate every nook and corner of the modern world for the delivery of the collective goods. Meyer provides an eloquent description of the institutional configuration of this world order.

Of course, in the wider world society to which we attend, the "scriptwriter" is a historical-cultural drama. For example, a 900-year history builds the great institutional complex we call the university, with the deepest cultural legitimations (notions about nature, rationality, the truth, and so on) and the most diverse specific instantiations (e.g., detailed analyses of a specific flower, or the culture of teenagers). And the constructed actors are the individuals and groups taking identities as actors within this drama (e.g., the intellectual protagonists, as in Collins 1998). And the participants turn out, despite their exotic roles, to be ordinary people with clay feet. So we recognize, in the great gaps between the postures of the renowned intellectual "actors," and the realities of their daily life and practice, that a great deal of institutional construction has gone on (Meyer, 2008:10).

Meyer argues that since the World War II, the international order has undergone dramatic integration. Three factors or drivers have pushed the integration of the global system. The remarkable economic growth of the Post-War era has led to increasing economic interdependence of the nations on earth. The second driving factor is the gradual awareness that large-scale disasters of our time demand concerted global action which is beyond the capacity of nation states. It has led to the growth of thousands of international organizations operating on a global scale for collective good. These organizations, however, face problems in their operation as there is no adequate global authority to sanction or promote their vision of a shared global culture. This compelling force has driven the global imaginary. In the words of Meyer, 2008:14):

Thus, a broadly coherent set of constraints produced the evolution of the modern world culture, eliminating or subordinating many themes (e.g., the class conflicts emphasized by the Communists; or the excessively nationalist ideologies of the authoritarians; or the conflictful religious ideas arising out of previous world orders) that threatened possibilities for a new order.

He argues that this new world order must be guided by rationality and by individual rational actors socialized in schools and organizations with universal standards. These individuals should be endowed with new social identity with global rights. Thus globalization has led to a stable world order. To quote Meyer (2008:17) once again:

Stabilization and equilibrium would stop these dramatic changes, and would probably also partly undercut the institutional theories that best analyze them. By the logic of these theories, under stable conditions institutionalization works by locating cultural and social material in the proper motives and choices of constructed social actors. So after a period of time, the modern institutional system constructs a drama of realist actorhood.

Thus Meyer reincarnates in his the world polity or world society theory the 19th century Comtian vision of the positive society for our time. It is an interpretation of the contemporary world and a normative vision with deep anchorage in liberal ideology. It is ironic for Meyer who has spent a lifetime in producing and propagating a theory that has little relevance for our time haunted by clash of cultures, trade wars and world-wide discontent against the global regime of collective good!. It is no wonder that Wimmera and Feinstein (2016:614) found little empirical evidence for even a weak version of this theory. Bly (2005) has argued that the concept world society creates more problems than it solves for nothing lies outside its pale. It is a non-exclusive category.
The global capitalism theory

This perspective has been developed by neo-Marxists like Petras and Veltmeyer (2001), Leslie Sklair (2008) and Robinson (2007). Petras and Veltmeyer (2001) view discourses of globalization as globaloney. They see globalization as both imperialist and class project on international scale represented by a vast network of transnational corporations. Globalization is nothing but imperialism writ large as a consequence of crisis in contemporary capitalism. The internationalization of capital and technology have been driven by the crisis of US imperialism that dominates the world today.

What is described as globalization is thus essentially a perpetuation of the past based on a deepening and extension of exploitative class relations into new areas previously outside of capitalist production….Moreover, the shifts in the axes of capitalist expansion from domestic production and exchange (enlarging the home market) to the world market has always been contingent on the political and socio-economic composition of the state, which orients economic policy.”(Petras and Veltmeyer, 2001:29).

They find that the current discourse of globalization three fundamental flaws. Firstly, the expansion of the international economy is contingent upon specific political-economic and cultural situation. Secondly, globalization project reflects the interests of a transnational class and is driven by them. Thirdly, it represents a failure of intellectual responsibility to unmask this imperialist project that only benefits a small transnational class at the expense of millions of workers and peasants across the world.

According to Sklair (2008:68), contemporary capitalism is a transnational project represented by transnational corporations and its essential ‘building blocks’ are transnational practices. The driving force of the system is the transnational class and the ‘transnational culture-ideology’ of consumerism holds the system together.

Another key exponent of this theoretical perspective is Robinson (Robinson, 2004; 2017). Robinson argues that globalization is a process of waves of expansion and crises in capitalism that force the capitalist class to reconfigure the system from time to time by bringing new institutions and new agents. “A ‘brave new world’ of globalized capitalism burst forth in the latter decades of the twentieth century….It was culmination of imperialism—a “…new epoch of global capitalism”(Robinson, 2017:125). Capitalism, according to Robinson, has developed over four stages. Beginning with the early era of capitalism that rested on colonialism, it has moved through industrial capitalism, national corporate capitalism of late 19th century, and culminated in the global capitalism of late 20th century. He argues that capitalism faced a major crisis in 1970s as a result of oil crisis, and Vietnam War and it solved this crisis through a restructuring of the system that gave it a global shape. The key process behind it he calls transnationalization which was driven by new inventions in communications and information technology, transportation, marketing, management, and automation. The new technologies made it possible for capitalism to expand its organizational form across the planet and the policies of neo-liberalism removed all obstacles to its victorious path towards global reach. It has led to the growth of a transnational capitalist class as agents of global capitalism that serves its interests. With the aid of transnational capitalist class and transnational state apparatus, global
capitalism has been able to exercise unprecedented economic control and political domination all over the world. It has led to increasing polarization of people marginalizing millions within a structure of “new global social apartheid” within and among nations (Robinson, 2017:126). The triumph of new technology that generated great momentum for the global capitalism is now producing its peril by creating unemployment and misery on a vast scale. It is producing protracted dissent and protests against the global capitalism which are likely to coalesce and deepen in future transforming it into a new form.

Drawing on Neo-Marxism and post-colonialism, Pieterse (2009; 2018) has developed an interesting theory of globalization. Pieterse (2009) is highly critical of the Eurocentric view of most globalization theories that consider it as an extension of western modernity across the world. Existing theories of globalization, he holds, takes “…Anglo-American capitalism as the gold standard” (Pieterse, 2018: XV). Most of the theories of globalization from Marx to Wallerstein are grand narratives. The changing and contingent nature of globalization demands a middle range theory which he has followed through his extensive range of writings and which defies easy encapsulating. Summarizing the diversity of the globalization discourse, he observes, “…the attempt to capture all the world’s variations under a single heading is a familiar refrain of hegemony in action, featuring U.S. capitalism as the end of history” (Pieterse, 2009:20). It is tempting to add to his observation that the discourse is exactly the same as Hegel’s conception world history in his time (Hegel, 1975). Pieterse views it as a deep historical and dialectical process involving multi-dimensionality and unequal power hierarchy and the idea of human integration posited by globalization will remain “…manipulative or meaningless, hypocritical or rhetorical,” without policy and intervention for global equality (Pieterse, 2009:26). In his view, globalization can be traced to the spread of humans across the world and related to the uneven articulation of modes of production over time producing a variety hybrid forms.

In his opinion, the specific form that globalization has assumed since 1960s is different from imperialism. Contemporary globalization is less cohesive and more heterogeneous. “Dependency theory may be read as a theory of structural hybridization in which dependent capitalism is a mélange category in which the logics of capitalism and imperialism have merged” (Pieterse, 2009:72). The structural pluralism of globalization produces variety of cultural forms. Cultural hybridity or glocalization as a single category is meaningless. “Each of these terms—creolization, mestizaje, orientalization—opens a different window on the global mélange” (Pieterse, 2009:77). The terms like hybridity or glocalization are meaningless and only hide deep “actual unevenness, asymmetry, and inequality in global relations” (Pieterse, 2009:72). He examines hybridity as historically embedded layers stretching from prehistory to contemporary post-imperialist time that involves three broad phases—hybridity across modes of production, hybridity before and after industrialization and hybrid regulation like Fordism or the third way. There are also hybrid states, regions and communities. Pieterse looks at the merging global culture as a process of multi-faceted hybridity that involves a continuous interplay of the local and the global with flows of ideas and images moving in different directions. It is much more complex than what Robertson calls glocalization and involves
both westernization and easternization. Thus contemporary culture provides a scenario of global mélange which cannot be interpreted by earlier theories or in terms of any structural determinism.

This brief and partial review of the major theoretical perspectives shows that the neo-Marxist or radical theoretical perspective goes wholly against the theory of world polity/society theory as developed by Meyer and his associates. Thus globalization theory provides a new intellectual theatre for the ideological battles that have continued in the West in the modern era. Globalization theories thus both reflect and represent the ideological fault lines that characterize modern history.

Globalization studies have proved to be a fertile ground for many other minor theoretical perspectives and a review of all these theories is impossible within the space of a single paper. But it is worth mentioning that major sociological theoreticians like Anthony Giddens and Ulrich Beck or urban sociologist Sassen or anthropologists like Appadurai have also produced powerful theories of globalization.

Giddens (1990) considers that globalization is an essential consequence of modernity—‘modernity at large’ and a multi-faceted process. It leads to time-space compression and intensification of interpersonal relationships. For Giddens (1990: 64):

> Globalization can ... be defined as the intensification of world-wide social relations which link distant localities in such a way that local happenings are shaped by events occurring many miles away and vice-versa. This is a dialectical process because such local happenings may move in an obverse direction from the very distanciated relations that shape them. Local transformation is as much a part of globalization as the lateral extension of social connections across time and space.

He argues that the term that best describes the fast moving contemporary society which is experiencing sweeping institutional transformation is globalization. He attributes development in the ICT technology and international division of labour as the key driving forces behind the unleashing of globalization in our time.

Giddens views globalization as consisting of four interrelated dimensions: nation states, world military order, world capitalist economy and international division of labour. Globalization occurs from above as a result development in technology and global market forces and also from below as individuals and organizations become organized on a global level. Globalization produced a new form of individualism with new skills centred on professionalism. Giddens compares globalization with juggernaut without centralized control mechanism that produces both benefits for individuals, inequality among them and unforeseen risks for human society.

Beck (2002), in particular, focuses on the nature of global risks which the first phase of modernity have produced and which now demand new intellectual tools and vision in sociology beyond the limits of nation-states and small collectivities to effectively deal with it. It demands transnational collective action and cosmopolitan worldview for solving crises and dangers that are destined to affect the planet as a whole like the climate change or nuclear winter. Thus Beck articulates a normative and futuristic theory that should form the eye of the storm in the intellectual debates of today in our endangered planet.
Sassen (2007) focuses on the network of global cities that are the command centres which determine the flow of capital, commodities and firms across the world and control local economies. The pivotal cities of today constitute the nerve centres of global economy. They are playing a key strategic role in today’s world and are likely to be more influential in the increasingly urbanized world of 21st century.

Sociologist George Ritzer (1993) has produced one of the most provoking metaphors of globalization through his theory of McDonaldization. He has captivatingly captured the global consumption style—“the modern “cathedrals of consumption” (Ritzer, 1993:5) from the examples of the global diffusion of McDonald fast food and shopping malls of advanced capitalist countries. Ritzer argues that the global consumption pattern is driven by deep rationalization of production and distribution of consumption goods. McDonald’s world-wide appeal lies in its uniform quality, cheap price and ease of distribution that it ensures by simplifying production and distribution (based on stock of semi-processed food that can be prepared and served quickly and low labour input achieved through introduction of self-service system). McDonald provides the perfect recipe for organizing a busy, competitive and Darwinian life in the global era. Thus globalization should be viewed essentially as McDonaldization writ large. McDonaldization is a recipe for global organizations to survive and flourish. It serves as the metaphor for the universal butchering of workers leaving as little as possible the scope for human mediation between production and consumption.

One of the most popular theories of globalization was spelled out by Appadurai (1990) who viewed the process of globalization as consisting of an interlinked five domains. He called these domains scapes. Globalization thus has occurred through sacrospace that means religious revivalism over the global landscape, ethnoscapes consisting of supra national organizations, econoscape that refers to global flow of commodities and labour and a common style of consumption across the globe; mediascape that ensures the global flow of images and information and finally, leisurescape that signified universal tourism and all these leading to the rise of global life-world.

**Evaluation of theories**

Sklair’s (Sklair, 1999:159) critical and excellent summary describes the blind spots of each theoretical perspective and is worth quoting.

Each of the four approaches to globalization has its own distinctive strengths and weaknesses. The world-system model tends to be economistic (minimizing the importance of political and cultural factors), but as globalization is often interpreted in terms of economic actors and economic institutions, this does seem to be a realistic approach. The globalization of culture model, on the other hand, tends to be culturalist (minimizing economic factors), but as much of the criticism of globalization comes from those who focus on the negative effects of homogenizing mass media and marketing on local and indigenous cultures, the culturalist approach has many adherents. The world society model tends to be both optimistic and all-inclusive, an excellent combination for the production of world-views, but less satisfactory for social science research programmes. Finally, the global capitalism model, by prioritising the global capitalist system and paying less attention to other global forces, runs the risk of appearing one-sided. However, the question remains: how important is that ‘one side’ (global capitalism)?
It is, however, necessary to point out that the world-system theory is not a theory of globalization as it describes the uneven development of capitalism in the West. Wallerstein himself is critical of the concept of globalization. The two other theories—global cultural and global society approach—are strongly normative for they assume the existence of a global culture or global society. If global capitalism appears to be inevitable, it is likely to contain great diversities leading to diverse forms of globalization. A key limitation of the world polity theory is the complete reliance on the process of rationalization and collective good that globalization produces. The world polity theory has drawn critical fire from one recent critic Olaf Corry (2013). The author argues that the prevailing theory of world polity has failed to address many crucial issues of contemporary politics which demand new theorizing.

In fact, a key limitation of the theories of globalization is the fact that each of them has strong normative standpoint. The so-called hyperglobalizer theories assert the virtues of globalization and its immanent permanence. The sceptical theories deny that it is anything new or beneficial and thus of little importance. The transformational theories see it as an inevitable process for reshaping the world. The in-built ideological aspect of each theory makes it vulnerable to strong denouncement from other ideological standpoints. Thus, all theories of globalization manifest simplistic, unidimensional and fragmented views geared to supporting ideological standpoints.

These theories hardly mention that globalization had serious negative consequences on the south. The globalization discourse has been characterized by two absences. Beyond the abstract local, the south does not exist. Giddens’ seminal book The Run Away World (Giddens, 2002) has only one reference about the vast geographical territory called south. Beck (2002) evokes the image of Brazil only to suggest that the West should be careful not to descend to that black hole. The cognitive framework has been dominated by the metropolitan vision in most studies of globalization in the south. Major theorists of globalization like Bauman, Beck, Robinson, Kellner or Sassen never took into account the social thought from the south Connell, 2007). Nor does Robertson, despite his career in development studies. Sassen, in particular, draws critical fire from Dawson and Edwards (2004) because of her focus on cities in developed countries although 95 percent of population growth in the 21st century would occur in the south and most of the growth of mega cities is taking place here. Giddens did not agree with the view that globalization increased income inequality (Carnegie Endowment for international Peace, 2000) even though it has been completely refuted now (Inequality Lab, 2018. And it was characterized by another great absence—globalization theory never included any black face or women or its impact on the south (Connell, 2007). The best evidence that existing theories of globalization are fundamentally flawed is evident from the fact that nearly all of them failed to anticipate the widespread resistance to globalization and its demise.

Nearly all theories are normative as each of them reflects an ideological standpoint. The world culture theory deals with cultural domain while the world-system theory focuses on economic factors. Neo-Marxist theories
fail to take into account the issues of rationalization and agency. The world polity theory becomes only concerned with collective good disregarding its negative consequences or dysfunctional aspects. Globalization theories also focus almost exclusively on the north taking little account of its dynamics and impact on the south. So what we need is paradigm-birding as Ritzer (1975) calls it. For more robust analysis of globalization we need merging of theoretical horizons that can seal the fragmentation and loopholes of current theorizing. I present below the outline of such a schema.

The review of the existing theories of globalization shows that each theory explains a specific aspect of globalization and fails to illuminate other aspects. A crucial problem of globalization theories is the lack of specification about its origin and end. Modernization theory deployed the concept of tradition as its point of departure and modernity as its end point. But globalization theories lack any such landmarks. Thus the huge controversy and confusion in globalization discourse can be reduced if we can locate it within the framework of social change.

Thus globalization discourse embodies all the shortcomings of modernization theory and now faces the same fate. In short, “globalization is both bad empirics and bad theory” (Held and McGrew, 2007:3). The obituary notice of the Economist ignores the fact that globalization has been dead for a long time. More recent studies of globalization are largely devoted to the autopsy of a vast body of intellectual endeavour geared towards the construction of a cosmic view of the social structure of the contemporary world shaped and reshaped by the fast pace of social change through which we are passing in the 21st century. Perhaps no other field of social sciences has attracted so many ideas within such a short time. Yet globalization—a child of the late twentieth century has gone with the wind. Globalization has been replaced by another master metaphor—deglobalization (Karunaratne, 2012) signifying the collapse of the intellectual castle that globalization theorists had tried to construct and following Thomas Kuhn (1970), it is best to acknowledge that the dominant paradigm has passed away and it is time to construct a new paradigm (for a full discussion of Kuhn’s theory and its application in social sciences see, Islam 1985).

Part 2

Towards a new metaparadigm of globalization

Towards a definition globalization

After reviewing the existing definitions of globalization, I propose the following definition of globalization. Globalization is a sub-process of social change involving greater connectivity, cultural homogenization, cosmopolitanism and cultural mélange which are triggered by technological breakthrough or development of new cultural forms or new policies or through any combination of these that result in compression of time and space and greater connectivity among different geographical regions and peoples enabling certain regions to exercise economic domination, political and cultural hegemony and permitting increased flow of ideas, innovations, practices,
commodities and services, enhanced mobility of people and heightened cultural exchanges and interaction among people dispersed over the planet or parts of it. Far from being a deterministic or linear process, globalization manifests a punctuated process of social change involving waves of expansion and counter waves of contraction.

The chief merits of this definition are:

- It clearly identifies the broad causes that lead to globalization including the role of agency
- It is not deterministic or linear.
- It views globalization within the broader framework of social change.
- It analyzes globalization as a contradictory and punctuated process consisting of waves and counter waves that enjoy both expansion and contraction.

Towards a new analytical Framework

The best approach to understanding of globalization lies in discarding both ideological and sectarian theories of globalization through integration of different theoretical perspectives or what Ritzier (1975) described as ‘paradigm-bridging.’ It is necessary to view globalization as part of the broader process of social change over time. This process is both evolutionary and cyclical. The evolutionary process involves punctuated evolution in which it occurs in rapids bursts of change followed by long periods of stasis and stagnation (Gould and Eldrege, 1977). The search for a single master cause of any dramatic event leads us to sterile dead-end. Although a single cause may be important, but it is always a specific interacting causal complex which is responsible for the rise of a new form of globalization. Every form of globalization also manifests cycles of expansion and decay. The history of globalization shows powerfully the interplay of these two forces at work. It occurs in the form of waves and counter waves of globalization and de-globalization which have characterized our known history. It calls for mapping out these waves and counter waves and what leads to one particular wave or its counter wave and it demands trans-disciplinary efforts to construct an integrated theory or what I would call metaparadigm.

Key arguments of the paper

1. First, I argue that globalization should be viewed as an aspect of a broader process of social change.
2. Secondly, I would argue that globalization theorists should agree with the minority view that globalization began very early in human history. The dispersal of Homo Sapiens out of Africa to all parts of the globe serves, indeed, as the best example for what we call globalization.
3. Thirdly, I would argue, following Hopkins (2002) for making a distinction between proto-globalization and globalization. Then I carry it further by indicating the different phases of
globalization in modern times suggesting that globalization does not constitute a single process. It is best to view it as multiple globalizations. The process of globalization in future will take the shape of multiple globalizations which I call segmented globalization. This schema will bring order into the lack of consensus about the onset of globalization.

4. Fourthly, I argue that globalization is a contradictory non-linear and punctuated evolutionary process consisting of waves of globalization and counter waves de-globalization.

5. Fifthly, I would argue that the world-system theory is particularly relevant for the analysis of globalization. Globalization or even proto-globalization always starts in the core and spreads over semi-periphery and periphery. Chase-Dunn and his associates have made major contribution in the study of globalization which should be integrated within the new meta-paradigm of globalization.

6. Sixthly, every new phase of globalization is triggered by major breakthrough in technology, military technology, emergence of new cultural forms, new business models or new strategic policy reforms. Although a single causal factor may have overwhelming role, most often it is a complex set of factors that trigger globalization. The causal complex is specific to each phase and thus it is useless to talk about generic causes of globalization as a whole. The absence of such rigorous causal analysis has bedeviled the existing discourse of globalization. In analyzing the causes, it is necessary to take into account both structure and agency perspectives.

7. Seventhly, I argue that modern globalization is the child of a contradictory process – concentration and incarceration of slaves and indentured workers in the plantations and mines of the colonies. Sugar, cotton, opium, tea, tobacco and other plantation products alongside gold and silver produced in the mines of the new world fuelled the rise and expansion of international trade (Wolf, 1982) which was a major contributing factor for the Industrial Revolution.

8. My eighth argument is that each theoretical perspective of globalization is partial and carries an ideological iceberg. An adequate sociological understanding of globalization calls for a blending of theoretical horizons. It will cancel out the different normative views on globalization and provide us with a broader perspective. Borrowing from a term from nursing studies and medicine, I would call the outcome of such endeavour metaparadigm (Nikfarid, Hekmat, Vedad and Rajabi, 2018).

9. I argue that globalization should be viewed in terms of core and periphery and both the processes of globalization and de-globalization radiate from the core and affect the semi-periphery in different ways which allow a few countries to move to the core.

10. Finally, I argue that we are now living in a post-global era characterized by four worlds of globalization and de-globalization. I call the first world global village (McLuhan, 1960) which means increasing connectivity, flow of trades, capital and expanding communication among countries and regions. I call the second world McWorld (Barber, 2008) which signifies both deepened rationalization of our life world, cultural flows from both global core and local cultures giving rise to complex hybridity and what Pieterse (2009) calls cultural mélange. Glocalization is too simple a category to capture this complexity. The third world I call the world on fire (Chua, 2003) that has
characterized the twentieth century and continues unabated until now. The fourth world I call lonely planet that marks the alienation and loss of identity in an expanding world of simulation, robotization and genetic experimentation.

The point of departure

There is no other better point of departure for an analysis of globalization other than Karl Marx who beginning from 1848 provided an analysis of globalization that has hardly any parallel on the discourse of globalization. It was Marx who first spelled out the unique inherent dynamics of capitalism as the driver of globalization which is inscribed in one of his most quoted observations. “Accumulate, accumulate! This is Moses and the Prophets!” of capitalism ((Marx.n.d: 595). It ceaselessly drives the expansion of capitalism and globalization. As Marx explained it eloquently (Marx, n.d. :16, Internet archive)

Constant revolutionising of production, uninterrupted disturbance of all social conditions, everlasting uncertainty and agitation distinguish the bourgeois epoch from all earlier ones. All fixed, fast-frozen relations, with their train of ancient and venerable prejudices and opinions, are swept away, all new-formed ones become antiquated before they can ossify. All that is solid melts into air all that is holy is profaned, and man is at last compelled to face with sober senses his real conditions of life, and his relations with his kind.

The need of a constantly expanding market for its products chases the bourgeoisie over the entire surface of the globe. It must nestle everywhere, settle everywhere, establish connexions everywhere.

The bourgeoisie, by the rapid improvement of all instruments of production, by the immensely facilitated means of communication, draws all, even the most barbarian nations, into civilisation. The cheap prices of commodities are the heavy artillery with which it batters down all Chinese walls, with which it forces the barbarians’ intensely obstinate hatred of foreigners to capitulate. It compels all nations, on pain of extinction, to adopt the bourgeois mode of production; it compels them to introduce what it calls civilisation into their midst, i.e., to become bourgeois themselves. In one word, it creates a world after its own image.

Marx showed that it was search for profit that compels the bourgeoisie to drive for continuous technological innovations and search for raw materials all over the world. The increasing competition and falling rate of profit also force them to spread over the globe. But he also showed it as manifesting contradictory cycles of expansion and crisis that punctuated the history of capitalism.

I would like to argue that although globalization as a process of social change as old as humankind, it is best to view it as a distinctive feature of capitalism and integrate Marx’s insights, world-system theory, modernization theory, recent developments in evolutionary biology with Paul Kennedy’s (Kennedy, 1987) concept of rise and fall of great powers and the concept of de-globalization to explain the dynamics of globalization. Daniel Lerner, the pioneer of modernization theory acknowledged Marx as one of the first modernizing theorists. He is also the father of globalization studies. Marx provides insights that globalization is a dialectical process that manifest regular cycles of expansion and contraction. I would argue that globalization is also a contradictory process that involves waves of expansion and counter waves of de-globalization. Globalization begins from the core of an empire or civilization and spreads to semi-periphery or periphery through expanding market ties and cultural diffusion.
Globalization as it flourishes in the core and radiates from the core spreads to semi-periphery and periphery in its economic, political and cultural forms. The integration of Marx’s insights, world-system theory and modernization theory allow us a better point of departure for the study of globalization. I have thus attempted to spell out the process of expansion of globalization through a marriage of theoretical perspectives of modernization and neo-Marxism. The process of institutional or cultural diffusion takes place on the strength of economic domination and political hegemony. Globalization advances by destroying or radically changing localized economic, political, social and cultural forms most often by deploying varying degrees of violence. It produces complex forms of hybridity of social structure and cultural forms which cannot be captured by the concept of glocalization. Most often it is more than that and the notion of cultural mélange can be a better concept to convey this complexity (Pieterse, 2009; 2018). As a contradictory process, globalization is both a process of structural connectivity and cultural homogenization and cultural mélange, and a force that produces structural divergence and clash of cultures. It is a process that reflects a change in the power hierarchy of nations, regions and localities; and inevitably causes violence, fragmentation of social life, religious revivalism and decline of social capital apart from growing inequality and political instability. Globalization does not result only in increased economic benefits and cultural homogeneity; it also leads to uneven economic benefits for different geographical regions and social collectivities. The concept of glocalization produces more analytical problems than it solves. Neither the global is pristine pure nor is local. The local culture is often pre-constituted by the earlier forms of proto globalization. The global culture is also adulterated with local cultures.

Figure 1 below shows the antinomies and contradictions of globalization in the form of globality and locality, convergence and divergence, hybridity, cultural mélange, globalization and de-globalization, and the four worlds that the contemporary post-globality manifests. The first two worlds—global village is the world of connectivity that has continued to grow from the colonial era and will continue in future as new technologies of communication develop including expansion of automatic translation among different languages, increasing trade flows and flows of capital and technologies. The great technological development, especially development of information technology has led to the shrinking of time and space--railways, telegraphy, telephone, radio, TV, internet and migration have led to great diffusion of ideas, cultural values, and social practices. It has now led to the death of space. The 2018 Global Connectedness Report shows that “[T]he world’s level of connectedness reached a new record high in 2017. For the first time since 2007, the shares of trade, capital, information, and people flows crossing national borders all increased significantly” (Altman, Ghemawat and Bastian, 2018:4). Although Europe remained the most connected region, South-East countries of Cambodia, Malaysia, Mozambique, Singapore, and Viet Nam were also very high in connectedness. Exports of goods and services expanded reaching 29% of the GDP, FDI flows reached 7% of fixed capital, 7% of the telephone calls were made across countries though only 3% of the people lived outside the country of their birth (Altman, Ghemawat and Bastian, 2018:12).
Figure 1: Four Worlds of Globalization

- **Global Village**
  - Global connectivity
  - Rapid mobility of capital
  - Greater flow of trade
  - Spread of firms across space
  - Greater flow of people
  - Instant communication without barrier

- **McWorld**
  - Cultural homogenization
  - Cultural mélange

- **World on Fire**
  - Resurgence of ethnicity
  - Return of the sacred
  - Jihadism

- **The Lonely Planet**
  - Increased inequality
  - Loss of employment
  - Loss of identity
  - New alienation

**Convergence**

- **Hybridity/Cultural mélange**

**Locality**

**Divergence**

**De-globalization**

**Globality**

**Globalization**
In a remarkable historical parable Admiral Cheng Ho completed his last voyage to the Indian Ocean region in 1433 that signalled the end of China’s exploration of the world and its inward looking policy that sealed her fate into the cocoon of involution and stagnation, and in 2013 Xi Jinping unveiled the vast mega project Belt and Road Initiatives to connect China with Asia, Africa and Europe as the Silk Road once did while USA turned inward to protect its domestic economy sealing her voyage of globalization. This mega project when implemented will mark a new age in global connectivity and regional governance (China Centre for International Exchanges and UNDP.n.d).

The McWorld represents continuity in the increasing rationalization process of capitalism following Fordism and post-Fordism as new business models develop. The strategic business policies of transnational corporations and activities of transnational class will carry forward the process of deepening of the rationalization process of production and it will be dominated increasingly by robotization of production and distribution replacing shopkeepers and shop staff. Globalization theorists hold that interconnectivity is producing a flattened world (Friedman, 2005) or leading to McDonaldization of the world as Ritzer (1993) calls it. One can find, in fact, McDonald in the Chalk of old Delhi where no transport other than rickshaws can move. It means cultural homogenization all over the world through a common consumer culture. It is leading to the formation of a common global youth culture across the world. The key factors of McDonaldization are satellite TV, advertisement, internet, mobile and film. The global culture both reflects US hegemony dictating a common cultural pattern as well as fusion of local and global cultures producing cultural mélange.

The world on fire which I borrow from Amy Chua (2003) captures two related issues. She shows how the market-driven globalization and export of democracy in poor countries have let great ethnic violence in the Third world and East Europe. The second aspect draws into attention four flashpoints of the world today. First, it point to the war in the Middle East and the consequent migration crisis which has produced severe backlash in Europe and USA leading to right-wing politics and even growth of anti-migrant extremism and threatening liberal democracies in the West as well. The second issue deals with increasing ethnic conflicts in different parts of the world. The third issue is the escalating religious revivalism not only among the Muslim countries, but also in India, Myanmar and Russia. The fourth issue deals with terrorism. Although it has gone down considerably, yet the threat is not yet over as terrorist groups continue to attract new recruits and plan new operations. The political instability of many countries may also fuel new acts of terrorism. “We are in the beginning of a new era, characterized by great insecurity, permanent crisis and the absence of any kind of status quo....”. Hobsbawm began the conclusion of his majestic survey of the twentieth century by citing M. Stürmer (Hobsbawm, 1995:500). In fact, much of the history of from the period of Crusades to until now has been characterized by great violence. Not only the colonial era, but also two World Wars have shown the ferocity of the killing machines of modernity. Amy Chua’s book ‘World on Fire’ (Chua, 2003) asserts that recent globalization and democratization have led to an escalation of ethnic violence in various parts of the developing world. She holds that global market forces have favoured small
mainly ethnic minorities such as the Chinese in South-east Asia, the Lebanese in West Africa, Indians in East Africa, and whites in Latin America who have been able to take advantage of the global opportunities. This has created an explosive relationship between majorities and minorities in these countries. These are likely to lead to conflicts and it will not be possible to contain these conflicts. This will lead to backlash against globalization and threaten democracy.

According to the Global Peace Index 2018, the impact of violence on the world economy in 2017 stood at $14.76 trillion in terms of purchasing power parity (PPP) which was equivalent to 12.4 per cent of the global GDP or $1,988 for every person. It underwent a rise of 16 per cent since 2012.

Looking at where event counts and reported fatalities are highest can help to identify conflict hotspots. But, relying on these aggregate figures alone misses the whole picture of what happened in 2018. While political violence decreased overall in volume, it also expanded. In 2018, more locations saw violence, more conflict actors emerged, more actors targeted civilians than before, and more countries saw disorder increase than decrease within their borders. Overall, the footprint of conflict expanded significantly (ACLED, 2018).

The number of locations in which conflict took place soared up by 11% worldwide and the number of actors involved by 20% within a year (ACLED, 2018). In 2016, 99000 people died as a result of warfare increasing by more than double from 2004 and 560,000 people from other forms of violence. It translates into one death by violence every minute of the year. The total number of violent death is projected to increase to 610,000 by 2030. Firearms killed 210,000 people in 2016 (Mc Evoy and Hideg, 2017).

Urban violence

The urban life: isolation and violence. There has been phenomenal rise in urban violence fuelled by, growing inequality and growing urbanization including mega cities characterized by ‘planet of slums’ and unstable political conditions and global networks of criminal or violent groups. In fact, global flow of small arms has been one of the most terrifying impacts of globalization (;Muggah, 2001;Moser, 2004).

“On average, 300,000 intentional firearm deaths occur each year as a direct result of armed conflict. An additional 200,000 intentional firearm deaths also occur in countries ordinarily classified as ‘peaceful’ (Muggah, 2001:72). In many countries, and in Latin America in particular, the city has become increasingly divided into citadel of the rich, enclaves of ethnic groups and the ghetto of the poor(Davis,2007). In essence, the rise in urban violence is a response to changes in global and sub-national demographics, growing inequality in urban areas, and increasingly unstable political conditions in developing countries (Moser, 2004).

Terrorism and violence

Extended southern Asian region, comprising Xingjian, Central Asia, Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, Bhutan, Nepal, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Myanmar, are presently the main cauldron of fundamentalist, Islamic and separatist terrorist activities. South Asia has become a major social space for religious revivalism. It emerged with global support (war in Afghanistan against Soviet Russia) and global money (Middle
The BJP - a major political party of India and preaches Hindu fundamentalism receives money and support from non-resident Indians from various parts of the world. Since 2002, the world except North America suffered from increase in terrorist attacks. The number of countries experienced death by terrorism from 65 in 2015 to 77 countries in 2016. Deaths from terrorism soared up by 67 per cent compared to battle deaths which went up by 66 per cent between 2006 and 2016 (Institute for Economics and Peace, 2017). Globalization has also produced socio-political instability.

The concept of lonely planet maps out the growing inequality, unemployment, fierce competition and loneliness of man against the brutal faceless forces of the market that makes most men vulnerable to quiet suffering. As Kuttner (2002) observes:

... but against the particular version of it imposed by the world's financial elites. The brand currently ascendant needlessly widens gaps of wealth and poverty, erodes democracy, seeds instability, and fails even its own test of maximizing sustainable economic growth (Kuttner, cited in Mentan, 2015:153).

Globalization and growing inequality

The World Inequality Report 2018 (World Inequality Lab, 2018:5) shows that income all over the world has increased sharply.

In 2016, the share of total national income accounted for by just that nation’s top 10% earners (top 10% income share) was 37% in Europe, 41% in China, 46% in Russia, 47% in US-Canada, and around 55% in sub-Saharan Africa, Brazil, and India. In the Middle East, the world’s most unequal region according to our estimates, the top 10% capture 61% of national income.

The lonely planet symbolizes a world growingly dominated by the rich and the super-rich. Firstly, it draws attention to the growing inequality and unemployment that have haunted the world from 1990s as a result neo-liberal policy of globalization. In 1997, Dani Rodrik (1997) sounded the bell of alarm that everything was not going well in the flattened world. Trade restrictions were beginning to loom large on the horizon for slashing of the trade barriers had signaled a world of Darwinian competition in which many people were becoming losers. Others pointed out the growing inequality that was producing growing insecurity for the poor and the vulnerable and the campaign against one percent that held most of the wealth of the world turned into global rage. Increasing inequality will continue to escalate as a major social problem in future technologies of communication – social media and robotization of the life-world haunted by breakdown of family life and other human relationships. As people become more engaged in the virtual world, live in a world of multi-layered simulation, they will become more and more alienated and lose lose social connectivity and social identity as well. It may also lead to increasing violence among children and adolescents. “With increased competition in the globalized economy and the rapidly rising capacity to use ‘world time’ to enhance productivity, the very best workers are now those who never sleep, never consume, never have children, and never spend time socializing outside of work” (Carnoy cited in Perrons, 2004: 275).

“…in this way, a Darwinian world emerges—it is the struggle of all against all at all levels of the hierarchy, which finds support through everyone clinging to their job and organization under conditions of insecurity,
The negative impact of globalization: an overview. The following figure encapsulates the issues discussed above.

**Figure 2: Negative Impact of Globalization**

**Economic**
- Increasing Inequality
- Increasing Unemployment
  - New Poverty
  - illegal Trade

**Political**
- Instability
- Violence
- Protest movements

**Social**
- Increasing Individualism
- New Alienation
- Uprooting of People and Migration

**Waves and counter waves of proto globalization**

Globalization shows that it is neither a deterministic nor a linear process. As indicated earlier, it is a cyclical process involving bursts of globalization and de-globalization. This long process can be divided into a number of phases: proto-globalization (Hopkins, 2002), early modern, modern and late modern and post-global era of de-globalization. Each wave spreads from a spatial core resulting from technological breakthrough in production, military technology or techniques, development of new cultural forms or policy breakthrough and lasts for a specific period of time. Then the wave loses its momentum and the process of globalization comes to an end as it suffers from a counter-wave. Again a new spatial niche archives technological breakthrough and new economic domination, develops new cultural forms and devises new policies and turn into a new core. Globalization begins to expand from this core and spreads over distant regions.
Table 2 below maps out the major historical forms of proto-globalization that predated the modern era.

Table 2: Dynamics of Proto-globalization

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Technology</th>
<th>Time period*</th>
<th>Dynamics</th>
<th>Carriers</th>
<th>Type of civilization</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Type of globalization</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Neolithic Revolution</td>
<td>Various time periods</td>
<td>Spread of agriculture, spread of cultures</td>
<td>Soldiers, merchants, traders, priests</td>
<td>Rise of empires and civilizations</td>
<td>Middle East, South Asia, China</td>
<td>Early proto-globalization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Invention of New Cultural form</td>
<td>1500 BCE-1200 CE, 12th century</td>
<td>Spread of Buddhism and Hinduism</td>
<td>Priests, monks</td>
<td>South-east Asian civilizations</td>
<td>South Asia</td>
<td>Trans-regional proto-globalization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hinduism</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buddhism</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decline of Hinduism in India</td>
<td>800 BCE</td>
<td>Muslim invasion of India, rise of Greek philosophy</td>
<td>Soldiers, priests, merchants, philosophers</td>
<td>Muslim civilization in India, Greek civilization</td>
<td>Greece, Eurasia</td>
<td>Trans-continental proto-globalization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New military technology</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slavery</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crisis</td>
<td>Decline 148 CE</td>
<td>Warfare crisis, Roman attack</td>
<td>Fall of Greek civilization, Roman civilization</td>
<td>Eurasia</td>
<td>De-globalization</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Invention of new military technology</td>
<td>509-480 CE</td>
<td>Spread of Christian civilization</td>
<td>Priests, soldiers, merchants</td>
<td>Eurasia</td>
<td>Transcontinental proto-globalization</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slavery</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christianity as new cultural form</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barbarian invasion</td>
<td>395 CE-500 CE</td>
<td>Fall of Roman Empire, spread of Islamic civilization</td>
<td>Feudal lords, serfs</td>
<td>Feudalism</td>
<td>West Europe</td>
<td>De-globalization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New military technology</td>
<td>7th century</td>
<td>Spread of Islamic civilization</td>
<td>Soldiers, merchants, saints</td>
<td>Islamic Civilization</td>
<td>Eurasia</td>
<td>Transcontinental proto-globalization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islam as new cultural form</td>
<td>7th century to early 18th century</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decline of Islam</td>
<td>From early 18th century</td>
<td>Crisis of Ottoman Empire, Mughal empire</td>
<td>Warfare threats from rising Europe</td>
<td>Decline of Islamic civilization</td>
<td>Eurasia</td>
<td>Deglobalization</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Dates and examples used are tentative and merely indicative of the beginning of rise and onset of decline of different civilizations for the sake of discussion and subject to further revision.
This table is self-explanatory. Every new civilization springs from a backward region that invents a new technology, new source of wealth or military technology or a new cultural form or a combination of a set of complex factors. The dynamics of its expansion lies in the extension of the empire or civilization or cultural diffusion to adjoin areas. The typical carriers of globalization are soldiers, merchants and priests. Soldiers protect or expand the borders of the empire. Each new empire or civilization has specific template and features. The rise of a new civilization heralds a new era of globalization. The fall of that civilization signals a process of de-globalization. At one time, there are many parallel civilizations with periodic exchange of culture and commodities. The table above only cites a few common examples of rise and fall of globalization or globalization and de-globalization as examples.

It shows globalization in its archaic form or proto-globalization. Each wave is distinctive. Each wave has its spatial origin. Each wave is based on a key or set of technological inventions and innovations. Each wave has a distinctive institutional configuration in the form of empire and civilizations including long-distance trade routes that connected distant civilizations. The typical carriers of the empire or civilization are soldiers who fight to expand its border, merchants who carry goods and commodities within the empire or to distant regions. The priests or saints spread the religion or religions both within and outside it. The waves can be also seen as changes in the centre of civilizations. The earliest proto-globalization began with the Neo-lithic Revolution in the Middle East that gave rise to cities and cultural diffusion from these cities over distant areas. It followed a period of the rise of empires and civilizations in different parts of the world all of which led to multiple sites of proto-globalization often with regular or sporadic trade links as the fortunes of these civilizations rose and fell. These civilizations thus were regional or transcontinental. Buddhism and Hinduism spread as mere cultural forms to many parts of Asia. Islam, on the other hand, became transcontinental.

I have shown that it was the new maritime technology including ships fitted with cannon and compass which came from China that led made it possible for Spain and Portugal to establish their colonies in Latin America and other places (Cipolla, 1989). But it was definitely not a single factor. There were other factors which were responsible for it which are not shown here for the sake of brevity. Historians most often waver between search for a master cause or empiricism that lists the possible causes of dramatic historical events. The rise of capitalism or modern globalization provides a good example of it. The rise of capitalism has proved to be a battle field for historians and social scientists. In trying to explain the birth of modern globalization in Great Britain, I have tried to build up an integrated model that comprises two different causal loops—one internal and the other external. It shows that the key to the rise of modern globalization was the plantation economy that created demand for slaves or indentured workers who were brought from long or short distance and kept confined in the plantations under the most brutal disciplinary regime that the colonial regimes imposed. It was the immobility of labour which was crucial to the dynamics of the global Atlantic trade in the 17th and 18th centuries in sugar, cotton, tobacco, tea, opium and other such products that
together with a number of other factors, both internal and external, led to the Industrial Revolution and modern globalization. The internal factors are primitive accumulation resulting from enclosure movements.
and which led to the growth of wool trade and mass market for Great Britain as Wallerstein (1974) shows. But equally important was the growth of what Anderson (1983) calls print capitalism that led to the growth of knowledge and information sharing and construction of a common world view among people.

Tables 3 describe the waves of globalization proper. It describes globalization as consisting of five phases.

**Wave 1 1492-1757 -- Early modern globalization: Iberian colonialism**

The early phase of globalization began from the Iberian core with the discovery of the New World by Columbus and which was followed by the age of geographical discovery and colonialism that opened up the world for colonial domination. It was a period of great violence.

**Wave 2: 1757-1910 Modern globalization**

The first Iberian wave failed to assume the global form as Great Britain became the new core and established her hegemony over the world. This phase began with the triumph of East India Company in Bengal over the local ruler that paved the way for Pax Britannica. Its high point was Industrial Revolution.

**Wave 3: 1945-1989**

This wave began after the World War II with the ascent of US as the new core and shaping of the international financial and political system under the influence of US neo-imperialism. The development of new communication technology like radio, TV, Hollywood and Fordism as corporate strategy paved the way towards ‘global village.’ This wave paradoxically contained de-globalization as nation states began to achieve independence over the ruins of colonialism with territorial sovereignty. It was also marked by clash of ideologies leading to the Cold War.

**Wave 4: 1990-2000**

This is a short but strong wave that accompanied the fall of communism, the IT Revolution, post-Fordism as a corporate model and the triumph of neo-liberalism as a commanding doctrine of the world order. I have called it late modern/postmodern period of globalization. It was apparent that there was nothing to stop the march of the ‘jauggernaut’ (Giddens and Sutcliffe, 2013). The world appeared to be flat with an end of history under US hegemony. The utopia lasted only for a short decade followed by a period of de-globalization.

**Wave 5: 2000-2030**

The post-global era of de-globalization the late/postmodern phase of globalization has now been replaced by the post-global era of de-globalization. It will be characterized by both high intensity regional globalization and deglobalization as the core changes from USA to China and India. The rapid development of
communication technology and robotization will mark the process of globalization in this era. I have called it global village with increasing global connectivity and McWorld that will ensure deep rationalization and robotization and homogenization of culture over much of the world. The post-global era has also begun to trigger an intense process of de-globalization which I have described under two metaphors – world on fire and the lonely planet. This period will be characterized increasingly by conservative extremism, ethnic conflicts and clash of cultures. Inequality, unemployment and deep alienation will characterize this robotized planet as discussed above.

Wave 6: 2030-50

It will be followed by segmented globalization during 2030 and 2050 during which new waves of globalization driven by new technologies will deepen regional ties in different parts of the world and even among different parts of the in an increasingly multi-polar world.

Table 3: Globalization in Modern Era

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type Of technology</th>
<th>time</th>
<th>Dynamics</th>
<th>Carriers</th>
<th>Type of civilization</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Type of globalization</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Breakthrough in maritime technology</td>
<td>1492-1757</td>
<td>Spread of Iberian Empire</td>
<td>Soldiers, Merchants, Priests, Spanish and Portuguese settlers</td>
<td>Extended Iberian civilization</td>
<td>South America/Latin American/part of the Caribbean</td>
<td>Transcontinental globalization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Superior naval technology</td>
<td>1757-1910</td>
<td>British colonialism</td>
<td>Soldiers, Merchants, Missionaries, educationists</td>
<td>British Empire</td>
<td>World-wide British colonies</td>
<td>Modern British-led globalization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scientific and technological breakthrough Industrial Revolution Invention telegraph and telephone and deep integration of empire Spread of modern education and War technology</td>
<td>1910-1945</td>
<td>Crisis of British imperialism</td>
<td>Armies</td>
<td>Clash of nations</td>
<td>Europe Southeast Asia</td>
<td>De-globalization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Superior military technology Fordism</td>
<td>1945-1989</td>
<td>American imperialism</td>
<td>Soldiers, military bases, Transnationals corporations, Fordism</td>
<td>American Empire</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>Modern America-led globalization</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Spread of democracy  
Spread of radio, TV, film  
Hollywood as cultural model  
New information technology  
Neoliberalism  
Post-Fordism  
Global relocation of production  
Stagnation in US technology  
Increasing protectionism  
Rise of new cores  
China  
India  
Southeast Asia  
Divergence  

IMF/World Bank Experts  
Soldiers, military bases Transnational corporations  
IMF/World Bank Experts  
US as new core of capitalism Unipolar Global American Empire End of history  
War Afghanistan Iraq Trade war with China  
Chinese Indian economic empires  
Multi-polar World order  
Multi-polar World  
China, Southeast Asia India, Russia, Brazil South Africa With increasing impact on other countries  

Conclusion

Globalization is more than before an expanding process of our time. Except any major catastrophe, it will continue to accelerate in future. But it has serious human costs. Globalization has led to the growth of tremendous inequality, ethnic violence, genocide, religious revivalism, terrorism, refugee crisis and now threatens the established democracies of the West. These serious human costs are forcing many countries to adopt a policy of de-globalization and scholars to describe the contemporary period as post-global era.

But if we look carefully at the history of globalization, we will find that all past periods of globalization has ended in such de-globalization followed by a new wave of globalization. Neither hyperglobalization theorists, nor sceptics nor transformationalists are correct. The current period only marks a phase of
reconfiguration of the world system in which new cores are emerging which are destined to advance the course of segmented globalization in the form of robotization, faster interconnectivity and greater fusion of local cultures with the metropolitan culture in the post-American age. It remains to be seen whether the current crisis of globalization can open up new policy agenda to address the global problems that the ‘run away’ globalization has produced. The history of China between 1433 and 2019 teaches us the follies of wrong policy.

References


Appadurai, A. “Disjuncture and difference in the global cultural economy.” Theory, Culture and Society, 7(2-3).


Davis, Mike. 2006. Planet of the Slums. London: Verso


Dirlik, Arif. “Globalization as the End and the Beginning of History: The Contradictory Implications of a New Paradigm”, GHC Working Paper 00/3


Roberts, J. Timmons and Amy Hite (eds.). *From Modernization to Globalization*. Oxford: Blackwell


Roland Robertson. 1990c. Mapping the Global Condition: Globalization as the Central Concept. Theory, Culture and Society, 7:15-30


The Economist. (June, 28) 2019 “Globalization is Dead. We Need to a New World Order.”


Wimmer, Andreas and Yuval Feinstein.2016. “Still no Robust evidence for World Polity Theory.” *American Sociological Review*, 81 (3);608-615

World Inequality Lab. 2018 World Inequality Report 2018


Boko-Haram & Social Identity Theory: Explaining the Enigma that is Threatening National and Regional Peace in Africa

O. Okafor Samuel1 and Raimi Lasisi2

Abstract: Because of the increasing nature of the global system, it is safe to say that insecurity anywhere is insecurity everywhere. The emergence of Boko-Haram in 2002 and the subsequent activities of the group have resulted to countless number of damages sustained by the Nigerian nation, the neighboring countries and the world in general especially with regard to loss of lives and properties. With this in mind, the necessity of understanding the group and the sociological factors surrounding their existence and survival becomes pertinent. The presence of Boko-Haram in Nigeria cannot be isolated from the underpinning social circumstances surrounding the understanding and interpretations of the ethno-religious forces that are prevalent in Nigeria and the proliferation of religious ideology from the Middle East. Hence, practical solutions to the problem cannot be realizable without a theoretically informed explanation. The objective of the paper is to trace the identity issue surrounding the emergence of boko haram and their activities using the social identity theory.

Keywords: Boko-Haram, Social Identity, Islamic religion, Ethnic Identity, Egalitarian Nigeria.

Introduction
Terrorism, as is the case with the Boko-Haram group is classified, as the premeditated threat or use of violence by individuals or sub national groups to obtain a political or social objective through the intimidation of a large audience, beyond that of the immediate victim. This appears in the multi-diverse strategies and the outcomes of the terrorists’ activities (Abu-Amr, 1993). Although the motives of terrorists may differ, their actions follow a standard pattern which involves but not limited to airplane hijackings, kidnappings, assassinations, threats of and actual bombings, indiscriminate killings and suicide attacks (Alexander, 2004). These terrorist acts come with various negative consequences which includes; human casualties with massive number of deaths and injuries, destruction of properties, a heightened anxiety level, and myriad of economic costs (Andoni, 1997; U.S. Department of State, 2014). For instance, the twin attacks

1 Department of Sociology & Anthropology, University of Nigeria. Email: samuelokey200@gmail.com
2 Department of Sociology & Anthropology, Federal University Otuoke, Bayelsa State. Email: Lasisirri@fuotuoke.edu.ng
on September 11, 2001 had significant costs that have been estimated to be in the range of $80 to $90 billion when associated economic indicators such lost wages, workman's compensation, and reduced commerce are included (Kruglanski, Jasko, Chernikova, Dugas & Webber, 2017).

Terrorist incidents not only that it causes human casualties but have other numerous socio-economic consequences such causing the diversion of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), destroying infrastructure, redirecting public investment funds to security, or limiting trade and economic growth generally in the affected area (Collier, Elliott, Anke, Marta & Nicholas, 2003; Ahmed, 2002; Anderson, 2001). Terrorism, like civil conflicts, can devastate a nation and cause spillover effects among neighboring countries and regions as the activities of a number of globally designated extremist groups such as, Alqaida, Alshabab, ISIS, Taliban, etc have shown (Drakos, 2004; Ito & Lee, 2004; Chatham House, 2015; Enders & Sandler, 2006; Home Office, 2011b; MI5, 2012). For instance, Yemen’s shipping industry suffered greatly after the terrorist attacks on the USS Cole and the Limburg, which led to the diversion of half of Yemen’s port activities to competitive facilities in Djibouti and Oman as at 2002 and currently, have been crippled in the face of continuous sponsored terrorist activities in the country. Among the neighbors of Pakistan such as India, Afghanistan, etc, the activities of Taliban and other similar groups in the region have threatened internal and external peace and stability in addition to the threat it poses to regional and global peace (US Department of State Fact Sheet, 2002; Edelman, 2001; Euben, 2002; Faqir, 2001).

Although developed nations can show signs of monetary and fiscal capabilities to limit socio-economic impacts of terrorist attacks than small developing countries, terrorism anywhere has no tangible benefit order than enriching few individuals against the majority of citizens who derive their peace and stability through logical and globally accepted procedure for inter and intra human relation (Richardso Hudson, 1999; Bakker, 2006; Martin, 2009; Knudsen, 2003; Langohr, 2001; Lia & Skjølberg, 2000). Despite the inherently controversial and fluid nature of the word “terrorism”, one point which is not often obscured is the fact that terrorist activities, whether politically, religiously or ideologically informed, have one objective, which is to oppose an established authority or other groups with the purpose of coercing that authority or group into meeting the demands of the terrorists (Noy, 2004; Fischhoff, 2006; Soy, 2004; Beck, 2002).

Due to the complex and enigmatic nature of terrorism at the domestic and international stage, there has been a huge rise in multidisciplinary scholarly activities targeted at unravelling and evaluating terrorism and its socio-economic consequences for society (Fox, 2001; Fuller, 2002; Gerges, 1999; Juergensmeyer, 2000). While many are in the business of tracing the root of terrorism and the likely factors surrounding it, others have been working hard to defend the phenomenon either in the interest of religion or political ideology. In whichever way, what has come to play with regard to the consistent nature of terrorism is that majority of the recorded and verifiable terrorist incidents across the globe is fundamentally connected to religion with significant ethnic and political manifestations in most cases especially in developing nations.
Terrorism has grown from the level of few individuals’ interests into global and lucrative business for groups and nations such that many nations across the globe are using the phenomenon as the alternative way of pursuing certain domestic, regional and international interests (Chaliand, Gérard, & Blin, 2004).

In developing nations, terrorism has been domesticated across the globe for different scales of operation focusing on certain internal objectives and interest but with different appearances and veil of social discontent (Counter Terrorism Calander, 2014). From 1914 till date Nigeria has been struggling to live out the expected implication of the amalgamation of the precolonial small scale societies with very unfavourable results. More importantly, the current challenge to the concept of one Nigeria is the metamorphosis of foreign religious interest into terrorist clusters as a covert strategy to continue the longstanding politics of domination in the country. Interestingly, no other terrorist group manifests this character more than the Boko Haram Islamic Sect which is by far the most coordinated insurgent group in Nigeria that is systematically aligned to the global Islamic terrorist network.

Scoring the knowledge base of the Nigerian government, African region and the global agencies for the curtailing of terrorist’ activities, there is yet ambiguity about the nature and operation of the boko haram terrorist organization in comparison to other globally designated terrorist organizations and by implication, calls for more theoretically sound approach to the explanation of the group’s activities, its origin and the likely future direction using the available indices of the group’s activities.

This paper focused on understanding the origin and identity issues surrounding the phenomenon of bokoharam in Nigeria and within the religious framework of Islam. Being conscious of the end products of intellectual enterprise, which is elucidation of phenomenon and solution-driven communiqué, the paper juxtaposes the sincere confrontation of terrorism in view of the blink future of nations like Nigeria where terrorism is covertly encouraged under the cloak of ethnic, religion and politics.

Taken a little foray into the past and the current situation in many countries across the globe, there are a lot of self-explanatory warnings against selling any nation or region out to terrorism. Among the developing nations that have covertly embraced terrorism as a smoke screen to pursue ethnic and political cum ideological interests, political instability has become the order of the day (Gall, 2016; Gunaratna, 2007; Hoffman, 1995; Pellot, 2014; Stakelbeck, 2011; Winer & Roule, 2002; Ganor, 2002), and Nigeria seem to be toeing this disastrous path having opened its doors for terrorism as a strategy to actualize certain ethnic, political, religious, economic and other interests among the political gladiators.
Boko haram and the Journey of Terror in Nigeria so Far

Terrorism and insecurity, is not a problem that is unique to Nigeria. The US, the UK and many other countries, face the challenges of insecurity within their borders on a daily basis (Adejumo, 2012; Önis, 2001; Woltering, 2002). The difference between most of these nations and Nigeria is how they manage the threats; how knowledgeable sincere and prepared they are; how they deploy resources; how effective these resources are; how patriotic and united their people are against threats of insecurity.

When the pillar of national security is weak, the structure quivers and sends sensations to the occupiers and potential occupiers of such structures. This is the case with the Nigerian entity, where insecurity and unrelenting violence by Boko-Haram in the country have continued to pose a threat to the nation’s economy and investments. According to Carson (2012), in the wake of the crisis in the country, many international agencies and countries began to issue travel warnings to their citizens about the dangers involved in travelling and doing business in some parts of the country. Precisely, the United States warned American citizens of the risks of coming to Nigeria, with particular emphasis on places such as Jos, Bauchi, Gombe, Yobe and Borno States (Campbell, 2014). Of course, this cannot be isolated from the prevailing understanding and social stigma attached to terrorism in its totality wherever the signs appeared (Sigrid, 2017).

The areas affected by the Boko-Haram insurgency especially the north-eastern part of Nigeria have become disproportionately affected in terms of socio-economic development since in most cases, insurgency in that zone leads to a reversal of previous development gains while hindering new progress in this regard. The tragedy is that the collapse of local economies and the gradual erosion of social capital reinforce a downward spiral of further impoverishment, which in itself sows the seeds of further conflict (Nigeria RPBA Volume II –Component reports, 2016). For most of the north, the ongoing insurgency has had a significant negative impact on the regional economy. This can be seen in the economic statistics of the affected region.

The annual impacts of Boko Haram related conflict on output and price in the North East were simulated between 2011 and 2015. It is estimated that the region suffered an accumulated output loss of 1.66 Trillion Naira between 2011 and 2015, with a significant loss registered in 2012 and 2014 (464.32 Billion Naira and 447.13 Billion Naira respectively) (Nigeria RPBA Volume II –Component reports, 2016).

The primary affected States of Adamawa, Borno and Yobe experienced significant output loss accounting for 75 % of the accumulated output loss in six States, with Borno experiencing the greatest loss between 2011 and 2015. While Borno, Adamawa and Yobe are the primary targets of the Boko Haram group, the loss suffered by the three other States is to a large extent attributable to the influx of IDPs and fear of conducting economic activities in locations that are close to primary targets of the armed group. [Nigeria RPBA Volume II –Component Reports, 2016]. Lebanese and Indian expatriates who have
established businesses in Kano going back decades have relocated to Abuja and the south. A good number of them have left the country altogether. Hotels, banks and other business sectors have witnessed significant reductions in their activities. The border towns that have thrived on trade with Nigeria have also seen their businesses curtailed because of increasing restrictions on cross-border traffic. In Kano alone, an estimated 126 industries have recently closed down (Sunday Trust, 2012).

Another trend is the massive movement of southerners from the north, many of them small and medium scale operators and professionals anxiously needed in this region for sustainable development. Boko Haram terrorist activities have been a bad signal to foreign investors who would have been interested in investing in the country’s economy (Baiyewu, 2012).

Some experts believe that there are no criteria to quantify the loss of Boko-Haram impact on the Nigerian economy including the loss of lives. As such, some have concluded that any figure that is thrown up from any source may be a scratch on the surface (Nigeria RPBA Volume II –Component Reports, 2016; Baiyewu, 2012; Eme & Ibietan, 2012; Okereocha, 2012).

The Human Right Watch report with its scary figures revealed that, in 2011 alone, ‘Boko Haram’ struck 115 times and killed 550 people. Within the first three weeks of the year 2012, the sect killed 250 people with the deadliest being the coordinated bombings in the ancient city of Kano, which claimed 185 lives (Eme & Ibietan, 2012). For a cause that is neither war nor natural disaster, the nation, according to a report by the Human Rights Watch (HRW), lost more than 935 of its human capital between 2009 and 2012 and more than 20,000 lives between 2009 and 2017. In terms of finance and investment, though direct and indirect loses are unquantifiable, a World Investment Report (WIR) of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), estimated that the domestic economy lost about N1.33 trillion Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), owing to the activities of Boko Haram (Okereocha, 2012). The quest for rapid industrialization of Nigeria has continued to suffer significant setbacks due to the heinous activities of the said group.

Even though the activities of Boko Haram seem to be more restricted to the Northern part of the country, the entire nation suffers because those outside Nigeria have a country-wide picture of the violence, hence, creating fear in the heart of prospective foreign investors. The attack that took place in Kano was one of the significant impacts of the Boko-Haram because the city has always been the commercial center for West African nations trading with Nigeria for the past 500 years, ever before the evolution of Nigeria (Suleiman, 2012). According to the UNCTAD report, FDI flows to Nigeria fell to $6.1 billion (N933.3billion) in 2010 after the spread of the terror activities of book haram activities, a decline of about 29 per cent from the $8.65 billion (N1.33 trillion) realized in 2009 fiscal year. Also, statistics obtained from the 2010 annual report by the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) showed that the total foreign capital inflow into the Nigerian
The economy in 2010 was $5.99 billion. The record showed that FDI represented about 78.1 per cent drop from $3.31 billion in 2009 (Okereocha, 2012). In 2009, over 837 factories have collapsed and closed shops during the first emergence of the Boko-Haram terror activities. About half of the remaining operating firms were classified as “ailing”, a situation that poses serious threat to the survival of the manufacturing sector in the country in the nearest future (Okafor, 2011).

According to a survey carried out as part of its membership operational audit in January 2010 by the Manufacturers Association of Nigeria (MAN), the 837 figure represents the cumulative aggregate of firms that have shut down operations in 2009 across the country. The report of the survey showed that in 2009, a total number of 176 firms became terminally ill and collapsed in the northern area, comprising the Kano and Kaduna manufacturing axis. (Maiyak, 2010; Okafor, 2008; Okafor, 2011). Many of these firms have severally cited insecurity, vandalization of equipment and sabotage, epileptic power supply, among other reasons. The skewed budget allocation in favour of security as represented in Fig. 1.1 below paints a better picture of the problem posed by book haram insurgence since 2009.

![Figure 1: Key Funds Allocation for the 2013 Budget in Nigeria in Billions of Naira](image)

Compiled by authors from This Day Newspaper, 2013

From the Figure above, key allocation of funds in the 2013 budget include: Critical infrastructure (including power, works, transport, aviation, gas pipelines, and Federal Capital Territory) – N497 billion; human capital development (i.e. education and health) – N705 billion; and agriculture/water resources – N175 billion. Also over N950 billion was allocated for national security purposes, comprised of N320 billion for the Police, N364 billion for the Armed Forces, N115 billion for the Office of the NSA, and N154 billion for the Ministry of the Interior (This Day, 2013). A situation where the funds allocated to security alone is almost equal to
funds allocated to education, health and critical infrastructure combined in a fiscal year, as is the case with Nigeria, is detrimental to national development (Adebayo, 2014; Eme & Jide, 2014). And this only appeared in Nigeria fiscal allocation structure for the first in 2013 due to book haram activities.

It is estimated that the northern region where Boko-Haram continued to operate suffered an accumulated output loss of 1.66 Trillion Naira between 2011 and 2015, with a significant loss registered in 2012 and 2014, 464.32 Billion Naira and 447.13 Billion Naira respectively (Nigeria RPBA Volume II –Component reports, March 11, 2016). Boko Haram’s global reputation is also a source of concern. For instance, the group has pledged allegiance to the world’s dreaded Islamic state and by implication has opened the Nigerian border as a safe haven for the fugitive group to escape the onslaught of the coalition forces and the Syrian forces. In the Middle East. Currently, Boko Haram is maintaining a regular training network with the Islamic state, Al-Shabaab, Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb and covert exchange of fighters with the Taliban. This cannot be far from the current situation on ground.

According to Central Intelligence Agency (CIA, 2018), boko haram has set up a plan to operate sophisticated military hardware such as drones against Nigerian forces; a situation which indicate that book haram is not isolated in their operations as they are in touch with more advanced global terrorists and some representatives in Nigerian government and other legitimate authorities. All the appearances and activities of Boko Haram placed them in a position that strongly shows that they are anti-domestic and global peace (Abayomi, 2014, Okafor, 2017, 2018).

**Boko haram, Political Capital and Public Deception in Nigeria**

The incidence and operation of book haram since 2002 has become a sociopolitical enigma in Nigeria and West Africa at least, looking at the fact that the sincere global think thanks in United States of America and across Europe cannot be confused in a context like this.

While the political gladiators from the Northern part of Nigeria and their staunch allies from the Middle East and North Africa continue to confuse the Nigerian public with their dominant access and control of the public media and the public institutions about boko haram, the Nigerian poor masses have given up to fate in the hope that eventually a miracle will happen from United States of America and Europe someday to relief the country of the pains.

However, in the absence of understanding the situation on ground at least for the sake of knowledge of our real problem, even the most dedicated human right organization cannot properly confront the matter as it is. Boko haram came up ostensibly to establish a mega foothold for global jihad in Nigeria but appeared first in camouflage of charity organization (Walter, 2014; Okafor 2018).
The original intension of boko haram was contained in the mission of the al-Qaida leader (Bin laden) and the former dictator in Libya (Gadaffi) who were in Nigeria in the latter part of 20th century. While al-Qaida leader focused on proselytization of the youth for the recruitment of more youth in Kano and other parts of Northern Nigeria for the propagation of jihad and elimination of their enemies (the non-Muslims), Gadaffi was using diplomacy to draw the politicians in the region into the quagmire by enticing them with money and other donations.

In their germination, Gadaffi’s mission resulted in the increase of seasonal jihad (Edoh, 2001), which relatively died down in the wake of boko haram (Green, 2011). As a matter of fact, before the domination of the Nigeria sociopolitical conflict stage by boko haram relatively from 2009, there were incessant youth restiveness across the northern Nigeria ostensibly to make things difficult for non-Muslims in the region especially the non-indigenes (Enukora, 2005). This restiveness came seasonally and in different states in the northern Nigeria but with similar methodology and focus (making the non-Muslims the target) (Ikelegbe, 2001). Usually the conflict started in any of the states in the North with a slightest provocation or group induced provocation to explain the conflict away from Islamic jihadist agenda. However, whenever these conflicts started they will attract all the Muslims within the area and beyond, who will gather in matter of hours to execute the killings and destructions (Okpanachi, 2010). These happened randomly among the states in the north at different times but with a specific interest, which was to make life difficult for the non-Muslims. Over the years of these incidents none of the Muslim politicians or religious leaders ever condemned the incidence sincerely rather they will only make a ceremonial statement of explaining the incidents away from Islamic jihad.

Boko haram was the bye product of Osama Bin Laden’s proselytization in the Northern part of Nigeria and this appeared to further establish the foothold of jihadism in Nigeria in an advanced form (Umej, 2008; Walter, 2013). While the mission of Gadaffi took care of monetary sponsorship at ranks and files of the Islamic political elements in the northern Nigeria to conceal covert jihads in this region, Bin Laden’s mission expanded the agenda by raising more foot soldiers and radicalizing the youth to actually see jihad as an Islamic obligation [a mission he has started even before appearing on Nigerian scene] (U.S Department of State National Counterterrorism Centre, 2012). Although boko haram surfaced in Borno state in the wake of their operation, the mysteries surrounding the group were made complicated by their sponsors and those who started it. For instance, Borno state was made the scape goat for the evidences of the disasters by the group owing to its location at the border as well as the natural facilities of desert encroachment in the area (Walter, 2013; Okafor & Iyalla, 2017).

The developers and sponsors of boko haram covertly operated from other states in the north and most of the states where the major sponsors of boko haram lives were carefully isolated from the activities of the group. This also can be observed in the bokoharam international posture. Although boko haram is not
exclusively an internationally focused jihadists, however in all their attempt on international interests, they never attacked certain foreign subjects such as citizens and interests of America, Russia, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Turkey, Lebanon and some countries in Europe.

While in the case of America, Russia, Israel and some other countries in Europe they are careful of falling in their wrath, they avoided most of the Middle East nations on the ground of invisible cord of brotherhood. This simply displayed the level of the intelligence among the developers and sponsors domestically and internationally. In the wake of boko haram, the incidents of incessant sociopolitical restiveness started dying down.

Boko haram was developed as political capital as well as instrument of jihad among the northern politicians and religious leaders as well as the global jihadism network. In the cocoon of political capital, the problem of boko haram, which ought to have appeared as national problem requiring sincere collective action was turned into political strategy when one of the politicians in the northern Nigeria publicly made the statement in Lagos in 2011 that if he didn’t become the president of the nation, that Nigeria will be ungovernable (Clottey, 2011). This statement was reinforced when the supreme court of Nigeria declared his agitation of declaring himself a president after the election, unfounded on the ground that his purported political party whose agenda was nothing but intolerable Islamism, did not cover even a single region not to talk of winning the constitutionally acknowledged majority. On this note he repeated the same statement of threat in another form by saying that “since Nigeria did not allowed me to assume the office of the president, the nation will hear it” (Aziken, Umoru & Akinrefon, 2012). They will hear it, in the local content and popular discuss, simply implies that the nation will see the violent or bitter aspect of the speaker. This reflected in the subsequent multiple bomb blast in Kano shortly after the statement.

When boko haram problem escalated the then government of Nigeria decided to approach the case with military might owing to sabotage by the Nigerian police force who could not explain the death of the then Boko haram leader (Yusuf Mohammad) (Warner, 2012); this move was also sabotaged by the entire northern politicians who took the then president of the country to the International Court of Justice in Hague on the ground that boko haram members are their children who deserved amnesty like the Niger delta youth a situation, which acted as a pull factor (van der Heide & Huurman, 2016; Schuurman & Bakker, 2016; La Palm, 2017) to many Muslim youth to consider the group as a potential representative of Islam.

Every effort to negotiate with boko haram or settle the matter with military strategy was sabotaged by the political and religious leaders from northern Nigeria (Roach, 2012). In the 2015 election boko haram became a hot issue in the political campaign majorly from the same quarters that has been threatening the nation with insecurity. Their claim was that they will eliminate boko haram in matter of weeks if they assume power. This, became a political capital to convince the poor masses in the northern Nigeria who were in
dare need of peace as well as further threat to the then president of Nigeria who has no military experience and by implication was assuming that his conceding defeat will bring about peace.

On conceding to defeat in the 2015 election by the then president of Nigeria from southern extraction, boko haram major agenda seemed to have been actualized while they now entered into the second trajectory of perpetuating global jihad. After the 2015 election, boko haram madness gradually fizzled away ostensibly to create the impression that “new government has started fighting the jihadists”. However, boko haram did not stop irrespective of the public media announcement that they have been technically defeated.

Boko haram simply entered into the trajectory of the second or rather, the major phase of their mission, which was to maintain global jihadism and to decimate the population of their enemies (non-Muslims) in the country. This, reflected on the new posture of boko haram such as openly acknowledging their ties with the globally designated terrorist organizations in Africa and the Middle East. Beyond these, they equally took a new posture domestically such as kidnapping for ransom, regaining their lost territories, collaborating with their staunch allies in the government and Nigerian army to decimate the Nigerian soldiers regularly posted to the area and using the Fulani herdsmen as a smoke screen to spread their terrors towards the middle belt region of Nigeria.

While their acknowledgement of affiliation with the globally designated terrorist organizations such as Islamic state yielded handsomely by providing them with state of the art terrorists equipment and training, kidnapping for ransom became a lucrative strategy covertly encouraged by their collaborators in Nigerian government, who secretly arranged for the amount and the delivering of the money to them at their convenience.

It should be noted here that one of the strategies suggested by U.S and other European nations to stamp boko haram out of existence was to starve them financially and materially- a strategy which succeeded in frustrating the Islamic state and the Al Qaida; however, owing to the fact that boko haram activities was a coordinated attempt having support from countless elements in Nigerian government, boko haram was revived by the return of ransom payment, which were strongly suggested by their agents in government [to release some of the chibok girls, the condition shifted from the international bodies pressurizing them into demand for millions of dollars of which they spent on importing more sophisticated weapons. Again, in the case of Leah, who was among the children they kidnapped from Yobe state, the condition of release shifted from government plea and international pressure to the demand of more than a billion naira].

Boko haram decimation of the Nigerian soldiers became a successful and sustainable agenda courtesy of their allies in Nigerian army who even sold their colleagues out at the point and time of posting. This can
be observed in a number of boko haram onslaughts on Nigerian army, which virtually took place on different occasions as soon as a new set of soldiers were posted to the area and almost at the point of their arrival.

On the herdsmen menace, boko haram has taken over the movement of the herdsmen as the trajectory to continue the spread of the terror towards the south especially, with the interest of fulfilling the Usman Danfodio’s unplayed manuscript in the west African jihad agenda. While they have been pursuing these agenda with double quick match mowing down communities, local government and states, their collaborators in government strengthens them by given deaf ear to what they are doing and making a perverted posting and transfer of commanders in the affected regions. Any commander that acted out of the auspices of the concealed jihad was transferred to another place while few soldiers were release to the affected region only after the jihadists have finished their mission.

Again, while the jihadists continued the mission of terror and destruction in the middle belt and the north east, the fighting equipment and the available soldiers are moved to the south east and the south south to unnecessarily threaten the inhabitants. Currently, boko haram has started running their own government in some parts of Borno, Yobe and Adamawa states. These were the places they were stamped out entirely before 2015, making them to rely on hit and run strategy and having the sambisa forest as their only stronghold.

Theoretical Underpinning of Terrorism (Boko-Haram) in Nigeria

Social Identity Theory

Social identity theory consists of three major components such as the social psychological component, the system component and the societal component (Rubin & Hewstone, 2004; Jost, Banaji & Nosek, 2004). Social identity theory’s social-psychological component relates to the understanding of the cognitive and motivational processes that are connected to a form of intergroup discrimination [social competition] which, makes the social identity inevitable in individual self-evaluation and as such, makes individual self-values attached to group’s value (Turner, 1975; Tajfel, 1979).

The need for self-esteem is thought to motivate group members to adopt various cognitive and behavioral identity management strategies (Blanz, Mummendey, Mielke, & Klink, 1998; van Knippenberg, 1989; Rubin & Hewstone, 2004). Among other things, social competition is a behavioral identity management strategy that may be used to change the status positions of the in-group and/or out-group in order to create or protect high in-group status (Rubin & Hewstone, 2004).
For competition to or not to take place according to Social Identity Theory is the determination of the system component which is the social psychological component that sets out such conditions. The system component indicates three socio-structural variables such as the permeability of group boundaries, the stability of the intergroup status system, and the legitimacy of the intergroup status system. The system component predicts that social competition will occur only when group boundaries are impermeable and the intergroup status system is unstable and illegitimate (Tajfel & Turner, 1979 as cited in Rubin & Hewstone, 2004:3).

The societal component of the theory relates to the specific historical, cultural, political, and economic context that contains and defines the groups and their status system (Rubin & Hewstone, 2004). The specifics of this societal context have been described as the social reality of the intergroup situation (Doosje, Spears, Ellemers, & Koomen, 1999; Tajfel, 1979). Two aspects of the societal context that are particularly important are societal norms and the societal value of intergroup behavior.

While the societal norms prescribe the background of intergroup relations against which social competition may be predicted to operate (for example, societal norms may prescribe outgroup favoritism), (Brown, 1978; Spears & Manstead, 1989), the societal value of intergroup behavior determines the behavior’s potential for creating or protecting high in-group status (Rubin & Hewstone, 2004).

Social identity theory maintains that there are three types of discrimination engendered in and by a group such as realistic competition, social competition, and consensual discrimination (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Turner, 1975; Rubin & Hewstone, 2004). Realistic competition according to social identity theory is driven by personal self-interest and occurs when there is an objective conflict of group interests over a limited material resource; social competition is driven by the need for social self-esteem and can occur in the absence of objective conflicts of group interests while, consensual discrimination is most likely to occur when intergroup status is stable and legitimate because these conditions indicate a high degree of intergroup consensus about each group’s status.

**Social Identity Theory Application in Diverse Social Circumstances**

Social identity theory according to Tajfel and Turner (1979), is one of the enduring theories that have critically examined the implication of group existence in the society and the individual membership of these groups. According to Tajfel (as cited in Sigrid, 2017:10), social identity theory views the individual relationship with the group in the society as “an individual’s knowledge that he belongs to certain social groups together with some emotional and value significance to him of this group membership”. Social identity theory has been subjected to a number of interpretations with each scholar focusing on the relevance of the theory to the particular field or phenomenon of interest. For instance, Hogg & Abrams (1988) have interpreted the theory with focus on social psychology of intergroup relations and group
processes giving the theory, a relevance in the understanding of intergroup relationship and the processes involved in the existence of group phenomenon. Similarly, Tajfel and Turner (1979) have applied the theory to the explanation and understanding of intergroup conflicts in the society. Nonetheless, Turner (1987), has approached the meaning and understanding of social identity theory with focus to self within the group as the individuals still realize their uniqueness in the group identity irrespective of the extent of collective image.

Relatively recent approaches to social identity theory have widened its relevance and scope to elaborate its understanding and utilitarian value in explaining social phenomenon. For instance, Sigrid, (2017) has recently applied some sections of the theory in explaining the disengagement process from terrorism among the die-hard terrorists.

The role of identity is a potentially important but overlooked aspect of terrorism globally (Barrelle, 2010; Sageman, 2017; Doosje, Moghaddam, Kruglanski, de Wolf, Mann, & Feddes, 2016), and in Nigeria. Studies on terrorism and radicalization have shown that identity is an important element in the process (Al Raffie 2013; Seth, Curtis & Alan, 2009). Blanco-Mancilla (2003) defines identity as an ensemble of subject positions, e.g. Hausa Muslim, Christian, Female, northern Nigerian; each representing the individual’s identification with a particular group, such as ethnicity, religion, gender and region. This definition captures the way people view themselves in Nigeria, where identity is defined by affiliation to ethno-religious groups rather than the national identity. In Nigeria, for example, it is erroneously assumed by many that a Hausa man, by virtue of his ethnicity, is a Muslim – a classification that distorts the Hausa-Fulani dichotomy in the northern region of Nigeria. In a similar vein, Ikelegbe (2005) argues that most Southerners are seen as Igbo, thereby submerging numerous other minority ethnic groups such as the Ibibios, Efiks, Ijaws, and many others. Here, identity is understood as ‘a combination of socio-cultural characteristics which individuals share, or are presumed to share, with others on the basis of which one group may be distinguished from others.

Identity acquires meaning when it is used as the only platform for the articulation of common interests or the pursuits of shared beliefs and culture. In this sense, ethnicity, religion, culture, etc. are all key components of social identity. Religions are absolutist in nature when they advance the view that they have precise and complete understanding of truth, and that therefore all other religions are in error. Religious concepts contrasting believers and unbelievers, such as infidels, ‘sinners’, and ‘heretics,’ can provide justification for attacking out-group members.

The emergence and operations of Boko-Haram in Nigeria bore the hallmark of social identity-induced actions among the Islamic world. Although nobody has accepted to acknowledge it as a legitimate social group, the evidence on the ground such as the identity and the claims of the members simply point to the fundamentals of Islamic teachings and goals especially under the doctrine of Salafism with its origin rooted in the mutual oath of loyalty taken by Muhammed Ibn Abdul Wahhab and Ibn Saud in 1744. The term comes from al-salaf al salih (the righteous ancestors), and the beliefs its adherents espouse are rooted in a strict
reading of the Quran and Sunna. Salafists believe they are following the path of the ancestors (Chatham House, 2015).

Fundamentally, the duty of the Salafist via the Sunni, which is the majority and domineering sect of Islam across the world is, to maintain strict adherence with the focus on protecting Islam from any form of innovation and adaptation to unfamiliar environment. This core and unwavering responsibility is surrounded by some level of violence and conservatism against the out-group such as the Shiite, the Christians and other non-Islamic adherents. In the principles of social identification and categorization as are found in the social identity theory (Spears, 2011; Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Hornsey, 2008; McKeown, Haji, & Ferguson, 2016), what the foundation and global objective of boko haram specifically, can be located within the ambit of Sunni Islam.

Having given a section where the Salafists are empowered for private jihad the few element drunk in ideology found a loophole for extremism which at the surface bore the mark of collective interest in Islam but in a micro view, stand for numerous biased agenda (Chatham House, 2015; Okafor, 2018; Okafor & Iyalla, 2017). Such a situation having succeeded at the global network of Islam became a powerful strategy for extremist elements among Nigerian Muslims especially, after the seeds of Bin Laden and Gadaffi germinated in the northern Nigeria.

With the spread of the extremist ideologies of which one of the elements is poisoning the mind of the youth against the status quo, the seed of boko haram found a fertile ground especially in the north eastern Nigeria. When the in-group appears derogatory to the members of the group with a close by out-group showing more favourable picture, the chances of defection increases and by implication, make the available members a lucrative venture to the proselytization of the out-group (Sindic & Condor, 2014; Jenkins, 2014; Reicher, Spears, & Haslam, 2010). While Sunni Islam in the perspective of social identity theory here [see social identification and categorization] appeared as the stereotype for violent religious crusaders, boko haram in extreme trajectory simply appeared as the prototype of the Sunni Islam.

While boko haram are fighting in their total understanding, to advance the cause of Islam, the Islamic world only label them terrors on the ground that every other group across the globe has seen them as terrorists otherwise, any mission, which they executed against the non-Muslims are simply seen as jihad and propagation of the interest of Islam in using force to lure people into conversion. Boko-Haram started with the foundation of Islam and maintained a strand in Islam especially the Sunni Islam in projecting the image of Islam in the best of their understanding having at the back of their mind the Islamic world as their social identity and passport to the general public.

Boko haram activities and interests are not far from the terrorists in the Middle East and South Asia who have embedded themselves in the mainstream social and political activities with the consent of the general
Islamic community in these places, especially the government of most of these nations. For instance, in Pakistan the Taliban, the Hakani network, etc. all have received the blessings of the general Islamic community especially, the Sunni Islam in fighting the Christians, the Shiite Islam, the Hindu, the Buddhists, the elements of western civilization etc. While the state of Pakistan is giving these groups support from behind the scene, they come out for mere soap box oratory to caution the group before the global scene in order to exonerate themselves (Pakistan) from any suspicion from the entire globe. A similar situation is found in Yemen, Iran [although Iran technically remove these groups from their domestic politics for fear of revolution on their soil but builds a consistent extremism in the internal circle against the West, the Sunni adherents, christians and other out-groups to Shiite Islam], Palestine, Lebanon, Syria, Egypt, etc., the expansion of this ideology of Islam among the Muslim dominated nations has become the form and format for seeking for political power and domination anywhere in the world where Islam steps its foot as it is gradually surfacing in the case of Nigeria¹ (Codewit World, 2013; Bakker, 2007; Bangstad, 2002; Ansari, 1984; Gall, 2016).

The operation and activities of Boko-Haram bore the signature of ethno religious politics in the country making it more or less an interest group and representative group in Nigeria polity (Okafor & Iyalla, 2017). The complication with Boko-Haram and its activities is the involvement of ethno-religious politics. At the inception of the group in 2002, they were more of proselytization group than violent group making them more or less a stealth instrument in the hand of modern Islam in spreading the message of Islam to win souls like their Christian counterpart. This took a dramatic change in 2009 after the death of the former president of the Federal Republic of Nigeria [Umaru Musa Yaradua]² (Campbell, 2014; Counter Terrorism Calander, 2014; Walker, 2012).

¹ In the case of Pakistan, a number of terrorist groups who were openly denounced by Pakistan before the whole world are gradually registering as political parties in the country with the clear knowledge of the state that these people have nothing as agenda other than terrorist mission. The most current example of these groups is the JUD (Jumaat-ud-Dawa), which has been the front group for Lashkar-e-Taiba who’s their posture and activities have helped Pakistan to sustain covert war against India in Kashmir. In the case of Hamas and Fatah in Palestine, they were specifically set up as anti-west and state of Israel before they mingled into the mainstream politics and socially reorganized groups in the system with mixed political objectives. In Lebanon, Hezbollah which was once the Shi’a Islamist group set up by Iran for their destabilization mission in the Middle East, later became a registered political party for the main stream politics in the nation. In Egypt, Muslim Brotherhood which in itself, set up the modern terrorism in the Middle East quickly grabbed power during the fall of Hosni Mubarak. In the absence of covert intervention by the U.S government, the party would have collapsed the entire Middle East and Africa via extremism. In Yemen, Al-Islah was one of the covert instrument for Islamic extremism and global terrorism planted by the Muslim Brotherhood. They appeared as political party for the main stream politics in the nation but were purposefully set up to harbor globally designated terrorists.

² Boko-haram was the by-product of the visitation of Marmur Gadaffi and Osama Bin-ladin who invested heavily on Islam in Nigeria in the early 90s. Specifically, while Gadaffi was interested in turning Nigeria into totally Islamic nation by luring more youth with money, Bin-ladin was interested in open spread of the message of Islam to all available youth in order to multiply the group. However, due to the shift in the analysis of Nigerian political power as Jonathan took over from Yaradua, there were some agitations from the North against the Niger Delta indigene holding the power instead of the already streamlined pattern of sharing power between the North and the West (Yorubans). This gave room for the manipulation of the Boko-Haram elements to turn their energy against the Nigerian nation. When they started their violent agitation, their leader who was captured by the Nigerian army was killed in police custody to seal every available information from him, these unfortunately gave the group more bitterness to see Nigerian government as corrupt and unreliable system and at the same time, sealed the truth about their mission and who was behind their violent agitation. Before the group started their full violent agitation, it was recorded there were a number of places in the North such as in Niger state where the group was identified as training more 3000 members for combat mission and none of the Northern states viewed such as threat to Nigerian existence. When the federal government arrested most of these youths who were involved in the training, the Northern states collaborated to release them to terminate any further interrogation. Even when the group continued with their violent agitation,
While the Boko-Haram see itself as an element of Islam with the mission of restoring the sanctity of Islam based on the original manuscript of their ancestors, this was corrupted by the ethno-religious politics, which now turned the human capital and the faceless nature of the group into political capital for securing power and influence hence, the campaign of 2011 and 2014 were mainly on how the Boko-Haram saga will end in matter of days as soon as Buhari takes power.

Having turned the groups’ heartlessness into political capital, the group itself understood their preeminence in the system and used the Islamic community to camouflage itself for efficient and successful mission of destabilization (Walker, 2012; Campbell, 2014). For more solid network and smoke screen, the group now attached itself to the parallel politics of the North and the South, which now gave them even more representation in the national house of assembly and senate, where their matters are argued about with hidden agenda and with more focus on how to conceal everything about the group and display to the world the image of human right protection while dealing with Boko-Haram. The Northern region now protects the agenda of Boko-Haram manipulators without understanding the inner circle of the group and their campaign of decimation of non-Muslims. The covert identities such as Sunni Islam, general Islamic community and Northern Southern politics have shielded the mission of Boko-Haram and granted them successful mission as one of the dreaded global designated terrorists. This is aptly represented in Figure 2 below.

**The concept of one Nigeria, African Regional Integration and boko-haram insurgency**

From the inception of the word “Nigeria”, the implication has been the conglomeration of ethnic cum religious entities living together with mutual respect and understanding in a geographical setting. More importantly, the existence of the groups involved is with one superseding goal, which is to champion the development of African humanity. After the colonial administration succeeded in drawing the Northern and

---

1 While the Northern politicians were using the group for campaign strategy, the group was growing wings to fly out of their cage of structural dominance and used the interaction between them and the men behind the scene to secure a secrete channel into the Nigeria government institutions such as the military, police, prisons even the presidency. These reflected on the way they are able to gather information about government activities and decisions concerning them. In a number of occasions, the group has specifically made open their knowledge of certain government plans towards them and has also succeeded in thwarting the military move to invade their hideouts.

2 While Salafism via Sunni Islam gave Boko-Haram the identity as fundamentalists, Sunni Islam gave them the identity as Islamic sect; the general Islamic world gave them the identity as religious group while the Northern Nigeria gave them the identity as regional militants other than terrorists. These made it difficult for any person or group that intended to confront Boko-Haram and eliminate their activities. While the Salafists are covertly sponsoring terrorists who dance to their tune anywhere in the world, the Sunni Islamists become biased when terrorists are linked to their sect; the Islamic world approach with bias terroristic activities related to Muslims except where it threatens their domestic interests and global image. The Northern Nigeria since the amalgamation of the country has always viewed every regionalized issue with bias in favour of regional interests.
Southern Nigeria together, the rest of the survival efforts needed for the development of the country were left on the shoulder of the indigenous people of Africa.

Figure 2: Basic target diagram displaying the cocoon of Boko-Haram in Nigeria (see the footnote (4) below for more explanation).

Source: Okafor and Raimi

There is no continent or country anywhere in the world where there is absolute homogeneity of social group, making it, more or less a quasi-natural phenomenon that geographical territory, will only exist in complementary of fluid social network of sub social groups culturally, racially and ethnically. In the case of Nigeria, the existence of heterogeneous group made up of sub groups, was inevitable as the groups living within the geographical setting have developed a consistent social network both in the economic activities and other fluid social interactions even before the amalgamation of the south and north parts of what we know today as Nigeria. These, made it easy for the colonialists to merge the groups without much stress unlike other African nations that later separated after some years into their independence.

Having been dragged into the relationship, which some international political merchants are using for their interests efficiently than the indigenous people of Africa, the only option is to check out how other countries
that fall into such incidence survived it and move on with development. Since the amalgamation of the southern and northern protectorates in 1914, the nation has been dabbled into the politics of regionalism irrespective of the absence of such in the fundamental constitution and structural set up. This regionalism, which came as a result of colonialism so to speak, has continued to take pre-eminence in the management of resources and relationship of the groups that made up the nation. The covert regionalism in Nigeria’s socio-ethnic co-existence has been more important than the entity itself, warranting the reckless adoption of unwholesome strategies by different groups to secure their interest. Among other things, boko-haram emerged and continues to survive as a result of the covert regionalism and reckless adoption of inhumane political strategies for regional interests. Since the beginning of the covert boko-haram activities in 2002 to 2009 when they clearly declared their religious cum political interests, none of the states in the Northern region of Nigeria ever came out to declare the activities of the group as detrimental to the existence of Nigeria instead, all attention was on how the group should be condoned or treated like the Niger Delta militants who were provoked into agitation by the environmental degradation in the area. The emergence of boko-haram in Nigerian political terrain has sent some ripples across various sectors in the country with the progressive destruction of the very essence of the collective conscience of the people. By far, the most affected and compromised is the defence sector. Nigerian military in particular has adversely been affected especially given the progressive defeat they encounter in the battle field in different parts of the northeastern Nigeria, where many senior and junior officers constantly lose their lives due to sabotage by the staunch allies of boko haram in the system. The ferocity of Boko-Haram and their style of gathering intelligence about Nigerian government and security system aptly displayed Nigeria as a failed nation that cannot protect her citizens let alone foreign citizens in the nation should the terrorists change their focus on the citizens and the foreigners.

---

1 When Boko-Haram started their campaign from the foundation of Islamic evangelism by Osama Bin-Ladin in Kano ostensibly to recruit more youth for terrorism and suicide mission here in Nigeria and other places in the world, they were treated as mere Muslim youth propagating the gospel of Islam in Nigeria. When the same group started training for handling of weapons and combat action, the states in the Northern region especially Niger state and other states they used as footholds were all quiet in the name of protecting Islam and the domination of Islam in the northern Nigerian territory. A good number of these youth (more than 3000) were cited in some secondary school grounds where they were having training and nothing was done about it. Even when some of them were arrested, the generals and political gladiators from the region only made contact with authorities to release them without prosecution or any further investigation. In 2009 when they came on board with their trainings and ideology to destabilize the nation, the northern Nigerian politicians teamed up to protect them as their frontiers for political domination. This resulted to mysterious death of Muhammad Yusuf in the hand of the police in order to terminate any covert investigation into the matter by the Nigerian intelligence group. Having been accused of approaching the matter with force by the then president of the nation, the presidency requested for negotiation with the group of which they claimed they were faceless group. All effort made to approach this group or control their activities simply failed because of the gang up by the northern Nigerian politicians to use the group as a covert political frontier in championing the domination of the region in Nigerian political affair. The northern power drunk entities went ahead to demand for amnesty for a group that has no tangible agitation in reaction to what the politicians in the region saw as sharing the national cake with the Niger delta militants who were offered amnesty after they accepted to drop their agitations. This same pattern and strategy of encouraging and sustaining the Boko-Haram elements re-surfaced in the subsequent administration of Muhammdu Buhari. The presidency went behind to pay ransom in millions of dollars to Boko-Haram for the release of the Chibok girls when the United States of American government has adopted financial starvation strategy to eliminate this group. More so, the same government went ahead to grant amnesty to a number of northern youths who were projected as Boko-Haram members while the main Boko-Haram members and leadership has not accepted any open negotiation with the Nigerian government.
Boko-haram emergence and operations opened the Nigerian border for the international jihadists, who now operate, using the smoke-screen of the herdsmen-farmers’ conflicts. Technically, Nigeria has not faced the farmers-herders clash as such a magnificent problem as these clashes are clearly defined and can be approached based on the substance of conflict. However, since the emergence of Boko-Haram and the subsequent emergence of government dominated by Fulani men especially, in the security institution of the nation, herdsmen/farmers clashes have taken a new dimension of battle of occupation and Islamic conquest using the elements of boko haram mostly from outside Nigeria. The role of the boko haram in this has made the herdsmen incidents more complicated such that the herdsmen have become the umbrella for the Fulani criminals from all over Africa and beyond who are now moving towards the south for their kidnapping and armed robbery businesses.

The emergence of boko-haram in Nigeria turned Nigerian economy into the avenue of the sponsors of boko-haram to make their own secrete wealth. The battle against boko-haram became a business opportunity for the merchant of death (weapon proliferation agents) in the West African region and in Nigeria particularly. While boko-haram collect money from Nigerian government and individuals via ransom payment and covert bank robbery to buy weapons from these merchants of death, the corrupt elements in the military, who have seen the situation as opportunity, are busy demanding and squandering funds made for the war against boko-haram. Worst still, the present government saw the situation as the opportunity of diverting foreign aids and other available funds to the political merchants in the north-eastern part of Nigeria under the guise of security and developmental aids for the affected region. The most recent of this scenario, is the demand for some billions of Naira to fight boko-haram after the government has pronounced the defeat of boko-haram by Nigerian army.

The north-south fluid economic investment, which made Nigeria more unified than parliamentary and military edits, was reduced to nothing in the wake of boko-haram insurgency, as the southern investors in the north felt more targeted by the boko-haram in the region. The fragile unity of Nigeria since the end of the civil war has been further undermined by the boko-haram emergence. While the northern political merchants were using the boko-haram as political capital to make way for their continual domination of the rest of Nigeria, the south saw the incidence as an indication that they needed to pull away from the concept of one Nigeria, hence, the militants in the Niger Delta changing their posture from the environmental agitators to freedom fighters seeking for the creation of Niger Delta Republic.

The emergence of boko-haram and their terror activities via the herdsmen insurgents gradually drew every part of Nigeria into the agitation for the re-negotiation of the unity of the country making Nigeria currently one nation in principle with multiple anti-unity interest in practice. The existence of terrorist groups anywhere is a threat to peace globally. This is strongly evident in the activities boko haram, which constantly pose significant threat to global peace, even though its base is in Nigeria. The group has become a conduit pipe
to covertly transfer the elements of Taliban, Islamic state, Al-Shabaab and other similar groups to Europe via Africa. In the fluid relationship of Nigerian Fulani and their likes in the West African region, boko haram has appeared as a covert strategy to complicate the already feared Islamic extremism in the region.

Having accepted to operate with the Islamic state and other globally designated terrorists, boko haram is now building a safe haven for these fugitives from Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan, Somalia, Kenya, Egypt, Libya, etc., from where to covertly plan and execute globally designated attacks without easy traces. Of course, boko haram has solidified the already existing terrorist groups in West African region for stealth domination of the region via porous borders and consistent criminal activities across the borders of West African nations. Currently, boko haram is preparing to operate combat drones according to the latest information from U.S Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). This, shows the degree of challenge boko haram poses to the West African region and the global peace looking at the sophisticated nature of such and the extent of vulnerability of the people in the region and beyond. This also reveals the activities of boko haram as a covert Sunni Islamic extremists’ encroachment with global pedigree.

Conclusion
Boko-haram insurgency is part of the globally recognized terrorists that had its foothold on the extremist teaching among a religious subgroup (Salafists). This teaching found its way into Nigerian political landscape via the mainstream religious group, with the major aim of turning Nigerian political landscape into political system run on theocratic principle, with much reservation for extremists’ ideology. While the group has this as the ultimate goal, they became vulnerable to the political gladiators of the northern region of Nigeria who adopted the wave and influence of their activities as political capital in the game of terror and domination, which has come to characterize Nigerian political culture after independence in 1960. In the lens of identity theory, boko-haram is a tiny group with globally recognized dangerous mission, which hides inside layers of political, ethnic and religious cocoons to operate in Nigeria and further turn the West African region into safe haven for globally designated terrorist organizations.

The effects of boko-haram insurgency across all sectors in Nigeria have undermined the country’s unity, arousing every region of the country to seek for the re-negotiation of the future of the nation. More so, the existence of the group is appearing to be a powerful sustenance for the dreaded Islamic state and the likes in view of the volatile security networks within Sub Saharan Africa thereby raising a concern over the battle against insurgency across the globe.

References


A Sociological Analysis of the Medicalization Process of Pregnancy and Child Birth in Bangladesh

Bijoy Krishna Banik¹

Abstract: Patriarchal and capitalistic ideologies and the domination of technology over nature have been transforming pregnancy and childbirth from a social to a medical issue that warrants more medical organisations and services for the safety of both mother and would-be-born child. This transformation is called medicalization of pregnancy and childbirth (MoP&C) in the medical and social science rhetoric. Exploring the extent to which the MoP&C is going on in Bangladesh was the main objective of the study. This study is of importance in that it helps to understand the effectiveness of the MoP&C in the reduction of high maternal mortality rate (MMR), resultantly achieving the 3rd Sustainable Development Goal (SDG)—ensuring better health for all ages of people by 2030—in Bangladesh. Different academic articles, newspapers and reports were consulted for developing arguments in this study. The main findings of the study suggest that there has been an increase in the availability of and accessibility to basic and comprehensive obstetric care. It draws a conclusion that the MoP&C has already been in Bangladesh though huge questions are raised about the efficacy of Western-based and medically proven interventions in the reduction of high MMR. As suggested, a robust national health policy and integrated health systems are the sustainable ways of improving maternal health.

Keywords: Medicalisation of pregnancy and childbirth, maternal health, ante-natal-care, Skilled birth attendance, Bangladesh

Introduction
Pregnancy along with childbirth has been transformed from a social to a medical event. Patriarchal and capitalistic ideologies and the supremacy of technology over nature have made major contributions to this transformation. This has resulted in providing the domination of obstetrics, mainly males, in the whole process of childbirth (Barker, 1998; Fox & Worts, 1999; Lowis & McCaffery, 2004; Rothman, 1989). Johanson, Newburn & Macfarlane (2002) claimed that the introduction of instruments, particularly forceps, by male barber-surgeons for safe baby delivery in the 17th or 18th centuries laid the foundation of an obstetric era. This instrumental mastery has changed the role and status of women in society. It has made not only pregnant women passive but also female midwives subordinate by not allowing them to use these

¹ Department of Sociology, University of Rajshahi, Bangladesh, E-mail: bkbanik2001@yahoo.com
instruments because of their feeble-mindedness, constructed by the so-called patriarchal ideology (Schnorrenberg, 2004). Later, this obstetric politics has begun to show pregnancy as a pathological matter that warrants certain interventions for successfully dealing with abnormal pregnancies (Henley-Einion, 2009; Johanson, Newburn & Macfarlane, 2002). Before that, the Cartesian principle\(^1\) of dissection of mind and body and the development of chemistry and computer programming contributed a lot to the development of this idea (Rothman, 1989), the results of which are the already developed or developing different interventions. That means, medicalisation of pregnancy and childbirth (MoP&C) process has been going on since the 17\(^{th}\) century.

This idea has also led political leaders and policy makers to propose different interventions at different national and international forums, particularly the International Conference on Safe Motherhood (held in 1987) and the UN Millennium Summit (held in 2000), to curb high maternal mortality rate (MMR) in developing countries though these were developed in western countries. These interventions include mainly ante-natal care (ANC), Caesarean section in place of vaginal delivery, the presence of skilled birth attendants (SBAs) at child delivery, basic and comprehensive essential obstetric care (B&CEOC). As suggested by Henley-Einion (2009: 181), the care that the doctors suggest for giving to labouring women and the interventions used to ensuring normal safe delivery are based on western notions of time and scientific calculation and on economic aspects of minimising risks. Johanson, Newburn & Macfarlane (2002) also claimed that in the 19\(^{th}\) and 20\(^{th}\) centuries, MoP&C started to a larger extent with the development of certain medical interventions, such as analgesia, anaesthesia and safe blood transfusion.

The main objectives of the paper were to detail the historical developments of the MoP&C and explore the effectiveness of different interventions. Detailing the situation of Bangladesh in light of the expansion of different interventions—reflecting the medicalisation process going on in Bangladesh—was another objective. Different academic articles, newspapers and reports were the main sources of the study. Accordingly, the first part discusses the historical development of the MoP&C, western countries in particular, which is followed by the discussion of debates about different interventions. The next part highlights the development of these interventions in the context of Bangladesh. The penultimate part builds up arguments explaining main findings whereas the final part draws a conclusion.

**Medicalisation of pregnancy and childbirth: Historical backdrop**

The MoP&C first started in the Western world in the 17\(^{th}\) century with the development of biological knowledge. Before that, pregnancy was a normal physiological development in women’s life cycle as is still the case in certain parts of developing countries. Historical documents suggest that childbirth in Britain, as

\(^1\)The philosophical and scientific traditions derived from the writings of the French philosopher Rene Descartes (1596–1650).
in other places, was considered as a social event which took place at home and in which lay midwives, friends and family members were the birth attendants till the 17th century (Anspach, 2010; Cahill, 2001; Fox & Worts, 1999; Henley-Einion, 2009; Johanson, Newburn & Macfarlane, 2002). Men handled complicated cases with lethal instruments and either baby or mother or both died before the introduction of forceps by Peter Chamberlen, a barber-surgeon, in the early 17th century (Cahill, 2001; Johanson, Newburn & Macfarlane, 2002).

The Chamberlen family kept it secret for three generations for consolidating their business interests. They only let people know that they had some preventive measures by which an impacted foetus could be extracted. Later, the barber-surgeon class was able to use it once their design was sold or became widely known. This established men’s exclusive rights to forceps and excluded female midwives from using it (Rothman, 1991: 52). However, these small numbers of men-midwives who delivered live babies with the use of forceps began to challenge the traditional roles and functions of female midwives. As their services were costly, labouring mothers continued to be attended by midwives. By the next century (18th), medical practitioners were able to secure their influences and statuses in society by using the power of the church and state which began to demolish the reputation of local and non-licensed medical practitioners, such as midwives.

The antagonistic philosophy of medical practitioners against abortion and church against lay women healers (treated as witches) enabled licensed practitioners with their superior knowledge and competent skills to move away from orthodoxy and asserted their intellectual and moral superiority over midwives and pregnant women. This created an environment that supported their dominant position in society, demeaned midwives’ significance as they came to be deprived of organisational support and regulations for further training and development and challenged the existing gender order: women were not allowed to go outside in the cold and that offered men-midwives the opportunity to assist in deliveries. Gradually, men-midwives began occupying the dominant position in childbirth practice. All these events suggest that scientific and factual knowledge is inherently male-dominated and males who subsequently claimed primacy over female intuitiveness, empathy and caring. Since then, medicine, religion and the state with its patriarchal ideology simultaneously devalued women’s roles and traits and dissuaded them from playing important roles in society (Cahill, 2001; Henley-Einion, 2009; Lowis & McCaffery, 2004; Rothman, 1991).

Scientific advancements in physiology and anatomy attracted men to the midwifery profession. By using their knowledge as physicians and skills as surgeons (the newly-developed forceps proved handy), these male-midwives changed the nature and pattern of midwifery practice. They not only introduced a new
concept, that is, ‘risk reduction or management’\(^1\) in childbirth discourse by urging that their superior knowledge and scientific practice could help easily manage risky pregnancies (Henley-Einion, 2009) but also began to be known as ‘obstetricians’ after around 1828 (Lowis & McCaffery, 2004; Schnorrenberg, 2004). Their overriding position became a threat for women who had previously played dominant roles in pregnancy and childbirth (Henley-Einion, 2009).

The social structure in both the UK and USA also supported the supremacy of men over women in pregnancy and childbirth. Wealthier women had begun to show their preferences for doctors to midwives as birth attendants from the 18\(^{th}\) century and this trend became more widespread in the next century. Midwife services were popular in the countryside and among lower class and black women which indicated their income level to have been less compared to doctors who discouraged women from becoming midwives (Lowis & McCaffery, 2004: 20-24). At first, men-midwives became popular among the upper classes who set the standard for the rest of society. This changed women’s role in childbearing from active to passive and transformed the delivery place from home to hospital in the mid of the 18\(^{th}\) century.

In the late 19\(^{th}\) and early 20\(^{th}\) century, childbirth began to be considered as a condition that warranted some kind of supervision. The introduction of X-rays between 1900 and 1910 complemented this idea (Henley-Einion, 2009). At the same time, the use of technologies successfully for toxaemia\(^2\) (the presence of albumin in urine) and eclampsia\(^3\) (increasing systolic blood pressure) during the ANC visits can make a pregnant woman an object and the physician a subject. The ability of a pregnant woman to know her own body through experience and exercising self-hygienic techniques to ensure her health is replaced by her new, primary patient status which necessitates technological monitoring, abstracts her body and creates an asymmetric power relationship between the patient and doctor (Barker, 1998; Rudolfsdottir, 2000).

Rapid advancements in obstetric medicine, reproductive technology and pharmaceuticals in the 20\(^{th}\) century not only provided women with reproductive freedom but also made them dependent on expert knowledge. The current trend of seeking expert opinion in complicated pregnancy provides obstetrics greater opportunity to exert their influence in pregnancy and childbirth (Henley-Einion, 2009). It is not true that all aspects of the MoP&C are negatives. Biomedicine has contributed to increasing the likelihood of survival of mothers and babies by using different interventions, such as foetal heart monitoring (FHM), more than others, including folk medicine. The use of antiseptic, aseptic and sulphonamides contributed or has contributed to the reduction of MMR (Henley-Einion, 2009; Johanson, Newburn & Macfarlane, 2002).
At present, normal labour means electoral monitoring of foetal heart rate, promoting epidurals and constant use of medical and surgical interventions to speed up the delivery process. It thus removes mothers from their normal surrounding and supportive agencies and warns that if they deviate from the given instructions they will face difficulties or risks. It is worth mentioning here that the obstetrics society sets the standard procedures of childbirth which ensures safe management of high risky pregnancies (Henley-Einion, 2009). This modern engineering obstetric practice has contributed to the re-conceptualisation of childbirth from a normal and attended event to an abnormal and managed risk or crisis that has put the domination of technology over nature and provided the ascendency of medicine in childbirth rhetoric (Cahill, 2001; Fisher, Hauck & Fenwick, 2006). In Barker’s (2010: 151) words, “Medicalisation is the process by which an ever-wider range of human experiences comes to be defined experienced, and treated as medical conditions.” Henley-Einion (2009) claims that this re-conceptualisation has provided a biomedical or technocratic model (consider pregnancy a problematic and isolated event)¹ which replaced the natural or holistic model of childbirth (view pregnancy a personal experience and a natural biological act)². This technocratic model puts more emphasis on different interventions, as claimed in medical science discourse, are more effective for the survival of mother and children. These interventions include ANC, the presence of SBA and B&CEOC.

Debates surrounding different interventions
A debate about the effectiveness of the ANC has been emerging around the world. Although the medical rhetoric claims that ANC services help prevent, detect and investigate anaemia, pregnancy-related hypertension, pre-eclampsia, eclampsia and primary infection (Rooney, 1992 in Maclean, 2005), some studies (Maclean, 2005:288-89; Stanton et al., 2006) reject this claim. Rather they show that the ANC services failed to routine measure of maternal height and weight and identify women’s life threatening complications. Similarly, there has also been debates on the introduction of SBAs in place of traditional birth attendants (TBAs) who have been available during the baby delivering period in most of the developing countries. As SBAs come from city areas and have better educational background in comparison to TBAs, they can perform more efficiently than others (Blum, Sharmin & Ronsmans, 2006; Carlough & McCall, 2005), contributing to the reduction of high MMR (Cook, 2002). However, some problems arise when they are deployed in rural areas where the literacy rate is rather low. This restrains them from communicating with the local people. Their deployment increases program costs as they are provided with accommodations

¹ Body and mind, mother and foetus are seen as dyadic than as an integrated relation. Motherhood is seen as a job; the mother’s work and her body are the resources from which babies are made, the final product is a baby produced by the labour of mothering and obstetricians are the forerunners or mechanics whose job starts when a pregnant mother comes to the clinic for ANC and finishes after her discharge from the maternity centre. It views the female body as a complex entity which warrants medical intervention to repair malfunctioning (Johnson, 2009; Miller et al. 2003; Rothman, 1989; Rothman, 1991; Rudolfsdottir, 2000).

² Being pregnant is seen as biologically determined by the ‘feminine’ qualities of women. The role of attendants like midwives or dai is to teach a pregnant mother how to give birth and to take care of a newborn baby (Clarke, 2010; Johnson, 2008; Meyers, 2001; Rothman, 1991; Rudolfsdottir, 2000; Van Teijlingen, 2005)
Acceptability of their services depends on users’ perceptions about their roles. Women often perceive them as rude, impersonal and arrogant as they undertake culturally sensitive practices like routine vaginal examination and lithotomic birthing position assessment. The waiting time, experience, age and gender of service providers appear to discourage women from accepting their services. They are treated, in most of the cases, as ‘outsiders’ in the areas they provide services because of their urban and higher educational backgrounds (Kruske & Barclay, 2004). This attitude dissuades people from accepting their services.

Moreover, a debate has been growing about the selection of birthing place and mode at both theoretical and practical levels. Various studies sorted out many reasons for selecting home as a birthing place. Some are lower level of mothers’ education and occupation, lower yearly income (Wagle, Sabroe & Nielsen, 2004), very well-known attendants, home environment (Borghi et al., 2006), availability of TBAs everywhere (Suwal, 2008), easily made communication with TBAs, dependent on husband decision, family responsibility (Koblinsky et al., 2009), no need to travel (Borghi et al. 2006) and difficult to find transportation facility (Khan & Islam, 2006). The rest are long distance to maternity hospital with facilities for Caesarean section (Koblinsky et al., 2009; Wagle, Sabroe & Nielsen, 2004), low cost, flexible payment systems of informal attendants (Borghi et al., 2006), direct and indirect costs related with facilities (Koblinsky et al., 2009), young age at marriage, late age at menarche, multi-parity, having no ANC (Wagle, Sabroe & Nielsen, 2004), poor quality of healthcare services in the facility centres (Khan & Islam, 2006), fear of referrals to district level facilities and previous bad experience with the existing facilities (Koblinsky et al., 2009).

On the other hand, it is sometimes urgent to select facility centre for the safety of both mother and would-be-born baby but Physicians appear to have greater influence on deciding on the mode of delivery. More often than not, they force pregnant mothers and their relatives to opt for Caesarean section in hospitals instead of vaginal delivery at home (Borghi et al. 2006; D’Ambruoso, Abbey & Hussein, 2005; Grisaru & Samueloff, 2004). In addition, some research raises doubts about safety and security of the Caesarean section (Alexander et al., 2003; Grisaru & Samueloff, 2004; Harper et al., 2003). However, this does not mean that vaginal delivery is always safer. Both mother (urinary and anal incontinence, pelvic floor dysfunctions) and baby (low birth weight) may face troubles for delivering baby vaginally in a repeated manner (Barbieri et al., 2000; Bek & Laurberg, 1992; Connection, 2006; Sakala & Corry, 2005). Needless to say that the risks of spontaneous normal delivery for mother and child are low compared to other modes of delivery.

**Current situation of these interventions in Bangladesh**

Pregnancy in Bangladesh is not conceived as an illness but a natural event that generally requires no medical interventions, pregnant mothers only go for ANC services if they go through any bad experience during pregnancy (Pendzich, n.d: 2). However, pregnant mothers have begun to visit ANC centres of both
government and non-government organizations (NGOs) as a matter of routine (Afsana, 2005). The availability of and accessibility to ANC services has steadily been improving since the 1990s. For instance, the percentages of mothers in receipt of at least one ANC service increased by four between three years. The figure for 2004 was 56 percent, whilst it was 60 in 2007. Moreover, between 2004 and 2007, the coverage rate of qualified doctors in ANC services increased from 31.3 to 35.5 percent, whereas that of nurse/midwife/paramedic went down to 15.7 from 17.4 percent (NIPORT et al., 2005; 2009). The latest data also indicates the same increasing trend. Eight in ten and six in ten mothers go for at least one ANC visit and receive ANC services provided by medically trained personnel respectively (NIPORT et al., 2015). A number of reasons, such as confirming pregnancy condition (normal or complicated), position of the baby and the estimated date of delivery, lead pregnant mothers to seek ANC services (Koenig, Saha & Al-Sabir, 2003: 42). More or less the same reasons were found in Ghana (Mills & Bertrand, 2005: 55) and Maharashtra, India (Griffiths & Stephenson, 2001: 355). However, pregnant mothers sometimes feel discouraged to go to the health centre because of the failures of ANC services to identify complicated cases and to raise awareness about dangerous signs of pregnancy. It has been found in the case of Bangladesh that only 38 percent ANC service receivers were informed of dangerous signs of pregnancy, though weight (80.3%) and blood pressure (86.4%) were measured in most cases. Also, service providers gave iron tablets to 54.8 and took urine and blood samples from 54.2 and 36.8 percent mothers respectively (NIPORT et al., 2009: 114). Pregnant mothers have been found to be nervous and pallid during their ANC visits being afraid of what the service providers would say about their pregnancies. They are also uncertain about certain procedures used there. One participant, for instance, said, “I feel scared because I don’t know what she will be telling about me and my baby.” Another participant added, “I don’t like the way she touched my belly. She pressed so hard that I felt pain” (Afsana, 2005).

Pregnant mothers usually need assistance from anyone trained, untrained or skilled during delivery, because certain changes occur in their physical and biological system at that time. Delivery without any assistance is highly risky for mothers; oftentimes it can prove fatal (Trevanthan 1987 in Afsana & Rashid, 2000: 25). The training of the TBAs, started in the 1980s, stalled one decade later this was blamed on the fact that trained TBAs were inefficient in containing the high MMR, although no robust data corroborates this claim and the Bangladesh Government (BG) trained 24,000 TBAs in two phases (first, 1979-80, and second, 1980-81) (Hossain, Huq & Alam, 1989: 8). A new strategy, therefore, was adopted — encouraging the presence of SBAs — doctors, midwives and nurses (Mannan, 2008) — at delivery time. The percentage of mothers delivering baby with the assistance of medically trained birth attendants increased from 32 in 2011 to 42 in 2014 (NIPORT et al., 2015). Further, there has been an increasing trend of urban women with better education using professional services compared to rural mothers having less education (Koenig, Saha & Al-Sabir, 2003; NIPORT et al., 2005; NIPORT et al., 2009).
Different factors, such as mother's age and education, parity\(^1\) and costs associated with attendance seem to influence people's decisions about their selections of birth attendants. For instance, the cost of a *dai* is Taka 180 (equivalent to 2.5 US$) and a piece of cloth, while the cost of a nurse, as an SBA, is 1200 Taka. The cost of getting a doctor's assistance in hospital in complicated cases is exorbitant though the amount varies depending on the nature of the complication (Caldwell, 2002: 14).

However, the BG started to create a new cadre namely, 'community-based skilled birth attendants' (CSBAs) in 2000 who are assigned to conduct normal home deliveries and refer complicated cases to facility centres at the appropriate time (BRAC & UoA, 2001: 24; Haider, 2007: 1). On paper, SBAs are supposed to perform different activities, such as managing normal labour and delivery, identifying the onset of complications, performing essential interventions, starting treatment and supervising referral cases, etc (Graham, Bell & Bullough, 2001: 99). One study revealed that 83 percent of ANC and 42 percent of delivery care services were provided by CSBAs, reflecting high coverage of services by trained and skilled hands. Their acquired knowledge and skills were also considered satisfactory by the majority of clients (Haider, 2007: 20). Similarly, another study found that more than half (52%) CSBAs performed ANC check-ups, followed by post-natal check-ups (44%) and attended home deliveries (29%). A large percentage of service users (91% of 288) were fairly or fully satisfied with their services. Among researched women (49%) with the expectation of having another child, 60 percent expressed that they would select CSBAs as attendants for their next delivery (Ahmed & Jakaria, 2009: 48).

Most SBAs are young, urban-centred and provide services in communities with which they are not familiar. Consequently, their services are not well accepted at the community level. In addition, retaining them in rural areas may require higher salaries, housing, special allowances and work prospects for their spouses and educational opportunities for their children. Even if they fail to communicate with rural mothers due to lack of understanding of local dialects and fail to respect their belief and practices relating to birthing, a small number of women are naturally willing to receive their services (Prata *et al.* 2011: 87; Walraven & Weeks, 1999: 527). So their workload is always low compared to other community-based health workers, particularly TBAs. The comment of one CSBA reflects the picture at the field level:

> I performed only one normal delivery after receiving SBA training. I have visited many pregnant mothers and tried to convince them to seek my support for delivery but they do not feel confident about me because I am newly trained and young. They feel that the local TBA is more skilled, close to them, can give motherly affection and can attend any time of the day and night. Also they are not aware of the benefit of performing delivery by a skilled birth attendant (SIDA-Bangladesh, 2010: 63).

Other studies reported that the CSBAs had low job satisfaction because of the lack of an enabling working environment, resultantly low acceptability of their services at the community level (Adégoke & Broek, 2009; Turkmani & Gohar, 2015). Both studies indicate that the demand for CSBA services is not increasing. Like

---

\(^1\) The order of pregnancy.
the CSBA, Rozario (1998) found the failure of professionals in rural Bangladesh in recognising the perspectives and actual situations of the villagers, including women giving births, their families and dais. Another study on Bangladesh found organisational (lack of transportation, environment and supplies of equipment and drugs), cultural (not accepted their service patterns) and personal (insecurity on the way) difficulties that SBAs faced carrying out deliveries at home (Blum, Sharmin & Ronsmans, 2006).

Maternal age and education, parity (Afsana & Rashid, 2000), perception of labour and healthcare quality (Afsana & Rashid, 2000; Caldwell, 2002; Griffiths & Stephenson, 2001), socio-economic condition (Afsana & Rashid, 2000; Basu, 1990), availability of healthcare services (Griffiths & Stephenson, 2001; Stephenson & Tsui, 2002), child delivery procedure (Afsana & Rashid, 2000) and costs of services (Caldwell, 2002; Griffiths & Stephenson, 2001) appear to influence people’s choice of birth place, be it home or hospital/clinic. One Bangladesh study revealed shyness in asking anyone for help and permitting outsiders, particularly male practitioners, to examine their genital condition, apprehension that facility centres would invariably carry out surgery even if for minimal ‘complications’, and the traditional giving of a higher value to birthing at home are important factors that encourage pregnant mothers to prefer having babies at home (Parkhurst & Rahman, 2007: 394). However, there has been a decrease in delivering baby at home. It has been estimated at 63 percent delivery at home in 2014 whereas the figure for 2011 was 71 (NIPORT et al., 2015). It has also been claimed that younger educated women with middle class backgrounds prefer delivering babies in hospitals (Afsana & Rashid, 2000; Barbhuiya et al. 2001; Caldwell, 2002; Kunst & Houweling, 2001; Stephenson & Tsui, 2002).

Mothers usually prefer home delivery unless an emergency situation occurs for which institutional arrangements are required. For instance, 86.3 percent of 1,825 slum households in Dhaka (Bangladesh) mentioned that they did not feel the necessity for institutional delivery (Caldwell, 2002: 11). In another study, almost all births were reported to have occurred at home (Barkat et al., 2006). If labour is perceived to be normal, rural women in Bangladesh choose to remain at home (Griffith & Stephenson, 2001: 349). Other factors for selecting home include unfriendly and uncomfortable atmosphere in hospitals, male birth attendants and uneasy birthing procedures (Afsana & Rashid, 2000; Caldwell, 2002; Sultana & Islam, 2007).

It is not always true that doctors have total influence over pregnant mothers’ choice of Caesarean delivery. The latter sometimes request health personnel for conducting Caesarean delivery. There are many reasons, such as avoiding negligence claims, earning more money within a limited time frame, ease of decision making and exerting power in the medical, specially obstetric, field for which doctors generally prefer Caesarean to normal delivery (Bhuiya, 2009; Leone, Padmadas & Matthews, 2008; Sultana & Islam, 2007; Wagner, 2000). On the other hand, doctors use many phrases—"Caesarean is safe", "Upcoming baby can face difficulties if baby is normally delivered", and "Pelvic is not opening"—in true or false senses to persuade their patients to opt for Caesarean delivery (Sultana & Islam, 2007). Sometimes doctors even
criticise women for not going for Caesarean and tease them as ‘selfish’, that is, mothers only think of their own health rather than the future of the upcoming baby (Wagner, 2000).

Bangladesh has the highest institutional Caesarean delivery rate compared to other countries (such as Colombia, Dominican Republic, Egypt, Morocco and Vietnam). The current trend is that one in four pregnant women goes for Caesarean section baby delivery (NIPORT et al., 2015). One of the main reasons for this situation is that physicians, especially private ones, prefer to perform Caesarean delivery in private hospitals. They earn more money if they serve in private hospitals, which also provide them with other forms of financial incentives (Chong & kwek, 2010; Leone, Padmadas & Matthews, 2008: 1239). For instance, one specialist doctor in Bangladesh said that he received a maximum 5,000 Taka for normal delivery which took either eight to nine hours or more, while he can earn 8,000 Taka or more for Caesarean delivery which takes not more than an hour. Specialist doctors prefer Caesarean because they can easily maintain their routine in their preferred way. In normal deliveries, they have to spend more time to observe the progress of the labour pain and keep close supervision for a longer period (Sultana & Islam, 2007).

Wagner (2000: 1678) claims that the Caesarean takes 20 minutes and normal delivery takes ten hours or more of the doctor’s time. Doctors and hospitals always earn more money from Caesarean than normal delivery.

Other reasons for the increasing Caesarean rate include doctors’ fear of normal delivery, lack of confidence of doctors in taking decisions and the politics of obstetricians. One reason for promoting Caesarean, according to Wagner (2000: 1679), is to ensure the domination of obstetricians who always try to keep midwives as their subordinates. A midwife considers a breech delivery¹ as a variation of normal delivery, whereas doctors, particularly obstetricians, consider this condition as pathological. A study found that the trainee doctors in Bangladesh conducted most of the deliveries be they normal or Caesarean (43.6%), followed by medical officers (25.7%). These trainee doctors assisted deliveries more (54.4%) than interns (19.0%) and nurses (15.8%). It claimed that Caesarean delivery rate has been increasing. As the trainee doctors performed more deliveries, they are more than willing to take decisions quickly for Caesarean delivery rather than waiting for a normal delivery (Bhuiya, 2009).

Rich and highly educated pregnant mothers sometimes request doctors for Caesarean delivery or ‘elective Caesarean’, due to the changing role and status of women in society, lack of physical fitness, avoiding tension and labour pain, high ‘value’ of the baby due to infrequent or no previous conception, and increasing access to ANC services hinting the development of congenial interactions between pregnant mothers and service providers (Leone, Padmadas & Matthews, 2008; Pittrof, Campbell & Filippi, 2002; Sultana & Islam, 2007). For instance, Sultana and Islam (2000: 32) reported that, in Bangladesh, eight out of 10 middle class

---

¹ Delivery of a foetus with the buttocks or feet appearing first.
respondents aged between 24 and 38 had Caesarean delivery experience. As reported by Leone, Padmadas & Matthews (2008: 1237), talking to peer groups and family members about reproductive health issues, including pregnancy and its outcome, may have an impact on demand for a Caesarean delivery. For instance, women having good interaction with family members and peer groups during pregnancy are less likely to prefer Caesarean delivery. Two studies (NIHORT et al., 2005: 144; NIHORT et al. 2009: 119) also reported that in Bangladesh economically solvent urban women with better education are more likely to go through Caesarean delivery.

The possible effects of Caesarean, be it elective or emergency, are anaesthesia accidents, damage to blood vessels, accidental extension of the uterine incision, damage to urinary bladder and other organs (Lumbiganon et al. 2010: 495; Parkhurst & Rahman, 2007: 399; Wagner, 2000: 1677). Both immediate and late complications were reported to be considerably more in Caesarean than in normal delivery cases (Begum et al. 2009). On the bad consequence of Caesarean delivery, Wagner (2000: 1677) commented, “If a Caesarean section is done, the woman and her baby take the risks while if the Caesarean section is not done, the doctor takes the risk”. All these facts indicate, in most Caesarean cases, pregnant mothers are not informed by doctors about the side effects of Caesarean.

High costs and deaths associated with the Caesarean mode of delivery appear to have had a negative impact on pregnant mothers’ choice of Caesarean. For these reasons and others, there has been growing mistrust in doctors’ recommendation for Caesarean delivery and a developing perception that doctors conduct medically not-justified Caesarean deliveries for their own interests (Collin, Anwar & Ronsmans, 2007; Koehlmoos et al. 2011: 75; Parkhurst & Rahman, 2007: 392; Penn-Kekana, McPake & Parkhurst, 2007: 34). Avoiding this situation arising from the greed of medical personnel, the International Federation of Gynaecology and Obstetrics (FIGO) (2007 in Leone, Padmadas & Matthews, 2008: 1254) correctly advised, “women should not be denied access to Caesarean delivery when needed, for want of funds or infrastructure; neither should they be placed under pressure to have a Caesarean birth because of a lack of professional care to support a normal labour and delivery.”

**Main discussion**

The BG formulated a population policy in 1976 and attempted to deliver family planning (FP)-related healthcare services for addressing the high population growth. The concept of Primary Health Care started receiving more attention after the ‘Alma Ata Conference’ held in 1978 which led the BG to plan the setting up of rural centres for providing basic healthcare services to all. Meanwhile, the International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD, Mexico, 1984), the Safe Motherhood Initiative (SMI, Nairobi, 1987) and ICPD+10 (Cairo, 1994), the 4th World Conference on Women (Beijing, 1995) and Cairo+5 (Cairo, 1999), the UN Millennium Development Summit (2000) and the UN Post-MDG Summit sought to create pressure on the government for ensuring the safety of both mothers and newborns. As a signature country of all
international initiatives, Bangladesh has been formulating its policy to set up more medical centres where medically qualified personnel and internationally acclaimed and medically proven intervention-related services (ANC and B&CEOC) are available.

Bangladeshi pregnant women started to accept ANC services though cultural practices and inter-generational beliefs create hindrances. However, the effectiveness of ANC in preventing high MMR is questionable; there is no robust data claiming the ability of it to reduce MMR. Sometimes, it fails to predict the possible outcomes of the pregnancy. TBA services are still more preferable to Bangladeshi women due to their high local connection and minimum level of service charge. However, the necessity of SBA services has been realising. As a result, the number of childbirth attended by the SBA has been increasing. As SBAs have urban and higher educational backgrounds, their services have not easily been accepted in rural areas. Home delivery is still more acceptable than institutional delivery. Unfriendly hospital environment, higher costs associated with institutional delivery and perceived rude behaviour of formal health personnel are potential barriers to increasing institutional, particularly hospital, deliveries.

The current trend does not support this argument. Mothers and their families now prefer for institutional delivery to home delivery in order to keep alive of both mother and children. In some cases, mothers are forcibly sent to hospitals for delivery when complications develop. With an increase in the facility-centre-based baby delivery, the Caesarean-section baby delivery rate has also been rising. An associational relation of education and wealth with the use of ANC, SBA and facility-centre-based services found here. Rising economic condition, building aware of dangerous signs of pregnancy and deleterious effects of delivering baby at home through different media, increasing literacy rate, particularly female, and tremendous development of communication systems are seemingly main reasons for this associational relation (Kabir & Khan, 2013; Killuwo et al. 2006; Nahar, Banu & Nasreen, 2011; Paul & Rumsey, 2002; Rahman & Anwar, 2013; Simkhada et al. 2008; Syed et al. 2006; Uddin & Choudhury, 2008).

Following lessons from other developing countries¹, Bangladesh with a dearth of medically trained qualified health workers can provide trainings local level health workers with or without medical background on administering ‘Misoprostol’ during the post-partum haemorrhage, anaesthesia, surgery, identifying blood loss using local instrument and referring complicated cases at the right time. These trainings help Bangladesh reduce high MMR within a short period. However, these should not be treated a panacea. No interventions can replace the need for strong basic health care systems that ensure safe delivery and supply essential drugs and equipment in emergencies. Rather, these strategies should be considered as interim solutions among many, albeit ones that can meet basic needs for MHC in resource poor countries,

particularly rural areas in Bangladesh. For this reason, Prata et al. (2011: 90) state that countries with less than half of births attended by SBAs should make attempts to introduce short-term interventions with a specific objective of improving maternal health (MH). It may take longer to bring a positive result if long-term strategies are taken. Moreover, Maine (2007: 1382) claims that Malaysia and Sri Lanka following a horizontal approach are able to cut high MMR by half every 7-10 years. Therefore, unless a strong integrated basic healthcare system through single delivery mechanism\(^1\) is developed, a robust national health policy (NHP)—giving a future guideline about how to improve different sectors, including MH, through proper coordination, supervision and monitoring—is adopted and a behavioural change communication (BCC) program at community level is introduced, it will not be possible to reduce high MMR.

**Conclusion**

Capitalistic, patriarchal, religious and technological ideologies have made significant contributions to the establishment of domination of men-midwives over females and of the pre-eminence of technology over nature in pregnancy and childbirth which are the founding stones of MoP&C. This process produces a biomedical model which ultimately replaces the social model of childbirth. Later, global politics has led this process to advance and moved pregnancy and childbirth from being social to being medical events.

All pregnancy and childbirth-related interventions, such as ANC, SBAs, Caesarean section, and B&CEOC, are the results of this process. Bangladesh is not an exception to this process. There has been an increase in the availability of and accessibility to ANC, SBA, B&CEOC and facility-centre-based services, indicating that Bangladesh has already been in the MoP&C. The efficiency and effectiveness of this MoP&C in reducing high MMR is still not out of doubt.

However, the experience of other liking countries asserts that these interventions vis-a-vis the MoP&C can be the short-run solutions to the existing high MMR. It thus suggests that formulating a robust NHP and developing integrated health systems are the actual means to improve public health that ultimately improves MH.

**References**


\(^1\) The two wings of the Ministry of Health should be made single for avoiding duplication and internal competition or rivalry.


BRAC, & UoA. (2001). Skilled Attendance At Delivery In Bangladesh: An Ethnographic Study. Dhaka: Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee (BRAC) and University of Aberdeen (UoA), UK.


In Search of Models for Healthcare Delivery in Multi-Cultural Africa

Abdullahi Ali Arazeem¹ and Moshood Issah²

Abstract: Africa is said to be one of the most diseased regions in the world. With mere 13% of the world’s population, Africa carries 24% of the global burden of diseases as there are more people living with HIV/AIDS in Africa than anywhere in the world. Malaria also kills more children than anywhere in the world as there are no less than half a million children younger than the age of five that die from malaria every year. Cardiovascular diseases are beginning to kill more people in Africa more than ever before. It is crystal clear that the rate at which diseases are killing people in Africa is alarming and catastrophic and this has attracted the attention of health policy makers in the continent. Africa has adopted and implemented different health policies to tackle health challenges ravaging the continent. However, many of these policies have failed perhaps, owing to the fact that the designers of health policies failed to recognize the role of culture in their design as well as implementation. In this paper, we make a case for the recognition of cultural factors in the design and implementation of health policies in Africa. Appropriate models have been reviewed in this paper to guide the design and implementation of health policies.

Keywords: Healthcare; Delivery system, Cultural care model, Sub-Saharan Africa

Introduction

The continent of Africa is faced with huge burden of health problems proportionately far beyond Africa’s share of the world’s population. With mere 13% of the world’s population, Africa carries about 24% of the global burden of diseases (World Health Organization, 2005). For example, Africa is rated highest in infectious and parasitic diseases. WHO (2011) reported that about 67% of the people living with HIV/AIDS worldwide reside in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) and 75% of annual global deaths from AIDS occurs in SSA. The reports further showed that 90% of new infections of HIV/AIDS among children occur in SSA countries. Although Southeast Asia had the highest number of new tuberculosis (TB) infections annually, SSA had a TB incidence rate that doubles that of Southeast Asia (WHO, 2011). Specifically, South Africa and Nigeria had the fourth and fifth largest number of new TB cases annually respectively, while Zimbabwe

¹Corresponding author, Department of Sociology, University of Ilorin, Nigeria and Department of Sociology, University of Johannesburg, South Africa. E-mail: kwaraeleven@yahoo.com; cell: +2348069696844
²Department of Sociology, University of Ilorin, Nigeria and Department of Sociology, University of Fort Hare, South Africa. Email: issahmoshood80@gmail.com
and Mozambique ranked second and third respectively (WHO, 2011). According to Crawley et al. (2010), malaria represents 10% of SSA’s overall disease burden and more than 70% of malaria-related deaths occurred in SSA. Maternal mortality was also high in SSA because reports had shown that one in seven women in Niger Republic and one in eight in Sierra-Leone would ultimately die of pregnancy-related infections and complications (WHO, 2012). Other neglected tropical diseases such as Dracunculiasis, Trypanomiasis, Leishmaniasis, leprosy, Lymphatic filariasis, onchocerciasis and schistosomiasis had also continued to threaten human existence in SSA (WHO, 2012).

Indeed, the existence of these diseases have adversely affected socio-economic life as well as general process of development in Africa, as they sap energy, creativity and productivity of over 67 million people in the continent (WHO, 2002; Von-Schirnding, 2002). Life expectancy on the continent, which is one of the lowest in the world, has been reduced further to an average of 52 years by the existence of many of these diseases. Women and children carry a disproportionate share of Africa’s heavy disease burden, with 4.8 million children dying annually, mostly from preventable diseases (WHO, 2014).

It is crystal clear from these narratives that the continent of Africa is diseased and this has attracted the attention of stakeholders resulting in high-level inter-sectoral actions for healthcare provisions. For instance, most SSA countries are signatories to global health initiatives such as Alma Ata Declaration that led to the birth of Primary Health Care in most African countries in 1978; the 1987 Bamako Initiative on Healthcare Provision; the 2001 Abuja Declarations on Health Expenditure; the 2008 Ouagadougou Declaration on Primary Healthcare and Health Systems in Africa; the Libreville Declaration on Health and Environment in Africa in 2008; and the Brazzaville Declaration on Non-communicable Diseases in 2011. The spread of disease and illnesses like the HIV/AIDS and tuberculosis despite initiatives to curb them is an indication that most of the health initiatives in Africa have failed.

Perhaps, one of the reasons health initiatives in SSA had failed to tackle incidence and control of diseases and illnesses ravaging the continent was because cultural context of disease and illness has not sufficiently taken into consideration in the designs and implementations of health policies. Existing studies have shown that there is a gap between cultural construction disease and the design and implementation of health initiatives in SSA (Lipson & Dibble, 2005; Giger & Davidhizar, 2004). For an example, in most African countries, diseases and illnesses are usually attributed to supernatural and mystical forces including witchcraft or evil machination. Extant literature has shown that determinants of health and illness across Africa have socio-cultural origins that are beyond the direct influence of the health sector and health policies (Arnold & Glenn, 2007). Thus, Purnell & Paulanka (2005) observed that health care providers and organizations must take and consider cultural diversity as a priority in the design and implementation of health initiatives in SSA as well as ensuring that the healthcare providers are culturally competent in handling health challenges of culturally and ethno-linguistically diverse people in the region. In most African
societies, diseases and illnesses are, sometimes, seen as punishment as a result of being disobedient to the spiritual forces (e.g. the ancestors) (McElroy & Townsend, 2009). Consequently, several deaths often take place before getting to health facilities (Taylor & Taylor, 2002). In this article, we make a case for the recognition of cultural factors in the design and implementation of health initiatives in Africa. The paper is structures into six sections.

The Nexus between Culture and Health

The concept of culture has been at the centre-stage of academic debate in sociology and anthropology, hence, finding a singular universally accepted definition has been very problematic. In this section, attempt is made to define culture from the point of view of scholars and connect these definitions to the concept of health. Historically, some scholars have maintained that the ‘scientific’ explanations of culture started with the work of Blumenthal in 1940 when he conceptualized culture in terms of symbols, ideas, personality, and functional relationships (Aina, 2007). This was said to have laid the foundation for a kind of scientific engagement in the concept of culture and this had inspired many scholars to follow suit. Barely one decade after Blumenthal’s (1940) definition, several other authors had attempted to add more flesh to the debate; what culture means, what it stands for and its universality as well as relativity. As at 1952, the American anthropologists, Kroeber and Kluckhohn, had compiled and reviewed more than 164 different definitions of culture. Despite these, there was still consensus among scholars that not much was done in the scientific conceptualization of the concept of culture (Aina, 2007). Even, it was argued, Blumenthal’s definition, which he claimed to be scientific, was non-inclusive and faulty in some respects. This position was demonstrated when Apte (1994: 2001) noted that ‘despite a century of efforts to define culture adequately, there was in the early 1990s no agreement among anthropologists and sociologists regarding its nature and dynamics’.

Prior to Blumenthal’s definition, a ground-breaking definition of culture had been conceptualized by Edward Burnett Tylor. According to Tylor (1871), ‘culture… is that complex whole which includes knowledge, beliefs, arts, morals, law, customs, and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society’. This definition is considered highly inclusive because it encapsulates various components and dimensions of human culture. Tylor’s definition was ground-breaking and appears to encapsulate the main components of culture and what it means to be cultured. Tylor deviates from previous scholars who defined culture based on biological traits. Tylor was perhaps the first who specified that culture is learned and acquired, as opposed to being a biological trait. Such a perspective to culture was perceived by many as revolutionary against the backdrop of colonialism, racism, and social evolutionism that dominated the ideologies of the 19th century.

Others have also attempted to define culture. For example, Schwartz (1992) defines culture as ‘consisting of the derivatives of experience, more or less organized, learned or created by the individuals of a population, including those images or encodements and their interpretations transmitted from past
generations, from contemporaries, or formed by individuals themselves’. For Morris & Maisto (2005), it is everything that describes individuals design for living. According to Coakley (2007:5), ‘culture consists of the ways of life that people create as they participate in a group or society’. Spencer-Oatey (2008:3), sees culture as ‘a fuzzy set of basic assumptions and values, orientations to life, beliefs, policies, procedures and behavioural conventions that are shared by a group of people, and that influence (but do not determine) each member’s behaviour and his/her interpretations of the ‘meaning’ of other people’s behaviours’.

From the foregoing, it is evident that the concept of culture is complex and dynamic in both theory and practice and that it influences and determines every aspect of human existence, including health. How a group of people perceive health, disease and illness is largely influenced by their culture. According to Iorvaa (2013), all humans, irrespective of ethnicity and creeds, behave in the context of a specific culture that profoundly influence reactions to the world, such as their beliefs, attitudes and predispositions towards health and illness. Conceiving culture as related to health dynamics of a people, Cunningham (2007) observes that culture includes ethnicity as well as the health belief system of the people of a particular area or region. The connection between culture and health is pervasive and widespread in Africa. In these societies, general medical practices and specific health belief systems are culturally embedded. Therefore, the diversity of health belief system can be explained in terms of the diversity in the socio-cultural dynamics of diverse nations.

Cultural Diversity in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA)

There is no widely acceptable definition of the term ‘diversity’. Most scholars would agree that diversity refers to differences between individuals, but there is disagreement concerning which different attributes should be included within the scope of the concept. According to Patrickson & Obrien (2001), diversity is a subjective phenomenon, created by group members themselves who, on the basis of their different social identities, categorise others as similar or dissimilar. Loden & Rosener (1991), defined diversity as that which differentiates one group of people from another along primary and secondary dimensions. From this perspective, on the one hand, primary dimensions of diversity are those aspects of differences that have primary influences on human social identities as well as fundamental world-views and they include gender, ethnicity, race, and age. On the other hand, secondary dimensions of diversity appear to be comparatively less conspicuous, and which exert influence on personal identity. They include social attributes such as educational background, geographic location, religion, and first language. In advancing the frontier of knowledge, Arredondo (2004) added culture, social class and language to the primary dimensions; and healthcare beliefs and recreational interests to the secondary dimensions. Table 1 shows the categorizations further.
From table 1, the categorization most relevant to this paper is cultural diversity. Thus, what is cultural diversity? Cultural diversity is increasingly employed and defined in relation to social and cultural variation in the same way as biodiversity is used when referring to biological and ecological variations, habitats and ecosystems (Brewster et al., 2002). Technically, cultural diversity is the quality of diverse or different cultures, as opposed to monoculture. Vertovec & Wessendorf (2004) expanded the scope of the conception of cultural diversity when they argued that the term cultural diversity is often used to mean the variety of human societies or cultures in a specific region, or in the world as a whole. The importance of cultural diversity has been enunciated by the UNESCO in its Article 1 of the Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity in 2002 that, which stipulated that cultural diversity is as necessary for humankind as biodiversity is for nature.

Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) is one of the most culturally diversified regions in the world in terms of ethno-linguistic compositions and divergent belief systems (Ahlerup & Olsson, 2012; Michalopoulos, 2012). Datasets on ethno-cultural diversity in SSA showed that standard deviation in the number of ethnic groups

Table 1: Categorizations of Diversity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Primary</th>
<th>Secondary</th>
<th>Tertiary</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a) Race</td>
<td>a. Culture</td>
<td>a) Assumptions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) Ethnicity</td>
<td>b. Sexual orientation</td>
<td>b) Perceptions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c) Gender</td>
<td>c. Thinking style</td>
<td>c) Attitudes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d) Age</td>
<td>d. Geographic origin</td>
<td>d) Feelings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e) Disability</td>
<td>e. Family status</td>
<td>e) Values</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>f. Lifestyle</td>
<td>f) Group norms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>g. Economic status</td>
<td>g) Health</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>h. Political</td>
<td>h) Belief</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>orientation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>i. Work experience</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>j. Education</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>k. Language</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>l. Nationality</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>m. Religion</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Source: Rijamampinina & Carmichael (2005:109)
per country is more than 35%, higher than any other region in the world (Fearon, 2003). Another dataset from Alesina et al. (2003) shows that the standard deviation in ethno-cultural diversity per country as measured by the Ethno-Linguistic Fractionalization (ELF) index is largest in SSA. Indeed, in a continent with high levels of diversity (for example, Liberia, Nigeria and Uganda) it is also striking to find largely homogenous countries like Burundi and Comoros.

For the purpose of comprehensiveness and systematization, it is imperative to adopt region by region analysis of the ethno-linguistic compositions of SSA using language as a yardstick. Language is used as the basis of classification because it represents one of the most important and visible components of culture. In other words, within the context of this work, the diversity of culture is reflected in language variability. This has been demonstrated by previous researchers and authors. To start with, Central Africa is a region of Africa that is primarily inhabited by Bantu and Pygmy groups (Heine & Derek, 2000). In the sub-region, Bantu languages predominate. Chadic and Nilo-Saharan languages were also spoken in some areas in the sub-region (Epstein et al., 1998). More specifically, the African Great Lakes region is primarily inhabited by Bantu and Nilotic who speak Bantu languages, especially Chichewa, Luhya, and Luganda tribes and Nilotic languages among the Luo, Dinka and Maasai tribes (Lyle & Mauricio, 2007). In Southern Africa, Bantu peoples as well as some Khoisan, who speak Bantu languages and Khoisan languages primarily inhabited the sub-region (John, 2011). There are also numerous Afrikaners and other Africans of European descent who speak a Germanic language as a first language, namely Afrikaans and English respectively (Heine & Derek, 2000). It is currently believed that speakers of Khoisan languages were the first inhabitants of Southern Africa (Grimes & Barbara, 1996).

In West Africa sub-region, people who speak Niger–Congo languages mainly occupy the area, Niger–Congo tongues spoken locally include the Kwa languages, Mande languages, Fulani languages, Wolof languages, Yoruba languages and Igbo languages (Lyle & Mauricio, 2007). West African Bantu-speaking communities are found almost exclusively in Cameroon, the purported homeland of the Bantu languages (John, 2011). In addition, some Chadic languages, including Hausa, are spoken in areas bordering the Sahara, and the Nilo-Saharan Zarma, Songhai and Kanuri languages are spoken in the areas bordering Central Africa (John, 2011).

From the foregoing, it is undisputable that SSA is culturally diverse, and this has implications on the conceptions and constructions of health and illness in the region. This is because the health belief is one of the critical components of SSA’s culture, and people of the region are embedded within cultural contexts, which defined and shaped their beliefs, altitudes and understandings of health and illness.
Culture and the Conception of Health and Illness in Sub-Saharan Africa: Empirical Evidence

Empirical studies have shown that culture plays a central role in health-related behaviours (Omu & Reynolds, 2012; Legg & Penn, 2013). Different cultural groups have vastly different perceptions of the causes of disease and these perceptions influence their health-seeking behaviours (Pronyk et al., 2001). Many ethnographical studies, such as Helman (2001) have shown that cultural factors have both positive and negative influences on health behaviours. For example, the escalation and spread of HIV/AIDS, especially in Southern Africa, is culturally rooted. Studies have shown that attitudes towards condom use in Southern African countries are partly influenced by cultural factors (Mulatu, 2000). Culturally, in most Southern African countries, condom use is seen as a ‘waste’ of sperm (Oke, 2001). Also, for many Africans, polygamy is celebrated where most men believe they have a cultural right to have multiple partners (Epston et al., 2003).

More so, in South Africa, male circumcision has some cultural undertones. Traditional male circumcision among indigenous communities such as Xhosa, Ndebele, Pedi, South Sotho and Venda, are culturally embedded (Connolly, et al., 2008). In some cases, the newly circumcised young men are encouraged to engage in sex soon after initiation with a woman whom they do not intend to marry and it has been observed that these cultural practices had aided the spread of HIV/AIDS among the general population. Some studies among the Swazi people of South Africa have found that the causes of illness are culturally categorized under two fundamental categories: proximate and ultimate causes (Gluckman, 1955). Proximate causes are believed to be infections from pollutants while the ultimate cause accounts for why a disease is contracted by a particular person in the midst of many. For instance, Green (1994) reported that a Swazi mother may accept that her child has diarrhea because flies settled on its food (proximate cause), but she might also want to establish who sent the flies to harm her child (ultimate cause). In the Swazi community, witchcraft, sorcery and ancestral vengeance are culturally believed to have the capacity and spiritual powers to inflict pains and illnesses on people. These spiritual agents are collectively believed to be the major determinants of illnesses even in the modern world.

Lyons (1999) documented the erroneous early search for explanations for the earliest AIDS-related deaths among the Haya of Tanzania. His findings showed that among the Haya people of Tanzania, the emergence and spread of the HIV was attributed to the distribution of the Juliana Shirt from Uganda at that time. The shirts were thought by the Haya as containing infectious substances, and were believed to have been contaminated by Ugandan traders. Also, among the Haya people of Tanzania, witchcraft and sorcery is another ultimate explanation for the outbreak and spread of diseases (Green, 1994). The slow sapping of strength and vitality of the affected members of the community and the fact that illness may spread from mothers to their unborn children make the Haya people to attribute the illness to witchcraft and sorcerers (Lyon, 1999). Also, among the Chagga of Tanzania, illnesses and diseases are believed to be the
consequences of breaking the communion with the ancestors (Amat-Roze, 1999). Thus, emergence and resurgence of illnesses and diseases are seen as the manifestations of ancestral wrath.

Amuyunzu-Nyamongo et al. (1999) reported that illness is frequently seen as traditional curse in East African societies. Studies carried out in rural areas of Malawi and Zambia by Edginton, Sekatane, & Goldstein (2002) reported that TB is commonly conceptualized as a disease which has its origins in the breaking of sexual taboos. Similarly, among the Dinka people in Amb societies, they believed that witches are the ultimate causes of ill-health. Among the Bira of Mobala and the Nande of Mukulia, of the Democratic Republic of Congo the etiology of ill-health could be attributed to seven different causes. These ranged from natural causes to transgression of cultural taboos (e.g. eating forbidden food) to witchcraft (Oke, 1982).

In West Africa, among the Akan people of Ghana, illness is attributed to witchcraft (Mensch, Hewett & Erulkar, 2003). In Nigeria state capitals, 10-12% endorsed the view that cultural factors are critical in health and illness (Orubuloye & Oguntim伊ehin, 1999). Studies in Nigeria have also shown that certain childhood diseases are attributable to the anger of the gods, especially when taboos had been broken (Oke, 1982). Some diseases were attributed to the evil machinations of certain persons who seemed to bear certain grudges against the sufferer. Studies in Nigeria showed that the aje (the witches) and the oso (sorcerer) can inflict diseases on people through their mystical powers. In a study conducted among the Yoruba speaking people of Southwestern Nigeria, 96.5% of the respondents indicated four etiological perspectives on illness causes: enemies (ota), which include witchcraft (aje) and sorcery (oso); gods (orisa) or ancestors (ebora); natural illness (aare) and hereditary diseases (aisanidile) (Jegede, 1998). A study conducted by Omorodion (1993) among the Esan communities in Nigeria illustrated that even diseases and illnesses such as diarrhea, malaria, small pox, chicken pox and minor headaches may be attributed to witchcraft and sorcery.

Empirical studies have also shown that in most SSA countries, women with breast cancer hardly go to the hospitals because of the fact that the health care systems in most parts of the region are male-centered, which goes contrary to the cultural provision of most countries in the region (Facione, et.al., 2002). More precisely, cultural norms in some SSA countries may make some females to be feeling reluctant to allow male physicians to examine them (Facione et al., 2000). This might be because once a woman is married, only her husband has the socially approved authority to touch her, particularly her sensitive parts. The presence of cultural beliefs is much more felt in maternal and infant care. There are certain cultural beliefs which determine the health seeking behaviors among African pregnant women. In Tanzania, for example, some cultural taboos prohibit the intake of some foods during gestation, which may be much more needed at the period. Culturally, most indigenous African people strongly believe in the use of ‘health’ herbs during pregnancy and the perinatal period as the best options to food supplements (Erinoso & Oke 1994). The maternal situation among the Ogu people of Badagry, Lagos State in Nigeria has been exacerbated by
cultural beliefs (Isiugo-Abanihe, 2003; Ajiboye & Adebayo, 2012). The influence of cultural practices could also be seen in the attitude to anti-natal attendance and the actual delivery. According to Evjen-Olsen et al. (2008:7), ‘about 50% of the pregnant mothers prefer to see traditional midwives or relatives for both antenatal care and delivery in Tanzania’. In studies conducted by Maimbolwa et al. (2003) on the cultural childbirth practices and beliefs among the women who accompanied pregnant women to the modern health center during labour (Mbusas) in Zambia. The Mbusas were advisors to the women regarding appropriate traditional practices and childbirth. They encouraged pregnant women to use herbs as they believed that these may help to precipitate labour and widened the birth canal. Any complication during labour is usually attributed to witchcraft or seen as punishment for misdeeds committed by the pregnant woman. Studies by Kyomuhendo (2003); Atuyambe et al. (2009) in Tanzania and Zambia showed that maternal death was seen as a ‘sad but normal event’, and mostly the work of ‘evil doers’. This belief could have accounted for the high level of maternal and infant mortality in both Tanzania and Zambia.

Similarly, treatment modalities of health and illness is conditioned and determined by culture. Prior to Western civilization, diseases and illnesses were usually (and are still) handled by traditional doctors. More than 70% of people in Africa use traditional medicine at some point in their lives (WHO, 2012). Among indigenous African communities, the traditional doctors are well known and are important players in health care delivery whether approved or not. In many of these communities, traditional healers often act, in part, as an intermediary between the visible and invisible worlds; between the living and the dead, sometimes to determine which spirits are at work and how to bring the sick person back into harmony with the ancestors. In South Africa, for instance, traditional medicine is practiced in accordance with the philosophy of Ubuntu (An African ethical or humanist philosophy focusing on people’s allegiances and relations with each other). Ubuntu philosophy requires traditional healers not to provide services for material gains, but for the benefits of humanity. The cultural taboo imposes on the practitioners a strong code of moral ethics in the provision of health care services to which they should always abide. The cultural tradition of Ubuntu symbolizes the uniqueness of SSA’s culture on health and illness and most practitioners seem to uphold this moral code in the treatment of their patients, and they often have higher patronage, especially in rural communities.

Kleinman (1980) pointed out what he called the ‘core clinical functions’ in traditional SSA’s countries within the cultural context. In his conception, the term ‘clinical’ represents treatment modalities in SSA’s countries, and it has five constructs. These are: (1) Cultural hierarchies of health values, (2) Experience of illness, (3) Cognitive response, (4) Healing activities and (5) Potential outcomes. The clinical functions of traditional herbalists in most SSA’s countries follow these patterns of treatment modalities and constructs. Bye and large, what could be deduced from the discussions under this sub-section of the chapter is that socio-cultural factors play prominent role in the general dynamics of health and illness as well health care seeking, utilizations and general health care delivery system in SSA. It is important to note that many of these medical conception are indigenous with the people and it has been part and parcel of their medical lives for
centuries and despite the advent of orthodox medicine, many still believe in the tradition and hence are influenced by such. Thus, there is the need to always consider this factor in the making and implementations of health policies in the region.

**Models for Healthcare Delivery in Multi-Cultural Sub-Saharan Africa**

In order to ensure functional and effective healthcare delivery in SSA, the models of cultural care and cultural competence are suggested for healthcare providers in Sub-Saharan African societies.

**Cultural Care Model**

The cultural care model was developed by Leininger (1970) to explain the prominence of environmental and cultural factors in determining health dynamics of a group of people, this include events, meanings and interpretations given to diseases or illnesses in particular cultural settings, in the understanding of disease and decision on treatment options. According to Leininger (1991), treatments should be more individualized and the socio-environmental and cultural context of the patient should be properly taken into consideration in his treatment. Leininger (1990) further argued that the historical and experiential conditions and incidents preceding illness or ill-health as well as patients’ interpretations and definitions of health conditionsshould be contextualized in deciding treatment options and modalities. The biggest challenge, according to Leininger (1990) is how healthcare providers could gather information about the historical and experiential conditions, interpretation and definitions of patients’ ill-health. Consequently, Leininger (1995) suggested the use of ‘ethno-history on health belief’, which explains human health concepts within particular cultural contexts. The collection of data on the ethno-history of health belief of the patients by the healthcare providers is fundamental and critical in treatment options divisions. This is important because, for instance, assuming an individual had a threat two days back from a perceived enemy (evil-doers, witchcrafts, sorcerers, herbalists etc.) and then today has this mysterious pain that would not go even with drugs and injections. This individual may narrate to healthcare providers that his pain cannot go with the administration of drugs and injections. A provider who has no or (limited) knowledge of ethno-history or health belief of the people may think that the patient might have been mentally or psychologically derailed and this may adversely affect the treatment outcomes. Ajiboye & Adedayo (2012) have documented the challenges the healthcare providers faced in treating patients who are believed to have been possessed by a spirit.

I had been employed at a construction site. In the evening when I was sleeping, I saw something like a bomb coming to hit me, then I heard someone in my sleep telling me to wake up, not sure who the person is but I think it was God strength (grace), and when I woke up something that could not be seen hit my body. I went to the medical doctors; they examined me but they could not identify the problem. Whenever I went to work, I would cry and complain because of pain, but no one could understand. So I went to a traditional healer who said that someone had sent to me a 'jini' (spirit). We looked for chicken, a goat, and some herbal roots. I was given some to use while bathing and the other to drink. The timing for using the medicine was just like the hospital one i.e. morning and evening; and with God’s help I now feel alright (Ajiboye & Adebayo, 2012:143).

Leininger’s culture care model has strong arguments, which should form the basis for the formulation of policies and programmes on healthcare delivery in multi-cultural societies such as SSA. In other words,
cultural care model perfectly fits into the cultural diversity and complexity of the SSA. However, the theory has been criticized for placing too much emphasis on the patient’s culture, which is capable of undermining and compromising the modern medicine. Hence, the need for an alternative supportive approach.

**Cultural Competence Model**

Another model that could be considered to tackle the challenges of health and illness in a culturally diversified society such as SSA is the cultural competence model. The model is connected to the cultural care model. The model is premised on the notion that, to provide an effective and culturally responsive health care service to a multi-cultural population such as SSA, healthcare providers need to be apprised of general and specific socio-cultural elements and components that are directly and indirectly connected to several health and medical issues as conceived by the people in diverse socio-cultural environment, proponents of the model assume that it is only such knowledge that could make a care giver be competent enough to provide useful and relevant health care service to people. Prominent among the proponents of this model are Campinha-Bacote (1998), Cross et al. (1989) and Carroll et al. (2007).

Cross et al. (1989) define cultural competence as a set of congruent behaviours, attitudes, and policies that come together in a system, agency, or among professionals and enables that system, agency or professionals to work effectively in cross-cultural situations. Campinha-Bacote (2002: 181) views cultural competence as ‘an ongoing process in which the healthcare provider continuously strives to achieve the ability to effectively work within the cultural context of the client’- individual, family or the community. According to him, in order to meet the needs of culturally diverse groups, healthcare providers must engage in the process of understanding the cultural dynamics of the people in order to become competent of providing reliable healthcare services to them especially as such a health care provider can take the cultural elements related to the health issue into consideration, conducting culturally sensitive assessments relating to cultural desire, cultural awareness, cultural knowledge, cultural skill and cultural encounters (Campinha-Bacote, 2002).

Cultural awareness is the self-examination and in-depth exploration of one’s own cultural background (Campinha-Bacote, 1998). This process involves the recognition of one’s biases, prejudices, and assumptions about individuals who are different. Without being aware of the influence of one’s own cultural values, there is risk that the healthcare providers may engage in cultural imposition; the tendency to impose ones beliefs, values and patterns of behavior upon another culture (Leininger, 1978; Treloar, 1999). Cultural knowledge is the ‘seeking and obtaining a sound educational foundation about diverse cultural and ethnic groups’ (Campinha-Bacote, 2002: 182). Obtaining cultural knowledge about the patient’s health-related beliefs and values involves understanding their world-view. The patients’ world-views will explain how they interpret their illness and how it guides their thinking, doing, and being (Campinha-Bacote, 2002). Health
care professionals’ lack of cultural awareness may lead to cultural imposition (Campinha-Bacote 2002). In other words, a practitioner must develop the desire to understand cultural dynamics of the people in order to be effective in the management of disease and illness. Cultural desire is defined as the motivation of the healthcare providers to ‘want to’ engage in the process of becoming culturally aware, culturally knowledgeable, culturally skillful, and seeking cultural encounters (Campinha-Bacote, 1998). In applying the cultural desire in healthcare provisions and delivery in SSA countries, healthcare providers should be motivated by the government through health care policies and programmes in such a way that they would be encouraged to engage in the process of becoming culturally aware and knowledgeable. In other words, they would be having the desire to learn various or divergent cultures of their locality or operating environment. For instance, healthcare providers in National Hospital, Abuja as well as healthcare providers in other places should have the desire to learn about people and their cultures. More precisely, they should demonstrate determinations to learn and understand the subjective interpretations and conceptions of illnesses as well as their cultural treatments as conceived by their patients.

Conclusions
This paper has examined the connections among cultural diversity, disease, illness and the implications of same on workability of health initiatives in SSA. The paper shows that health and illness dynamics in SSA are culturally embedded, and since there is diversity in cultural components among various groups that made up the region, the cultural conceptions, constructions and interpretations of health and illness are diverse and divergent across the region. The paper observed that SSA is bedeviled with many health challenges and in a bid to control and manage the incidence of diseases and illness in the region, several efforts have been made in this regard. However despite the enormous time and resources dedicated to these initiatives, little has been achieved in the region in terms of disease control and incidence of ill health among the teeming population of the people in SSA. The position of this chapter is that the palpable failures of health declarations and programmes could be linked to non-consideration of socio-cultural elements and less regard of cultural diversity of the people in their formulations and implementations.

Consequent upon the above, the paper suggested that there is the need for the awareness of the patients’ health beliefs by healthcare practitioners. This will enable the policy-makers and the healthcare providers to domesticate, situate and contextualise their practice within communities. In order to achieve this, traditional healthcare providers should also be formally incorporated and included in some relevant areas of health care provision because they are the custodian of traditional medical knowledge which form an important part of culture and tradition. This is theoretically buttressed by the positions of the cultural care and cultural competence models discussed in the paper.

Reference


Comparing Multi-Ethnic Countries in Providing Territorial Autonomy to Ethnic Groups

Mogau Petrus Sekgala¹ and Tshehledi Isaac Mokgopo²

Abstract: Territorial autonomy means the country’s ability to respond to challenges faced by different ethnic groups in a diverse ethnic population: to accommodate different ethnic groups without the marginalisation or suppression of other ethnic minorities. Territorial autonomy advocates for the process of using ethnicity in determining internal boundaries in ethnic diverse countries. The process which was followed by some African countries including Ethiopia. This paper finds that territorial autonomy to ethnic groups is a solution for many countries in curtailing ethnic boundary violence and it can also assist in addressing ethnic divisions in the country. Simultaneously, all ethnic groups will have a place of belonging within the country if ethnic consideration in determining boundaries or territories is considered, thereby ensuring equal participation by ethnic minorities in the affairs of the country. This paper seeks to compare territorial autonomy of few selected countries in Africa and outside Africa.

Key Words: Territorial autonomy; Ethnic diversity; Ethnic minorities; Ethiopia; Nigeria; Regional autonomy; Federalism; Constitution; Demarcation; Sub-national.

Introduction

Autonomy provides for the possibility of sharing both executive and legislative powers between the central government and national minorities; with the main aim of preserving state integrity and its sovereign territory while ensuring clear self-government or boundary determination for ethnic minority group in a specific region or province. According to Ghai (2000) autonomy can be defined as a device to allow ethnic or other groups the right to claim a distinct identity to exercise direct control over affairs of special concern to them while allowing larger entity to exercise those powers that cover common interests.

On the other hand territorial autonomy can be defined as:

an arrangement that is aimed at granting a group that differs from the majority of the population in the state, but that constitute a majority or a significant part of a specific region, a means by which it can express its distinct identity (Benedikter, 2006).

¹ LLB (UL); LLM (UWC). Email: mpsekgala@gmail.com
² Advocate of the High Court of South Africa: LLB (UL); LLM (UWC); LLM (UL). Email: mokgopoisaac@gmail.com
This means that territorial autonomy should be understood as a special status that is awarded to a territorial unit which enables citizens or residents of that particular territorial unit to regulate their own affairs through autonomous government, legislation, judiciary and administration. For the purpose of this paper territorial autonomy in as far as ethnic diversity in a country is concerned should be considered as an efficient mechanism of preventing ethnic conflicts or providing conflict resolution through which ethnic minorities are accommodated and their fundamental needs are meet within the boundaries of the existing state, region or province.

Territorial autonomy not only can potentially cater for most of the needs and interests of national minorities, but its decisive advantage is that it does not clash with the interest of the states to preserve full integrity of their territory. Moreover, autonomy must often tackle a double problem faced by the country: to grant the protection of the national minority in its traditional homeland, but also to include self-governance to all the groups living in that area. This means that regional autonomy should benefit a whole regional community, not just one sector of the regional population.

This paper will firstly, examines the two basic approaches relating to geographical arrangement of multi-ethnic federations, which are territorial or administrative federalism and multi-national federalism or the ethnic model of federalism. Secondly, it will examines the general factors to be considered when the boundaries of sub-national units are demarcated or delineated. The paper will also discuss in-depth the approach followed by two African countries: namely Nigeria and Ethiopia.

In summary Nigeria is the Africa's most populous country, with about 120 million people and 250 linguistic groups. Although most of the ethnic groups are very small, three ethnic groups constitute somewhere between 60 and 70 percent of the population. The Hausa-Fulani ethnic groups count for 30 percent of the population, the Yorubas about 20 per cent and the Igbos about 18 percent(Benedikter, 2006). Consequently, this paper examines how and why states were created in multi-ethnic federation of Nigeria and the present constitutional principles.

Ethiopia, on the other hand, has 83 different languages with up to 200 different dialects spoken. The largest ethnic and linguistic groups are the Oromos, Amharas and Tigrayans. The Oromo group represents approximately 40% of the population and is concentrated primarily in the southern half of the nation (Worldmark Encyclopedia of Nations, 2007). The Amhara and Tigrean groups constitute approximately 32% of the population and have traditionally been dominant politically (Worldmark, 2007). The paper examines how the territorial states came into existence and the relevant articles in the Ethiopian Constitution.
The Concept of Federalism

In short federalism is a system upon which democratic rules and institutions in which power to govern is shared between national (central) and provincial/state governments. It is also viewed as one of the best system used in an international negotiation for integrating ethnic groups, diverse nations or combatant parties. However, there is also among countries fear that through federalism an increased regional autonomy is likely to lead to what is called secession or dissolution of the nation. What follows this discussion will be the discussion of two types of federalism being territorial and administrative federalism.

Territorial or Administrative Federalism

Territorial federalism recommends the drawing of boundary lines as per geographical or administrative convenience (Fessha, 2011). Its primary intent is to use the delineation of subunit boundaries to crack a territorially concentrated ethnic group inorder to ensure that the group does not form a minority in any subunit (Anderson, 2012). The softer form of this involves using boundary lines to maximize ethnicheterogeneity of federal subunits (Anderson, 2012:6).

In territorial federalism, federal units do not match in any way with different ethn-cultural groups who desire to retain their self-government and cultural distinctiveness (kymlicka, 2012). The formation of a territorial federalism can be encouraged by the ambition to offer better protection against external threats or by the ambition to facilitate access to the administration in very large areas or by the aspiration to protect democracy (Van der Beken, 2012).

In the United States, for example, an intentional decision was made not to use federalism to accommodate the self-government rights of national minorities (Kymilicka, 2000: 210). Alternatively, it was decided that no territory would be accepted as a state unless national minorities were outnumbered within that state (Kymilicka, 2000: 210).

The most prominent case in United States was the expansion of southwestward from its original heterogeneous 13 colonies and it was decided that no territory would receive statehood unless minorities were outnumbered by White Anglo-Saxon Protestants (O’Leary and McGrarry, 2012). Another technique employed was to gerrymander state boundaries to ensure that Indians or Hispanics were outnumbered, as in Florida (O’Leary and McGrarry, 2012:28). Lastly, another method used was that the statehood, as in Hawaii and the southwest, was delayed until the region’s long-standing residents could be swamped with enough White Anglo-Saxon Protestants (O’Leary and McGrarry, 2012:28).

American federalism, as one of the territorial or administrative federalisms, is a way of dividing powers on a territorial basis within a single national community, whose members are dominant within each of the subunits (Kymilicka, 2000:211). This federation resulted from the coming together of its units, which
previously existed independently (Adegehe, 2009). Its main purpose was to unite people living in different political units, who nevertheless shared a common language and culture (Adegehe, 2009: 28).

From the above, it is best to point out that the fact that territorial federalism rejects the awarding of territorial autonomy to ethnic groups is a disadvantage. According to Fessha (2011:28), territorial federalism denies geographically concentrated ethnic groups with territorial spaces which are essential to promote their identities. Furthermore, he argues that it makes cultural groups continuously vulnerable to the dominant position of the majority group or, as the case may be, to the historically dominant group (Fessha, 2011:28).

**Multi-National Federalism or the Ethnic Model of Federalism**

Fessha (2011:28) writes that multi-national federalism takes ethnicity as the pillar for the organization of the state and draws the internal boundary of a state along ethnic lines. As such ethnic federalism presents itself as an ideal mechanism to reconcile the potentially conflicting objectives of accommodating ethnic diversity and guaranteeing state stability. According to Van der Beken (2012:44) in ethnic federation, ethnic groups have a right to self-rule in their own territory. This provides ethnic groups with the possibility to autonomously deal with issues that affect the specific interests of the group (such as language, education and culture) and thus to develop policies adapted or to cater their needs.

For example, in India the reorganization of the state boundaries was based on ethnic language in the 1950s. All regional languages were to have their own state, except for Hindi speaking states of which more than one was created. Later reorganizations were more controversial and arguably less successful, although the territories, mostly in the North East, which were being reorganized, were far more heterogeneous (Adeney, 2000). However, the states are, in many regards, a microcosm of the Indian society and in several instances the states have greater diversity of minorities and population numbers than entire federations in other parts of the world (Adeney, 2000:13).

Another notable example is Belgium, when three regions which coexisted with the three linguistic areas fixed in 1963. The ‘Flemish community’ consists of the Dutch-speaking Region and the Dutch-speakers in the bilingual Region of Brussels, while the ‘French community’ consists of the Francophone (Walloon) Region (not the German speakers) and the Francophone of Brussels (Deschouwer, 2014). As for the German community, it is located in the Francophone area, but it is granted language facilities (Deschouwer, 2014:17).

It is worthwhile to note that Belgium’s linguistic groups have traditionally been highly concentrated geographically, a factor that greatly facilitated their separation into federal subunits. It has been argued, correctly in our view that without this arrangement Belgium would have not existed as a federal state today had such an arrangement not been made (Fessha, 2009).
Some scholars positively claim that ethnic federalism reduces ethnic groups’ disparity and secession of certain regions, while enabling self-rule to ethnic groups and therefore leads to ethnic harmony (Jessner, 2012). Critics on the other hand argue that rather than being a panacea for ethnically and nationally diverse states, the dismemberment of a centralized state into a so-called multi-ethnic federalism would contribute not only to centrifugal, destabilizing effects but would also create a safe haven for guerrilla activities, eventually contributing to the formation of endless unstable states (Aayehgn, 2014).

Factors to be Considered when Demarcating Sub-National units’ Boundaries

This paper provides that when drawing the territorial boundaries of sub-national units, it is paramount to balance diverse and often contradictory needs in order to achieve the balance in a way that is broadly agreeable to all major political actors. However, this can be one of the most difficult aspects of the constitution building process, as such it requires political will. According to Anderson and George (2014), the following factors may be taken into account when drawing sub-national units, depending on the circumstances of each country: First, economic factors such as efficiency, effectiveness, viability (an argument for avoiding many small or economically poor units) and grouping economic regions may be considered; Secondly, the socio-cultural factors, for example, nationality, ethnicity, language, religion, tribe and clan; Thirdly, political balance which may mean breaking up one or more dominant regions, or a region that may have separatist tendencies, or avoiding a structure with just two or three units (that are often characterized by divisive politics); Fourthly, geographic features like natural boundaries such as rivers and mountains. The fifthly factor will be public opinions which may be assessed through elections, referendums or public consultations; Lastly, what may be considered is historical boundaries which people often identify and which can serve as a useful reference point and remove the need for detailed consideration of other factors in drawing boundaries (Anderson, 2014).

Nigerian Case Study

The contemporary Nigerian geographical boundaries were established in 1914 by combining the two British colonies of Northern and Southern Nigeria (Suberu, 2006). The objective of amalgamation was to ensure financial viability of the relatively British colonial project through economic unification of the relatively poor but larger northern colony with its more prosperous southern colony (Suberu, 2006:68). However, the amalgamation of two colonies experienced the rising of ethnic and regional antagonisms. In response, the British political rulers and the country’s regional leaders negotiated a compromise 1954 (Ejohbowah, 2008). The compromise was the creation of three regions, namely the Northern, Eastern and Western regions. The three regions were designed to grant political autonomy and security to the Muslim Hausa-Fulani of
the Northern region, the religious bicomunal Yoruba of the Western region and the predominantly Christian Igbo of the Eastern region (Suberu, 2001).

According to Ojo (2001) in a pre-independence conference held at Ibadan to consider the division of power of different levels of government and whether more regions should be created based on ethno-linguistic lines, however, each region took a different position. The Northern region proposed for a federal structure with a weak centre in which the federal authority would emanate from the constituent units and asserted that the existing boundaries should be left unchanged. The Western region desired a federal structure in which boundaries were to be altered along ethnic-linguistic lines. The Western region proposed for a unitary formula that would have downgraded the existing regional authorities to a local government status (Ojo, 2001:29).

At independence in 1960, the Nigerian federalism experienced big problems. First, there was an imbalance in its federal structure in which the Northern region was larger than the East and West combined. Secondly, the minority ethnic groups demanded the creation of more states on the basis of perceived fears of political domination by majority groups. Thirdly, the drawing of federal boundaries along Hausa-Fulani, Yoruba and Igbo ethnic fault lines led to hegemonic ethnocentrism and secessionism on the part of the big three ethnic groups (Suberu, 2006:70). The above problems led to the beginning of the crumble of the First Republic. When the Western region experienced the political crisis which led to an establishment of a new party by a splinter group, the federal government quickly exploited the situation by carving out the Mid-western region from Western region in 1963 and it represented the first creation of a state in post-independence Nigeria (Ojo, 2001:33).

The military government, in 1967, announced the disestablishment of four regions into twelve states, six in the Northern region and three in the Eastern region and two in the Western region and the Mid-western region was left intact (Ojo, 2001:34; Suberu, 2006:70). The reason for disestablishment of four regions was to stop succession of the Igbo-dominated Eastern region as a Republic of Biafra. The creation of twelve state federation had weakened the hegemony of the Northern region, reduced the chauvinism and secessionism of the three major groups, diminished ethnic minority insecurity and re-established the authority of the federal government against centrifugal ethnic and regional challenges (Suberu, 2006:70).

The twelve state federations did not settle the issue of state creation in Nigeria. In 1970 there were renewed agitations across Nigeria as more Nigerians demanded for state creation of their own out of the existing ones (Oluwatobi, 2013). The agitation for new state became a political issue and the newly emergent politicians used the issue to canvass for votes and political support in the bid to gain political power (Oluwantobi, 2013:164). In 1976 the Murtala Mohammed administration announced the creation of seven more states which led to nineteen state federation. In announcing the states, Murtala Muhammed emphasized three basic considerations that informed his decision, the need to ensure even development within a federal structure of government; the need to bring government nearer to the people; and the need
to make the creation of new states as one time operation that would minimize future agitation for new states (Oluwantobi, 2013:164).

The addition of seven states did not stop the demand for state creation. Therefore, in 1987 Ibrahim Babangida administration announced the addition two states making it twenty one states in Nigeria (Ojo, 2001:34). However, in 1991, Babangida announced the creation of additional nine states to make the total number of the states in federation thirty. While the 1987 reorganizations genuinely appeared to be in national interest, as claimed by Babangida, the 1991 reform underscored both the continuing popular pressure for new states and Babaginda’s desired to exploit these demands to promote his personal rulership project (Oluwantobi, 2013:166).

In 1993 Nigeria was experiencing political crisis as a result of annulment 1993 general election. As a way of resolving the problem of the country, the regime set up the National Constitutional Conference. State creation was one of the issues that dominated the debate of National Constitutional Conference set up by the Abacha’s government. Finally, Abacha announced the creation of new six states to make Nigeria a federation of thirty six states.

**Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999**

The preamble of the Constitution provides that the people of Federal Republic of Nigeria have resolved to live in unity and harmony as one indivisible and indissoluble sovereign nation. In reiterating and emphasizing that, article 2 (1) stipulates that Nigeria is one indivisible and indissoluble sovereign state to be known by the name of the Federal Republic of Nigeria.

By indivisible means that Nigeria cannot be divided, in other words these provisions prohibit secession. The states of the federation of Nigeria are allowed to secede from the Federal Republic of Nigeria. As much as secession is prohibited, most importantly, article 10 provides that the Government of the Federation or of a State shall not adopt any religion as State Religion.

Article 2(1) declared Nigeria to be a Federation consisting of States and a Federal Capital Territory. As a Federation, it therefore consists of 36 states which are: Abia, Adamawa, Akwalbom, Anambra, Bauchi, Bayelsa, Benue, Borno, Cross River, Delta, Ebonyi, Edo, Ekiti, Enugu, Gombe, Imo, Jigawa, Kaduna, Kano, Katsina, Kebbi, Kogi, Kwara, Lagos, Nasarawa, Niger, Ogun, Ondo, Osun, Oyo, Plateau, Rivers, Sokoto, Taraba, Yobe and Zamfara.

Article 14 (3) of the Constitution prescribes that the composition of the Government of the Federation or any of its agencies and the conduct of its affairs shall be carried out in such a manner as to reflect the federal character of Nigeria and the need to promote national unity, and also to command national loyalty, thereby ensuring that there shall be no predominance of persons from a few State or from a few ethnic or
other sectional groups in that Government or in any of its agencies. Moreover, article 14 (4) stipulates that the composition of the Government of a State, a local government council, or any of the agencies of such Government or council, and the conduct of the affairs of the Government or council or such agencies shall be carried out in such manner as to recognise the diversity of the people within its area of authority and the need to promote a sense of belonging and loyalty among all the people of the Federation. This article prohibits the government which is made up of the people from one ethnic group or subnational unit. This accommodative character has ensured minority appointments in the national offices, subnational units and local government.

Assessment

It is clear that following a geographical criterion in drawing a country’s boundaries will dependent on whether the country is a multi-ethnic country or not. In a multi-ethnic Nigeria, drawing subnational units based on the geographical criterion caused problems. This was seen from the amalgamation of two regions which experienced the rising of ethnicity and regional antagonisms. In trying to solve this situation, three regions were created along three big ethnic groups, which were Hausa-Fulani, Yoruba and Igbo. However, the creation of three regions along three ethnic groups led to hegemonic ethnocentrism and secessionism on the part of the three ethnic groups.

This was a call to create more states to accommodate minorities and the fear was, inter alia, that once the process of creating states along ethnic lines started, it would be difficult to stop it. This is because of the heterogeneity of Nigeria, every creation of new states create new majorities and majorities. Despite a Nigeria being a federation of 36 states, the demand for state creation has not yet being fulfilled. The reality is that each ethno-cultural unit feels itself marginalized when enclosed with another ethnic group that is more dominant (Nwankwo, 2003).

One of the remarkable contributions of this Constitution is to accommodate both majority and minority groups in several states and local governments, thus making possible for groups that would otherwise be locked out of national power to have their own internal governments. Moreover, the multiplication of states has made it possible for groups to be accommodated fairly and thus creating a sense of reasonableness or legitimacy. The existence of several states which are nearly equal in size has reduced the political capacity to threaten secession.

Another indispensable contribution is that it has put some conflicts within a local area, thus preventing them from inundating the entire country. Formal territorial dispersal of powers has produced, at local level, a complete set of legislative, executive and judicial institutions that serve as focal points of political contestation, thereby providing a buffer for centre.
The Case of Ethiopia

The statehood of Ethiopia went back to 3000 years where the traditional governance systems were hereditary basis on monarchical state consisting of many autonomous provinces characterized by an empire federation (Baraki, 2016). A king of kings or an emperor was at the centre and the provinces used to be governed by kings or chiefs (Baraki, 2016:1). However, the present Ethiopia, in both its territorial context and ethno-linguistic architecture, only became defined at the end of the 19th century and the turn of 20th century (Praeg, 2006). Ethiopian emperors tried their best to integrate and unify the different regions by means of territorial expansion (Praeg, 2006:63).

The expansion of Menelik brought together different ethnic groups that had their own identity, culture, and language. With the creation of a modern empire, there is the domination of Amharic culture over the newly incorporated ethnic groups. According to Clapham, the expansion was accompanied by an assumption of Amhara supremacy and a policy of Amharisation. The Tigray, Oromo and Somali described the central rule as an 'Amhara rule', and this gave an advantage for the movements to mobilise significant supporters and fighters in ethnic lines (Balcha, 2008).

Emperor Haile Sellassie (1916-30 as regent and 1930-74 as emperor) subsequently centralized all power. The 1931 Constitution and the 1955 revised Constitution were important instruments to reduce the power of regional lords and consolidate his personal rule. For the sake of Ethiopian Unity, there was an attempt to suppress all non-Amhara identities. Political domination was aggravated by cultural domination and economic exploitation. To be within the state structure, all non–Amhara people were expected to speak Amharic and adopt the culture and religion of the ruling class.

This discriminatory policy resulted in an uneven representation of various ethnic groups in central government. The condition for southern Ethiopians was worse. Therefore, the formation of the modern Ethiopian empire is characterized by political exclusion, economic exploitation, and cultural domination. Because of the suppression of various ethnic groups, Ethiopia was called the prison house of nations and nationalities.

The military junta or Derg that seized power in 1974 ignored the principle of self-determination, and the various political movements continued their armed struggle until 1991. In 1991, a new government led by the EPRDF (Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary Democratic Front) replaced the Derg. In order to address the national questions of Ethiopia, a democratic federal system was set up in 1995. The attempt was to accommodate ethnic diversity within a new federal Ethiopia based on the principle of political, economic, and social equality. As it was seen, the view of the EPRDF government could be considered as a compromise between a unitary government, which cannot easily accommodate diversity, and disintegration of the country into its constituent ethnic regions.
In 1991 the Boundary Commission was established and it was composed of 10 members, and represented six political groups in addition to EPRDF: three from EPRDF, two from OLF, one Gurage, one Hadiya, one Harari, one Somali, and one Afar (Vaughan, 2003). The Commission drew only the outlines of the regions, and left it to the regional governments to sort out their own internal boundaries (Vaughan, 2003:33). Whilst the states are constitutionally ‘delimited on the basis of settlement patterns, identity, language and consent of the people concerned’, it was current language use which became the single effective criterion applied by the commission, considered a more visible and conclusive marker than, for instance, history (Vaughan, 2003:34).

**The Constitution of Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 1995**

The Constitution declares, in its preamble, that the Nations, Nationalities and Peoples of Ethiopia are committed, in full and free exercise of their right to self-determination. It went further to stipulate that every Nation, Nationality and People in Ethiopia has an unconditional right to self-determination, including the right to secession (Article 39(1) of the Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia). According to the Constitution, a Nation, Nationality or People is a group of people who have or share large measure of a common culture or similar customs, mutual intelligibility of language, belief in a common or related identities, a common psychological make-up, and who inhabit an identifiable, predominantly contiguous territory (Article 39(5) of the Constitution).

The Federal Ethiopia comprises of states which shall be demarcated on the basis of the settlement patterns, language, identity and consent of the peoples concerned. These states are the State of Tigray, the State of Afar, the State of Amhara, the State of Oromia, the State of Somalia, the State of Benshangul/Gumuz, the State of the Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples, the State of the Gambela Peoples and the State of the Harari People. These nine regional states were created on the basis of predominant ethnic group, except the Southern regional state formed by 46 ethnic groups, and except two federal territories, Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa (Article 47 (1) of the Constitution).

The Nations, Nationalities and People within the States have the right to establish, at any time, their own States. However, the following procedures, as stipulated in the Constitution, must be adhered to:

(a) The demand for statehood must be approved by a two-thirds majority of the members of the Council of the Nation, Nationality or People concerned, and the demand is presented in writing to the State Council; When the Council that received the demand has organized a referendum within one year to be held in the Nation, Nationality or People that made the demand;

(b) The demand for statehood is supported by a majority vote in the referendum;
(c) The State Council has transferred its powers to the Nation, Nationality or People that made the demand, and

(d) When the new State created by the referendum without any need for application, directly becomes a member of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (Article 47(3) of the Constitution).

In order for a self-determination or secession to come into effect, the following conditions, as prescribed in the Constitution, must be fulfilled:

(a) The approval of secession by a two-third majority of the members of Legislative Council of the Nation, Nationality or People concerned;

(b) A Federal Government has organized a referendum which must take place within three years from the time it received the concerned council’s decision for secession;

(c) A demand for secession is supported by majority vote in the referendum;

(d) A Federal Government has transferred its powers to the council of the Nation, Nationality or People who has voted to secede; and

(e) When the division of assets is effected in a manner prescribed by law (Article 39(4) of the Constitution).

Assessment

It is possible for the regional states to increase since the Constitution allows the different nationality groups within the existing regional states to establish its own state as long as the procedure for that purpose is adhered to and to large extent the Constitution provides for secession provided that the procedure has been met. However, it has been argued, correctly in my view, that the implementation of all these principles is a cumbersome issue in a land of more than 80 ethnic groups, in which all ethnic groups may fulfill the defining criteria to be identified as Nation, nationality or Peoples (Chekole, 2012). It was argued further that the minority governance in this context requires a right-based bottom up approach and a participatory democratization process, in which the needs of each ethnic group is accommodated depending on the practical context on the ground (Chekole, 2012:7).

In Nigeria, there were critics on the proliferation of the subnational units since they are economically unviable. Another critic was that the multiplication of the states undermines the federal principle because of the problem of representing all the states in national institutions. However, the indispensable fact is that
the proliferation of the states has made it possible for groups to be accommodated fairly and thus creating a sense of reasonableness and legitimacy. In Ethiopia, the federal response has facilitated the recognition of ethnic diversity and responded to ethnic claims, thus elevated ethnic identity to a primary political identity (Fessha, 2012). According to Fessha (2012:277), this can be seen from the proliferation of ethnic-based parties or movements. According to the National Electoral Board, in 2015, 75 political parties were registered; 23 of them are national parties while the rest are regional, whereas in Nigeria, there were 28 registered political parties in 2015.

Both Nigeria and Ethiopia are prohibiting religion to play a part in the regional states. The Nigerian Constitution provides that the Government of the Federation or of a State shall not adopt any religion as State Religion (Article 10 of the Nigerian Constitution). And just like its Nigerian counterpart, the Ethiopian Constitution stipulates that there shall be no state religion and the state shall not interfere in religious matters and religion shall not interfere in state affairs (Article 10 of the Nigerian Constitution).

Ethiopian ethnic federalism has effectively undercut the drive for secession by ethno nationalist organizations by largely denying them manifest ethnic oppression as a rallying cause (Habtu, 2003). Therefore, its proclamation of ethnic and regional autonomy, ethnic federalism has managed to maintain the integrity of the Ethiopian state. The proclamation of ethnic autonomy has diminished grievances based on diminished languages and cultures (Habtu, 2003:27). On the other hand, the Nigerian federal model has explicitly sought to contain potential secessionist impulses from the country's major ethnic groups through the subdivision of each ethnic of the large ethnic communities into separate sub-ethnic states (Suberu, 2006:86).

Furthermore, the Nigerian Constitution is silent on the secession, in fact it provides that Nigeria is indivisible and therefore closing a door for secession. However, its counterpart in Ethiopia does have a clause for self-determination or secession provided that the requirements for such are met.

Conclusion

In a multi-ethnic country, like Nigeria and Ethiopia, it is difficult, if not impossible, to accommodate all ethnic groups by granting a mother state to each of them. Empirical evidence shows that an attempt to adopt a territorial federalism is not workable in a multi-ethnic country. However, in Nigeria and Ethiopia, the emergence of ethnic consciousness and ethnic mobilization are not based on the fact that those countries are ethnically diverse but because of social, political and economic reasons.

Creation of states in Nigeria, unlike in Ethiopia, has never intended to create ethnic or national states. The architects of Nigerian Federalism have sought to use the internal boundaries of the federation to fragment the identities of the country's largest ethnic groups and create constituent units of roughly equivalent
population (Suberu, 2006:86). Despite the fact that the drawing of the boundaries of sub-national units in Nigeria followed geographical approach, however the boundaries followed ethnic and sub-ethnic group territories very closely. In Ethiopia, the demarcation of sub-national units followed rigorous ethnic basis where each ethnic group has been given statehood. Lastly, the authors agree with Fessha that the institutionalization of ethnicity not only encourages the political mobilization of ethnicity, but also elevates ethnic identity to a primary political identity. However, we have seen from Nigeria that even if ethnicity has not been institutionalized, it may still enter in the political arena.

Reference


Suberu RT Nigeria Dilemmas of Federalism in Ugo M & Bermeo NG (eds.) *Federalism and Territorial Cleavages*.


The use of Ethnicity in Ethiopia in Determining Internal Boundaries

Tshehledi Isaac Mokgopo

Abstract: Since the year 2008 the South African government experienced community protest with allegations of municipal service delivery dissatisfaction by members of the community. This was followed by 2014-2016 community protest in Malamulele and Vuwani communities in the Limpopo province. Both these communities wanted their own separate municipality away from other ethnic communities. Based on that this study seeks to depict the process used in Ethiopia where ethnicity was solely used in determining internal boundaries. Conclusion will be drawn from the findings as to whether same approach can be followed in South Africa or not.

Key words: Ethnicity; Internal Boundaries; Local Government; Ethiopia; Malamulele and Vuwani; Limpopo Province; Ethic conflict; Power sharing; South Africa.

Introduction

Ethiopia was never colonised by a European power but was occupied for a few years by Italy in 1936-41. It has been governed by several sovereign rulers (emperors) until the overthrow of Emperor Haile Selassie in 1974 which was followed by the dictatorship of MengistuHailemariam, the leader of the communist military junta, called the Derg (Frank, 2009). The first efforts to unify the state were made in the middle of the 19th century when the authoritarian regimes applied politics of nation-building in Ethiopia (Lukas, 2017). As a result, Ethiopia underwent a dramatic system-change after the military regime that had ruled the country between 1974 and 1991 was defeated.

In 1991, an ethno-nationalist group, led by the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) and the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) with other ethnic-based movements, ousted the Derg regime and introduced a federal political system. The defeat of the Derg military-regime was thus achieved through a coalition of ethnic-based armed groups. This saw the principle of ethnic self-determination and a democratic order becoming a precondition for the maintenance of a polity within Ethiopia's boundaries, thus

1 Department of Mercantile & Labour Law, University of Limpopo and Advocate of the High Court of South Africa: LLB (UL); LLM (UWC); LLM (UL). Email: mokgopoisaac@gmail.com
making space for diversity. After the military defeat of the Derg-regime a complete shift in paradigm was undertaken. Instead of seeking unity through assimilation, unity was going to be achieved through the accommodation of diversities of all kinds as well as the granting of equal rights and status to all of the groups in the country (Ethiopia) (Zimmermann-Steinhart & Bekele, 2012). Zimmermann-Steinhart and Bekele (2012;90) point out that between 1991 and 1995 the country was ruled on the basis of the "Transitional Charter" which provided for decentralised government and upheld the self-determination principle and.

The Ethiopian federal arrangement is perceived to be unique in Africa because it is explicitly built on ethnicity (Baraki, 2016). This is due to the fact that Ethiopia hosts more than 80 different ethnic groups, most of them with their own unique culture, custom, belief and peculiar ways of doing things (Belay, 2016).

This led to the adoption of the Federal Constitution of Ethiopia which established the nine regional states. None of the regional states in Ethiopia are ethnically pure, and only five regions are named after its numerically dominant ethnic group: Tigray, Afar, Amhara, Oromia and Somali. However, by using local government structures further ethnic groups have been accommodated. This strategy has its own challenges as different ethnic groups are fighting over limited resources - the exclusion of ethnic minorities in employment - as well as boundary tensions and constant conflicts amongst ethnic groups at regional and local government level (Zemelak, 2011). This paper will, therefore, discuss the historical transition and the creation of regions in Ethiopia. Pursuant to that, it will also discuss the legal framework and establishment of local government in Ethiopia as well as the challenges faced at both the regional level and local government.

**Historical transition of Ethiopia**

Tigray People’s Liberation Front being the core rebel group fought an ethno-regional liberation war from 1975-1991 and ended the long civil war in Ethiopia. The TPLF then promised a solution to the national question of inequalities in cultural prestige, power and resources between the various ethno-linguistic groups as well as the diffusion of ethnic and regional tensions. In 1990 the TPLF, broadened into the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front which was a coalition of parallel parties to represent other parts of Ethiopia. It later enlarged its programme nationwide with the ambition of creating a renewed, ‘revolutionary-democratic’ state, with more rights to be accorded to neglected minorities and language groups. The main aim was to establish a decentralised and ethno-linguistically based federation instead of an enforced unitary state in Ethiopia (Abbink, 2006).

The adoption of a provisional Charter in July 1991 in Ethiopia gave birth to the Transitional Government of Ethiopia also known as the (TGE) (Engedayehu, 1993). The Charter granted Ethiopia’s numerous nationalities the right to self-determination which also included the right to secession. The Charter was
purposed to serve until a permanent constitution was drafted and popularly approved (Engedayehu, 1993:30-32).

In 1995 the Ethiopian Federal Constitution was adopted and gave effective to the protection of all ethnic minority groups in Ethiopia. The constitution provided for the right to self-determination of all ethnic groups and the creation of ethnic regions in Ethiopia to accommodate the large ethnic groups in the country. Ethnicity was thus central to the creation of ethnic-based subnational governments which could provide education, etc. This saw the minority groups using their languages for education purposes (Abbink, 2006:395).

The creation of regions in Ethiopia

One of the most significant features of the Federal Constitution of Ethiopia in as far as the creation of regions is concerned, the Federal Constitution makes ethnicity the sole criteria for organising regional states in Ethiopia, while making the dominant ethnic groups the owners of sovereign powers in the areas under their jurisdiction. According to the Ethiopian Human Rights Council, this arrangement prevent non-native ethnic groups from any share in the political life of the regions and has de facto and de jure created native ethnic sovereigns in each region without recognising the existence and right of ethnic minorities. In other words, the regional states have been instruments for the exercise of a sovereign right to self-government of native majority ethnic groups to the exclusion of other ethnic minorities living in those regions (Ethiopian Human Rights Council Parallel Report, 2009). By so doing, the Constitution has therefore created a new system of domination of minority ethnic groups by native including dominant ethnic communities in Ethiopia. The Constitution has made minorities out of non-indigenous (non-native) communities that long inhabited the regions as their homeland (Ethiopian Human Rights Council Parallel Report, 2009:10).

The EPRDF government used the nationalities map of the Study of Ethiopian Nationalities of 1983 to delineate preliminary boundaries between the ethnolinguistic areas in Ethiopia. In 1995, the constitution then provided for the establishment of nine regional states or regions, namely: Tigray, Afar, Oromia, Somali, Amhara, Harar, Benishangul-Gumuz, Gambella, and the State of the Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples (Southern Region of SNNPR) (Art 47 FDRE Constitution, 1995).

The regions that were created in Ethiopia are ethnic-based regions, however, the only differences is that some have a dominant ethnic community whose name they bear while others are multi-ethnic with no numerically dominant ethnic community. It is worth noting that because Ethiopia is a home to 80 ethnic groups not every ethnic group can get a state. This resulted in regional states that are ethnically heterogeneous. For example, in regional states such as South Regional, Benshangul-Gumz and Gambela

---

1Nationalities map of the Study of Ethiopian Nationalities of 1983 was a political research bureau which did the research work under the Derg regime (which was the first government to officially recognise the Ethiopian nationalities).
states, where multi-ethnic groups exist but no ethnic group is dominant, a mix of factors such as political, economic, settlement pattern, similarity of culture and language have been taken into consideration to an extent that ethnic minorities are also protected both at regional and local government level (Baraki, 2016:5).

Ayele and Fessha (2012) write that with the constitution allowing for the establishment of an ethnically defined territorial unit in which members of an ethnic group can govern their own affairs, the intention is to give effect to the right of ethnic groups to a full measure of self-government. It is therefore based on this principle that some of these regional states are designated as belonging to a particular ethnic group.

It is worth noting that none of the regions in Ethiopia are ethnically homogenous. This is because some have minorities in regions with a dominant ethnic community while on the other hand; others have even minorities within minorities. This therefore created ethnic tensions between ethnic minorities and other dominant ethnic groups at regional level. There are many challenges and constant fights between different groups over limited resources at regional level. Some of these challenges that are experienced at regional level are somehow similar to those experienced at local government level. Some of the challenges experienced at both the regional and local government level will be discussed in details below.

Ethnic conflicts in Ethiopia

As a multi-ethnic state, Ethiopia has witnessed numerous incidents of ethnic conflicts and tensions both at the regional and local government level. Because of the history of the country, the current ethnic federal arrangement was in fact created to do away with suppression and the legacies of ethnic domination, while at the same time providing for a constitutional and legal framework for the resolution and mitigation of ethnic conflicts (Ethiopian Human Rights Council Parallel Report, 2009:20).

However, the creation of the ethnic federal system had its own limitations.

“Ethnic federalism brought new dimensions that often aggravated and complicated ethnic conflicts in the country. By making ethnic groups the building blocks of the country’s federal system, the new arrangement elevated the importance of ethnic identity as a key instrument to claim social, economic and political resources. Accordingly, ethnicity and ethnic identities have been used as flagships for mass mobilization in group conflicts. Some of these are often waged by the local elite to secure political power based on ethnic distinctiveness. As a result, those conflicts manifest themselves in the form of disputes over geo-political (regional, zonal or special woreda) boundaries” (Ethiopian Human Rights Council Parallel Report, 2009:20).

Although many Government reports indicate that incitement and ethnic violence are prohibited by law, in practice incidents of ethnic violence have been on the increase in Ethiopia in the last two years. A cursory look at the recent history of ethnic conflicts in Ethiopia indicates that such conflicts could be categorised into four types or more, depending on the cause each conflicts and the identity of the parties involved. These include resource-based conflicts, settler versus native conflicts, boundary disputes and clashes over
power-sharing. As resource-based conflicts are almost invariably presented as boundary disputes, they will not be discussed separately (Ethiopian Human Rights Council Parallel Report, 2009:21).

**Boundary-Related ethnic conflicts**

The establishment of other administrative units and regions in Ethiopia along ethnic lines required drawing boundaries between ethnic communities which in the past, had geographically been interspersed through diverse and long-standing patterns of settlement. As a result, the physical demarcation of geographical borders between the various ethnic groups in Ethiopia was difficult since there have been considerable population movements in many parts of the country. In redrawing the regional states, the concern of where the physical border between the national communities should be drawn has led to disputes and tensions in the country. Ethnic conflicts often resulted in civilians being attacked and robbed by virtue of their connection and membership to a certain ethnic group (Ethiopian Human Rights Council Parallel Report, 2009:21).

It is true that many of these ethnic minorities or communities had experienced a small scale resource-based conflicts in the past. However, the introduction of the ethnic federal system in country (Ethiopia) changed the dynamics of these conflicts and tensions by reinforcing their ethnic dimension. Furthermore, the fact that the disputed areas coincided with the boundaries of regional governments has transformed the conflict between local communities into conflicts between regional states (Open document:2017). Instances include the claim of ownership over Babile town (between the Oromiya and Somali regional states), the Borena and Gari conflict between the Somali and Oromia regional states, the conflict between the Gedeo in the SNNPR state and the Gujji Oromo in Oromia regional states and the conflict between the Oromia and BenishangulGumuz regional states, etc. (Ethiopian Human Rights Council Parallel Report, 2009:21).

According to the Ethiopian Human Rights Council (2009:22), the major hindrance to a lasting resolution of such conflicts in Ethiopia is the fact that the boundaries between these regions or ethno-national communities are not clearly demarcated. There has been no systematic effort by the Government to delineate the boundaries in a clear manner, often because the tension is very high in the disputed territories.

As a result, the absence of a specialized government authority to assume the responsibility of attending to disputes between members of different ethnic groups living in adjacent regions has continued to give rise to frequent conflicts and tension in different parts of the country, often resulting in the death and displacement of many citizens and destruction of public and private property (Ethiopian Human Rights Council Parallel Report, 2009:23).

Article 48(1) of the Constitution states that:
“all border disputes shall be settled by agreement of the concerned states. Where the states fail to reach agreement, the House of Federation shall decide such disputes on the basis of settlement patterns and the wishes of the people concerned” (Art 48(1) FARE Constitution, 1995).

However, in many cases the principles stipulated in the Constitution are not implemented and issues regarding border conflicts are also not adequately addressed. Most attempts to resolve boundary related conflicts have been made by ad-hoc inter-regional border committees coordinated by the Ministry of Federal Affairs (Ethiopian Human Rights Council Parallel Report, 2009:23).

The fact that members of these committees come from the ruling elite of the regions having claims over territories meant that they are biased and lack neutrality. This has complicated the matter further and the settlement of boundary disputes has been a long and inexpedient process due to failure of committee members to reach an agreement. For instance, attempts to resolve boundary disputes between the Afar and Somali, Oromia and Somali and Oromia and BenishangulGumuz regions have been dragging for years (Ethiopian Human Rights Council Parallel Report, 2009:23).

Despite its constitutional mandate to resolve these disputes, the House of Federation was not able to give a decision on these and similar cases due to serious human and technical capacity constraints. There is also a lack of clarity regarding the role of the House of Federation and the Ministry of Federal Affairs in this regard, leading to confusion as to which federal institution has the lead role in managing and resolving ethnic conflicts (Ethiopian Human Rights Council Parallel Report, 2009:23).

**Competition over limited resources**

Boundary disputes are linked to competition over limited resources by different ethnic groups (both at the regional and local government level). The reason for limited resources is population pressures at regional level between different ethnic groups, environmental degradation as well as climate change (Tenaw,2016). Improper agricultural practices and soil erosion have greatly damaged the land’s productivity. The food production rate is declining at an alarming rate as compared to an increasing population growth rate in the country.

The competition over scarce natural resources is influenced by struggle for political power at regional level. This saw the agro-pastoral areas being in a state of instability due to competition over scarce resources (Kifle, 2015).

The Somali and Oromo regions and the Ittu and Issa clans have become the areas that are hit by serious conflict over limited resources. It was after the introduction and implementation of ethnic-based boundaries in Ethiopia that the issue of administrative boundaries between Somali and Oromo regions in general and
Ittu and Issa clans in particular became a source of conflict (Tenaw. 2016:7). The major causes for conflict in these regions are cattle raiding, competition over declining resources and territorial expansionary moves.

Tenaw (2016:3) writes that in agro-pastoral and pastoral areas the stock of natural resources, particularly grazing lands as well as water points, is shrinking from time to time as a result of several factors, including environmental degradation, expansion of agriculture and human, the occurrence of prolonged drought, and animal population growth. Tenaw (2016:3) further highlights that there are no doubts that all these factors intensify resource scarcity and competition for water sources and pastures in the regional level among the pastoralists.

It is worth noting that for pastoralism to survive they require movement within and across regional boundaries in search of pasture and drinking water for their livestock. However, currently the situation has not been conducive for them to move across regional boundaries because of enmity among ethnic groups. Ever since 2000, three major conflicts have occurred between major rival pastoral groups, such as the Borena and Gari; the Merihan and Digidia, as well as between the Degidia and Borena in Oromia region. These conflicts therefore resulted in the death of hundreds of people (Tenaw, 2016:4).

In trying to resolve these resource competitions at regional level, territorial expansion became one of the main strategies for control over scarce resources. However, such boundary claims resulted in various violent conflict between the two clans in the Omali/Oromia area. Taha (2007) writes that:

"In 2004, Somali Region claims that 21 kebeles which are the small units of administration in a district should fall within its regional administrations. These events led to a referendum in November 2004, which allocated only one of the contested kebeles to Somali regional state and the remaining twenty to Oromia regional state. As a result, the Issa and other Somali clans were not satisfied about the result and they made indiscriminate violent attacks on Ittu clans".

Oba (1992) highlights that scarce resource competition and cattle raids between Ittu and Issa clan groups have resulted in conflicts ever since the 1960s. As a result the pastoralists are now facing more pressures and challenges than ever before because of: the loss of pasturelands to national parks, private farms, and ranches; increased commoditisation with concomitant inequality within the livestock economy; changes to other types of land use; out-migration of poor pastoralists as well as periodic dislocations brought about by drought, famine, and civil war.

BassI (1997) points out that the recent clan and inter-ethnic conflicts are related to national political processes because the absence of clearly demarcated zonal, regional, district and kebele level boundaries in eastern Ethiopia led to stiff competition and territorial expansive moves by several ethnic groups. Though the two regional state governments of Somali and Oromia tried to resolve the boundary dispute through the referendum in 2004, their efforts did not bring a long-lasting solution.
Power sharing conflicts

The fact that ethnicity became a major criterion or deciding factor for the distribution of political power at the regional levels has naturally created competition over political power between different ethnic groups in Ethiopia (Van Veen, 2017). This has especially been problematic at the regional level, where an ethnic group’s access to political power also guaranteed superiority and better access to economic resources and over other ethnic groups. While non-native ethnic groups have been excluded from such competition; rivalries between native ethnic groups for political power have led to violent ethnic conflicts, especially in the Gambella and Benishangul Gumuz regions (Ethiopian Human Rights Council Parallel Report, 2009:8-10).

Conflicts between ‘native’ and ‘settler’ communities

As highlighted above, the relation between native and settler communities in the different regions is fraught with tensions. According to the Ethiopian Human Rights Council, several factors have contributed to these tensions: discrimination; the disenfranchisement and lack of political representation of settler ‘minorities’; native resentment towards settlers due to the past history of domination; parochial sentiments of ownership and territoriality among native ethnic groups; fear of displacement and economic insecurity due to increased migration and presence of settlers (Ethiopian Human Rights Council Parallel Report, 2009:25).

These tensions led to conflicts resulting to the destruction of property, loss of lives and displacement of thousands. The action or omission of the Federal and regional government authorities exacerbated these conflicts and contributed to the worsening of damages. Two of such conflicts – the conflicts in Eastern Wollega zone of the Oromia and Gambella region involved discriminatory action towards the ‘minority’ Amharic speakers.

The local Oromo elite mobilized the native community and appealed to xenophobic and territorial sentiments by reigniting historical memories of domination by the Amhara. The local administrators agitated the Oromo community to evict the Amhara settlers and ‘send them to their native region’ by claiming that just like their ancestors, the Amharas were trying to rob Oromia by occupying their lands and depriving their children of their future livelihood (Ethiopian Human Rights Council Parallel Report, 2009:26).

Language and political tension

The Constitution guarantees equality of languages and empowers regions to determine their own official working languages. This has resulted in the adoption of the languages of the ethnic groups dominating the regions as working languages in some regions. In other regions pragmatic considerations have led to the
adoption of Amharic as official language. The adoption of the language of a certain ethnic group as the official language means that all aspects of the administrative, judicial and other affairs of the region are to be conducted in this language (Midega, 2015).

Accordingly, education must be provided in the language of the region. This is also reflected in access to employment, the right to representation, access to justice, etc. In these and other areas accessibility is linked to literacy in the language of the dominant ethnic group. While this is a positive arrangement for the realizations of the rights of the ethno-linguistic groups which exercise sovereign powers in the regional state, the fate of those communities, which are unable to speak the languages of the dominant and native groups needs to be addressed. Such communities include settler communities, as well as indigenous communities whose languages have been denied the status of official languages. Members of such communities will inevitably face difficulties in the exercise of their human rights due to their illiteracy in the regional working languages.

**Ethnic local governments in Ethiopia**

The Constitution of Ethiopia provides for constitutional autonomy for the regions which includes the power to draft, adopt and amend the regional state constitution (Art 55(5) FDRE Constitution, 1995). This allows regions the opportunity to protect subnational ethnic minorities and accommodate regional ethnic pluralism. Tarr (2011) highlights that “Ethiopia’s Federal Constitution (the Federal Constitution) leaves the regions with considerable constitutional space to design their institutions and local governments”. This is due to the fact that local or (sub-regional) government is barely touched upon by the Federal Constitution. The regions are therefore autonomous in determining their institutional structure organisation and competencies of local government. Van der Beken highlights that each of the nine regions in Ethiopia has successfully managed to adopt an effective constitution that acknowledges the existence of different ethnic minorities at regional level. The majority of these regions have also designed the institutions of local government as the primary mechanism of protecting sub-national ethnic minorities (Van der Beken, 2015).

Ayele and Fessha (2017) point out that “the right to self-government is not limited to the ethnic groups that have their own regional states: rather, it is a right that is constitutionally reserved to all ethnic groups in the country”. Article 47(2) of the constitution states that ethnic communities within the states “have the right to establish, at any time, their own States”. Therefore, the right to self-government or determination means that ethnic communities have the right to exercise their right to self-determination, which includes the right to establish government institutions in the territory in which they reside and also within the territorial boundaries of the regional state in which they are situated.

Ayele (2008) writes that the reason for decentralisation in Ethiopia was to empower ethnic minorities and thereby mitigate or prevent ethnic conflicts. This meant that any ethnic related issues and questions which
were not answered and cannot be dealt with through regional state formation will be addressed through the establishment of local government (Ayele, 2008:13).

The 1995 Constitution of Ethiopia thus provides for the establishment of two types of sub-regional government in terms of articles 39(3) and 50(4) respectively (Nigatu, 2015). Article 39 (3) implicitly provides for the establishment and implementation of autonomous sub-regional territorial units which are meant to accommodate intra-regional ethnic minorities in the country. Pursuant to that this means that what is stipulated in article 39(3) is an autonomous local government that is empowered with powers that are relevant in protecting and promoting the interest of all ethnic communities on whose behalf it is established (Ayele & Fessha, 2012:93).

Local government in terms of article 39 as stated above is a local government whose territorial boundary is largely delimited along ethnic lines (Art 39 FDRE Constitution, 1995). As stated by Ayele and Fessha (2012:93):

The boundaries of article 39 local governments are to be demarcated based on the settlement pattern of an ethnic group whose aspiration for self-government could not be met through the establishment of a regional state. This means that article 39 local governments can only be established for an ethnic group that is geographically concentrated.

Article 50(4) obliges the regional states to establish government units below state level. However, as stated above regional states have the power to enact their own constitution and to establish local government. The Amhara Constitution established an ethnic-based local government with one purpose of protecting sub-regional ethnic minorities. This approach has also been adopted and followed by the Benishangul-Gumuz, Gambella and Southern Region in their Constitutions (Van der Beken, 2015:164).

Currently there are only five regions that have established ethnic local government in Ethiopia; there are still several state constitutions which do not recognise ethnic diversity including Somali and Oromia state constitutions. These ethnic-based local governments are designed in such a way that they offer important protection to the cultural and language rights of the concerned ethnic minorities. The competence of the ethnic-based local governments in Amhara, Benishangul-Gumuz, Gambella and Southern Region allows local governments to determine their working language which is used for official purposes, such as in the local administration and judiciary (Van der Beken, 2015:167).

For example, the SNNPR is home to dozens of ethnic groups and in order to respond to the constitutional requirement of ensuring self-government for the different ethnic groups, the regional constitution has established ethnically defined zonal administrations (Zimmermann-Steinhart & Bekele, 2012:94). The Amhara state has also established three special zones (or Nationality Administrations) for the three indigenous minorities (i.e. the Agew Himra, Awi and Oromo). Similar administrative entities are provided for the five indigenous minorities in Benishangul-Gumuz. The Gambella constitution also provides for the
establishment of a Nationality Zone for the three indigenous minorities of Anuak, Nuer and Mejenger (Baraki, 2014).

Fessha and Van der Beken (2013) argue that Ethiopian ethnic-based local government administrations offer excellent opportunities for institutional representation and participation for the empowerment of minority. Ethnic local government is established at both the zonal and woredalevel known as liyu-woreda (special districts) (Art 50(4) FDRE Constitution, 1995).

Depending on the level of ethnic diversity, the regional states have established three Local Governments (LGs) tiers. According to Baraki, two pragmatic approaches have been applied in the delimitation of local governments into the Zones, Special Zones, Special Woredas, and Woreds. Zonal governments and Special Woreda governments comprise several rural and urban woreda governments (Baraki, 2014:52). As such, in the heterogeneous states of Southern Region (SNNP), Benshagul-Gumuz and Gambela, Zonal and Special Woreda Governments are mainly established along ethnic lines regardless of their economic viability. In the SNNP, Zonal Governments (ZGs) and Special Woreda Governments (SWGs) are formed by breaking up heterogeneous Zone/Woreda Administrations. Baraki (2014:52) highlights further that when a single ethnic group is found to be very tiny, two or more ethnic groups were brought together to form a ZG or SWG, often based on cultural and language similarities.

According to Ayele and Fessha (2017), zonal administrations are not even recognised in the regional constitutions, other than in the constitution of Oromia regional state, yet it is established in most regions. However, its main purpose is to serve as an intermediate point between a regional government and a woreda.

The most powerful tier in terms of article 50(4) local government is the intermediate local government known as woreda. A woreda is created through the regional constitutions and it is established throughout the rural areas of the country. As a result, a woreda has a council: a legislative organ whose members are directly elected by the people. Ayele and Fessha (2017:9) highlight that:

Equivalent of a woreda in urban areas is a city administration, which is an equally autonomous local government. The deliberative arm of the city administration is the city council, whose members are directly elected by the residents of each city administration is the city council. A city administration has a mayor, a mayoral committee, a professional municipal manager, a municipal judicial organ and a municipal administrative court.

It is worth noting that urban local government is created through regional statutes as opposed to a woreda which is created through regional constitutions.

The article 39 local governments are established to address ethnic claims or accommodate ethnic communities within some sort of territorial framework. Though these types of local governments have been established at the different levels in the hierarchy of local government these organisations are mostly
It is worth highlighting that nationality zones are established as institutions of self-government for regional minority groups that occupies a territorial area covering a number of woredas. While on the other hand, a liyuworeda is a subdivision of a region which in terms of territorial and population size is comparable to a woreda administration and is established for a particular ethnic group that inhabits the area (Ayele & Fessha, 2017:9).

There is thus a clear difference between nationality zones and liyuworedas with the rest of local governments established in the country. Ayele and Fessha (2017:10) point out that:

In the Amhara regional state, the region is largely inhabited by individuals who belong to the Amhara ethnic group. However, within the regional boundaries of the Amhara regional states are pockets of territory that are dominated by the Himra, Awi (the two strand of the Agew ethnic group) and Oromo.

In order to accommodate all these three ethnic communities, the Amhara regional state has established three nationality zones. The same can be said about the Afar regional state.

Ayele and Fessha (2017:10-11) further write that

In contrast, the constitution has established regional states that are ethnically heterogeneous, with no single ethnic group accounting for the majority of the regional population. In these regional states, the claims for recognition and self-rule by ethnic communities have resulted in the regional governments establishing, depending on the size of the ethnic community, either being a nationality zone or a liyuworeda.

Currently, the SNNPR has established fourteen nationality zones and eight liyuworedas. The same has been established in ethnically diverse Bensinsangul and Gambella regional state.

The Constitution of Afar region recognises the right of the minority of people who belong to Argoba to have their own “special woreda” in the region. In the Amhara region there are also special zones for a minority from the Oromo ethnic group. The Constitution of the Southern region is also designed in such a way that recognises the “special woreda” as an ethnic based sub-regional local government administration (Van der Beken, 2015:162).

It is worth noting that the territorial demarcation of both the nationality zone and a liyuworeda follows the territorial settlement of the ethnic group on whose behalf they are established. As a result, these ethnic local government units are autonomous and should the ethnic group for which they are established choose to secede from the region and establish their own regional state they can do so (Art 47(2) FDRE Constitution, 1995). Currently, nationality zones and liyuworedas are established only in five regions such as the Afar, SNNPR, Amhara, Benishangul-Gumuz and Gambella regions.

Liyuworeda is found only in four regions of Amhara, SNNPR, Gambella and Benishagul-Gumuz. In SNNPR there are nine liyuworedas that were established. Whereas, in Benishagul-Gumuz there are two
liyuworedas, one in Gambella known as Godreliyuworeda and one in Afar known as Argobaliyuworeda (Barki, 2016:7).

It is therefore worth concluding by stating that nationality zones in Ethiopia are mainly established as institutions of self-government, for regional ethnic minority groups that occupy a territorial area covering a number of woredas (Ayele&Fessha, 2012:96). Whereas a liyuworeda (special district), is a subdivision of regions which in terms of territorial and population size is comparable to a Woreda administration (Fenta, 2014:74). It is established for the particular ethnic groups that inhabits the area. Nationality zones and liyuworedas are established only in five regions: Afar, Amhara, Benishangul-Gumuz, Gambella regions and SNNPR (Fenta, 2014:73).

Challenges, ethnic tensions and conflicts at local level in Ethiopia

According to Van der Beken (2015:169), the main idea in the establishment of ethnic-based local government in Ethiopia is that through these local governments system, the concerned ethnic minorities can exercise the self-rule component of the right to self-determination. Although the above facts managed to indicate the opportunities offered by the mechanism of establishing ethnic-based local governments for the fulfilment of the rights of sub-national ethnic minorities, this mechanism has substantial challenges, tensions, conflicts and limitations as well. Some of the limitation relates to the degree of autonomy enjoyed by the ethnic-based local governments in the exercise of their powers. The challenges brought by ethnic-based local government in Ethiopia are:

a) Land disputes between ethnic groups which includes contestation over district boundaries;

b) Ethnic mobilisation and competition over resources

Land disputes at the local government level

Some of the challenges that are faced at the regional level are somehow similar to those that are experienced at the local government level. The land issue in Ethiopia constitutes one of the most contentious issues because it involves conflicting political, socio-cultural and economic interests (Hebo, 2007). However, the point of contestation in Ethiopia’s ethnic-based local government level is who has authority and power in the regional administration and who has the right over which land in the region. According to Abbink (2006:396) “the majority of tensions and challenges in rural Ethiopia emanated from disputes on land and on boundaries of (woredas) districts and zones between the newly defined ethnic or linguistic groups”.

After ethno-linguistic or ethnic identity was accorded an organising role in the determination of boundaries and adoption of policies, the new political dispensation was immediately used as a means to make claims
to resources on both the national (state) level and local level (especially government funding and land) (Abbink, 2006:395-396). This started with intricate negotiations and ethnic positioning strategies of ethnic elites to get advantages at the expenses of other groups. Land and borders in Ethiopia became the prime cornerstone of contestation. Land had become an increasingly scarce resource due to soil erosion and population growth, these contestations were backed up by an explicit reference to language and cultural differences (Abbink, 2006:396). Other recurring factors with regard to land include:

"The disagreements about the possession of or use rights to water resources, prestige, land, and cultural policies (feelings of inter-group superiority and inferiority), settlement, licences for investment and language policy in education and administration" (Abbink, 2006:391).

Land issues lead to a high level of contestation over district boundaries in Ethiopia. This is the result of the competition over grazing space and water for livestock leading to sporadic cases of cattle rustling and revenge killings. These therefore led to other minority groups having limited access to services in areas that are dominated by rival ethnic groups. This resulted in ethnic mobilisation at the lower level. In many areas, minority groups re-negotiated local relationships and mobilised people to fight for recognition as 'nationality' or ethnic groups in order to take advantage of the new political order in Ethiopia. As a result, they used the constitutional status of the nationalities to pursue their goals (Aalen, 2006).

Ethnic mobilisation usually results in different ethnic groups competing with each other over limited resources. Competition for resources in Ethiopia had shown itself primarily in the form of pastoralist conflicts and clashes over scarce resources of land. The reason being that pastoralist conflicts have a lengthy history and occurred in the lowland areas of the country mostly in the Afar, Oromia, and Somalia regions (Dibaba, 2016). Feyisaa (2009) highlights that:

There is a constant fight between the Nuer and Anywaa over privileges, over federal funds, over representation in the regional state government and land for pasture (Nuer) or agriculture (Anywaa). The two major groups dominate the local arena of politics and are locked in violent rivalry against each other. The basic claim of the Anywaa is that they are the original inhabitants of the area and that most of the Nuer are newcomers from the Sudan, who should not dominate and occupy Anywaa lands along the Baro River.

While different ethnic groups are in competition with each other over limited resources, the major challenge of local government in the regional level is the allocation of federal funds between different ethnic groups and representation at the regional level which resulted in political repression.

The majority of conflicts in Ethiopia now are about boundaries between territorialisied ethnic groups. This is because fights are waged about identity in order to establish the borders of districts and zones and the identity professed by local people is the deciding element. Because of ethnic difference between ethnic communities, different areas are given to each ethnic group but that does not stop the conflict. This led to unhappiness about how the boundaries have been drawn. Boundaries are tied up with ethnic identity as well as a conflict about resources in the disputed border areas. Abbink (2006:397) writes that that is
‘secession’ in miniature form; however some of the conflicts are about power or authority and access to scarce resources in a shared arena.

By so doing the post-1991 regime in Ethiopia, despite its promise and claims to bring solutions, has been less successful than expected in managing ethnic tensions in the country and has basically only ‘decentralised’ the problems by defining the sources of conflict to be on the local and not national level (Abbink, 2006:390). However, there are other problems too, such as minority exclusivity in employment and political privileges, etc.

**Minority exclusion in employment.**

One of the challenges faced by Ethiopia is the exclusion of ethnic minorities in as far as employment is concerned, resulting in a serious lack of employment for minority groups at the regional level. This is because they are usually considered as not being part of the dominant ethnic group. This is irrespective of them knowing the local language or even having resided in the region for a long time. Because there is high unemployment, there is also high level of competition over resources in Ethiopia. This has led to the exclusion of ethnic minorities with regard to employment (*Ethiopian Human Rights Council, 2009:10*).

**Political privileges**

Identity politics in Ethiopia has reinforced inter-ethnic boundary and fostered intra-ethnic solidarity in the country (Feyissa, 2009:646). However, the same process has also raised serious problems of where to draw the line in the definition of the ‘self’ and engendered intra-ethnic competition for resources and political power. As a result, the repercussion of institutionalised identity politics does not end at the migrants and inter-ethnic or indigenes level. It has also introduced social displacement within the ethnic groups magnifying and politicising sub-ethnic units (Feyissa, 2009:651).

Political representation is a quarrelsome issue played out in power struggles between political elites at all levels of government in Ethiopia, affecting the stability of the regional states. Power struggles are expressed through inter-ethnic and clan-based conflicts and tensions (UNICEF, 2015).

According to Feyissa (2009:651), due to political privileges experienced by dominant ethnic groups, multi-ethnic regional states are ‘up for grabs’ for the various groups who compete for resources and political power with various narratives of entitlement instead of building a viable regional political community.

The struggle for political power and competition over limited resources among the ethnic elites in Ethiopia is a reflection of the contentious issue of political ownership of the multi-ethnic regional states such as Gambella. Conflict situations in the Gambella region are also related to the introduction of territorialized
ethnicity and the politicisation of migration. Resources are allocated according to political affiliation and between ethnic lines.

The challenges of establishing ethnic boundaries in Ethiopia

The organization of state power along territorially based ethnic communities has been reinforced and elevated to a constitutional level (Belay, 2016). The Ethiopian federation is unique in many aspects, insofar as it departs radically from the usual fear of African states to ‘play with fire’ i.e. ethnicity (Watts, 2008). Despite some serious debates among different scholars, those who are in favour pointed out: that federalism was the best (indeed the only) solution to Ethiopia’s ethnic diversity problem (Barata, 2012:67). Ethiopians have always regulated their lives and handled their disputes according to customary law and will continue to do so (Abbink, 1997:170).

However, according to the rejectionist of ethnic federalism, ethnic based federalism has the propensity to divide the people ethnically and elevate normal competition for resources to the level of ethnic strife and inter- and intra-ethnic mistrust (Belay, 2016). Ethiopian ethnic federalism encourages political parties to organise along ethnic lines and to maintain or enforce an ethnicised federal state in Ethiopia (Habtu, 2003).

Conclusion

The Constitution of Ethiopia says almost nothing regarding the place and status of local government. This is because the local government structure is to be regulated in the regional states’ constitutions. However, in terms of Article 50(4) the Federal Constitution requires states to transfer adequate power to lower levels of government. Furthermore, in terms of Article 39(3) it also grants each ethno-national group “the right to a full measure of self-government, which includes the right to establish institutions of government in the territory that it inhabits and to equitable representation in State and Federal governments”.

Regions in Ethiopia were established based on ethnic differences and diversity of the country. This provided regions also with the power to determine or establish their local government based on their ethnic identity. It should be noted that “although the regions enjoy considerable constitutional space to design specific devices, the major constitutional tool for minority protection at regional level is invariably the establishment of ethnic-based local governments”.¹

This enabled Ethiopia to establish at local government system that is ethnic-based, to accommodate all ethnic minorities. However, Ethiopia is now experiencing ethnic tensions between members of different ethnic groups that are fighting over limited resources. Such ethnic tensions are due to the greediness of

¹ Van der Beken C (2015) 177.
the dominant ethnic groups either at the regional or local government level that refuses to or are not willing to share resources with other ethnic groups. Ethnic tensions are also due to limited resources in the country which led to ethnic mobilisation.

After the establishments of the woredas, they became responsible for preparing and implementing developmental plans and the distribution of resources without seeking authorisation from higher levels, through the woreda block grant transfers. However, the grants which are given to the woredas are also limited and this makes it difficult for the woredas to provide communities with proper services. This gave rise to ethnic challenges and tensions amongst ethnic minorities.

Though there are challenges at the local government level in Ethiopia, South Africa can learn one or two things from Ethiopia as the establishment of regions and local government has some advantages:

a) Ethiopia has managed to accommodate ethnic minorities by demarcating regional boundaries along ethnic lines and ethnic communities, and

b) It has also managed to accommodate ethnic minorities by establishing ethnic local government.

Some of the disadvantages of the system that is followed by Ethiopia are that there is a constant conflict between ethnic communities over regional boundaries. The determination of boundaries within ethnic lines resulted in conflicts which gave rise to ethnic mobilisation, land dispute and contestation over limited resources. There is also livestock and property looting between ethnic communities as well as minority exclusion in employment, etc.

Cohen is of the view that in recognising ethnicity for what it is, Ethiopia is sitting on an ethnic time bomb and it must come up with a possible solution. However, according to Abbink, pessimists argue that it may already be too late for the re-drafting of the constitution in Ethiopia because among the generation coming to maturity since 1991, new identities have already been formed and are being internalised by local people.

Ethiopia has now declared a state of emergency due to violent protests which led to the killing of hundreds of people. This is because ethnicity has been mobilized in the contest for resource, and ethnicity has been built into the system. Ethnic minority groups alleged repression and exclusivity from resources by the dominating ethnic groups.

This shows that the main problem in Ethiopia is power sharing and equitable distribution of resources between or among ethnic lines or groups. Some of the problems faced by Ethiopia includes political mobilisation by ethnic minorities and the exclusion of minorities in as far as employment is concerned.

---

To eradicate demarcation tensions and protests South Africa should follow Ethiopia’s example by demarcating municipalities using ethnicity. The South African Constitution provides for the establishment of municipalities in the territory of the republic and also provides for the equitable distribution of the revenues raised nationally. This means that should South Africa follow the Ethiopian example, it will still be financially viable and still manage to provide municipal services between ethnic communities. Demarcating municipalities along ethnic lines will be the best system to eradicate demarcation tensions and protest in South Africa.

By using ethnicity as a factor to demarcate municipal boundaries in South Africa: the starting point will be by looking first at the advantages and disadvantages, as well as the challenges faced in Ethiopia by using ethnicity as a factor in demarcating internal boundaries.

Reference


Ethiopian Human Rights Council Parallel Report Submitted to the Committee on Racial


Feyissa D ‘A National Perspective on the Conflict in Gambella’ 2009 Proceedings of the 16th International Conference of Ethiopian Studies Trondheim 642.


GA Tarr ‘Explaining sub-national constitutional space’ (2011) 115 Penn State Law 1134.


Nationalities map of the Study of Ethiopian Nationalities of 1983 was a political research bureau which did the research work under the Derg regime (which was the first government to officially recognise the Ethiopian nationalities).


Zimmermann-Steinhart P & Bekele Y ‘The implications of federalism and decentralisation on socioeconomic conditions in Ethiopia’ 2012(15) 2PER / PELJ 91.
The Governance, Taxation and Regulation of Beneficiary Funds in South Africa

Lufuno Tokyo Nevondwe

ABSTRACT: A beneficiary fund is a pension fund established in terms of section 1 of the Pension Funds Act, 24 of 1956 for the purposes of a dependant of a deceased’s member. A Beneficiary Fund is a legal entity that is setup in accordance with the Pension Funds Act for the purpose of accepting Section 37C death benefit payments. The Beneficiary Fund has a board of trustees who are there to ensure that the monies (or other assets) are administered with the necessary care for the benefit of the beneficiaries. It is an efficient and flexible way to ensure that assets are looked after. It also ensures that assets are objectively managed and controlled by the appointed trustees in the best interest of the beneficiaries. The beneficiary fund has its own rules, its own Board of Trustees and a Principal Officer (who reports to the board of trustees and is responsible for the daily running of the Fund). The paper discusses the legislative frameworks, taxation, governance and adjudication of complaints relating to beneficiary funds.

Keywords: Governance, Taxation, Beneficiary Funds, Pension Funds, South Africa

Introduction

A beneficiary fund is a fund established for the purposes of accepting lump sum death benefits awarded in terms of section 37C of the Pension Funds Act, 24 of 1956 (the Act) to a beneficiary (dependant or nominee) on the death of a member, which are not paid directly to that beneficiary (or his/her recognized care giver or guardian in the case of a minor), or to a trust nominated by the member, or to the member’s estate or to the guardian’s fund. The object of the beneficiary fund is to receive, administer, invest and pay benefits on behalf of and to beneficiaries who become members of the fund. This replaces the previous payments to trusts and a fund can now only pay to a trust if the trust was nominated by the member, a major dependant or nominee; a person recognised in law or appointed by a court as the person responsible for managing the affairs or meeting the daily care needs of a minor or incapacitated major dependant or nominee. Any association of persons or business carried on under a fund or arrangement established with the object of receiving, administering, investing and paying benefits, referred to in section 37C on behalf of beneficiaries,

1 University of Limpopo
payable on the death of more than one member of one or more pension funds is a beneficiary fund and must be registered by the Financial Services Board and approved.

Beneficiary funds were first mooted by the then Finance Minister Trevor Manuel in March 2007 following the Fidentia scandal which arose from glaring gaps in the regulation of umbrella trusts, which traditionally operated under the jurisdiction of the Master of the High Court. According to Nevondwe (2009), the aim was to beef up the regulation and supervision of beneficiaries’ assets in order to avoid future loses, improve the protection of beneficiaries, and ensure that the trustees of trusts adhere to their fiduciary duties.

Beneficiary funds were introduced by the Financial Services General Laws Amendment Act, 22 of 2008 particularly section 15(2) (a) which came into effect on 1 November 2008 and the beneficiary funds came into operation with effect from 1 January 2009.

These funds are governed by the Pension Funds Act 24 of 1956. Since 1 January 2009, death benefit payments need, by law, to be made into a beneficiary fund. When a member of a retirement fund dies, leaving children behind who are not yet 18, the trustees of the retirement fund have a duty to establish who the member’s dependants are. They then have to decide how best to divide up and allocate the death benefit.

If a spouse has been left behind and is financially competent, it makes sense to pay the funds to him or her to manage on behalf of the minor children. If the surviving spouse as guardian is not financially competent to manage the minor dependants’ money, the trustees have the option to pay it into a beneficiary fund. But if both parents are deceased and the children are cared for by a caregiver, the trustees will consider paying the funds into a beneficiary fund. This is because the chances are that there will be a different caregiver at some stage (for example, a grandmother may die and someone else will take over).

Beneficiary funds are mainly umbrella funds, which mean that they serve multiple retirement funds of different companies. They are properly regulated by the Act and members have recourse to the Pension Funds Adjudicator.

Since the 2008 amendments to the Pension Funds Act, the beneficiary funds were introduced with stronger regulatory framework. They have sufficient governance, reporting requirements and conduct annual audits. This regulatory framework will prevent the scandals like Fidentia scandal and misuse of funds as the case in the trust funds. Beneficiary funds are aimed at protecting the funds of widows and orphans.

**Legislative framework**

In 2008, the definition of “pension fund organization” in section 1 of the Act was amended to create a new type of fund known as a beneficiary fund. This fund is defined in section 1 of the Act as “a fund referred to
in paragraph (c) of the definition of “pension fund organization”. Paragraph (c) in turn defines a pension fund organization as “…any association of persons or business carried on under a scheme or arrangement established with the object of receiving, administering, investing and paying benefits, referred to in section 37C on behalf of beneficiaries, payable on the death of more than one member of one or more pension funds”.

In terms of the above definitions, a beneficiary fund is a special fund that only receives, invests and administers benefits payable in terms of section 37C of the Act on behalf of beneficiaries. These benefits are paid into a beneficiary fund by trustees of pension and provident funds in terms of section 37C (2)(a) of the Act for the benefit of deceased members’ beneficiaries, particularly minor beneficiaries. In terms of section 37C(2) of the Act, payment into a beneficiary fund is deemed to be payment to the beneficiary concerned.

Although payment of a benefit into a beneficiary fund is deemed to be payment to a beneficiary, the opening words of section 37C(1) of the Act seems to suggest that in the event of the death of such beneficiary, the benefit payable from a beneficiary fund would again be payable in terms of section 37C of the Act. The opening paragraph of section 37C(1) states “Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any law or in the rules of a registered fund, any benefit (other than a benefit payable as a pension to the spouse or child of the member in terms of the rules of the registered fund, which must be dealt with in terms of such rules) payable by such a fund upon the death of a member, shall, subject to a pledge in accordance with section 19(5)(5)(i) and subject to the provisions of section 37A(3) and 37D, not form part of the assets in the estate of such a member, but shall be dealt with in the following manner:”

Therefore, it appears that on the death of a beneficiary in respect of whom a benefit had been paid into the beneficiary fund the provisions of section 37C will apply. This is because, firstly, with effect from 1 January 2009, a beneficiary fund is required to be registered in terms of the Act in order for such fund to receive benefits from a pension or provident fund. Secondly, a beneficiary under the beneficiary fund falls within the definition of a “member” in section 1 of the Act.

Section 37C specifically provides that a benefit payable upon the death of a member a pension of provident may not form part of the estate of the deceased member other than the limited instances outlined in the section itself. Such circumstance are set out in Sections 37C(1)(b) and (c) of the Act. These provisions make it clear that there are only three sets of circumstances in which the benefit payable from a registered fund on the death of a member is to be paid to the executor of such member’s estate after the member’s death. One is where no dependant is found and the deceased member died without having nominated any beneficiary (bases on section 37C(1)(c). In this instance, the benefit must be paid to the executor or if no inventory has been filed with the Master of the High Court, the benefit is paid into the Guardian’s Fund. The second instance is where the estate of the deceased member is found to be insolvent, where no dependant is found, and the deceased member had nominated a
beneficiary who was not a dependant (based on section 37C(1)(b)). The third one, which is also based on section 37C(1)(b) is where the deceased member has nominated a beneficiary to receive a portion of the benefit in which case the remaining balance of the benefit will be paid into the estate.

According to Nevondwe (2008), section 37C of the Act seeks to ensure that those who were dependent on the deceased member are not left destitute by that latter's death. To achieve this object, section 37C overrides the freedom of testation, and the board of management is not bound by the wishes of the deceased as expressed in the nomination form. For this reason, the death benefit subject to the exceptions outlined in section 37C is excluded from the estate of a deceased member and placed under the control of the retirement fund.

The board is not bound by the deceased's will or nomination form. So although the deceased may have expressed an intention to benefit a certain nominated beneficiary in the nomination form, this does not necessarily imply that the whole amount of the benefit will in fact be awarded to that beneficiary. For the deceased's intention as contained in the nomination form is only one of the factors considered when allocating a death benefit. The section essentially imposes three primary duties on the board of management:

- to identify the dependants and nominees of the deceased member;
- to effect an equitable distribution of the benefit amongst the beneficiaries; and
- to determine an appropriate mode of payment.

The application of section 37C on the benefit payable from a beneficiary fund would unfortunately mean that the benefit originally paid into a beneficiary fund in terms of section 37C of the Act would be subjected to the same uncertain and onerous process prescribed in that section. Whilst the primary objective of this section is to protect dependants of the deceased member, it places a very onerous burden on the board and it is difficult to implement. In Dobie NO v National Technikon Retirement Pension Fund 1[1999] 9 BPLR 29 (PFA), the Pension Fund Adjudicator said “One thing is certain about section 37C, it is a hazardous, technical minefield potentially extremely prejudicial to both those who are expected to apply it and to those intended to benefit from its provisions. It creates anomalies and uncertainties rendering it most difficult to apply. There can be no doubt about its noble and worthy policy intentions. The problem lies in the execution and the resultant legitimate anxiety felt by those who may fall victim to a claim of maladministration in trying to make sense of it.”

Only section 37C death benefits (approved benefits) payable by a registered fund for the benefit of a dependant or nominee may be paid to a beneficiary fund. This can be for a minor or major if considered appropriate by the retirement fund trustees. The regulator (FSB) main purpose in creating a new legal
vehicle, the Beneficiary Fund, was to offer greater protection to dependants of lump sum benefits under the Pension Funds Act.

The beneficiary funds require the fund to perform the annual audit, the board to have independent trustee representation, the fund must report to FSB annually on financial statements, fund rules are registered and approved by the FSB, section 13B administrator licence, fund is FICA exempt and the fund has administration agreement with administrator setting out duties and service standards.

The objective of the beneficiary fund is to receive lump sum death benefits from transferor funds (approved funds) and administer them for the benefit of the beneficiary fund member (dependant). Approved funds include transfers from other registered beneficiary funds and trusts.

**Taxation of beneficiary funds**

Transfers to the beneficiary fund, are tax-exempt – receipt of transfer not subject to section 14 of the Pension Funds Act. Vesting in the beneficiary takes effect on date of transfer into the beneficiary fund. Payment to beneficiary is part of gross income and taxed in terms of PAYE scale. Fund withholds tax in terms of the Fourth Schedule of the Income Tax Act. Majority of payments to beneficiaries are below PAYE threshold and therefore no tax withheld. Tax implications on individual members of the pension fund will differ in respect of decision to pay to a beneficiary fund. This will be a relief to the beneficiary whom majority of them are found to be poor since they will have lost the breadwinner.

The investment income earned by the beneficiary fund will be tax-exempt and all benefit payments made to the beneficiary will be free of tax. The beneficiary fund appears to be a clear winner in the case of higher amounts. In respect of lower benefit amounts, it attracts absolutely no tax at any of the three points at which tax could possibly arise. As the lump sum death benefit increases, tax calculated in terms of the retirement / death table will reduce the net benefit received, but there is no tax on the income or benefit payments. Payments to a parent or a family trust will be less because the investment income is taxed in the beneficiary’s hands. To do a more holistic comparison, one should take the costs of the beneficiary fund, trust and/or investment selected by the parent into account as well. Despite the latest amendments to the basis of taxation, beneficiary funds remain an exciting and tax-efficient new development, offering practical solutions with increased protection for minor dependants.

**Governance of beneficiary funds**

Beneficiary funds must comply with Regulation 28 of Pension Fund Act (prudential investment guidelines). It must have an investment policy in place. Beneficiary funds must adopt the principles of governance as set out in PF130 issued by the Financial Services Board and also has a code of conduct; an investment policy statement; a communication policy; and a performance assessment tool for trustees.
The governance of private pension plans and funds involves the managerial control of the organizations and how they are regulated, including the accountability of management and how they are supervised. According to Stewart and Yermo (2008), the basic goal of pension fund governance regulation is to minimize the potential agency problems, or conflicts of interest, that can arise between the fund members and those responsible for the fund’s management, and which can adversely affect the security of pension savings and promises. Good governance goes beyond this basic goal and aims at delivering high pension fund performance while keeping costs low for all stakeholders. Good governance can have many positive side effects such as creating trust amongst all stakeholders, reducing the need for prescriptive regulation, and facilitating supervision. Good pension fund governance can also be conducive to more effective corporate governance of the companies that they invest in, as well-managed pension funds are more likely to seek value for their investments via a more active shareholder policy. Good governance also needs to be “risk-based”. For example, the more sophisticated the investment strategy the pension fund adopts, the stricter the governance oversight required; or the more complex the administrative arrangements of the plan, the tighter operational oversight needs to be.

Clark, Caelewy-Smith and Marshall (2005) believe that policymakers around the world have robustly debated the efficacy of a retirement fund governance model which relies heavily on the expertise of pension fund trustees. In a financial world of increasing complexity that demands high levels of expertise, it is widely believed that many trustees may lack the competence to make investment decisions consistent with the best interest of beneficiaries (members). Another problem is conflicts of interest in the way that trustees discharge their duties to the beneficiaries of the fund.

In 2007, the FSB issued a Pension Funds Circular 130 on good governance for retirement funds. Circular 130 requires that trustees put in place a documented code of conduct, an investment statement, communication strategy to members, and have a performance appraisal system for trustees. It also obliges new board members to receive comprehensive training and all board members to be trained on a continuing basis. Although the circular extensively covers elements relevant to the sound operation, conduct, duties and obligations of boards of trustees, it is not enforceable. The non-enforceability might be a concern because the industry and trustees might voluntarily adhere to the circular. It is Government’s view that Circular 130 should be legally enforceable by the Registrar of Pension Funds, and therefore attain the status of a regulation that would be rigorously applied and complied with by boards of trustees.

The FSB has also launched an online education programme, known as the Trustee Toolkit, for the development and education of retirement fund trustees. The Toolkit is voluntary and may also serve as a useful reference for trustees, administrators of retirement funds, and anyone interested in retirement fund governance and management. The Toolkit is structured along the lines of the Pension Funds Circular 130.
(that is, governance by the board, governance of operations of funds, and management of stakeholder relationships), thus reinforcing the importance of good governance.

**Adjudication of complaints relating to beneficiary funds**

The adjudication of pension funds complaints rest with the Pension Funds Adjudicator. The Adjudicator has jurisdiction to deal with complaints relating to the administration of beneficiary funds. In terms of section 30D (3) of the Pension Funds Act, the main object of the Office of the Pension Funds Adjudicator is to dispose of complaints in a procedurally fair, economic and expeditious manner. The definition of complaint in the Act requires the complaint to relate to a fund. The beneficiary fund falls within the definition of a pension fund organisation.

A complaint must be lodged within three years of the act or omission that gave rise to the complaint (section 30I (1) of the Act). If the three year period has expired, the Adjudicator may not investigate the complaint.

There is a good reason for a limit to be imposed on the time during which litigation may be launched and the Constitutional Court has pronounced on this issue. As Didcott J explained in *Mohlomi v Minister of Defence* 1997 (1) SA 124 (CC) in paragraph [11]:

“Rules that limit the time within which litigation may be launched are common in our legal system as well as many others. Inordinate delays in litigation damage the interest of justice. They protract the disputes over the rights and obligations are sought to be enforced, prolonging the uncertainty of all concerned about their affairs. Nor in the end is it always possible to adjudicate satisfactorily on cases that have gone stale. By then witnesses may no longer be available to testify. The memories of ones whose testimony can be obtained have faded and become unreliable. Documentary evidence may have disappeared. Such rules prevent procrastination and those harmful consequences of it. They serve a purpose to which no exception in principle can cogently be taken.”

Similarly, it was held in *Vandeyar v UTICO Staff Pension Fund* [2000] 3 BPLR 332 (PFA) that the purpose of section 30I(1) of the Act is to ensure finality and certainty in pension fund affairs and to promote efficiency by an incentive for the prompt enforcement of complaints: “all legal systems accept that the operation of obligations should be limited by requiring enforcement with a reasonable period of time”.

**Conclusion**

The reasons why beneficiary funds were introduced is because there has been mismanagement and abuse of death benefits allocated to minors and widows by pension funds, held in trust, by trust funds.

For the moment, the beneficiary fund has not replaced the Trust Fund and payment of a benefit due to a beneficiary made by a fund into a trust fund is still regarded in terms of section 37C as payment to the beneficiary. Similarly, benefits held in trust by trust funds will still have to be distributed in accordance with
their original mandate. Therefore, the responsibility of choosing a beneficiary fund over a trust fund and the safety accorded to beneficiaries of each institution lies with board of trustees of the transferor fund. History dictates that trust funds are not managed properly and there are not approved by the FSB. Complainants or aggrieved persons does not have a recourse to lodge their complaint to the Office of the Pension Funds Adjudicator over trust fund issues which makes them to be more frustrated and not knowing where to seek assistance. If you have a complaint regarding the governance, operations and payment to beneficiary funds, you can now lodge a complaint to the Pension Funds Adjudicator which was not the case in the trust fund.

References

Articles published in journals


Online articles

Liberty Corporate, All you need to know of retirement funding (2012), p10-11.

**South African legislations**


Pension Funds Act 24 of 1956

**South African cases**

Dobie NO v National Technikon Retirement Pension Fund [1999] 9 BPLR 29 (PFA).
Mashazi v African Products Retirement Benefit Provident Fund [2002] 8 BPLR 3703 (W);
Mohlomi v Minister of Defence 1997 (1) SA 124 (CC)
Vandeyar v UTICO Staff Pension Fund [2000] 3 BPLR 332 (PFA).

**Policies, papers and other documents**

National Treasury, Preservation, portability and governance for retirement funds, a discussion paper published on 21 September 2012, p25.
Minorities and Cultural Identity: Insights on Shia Women of Kashmir

M. Saleem Jehangir¹ and Shugufta Akhter²

Abstract: Religion plays a vital role in the cultural life of different spaces. It is deeply rooted in people’s experiences and influences the socio-economic and political direction of societies. However, the flow of influence is not necessarily symmetrical and indeed religion forms both theoretically and empirically. The differences are due to cultural legacies, historical development, geographic location, and last but not least the religious norms which predominate in society. The Shia community has a common culture of mourning throughout the globe in the months of Muharram and Saffar which has religious sanctity. In this way, the Shia community at large remains a distinct identity. In this context, the present paper highlights the culture of mourning in the months of Muharram and Saffar based on primary sources. Interview schedule and observation were the main tool and technique of data collection.

Key words: Minorities, culture, women, Shia and Kashmir

Introduction:
The twenty-first century embodies the era of globalization witnessing human movements, massive exchanges of economic activities and information flows across borders. The transnational flows of people, financial resources, goods, information and culture have been increasing in a drastic way and have profoundly transformed the world (Ritzer and Malone, 2000). Accordingly, globalization affects diverse dimensions on the life of people. The world seems to be shrinking because people know more about the differences and similarities between them and other people around the world (Storey, 2009). With this knowledge, attributes of foreign cultures are constantly being adopted or adapted by their counterparts throughout the globe. As a result, a great deal of debate and discussion, even controversy has taken place about globalization in various disciplines from different angles (Bird and Stevens, 2003). Globalization effects are addressed as a determinant that impacts societies and their cultures. More precisely, the interaction between globalization and culture still remains under-researched (Prasad and Prasad, 2007). In other words, globalization represents a significant shift in the spatial reach of social relations and organization towards the interregional or intercontinental scale. This does not mean that the global

¹ Associate Professor, Department of Sociology, University of Kashmir. Email: smfazilli19@gmail.com
² Lecturer Sociology, Department of School Education J&K
necessarily displaces or takes precedence over local, national or regional orders of social life. Rather, the point is that the local becomes embedded within more expansive sets of interregional relations and networks of power. Thus, the constraints of social time and geographical space, vital coordinates of modern social life, no longer appear to impose insuperable barriers to many forms of social interaction or organization, as the existence of the World Wide Web and round-the-clock trading in global financial markets attests. Globalization thereby engenders a cognitive shift expressed both in a growing public awareness of the ways in which distant events can affect local fortunes and vice versa as well as in public perceptions of shrinking time and geographical space (Held and McGrew, 2002). Despite its long history, globalization remains almost constant as its forces continually aim at transcending human differences around the world. The impact of this process on communities cultural diversity has not probably yet been completely understood. Its main characteristic and the strongest tool is that the majority of cultures are homogenized. Kashmir is predominately Muslim populated area constituting 95 percent of population (census of India, 2011) Muslims are further classified into two broader sects, Sunnis and Shias. Sunnis form the majority of population whereas Shias are in minority. Minority women usually are cut off from a full involvement in the workings of the society and from an equal share in the society’s rewards. Shia Women are of triple minority: they are members of minority group being Muslims as minority in India and then being women and again then being women of minority group Shia Muslims in Kashmir.

The culture outbursts as a model and blue-print for understanding the patterns of meaning that human societies create. Culture is a macro-concept. It is definitive of human society in which many or all people think in the same ways (Marana, 2006). It refers to a human-made environment which includes all the material and nonmaterial products of group life that are transmitted from one generation to the next. It is common knowledge that culture outplays in practice. This practice is observed in all sub-cultures as frivolous and equated with community prestige. As the relationship between religion and culture is reciprocal, religious systems are locked in a circle of mutual influence with social norms and patterns of social organization (Sinclair, 1986).

Religion plays a vital role in the cultural life of different spaces. It is deeply rooted in people’s experiences and influences the socio-economic and political direction of societies (Stump, 2008). Religion is an important variable than race or ethnicity (Peach, 2006). On the one hand all world religions maintain male social dominance within societal structures and on the other hand, women are more inclined to participate in religious life (Young, 1987). Religious norms and prejudices may reflect patriarchal values which are characteristic of all societies of the world religions (Seguino, 2011). The role of God, or a creator of a religion is always taken by a male and the woman is primarily valued as a mother, especially as a mother to a son. Her place is in the household, less so at religious ceremonies or in public positions. The real status of a woman in a religion is more complicated (Holm, 1994). The status of women in society is an outcome of
the interpretation of religious texts and of the cultural and institutional set-up of religious communities (Klingorova and Havlecik, 2015).

Within this inquiry, two categories of culture are particularly relevant social culture and individual culture. The borderlines of a culture will not necessarily be coextensive with the constitutional realm, different cultures may co-exist concurrently. At different levels there may be coexistence of different cultures. There may be a diversity of culture on the basis of ethnic or religious differences, hence within the constitutional realm there may be a dominant culture and minority subcultures or there may be a mosaic of subcultures. There may be diversity of institutional cultures within the constitutional framework even in religiously or an ethnically homogeneous society, the cultural norms may vary at the levels of family, workplace and state. Beyond the constitutional realm, there is a developing international or global culture. This global culture is on the one hand generated by states and on the other is increasingly determinative of the limits of state power and states constitutional culture. Culture and religion are frequently treated as different categories in some ways, Nevertheless in the context of the defence against human rights principles, they also have much in common, religion as a part of culture must both influence and be influenced by social and ideological culture. However the flow of influence is not necessary symmetrical and indeed religion forms both theoretically and empirically the core of cultural resistance to human rights (Raday, 2010). Religion is hence an institutionalized aspect of culture with bureaucratic institution that is focal point for economic and political power with the society. Within secular states, religious sects are often a haven against social and cultural change and acts as a barrier against rationalized and scientific explanation.

Review of literature

Madan (1984) defines the socio-cultural identity of the Muslims and Hindus of rural Kashmir. His study reveals that both Hindus and Muslims recognize the notion of zatas, the crucial factor in identity specification and in determining an individual’s natural and moral conduct. The identity of Muslims notwithstanding, in actual practice with the teachings of the Quran but attaches a crucial importance to the fact of birth in the determination of a person’s nature and his legitimate socio-cultural identity. At the ideological level, he observes there is complete mutual exclusion that is fundamental opposition between Hindus and Muslims. Thus he concludes though the Muslims and Hindus are mutually dependent, there is no reciprocity of perspective however, an agreement and a synthesis between the two. Querish (1989) highlights the context of politics of the Shia minority in Pakistan. He outlines that, in the political culture of Pakistan temporal political considerations have usually been downplayed in favour of the religious considerations. Appeasement of religious elements has led to the secession of East Pakistan and the minoritization of Ahmadi/Qadiani sect and the same end for the Shia. The Islamic penal laws threatened the Shia in terms of their interpretation of the Quran and the Islamic economic laws, enforcing zakat and ushr, imposed a disability on the Shia for being Shia. The first stone of Shia politics began by the military
regime General Zia-ul-haq who forced the Shias to take into account their doctrinal, social and political interests distinct and separate from the Islamic interest of Sunni majority. The politics of Shia in the sense of being the politics of this sect by its members for the advancement of its own causes and developments and with this, the zakat ordinance is passed which is universally applicable to all Muslims of Pakistan irrespective of their religious beliefs. The implementation of fiqh jafariya had become an article of faith that would establish a legal basis for the Shia to be recognized as a legitimate part of Islamic community and as full citizens of Pakistan. Pandey (1997) describes the minorities in the global context giving historical overview of development of minority phenomenon. The development of minority phenomenon accentuated only after emergence of nationalism in the post renaissance period particularly since French revolution. He presents a theoretical model for analyzing ethnic group relations consisting of four dimensions; demography, assimilation, power relation and value system dimension. The question of national identity was sifted along with the identity problem of major religious communities in India and emerging identity problem situations. The issue of minorities was then scrutinized in relation to nationalism and secessionism in terms of language, tribe and religion. Lastly he highlights the various perilous situations threatening Indian society like ethnicity and social stratification, renaissance of ethnic identity, emergence of ethnic conflict, balkanization of society, economic deprivation and exploitation, political powerlessness, educational deprivation and national integration and concludes that subordination of some groups is by no means confined to any particular society; it is too much to say that it occurs with varying intensity on every continent and is virtually in every country of any great size.

Kareem (2007) uses secondary source to provide data on employment of Minorities in government, public and private Sector. He highlights the employment levels of various religious minorities and their representation in government services and autonomous bodies like defense services, profession of medicine, wholesale business and observes that the representation of Muslims is extremely low compared to Christians, Jains, Sikhs, Buddhists and Parsees which are other religious minorities present in India. In addition the author suggests some measures to promote employment such as reservation, regional resource centers etc. Ahmad (2007) describes the governance of minorities in Indian society within the structure of democracy. Minorities are prone to feeling challenged in democratic governance founded on the principle of majority rule. It assumes that any elected majority has a legitimate right to rule over the minority, as majority opinion is considered to be right. But the government by majority is seldom fair. This is more so because minority has little share in political decision-making. This is what he calls ‘majoritariarism’ by which nation hegemony is constructed thereby denying the minorities, representation and participation in governance. In a democratic polity, it is possible that those enjoying the support and confidence of minority group will act as representatives on its behalf. But this is based on the bonds of trust that exist between minority and majority groups. But the capacity to trust the majority to address minority concerns equitably has been seriously damaged in recent years. There would be a mutual obligation to locate modes of discourse, which will open-up the possibility of intercultural understanding and ensure participation.
of minorities in governance. Khan (2012) understood how globalization has impacted the higher education of Muslims and Dalits in India in a comparative and historic perspective. His study shows how Dalits across India has utilized the process of globalization and achieved educational and social mobility higher than Muslims. This has put the double burden and deprivation imposed by the Globalization on the Indian Muslims because of lack of overall educational development among the community and alienation from the whole process. Thus Muslims in India as a homogeneous community is behind all other communities in higher educational attainment, and how scheduled castes in India have made progress in the higher educational attainment, higher than Muslims in the context of globalization and their social mobility through the higher educational mobility in the post-globalized India with the help of protective discrimination policy.

Objectives:

1. To highlight the specific cultural attributes of Shia women of Kashmir;
2. To find out the cultural traditions and customs among Shia Muslim women of Kashmir;
3. To suggest some measures for reframing the culture in the phase of global culture.

Methodology:
Keeping in view the above objectives of the study primary sources of data collection was utilized. The sample was selected by simple random sampling method. Interview schedule were the main tool of data collection comprising of both open ended as well as closed ended questions based on the different variables

Findings of Study:
Culture is macro-concept. It is definitive of human society in which many or all people think in the same ways. Bourdieu pioneered the concept of cultural capital which consists of familiarity with particular types of culture or activities can act as powerful barrier to or facilitator of social mobility. The relationship to social mobility is that cultural knowledge, goods and experiences can help to bridge access to social groups and ownership of it can bring power and social advantage. Cultural knowledge and familiarity may thus act as a hidden barrier to social progress for those that do not possess it or for those that are associated with the wrong forms of cultural capital. The literature discusses religious faith as one form of cultural capital found that religious differences were linked to class, status power and prestige. It includes possession of particular skills, practices, characteristics and behaviors associated with a particular group. Thus the study aimed to explain the potential linkages between cultural capital and social mobility to provide a model for understanding the patterns of meaning that human societies create.

The study discloses that 100 percent of respondents are visiting Imambads and attending Marsiyas as well as Majlis. There is no variation regarding the specified variables of study. The variation is only regarding the days of visiting, a significant percentage (34.33 percent) of respondents visit Imambads regularly from first to fourteenth Muharram. Most of the respondents (59 percent) visit from seventh to tenth Muharram and
Table 1: Visiting Imamabads/ Marsiyas/Majlis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Visiting</th>
<th>Area of residence</th>
<th>Age (in years)</th>
<th>Income groups</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>15-30</td>
<td>31-50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>150</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total no of respondents</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imamabads</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>150</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marsiyas/ Majlis</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Field study

a minor percentage (6.67 percent) only on tenth Muharram. This signifies culture as stagnant and homogeneous system, bonded, isolated and stubbornly resistant.

Table 2: Charities/Donations (in the form of edibles and money)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Charities/Donations</th>
<th>Area of residence</th>
<th>Age (in years)</th>
<th>Income groups</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>15-30</td>
<td>31-50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>150</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total no of respondents</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>106</td>
<td>134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(84.88)</td>
<td>(85.33)</td>
<td>(70.66)</td>
<td>(89.33)</td>
<td>(95.33)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1.33)</td>
<td>(3.11)</td>
<td>(6.66)</td>
<td>(0)</td>
<td>(0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occasionally</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Field study
The study reveals that 85.11 percent of respondents regularly pay charities and donations in the form of rice, variety of dishes, sweet dishes especially halwa tea, juice, fruits etc. in which above 50 age group constitutes the highest proportion and 15-30 age groups the lowest. There is little difference regarding the economic status and area of residence of respondents. Thus the identity of minority is anticipated rather than enforced and allotted. The minority represents the universal, while also reclaiming the specific.

In the dressing pattern 74.66 percent of respondents prefer black dress whereas only 25.33 percent respondents prefer any colour. The study indicates that the wearing black dress pattern is going up across generations while as preference of any colour goes down. This signifies culture as adaptive in a state of constant change and rife with internal conflicts and inconsistencies.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dress pattern</th>
<th>Area of residence</th>
<th>Age (in years)</th>
<th>Income groups</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>15-30</td>
<td>31-50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total no of respondents</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>175 (77.77)</td>
<td>161 (71.55)</td>
<td>139 (92.66)</td>
<td>103 (68.66)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Any colour</td>
<td>50 (22.22)</td>
<td>64 (28.44)</td>
<td>11 (7.33)</td>
<td>47 (31.33)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Field study
Table 4: Customs and traditions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Customs and Traditions</th>
<th>Area of residence</th>
<th>Age (in years)</th>
<th>Income groups</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>15-30</td>
<td>31-50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total no of respondents</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No marriage ceremonies</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(100)</td>
<td>(100)</td>
<td>(100)</td>
<td>(100)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No new business establishments</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(100)</td>
<td>(100)</td>
<td>(100)</td>
<td>(100)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No new construction</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(100)</td>
<td>(100)</td>
<td>(100)</td>
<td>(100)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Field study

The study illustrates depicts that the traditions and customs remain bastions of established social practices and the claim of religious freedom are employed in an attempt to stem the tide of established customs and traditions. The present study deconstructs the “homogenization” of cultures by the process of globalization and shows how minorities are resilient towards homogenization and repressible towards cultural identity. Thus the sign of global homogenization is at static pace in the community which hinders their social adjustment at large level of society. Thus there is need of alteration in norms and value system dimension so as to be a part of global system.
Table 5: Norms and values

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Norms and values</th>
<th>Area of residence</th>
<th>Age (in years)</th>
<th>Income groups</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>15-30</td>
<td>31-50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total no of respondents</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uncombed hair</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(100)</td>
<td>(100)</td>
<td>(100)</td>
<td>(100)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No jewellers</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(100)</td>
<td>(100)</td>
<td>(100)</td>
<td>(100)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Field study

Conclusion:

Culture connotes as a relatively static and homogenous system, bounded isolated and stubbornly resistant. Attending the Majlis is the static feature of community. Many of the practices defended in the name of culture impinge on women rights. The patriarchal practices such as father’s and brother’s control and husband’s right to obedience are widely prevalent in the community. The dress pattern of women in the community speaks intersection between traditional culture and religious norms. There seems minute amount of mobility among women of three generation in attending Majlis, praying, wearing Burqa and dress pattern. However, attitudinal differences are between the highly educated respondents and less educated respondents. The inferiority feeling is prevalent among some women which prevents their educational attainment and consequently contributed to their low rate of occupational and cultural mobility. It is only at the level of right of individual women to consent to living under patriarchal norms that autonomy must be respected, since it is only at the individual level that the systematic impact of patriarchal authority in the community can be avoided. Thus where there is clash between cultural practices or religious norms and the right to gender equality, it is the right to gender equality that must have normative hegemony but the practice is totally different in the community which proved that decline in their social mobility has become a source of alienation and an obstacle in the social adjustment at larger level of society. Hence there is need to rethink, reflect on and reshape our culture to make it a part of the global culture at large. The issue of
globalization is signified by the word “diversity” in approach there are also diverse impacts. The study agrees with the theoretical model of Pandey who gave four dimensions; demography, assimilation, power relation and value system dimension in studying majority-minority relations.

References


Kustow, Michael, 2001, theatre@risk. London: Methuen


The Juxtaposition of Antagonistic Urban Landscapes: Rural-Urban Interface in South African Cities

Ngoako Johannes Mokoele1

Abstract: Unprecedented urbanisation has been a global character during the 21st century. During the apartheid era in South Africa, the rate of urbanisation was controlled which limited the invasion of black people into the city centre. However, with the relaxation of urbanisation policies, the country witnessed an unmatched invasion of black people into the city centre in the quest to access various resources. The inability of the new urbanites to access resources, many people resorted to land invasion to access public land illegally. The urban corridors were immediately harbouring a dye, ugly and unplanned antagonistic new urban character. Consequentially, cities in developing countries portrays the juxtaposition of antagonistic urban landscapes – rurality and urbanity interface. The ruralisation of urban centres in the midst of all the development framework question the applicability of urban planning theory in addressing the rurality within the cities. The paper argues that without good governance structure and effective urban planning model, rurality in an urban context will continue to characterise most South Africa cities. The paper concludes that the dearth of a clear strategy poses a deleterious ramification in the quest to resolve informality that local government are confronted in urban areas.

Key words: urbanisation; informal settlements; ruralisation; rurality-urbanity interface

Introduction

Globally, urbanisation is not a new phenomenon within the mobility and urban studies, and it can be coined back during the hunter-gatherer (nomads) era (Lee, 1972; Price and Brown, 1985). Therefore, the movement of people remain an important field of research in understanding the rural and urban interface. Developing countries such as South Africa continue to face an unmatched movement of people from rural areas and international migrants into the city centres. The densification of urban population continues to trouble most urban planners to plan for and manage urbanisation (Allan, 2009; Roy, 2009; Darkey and Visagie, 2013) due to its complexity. This densification of urban population has fuelled the increasing socio-economic problems such as housing deficit, urban poverty, congestion and informality within an urban context. Notwithstanding the densification population which perpetuate informality, market orientated

1 University of Limpopo, South Africa. Email: ngoako.mokoele@ul.ac.za
growth play a major part in relegating people into informality (Steyn, 2007), and thus forced them to reside in informal settlements. Informal settlements are characterised by lack of water provision, sanitation, waste removal and planned structures.

Despite the attainment of democracy in South Africa, the aspiration of informal settlement dwellers to realise this democratic state remain vague and unattainable (Darkey and Visagie, 2013). Despite the political liberation that enabled poor South Africans the right to vote, the fruits of democracy have not cascaded down to the poor, particularly those residing in informal settlements. High poverty, informality and lack of proper services characterised urban sitting as rurality. "Although the promises of the Freedom Charter were reiterated at the ANC’s (African National Congress) 50th National Conference as fundamentally transforming the South African economy, in order to empower black people, especially Africans (collectively, as well as communities and as individuals); eliminate poverty and the extreme inequalities generated by the apartheid system, for many residents in townships such as Mamelodi, as well as in poor rural communities, urban slums and informal settlements; very little improvement in the quality of life has been realised since the democratisation process began in 1994" (Darkey and Visagie, 2013: 302). The increasing level of urban poverty, lack of waste disposal, water and sanitation which characterises informal settlements has resulted in the emergence of a new character of rurality within an urban context. The continuous existence of informal settlement existing alongside formal settlements in urban areas has resulted in the “juxtaposition of contrasting urban landscapes” (Oelofse and Dodson, 1997: 91). However, in order to understand the characteristics of informal settlements, it is imperative to understand its genesis. Regardless of the actualisation of informal settlements in most developing countries, South Africa’s apartheid context provide an interesting character of cities in the new political dispensation.

**Informality as an old character of South Africa cities: apartheid context**

The actuality of informal settlements in South Africa is not a new phenomenon, and can thus be coined back in the late 1800s and early 1900s (Harrison, 1992). Informal settlements initially mushroomed in the city after ex-slaves were emancipated in the 1830s (Harrison, 1992). Durban, Johannesburg and Cape Town are some of the cities that experienced this antagonism in urban areas. Many informal settlements were demolished due to the outbreak of bubonic plague (Harrison, 1992). The demolition of informal settlement was a strategy used during the apartheid government to reduce disease outbreaks, and thus, legislated the control of black people into the city centre. In the expedition to black influx control, the Native Urban Areas Act was promulgated to restrict or control the invasion of black into the city centre (Harrison, 1992). Furthermore, blacks were only allowed to enter urban centres based on the demand by the whites (Groups Area Act, 1950). However, the years between 1939 and 1948 during the World War II witnessed an unmatched urbanisation as there was a great demand for soldiers. Consequently, informal settlements re-emerged, and it was now a new character of South African cities. In 1948, Pretoria was hemmed by the continuous existence of informal settlements along the neighbouring areas (Harrison,
1992). The increasing number of informal settlements within South African cities was now seen a development gap.

Successive governments’ attempt to eradicate informal settlements in Johannesburg were utterly failing. The reason for the failure was uttered by the informal settlement leader saying that: “the Government is like a man who has a cornfield which is invaded by birds. He chases the birds from one part of the field and they move in another part… we as scatters are the birds… we will see whether it is the farmer or the birds who gets tired first” (Harrison, 1992: 15). This farmer and birds chase created a huge development problem for the government to eradicate this antagonistic urban landscape that portrays poverty and wealthy, well planned settlement and poor, dirty, dyer and unplanned once, formality and informality, which are coexisting at the same space.

In the expedition of curb therurality-urbanity interface which portrays this contradicting urban landscape, the government implemented the project to provide housing for informal dwellers. Therefore, by mid-1960, all the informal settlements in South Africa were completely eradicated (Harrison, 1992). Therefore, the government’s fight against informal settlement was finally won. However, the successful eradication of informal settlements was short lived, with the provision of housing in urban areas pulling many black towards the city centre. Consequentially, the densification of black population into the city forced the government to cease the housing projects, thus the re-emergence of informal settlement within an urban areas. Therefore, the proliferation of informal settlements sparked a closer scrutiny in the expedition to solve housing problems within urban areas in South Africa. Some scholars argued that the legalisation of informal settlement can be seen as a nostrum to the housing challenges within the city. In South Africa which is characterised by high unemployment, poverty and illiteracy, informal settlement can now be seen as inevitable development gap. It is cogent that the contemporary urban challenges were bequeath by the apartheid era. The proliferation of informal settlement during the apartheid regime is now a character of South African cities 24 years into the democratic era.

**Democratic policy context in South Africa**

The new democratic government was immediately confronted with a mammoth predicament of addressing housing deficit in urban areas and, thus eradicating the ever-increasing informal settlements (Ndinda, Uzodike and Winnar, 2011; Arguello, Grant, Oteng-Ababio and Ayele, 2013; Darkey and Visagie, 2013). Since the democratisation of South Africa, various pieces of legislative framework have been promulgated to address the house backlog bequeathed by the apartheid regime. The Constitution of South Africa, 1996 (Herein referred to as Constitution) was adopted as a supreme law to afford all citizens with equal rights. Section 26 (1) of the Constitution afford all South African citizen with the right to access adequate housing. Since the adoption of the Constitution, there has been a significant shift in the housing trends from informal
to bricks houses (Ndinda et al., 2011). The Constitution provided a new development trajectory for urban housing trend in addressing informality in urban centres.

In November 1994, the former president of South Africa Mr Nelson Mandela signed a Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) that aims at deepening democracy and eradicate all the injustices bequeathed by the apartheid regime (Reconstruction and Development Policy, 1994). The Constitution and RDP afforded the South African populace with the opportunity to live a place that preserves their human dignity. Therefore, the new democratic government was committed to provide basic services such as water, shelter and food to all South African citizens. Furthermore, since the promulgation of the RDP as a policy that is people centred, many people became the beneficiary in the provision of housing and other basic services. The provision of housing through the RDP has benefited many people poor over the past 24 years. SA News Agency (2014) noted that, in 1994, the housing backlog was on 1.2 million. It further indicated that those people living in informal settlement stood at 1.5 million. SA News Agency (2014) reported that by 2014, RDP has managed to house more 12.6 million poor people regardless of whether they are in rural and urban areas. The rapid population growth in urban area continue to puzzle urban planners (Ogbazi, 2013) in the capacity house the unprecedented invasion of people into urban areas. The densification urban population and the inability of local government to house these new urbanites, condition the proliferation of informal settlements. This proliferation of informal settlement continue to reflect the apartheid battle within a democratic era to address housing challenges in the cities.

Furthermore, the democratic government promulgated National Housing Policy and Subsidy Programme (NHPSP) in 2010 as a way of addressing the housing challenges in South Africa. The vision of NHPSP was to provide for the national sustainable human settlement for all the citizens of South Africa. The programme focused on profiting those people who have never owned fixed residential property. Furthermore, only lawful South African citizenry with certified copies of relevant documents were allowed to make the application. Furthermore, South African government implemented the housing subsidies as a panacea to eradicate informal settlements and shift to brick houses in urban areas (NHPSP, 2010; Ndinda et al., 2011). The eradication of informality within an urban context was imperative in maintaining a “good image” that does not harbour environmental challenges. Since the inception of housing subsidies in 1994, it has sheltered more 2.8 million households (Ndinda et al., 2011). Thus, the housing subsidies has seen the reduction in the proportion of people living in shacks and informal housing structures (African National Congress, 1994; Ndind, 2009; Ndinda et al., 2011).

Contrary to the important milestone in housing the homeless in South Africa, the government continue to chase a moving target in the expedition to eradicate informal settlements. Due to the fact that all this legislative prescribes aim to house only South African citizenry, informal settlements are characterised by people from other countries. Therefore, due to many people from other countries, the plethora of legislative
frameworks does not adequately address this development gap. The lack of resources, capacity and the increment of foreign nationals in South Africa complicate the commitment to eradicate informal settlements. The manifestation of informal settlement in urban areas continue to ruralise urban centres. Regardless of the plethora of legislative framework to combat housing problems in South Africa, informal settlements continue to be a serious character of democratic city.

Local government housing challenges in urban areas
The demise of apartheid regime signalled a renewed hope for better life for all South African citizenry. Local government was immediately confronted with a mammoth challenge to eradicate informal settlement and reduce housing backlog (Housing Development Agency (HDA), 2012; SA News Agency, 2014). According to HDA (2012), informal settlement continue to house about a significant proportion of South African urban population. Local government immediately committed to address this housing problem by providing RDP houses. Twenty-four years into democracy, informal settlements continue to be an underlining character of most South African cities, and other African cities. Contrary to this notion, there has been an unmatched progress to provide housing for the homeless, however, the rapid urbanisation continue to overwhelm the efforts made by urban planners provide equitable houses for the poor. The manifestation of service delivery protests and the distraction of property hinder the achievement to house the poor in urban areas. The manifestation of informal settlements 24 years into democracy connotes that urban planning and governance continue to face a serious predicament. Furthermore, Ogbazi (2013) argued that the conventional planning and management practises have proved ineffective and inefficient in many cities to address the contemporary urban challenges, particularly informal settlements. Twenty-four years and counting, the fight against informal settlement and ruralisation of urban centres continue to evade most urban planners.

Over the years, one of the most pressing challenge that local government are confronted with, is the increasing number of undocumented foreign internationals. The foreign internationals residing in informal settlements create a huge predicament and fuel the government’s inability to provide housing and eradicate informal settlements in South Africa. The multifaceted or convoluted challenges that urban planning is facing, is tied to their financial deficits within local municipalities which is answerable for the manifestation of informal settlements. Furthermore, finance is an important factor in dealing with informal settlement for those provinces that are doing well (African National Congress, 1994; Ndinda, 2009; Ndinda et al., 2011). Those provinces without clear path in resolving the perpetuation of informal settlements appear to be failing to deal with the proportion of informal dwellers within the country (Ndinda et al., 2011). The availability of resources, both capital and human resources provide an avenue in dealing with the problems confronting local government.
Antagonistic urban sceneries: rural-urban interface

Steyn (2007) and Ngetich, Opata, Mwasi, Obiri and Meli (2015) posited that informal settlement portrays various alleys, lanes and small patches of open ground. The layout is informal and organic, but certainly not amorphous, organised by the distorted grid of lanes and alleys. Student architects trained to appraise ambience and environment have commented on the ‘rural feel’ and ‘sense of place’ within urban areas. This phenomenon was sensitised by Matthews and Kazimée quoted in Steyn (2007: 72) indicating that "in Third-World cities, we no longer see urbanisation of the rural migrants, but rather a growing ruralisation of the cities". The densification of urban population at a face value, can be seen as increasing the informality in urban areas. Contrary to the notion of informality, there is an emergence of a deeper meaning of rurality in the cities. The proliferation of informal settlements demonstrates the faltering democracy because of the country’s inability to shelter for all its citizenry. The persistence of informal settlements in cities creates a problem of ruralisation of urban centres (Ndinda et al., 2011; Ngetich et al., 2015). These phenomenon of rurality in an urban context remain a serious development issue in the cities (Gxowa-Dlayedwa, 2006; Steyn, 2007). Consequently, the eruption of informal settlementshas resulted in the increasing environmental problems such as pollution, land degradation, congestion and spread of communicable diseases. Therefore, the proliferation of informal settlements has changed the complexion of most cities in South Africa, thus perpetuate the ruralisation of urban centres (Steyn, 2007).

Informal settlements, though often pronounced by diverse appellations of low income and unplanned settlement (UN-HABITAT, 2003 cited in Agunbiaide, Olajde and Bishi, 2015), is a spatial construction of the living condition that portrays a certain character of a rural setting. Furthermore, these spatial construction of the living condition “do not conform to formal planning and legal rules, standards and institutional arrangements in the cities, and are often characterised by lack or limited access to one or more of the following five conditions: water, sanitation, durable housing sufficient living area and security of tenure” (Agunbiaide et al., 2015: 1046). The phenomenon that is characterised by lack of water, sanitation, durable housing, and the security of tenure (Steyn, 2007, Agunbiaide et al., 2015; Ngetich et al., 2015) and most in particular unplanned coupled with urbanisation should be viewed from the rurality perspective. The concept of land invasions, squatting and informal settlements present an important and inevitable re-ordering of space in the process of post-apartheid social restructuring, that the poor will continue to ‘make their own geographies’, and that this must simply be accepted and managed by the urban authorities (Oelofse and Dodson, 1997). The re-ordering of the urban spaces has created the antagonistic urban sceneries. Urban areas are now facing the two divergent elements of informality and formality that coexisting in the same space. On one hand, urban landscape portrays a clean, well planned, serviced, appealing space which remain the main element of the city. However, alongside the well planned, clean, serviced and appealing spaces, exist an unplanned, unappealing space and informality that holds the characteristics of rural areas (Raveesh, 2014, Agunbiaide et al., 2015; Ngetich et al., 2015). Consequently, the rurality and urbanity interface. Due to the proliferation of informal settlements in urban
sitting, this has created multiple problems in the city such as crime, spread of diseases and environmental problems.

The economic deficit resulted in the inability of the industrial sector to increase the employment opportunities to cater for the increasing urban population. The “deficit tends to impede efforts of providing planned plots for housing and basic services” (UN-Habitat, 2009 cited in Sakijeg et al., 2014: 1). Consequently, the urban deficit has significantly contributed to the progression of informal settlements, thus question the planning ideology to effectively manage urbanisation. Drawing from an international experience, “the situation is worse in capital cities; for instance, 60% of inhabitants in Jakarta, Indonesia lived in informal settlements (commonly known as urban kampungsin Bahasa, Indonesia) by 2006 (UN-Habitat, 2006). The situation is even direr in the city of Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, where 80% of all residential houses in urban areas are found in informal settlements” (Harrison, 1992; Sakijege et al., 2014: 1). The envisaged urban landscape is clouded by the increasing rurality that portrays antagonistic image.

As indicated above, the manifestation of informality and the inability of an industrial sector to absorb the surplus of labour resulted in increasing poverty, unemployment, congestion and lack of services such as water, sanitation, and waste removal, infrastructure (roads and clinics). Urban setting is portraying the juxtaposition of two divergentsceneries where rurality and urbanity interface. Ruralisation of urban centres is increasingly becoming a persistence phenomenon in the 21 century. Therefore, the increasing informality and mushrooming of informal settlement painted a new image which is remote to the conventional understanding of the image of the cities. With regard to the increment of industrialisation in the cities, rurality now emerges as one of the defining character of urban landscape. Furthermore, urban centre harboured a vast amount of informal sector (informal trading) which was viewed as a nostrum to escalating poverty in urban areas. Informality and informal settlements provide a contrasting image to the notion rooted within an urban setting.

Paradigm shift within local government

Urbanisation has been labelled as a complex phenomenon (Portugali, 2006) to plan for and manage in order to address the challenges that cities are confronted with on a daily basis. Cities hold both social and economic opportunities for most people, however, the management of urbanisation continue to evade urban planning. The conventional planning practises which most were inherited from the colonial system failed to provide solutions to the continuous rising in informal settlements and its deep inherent nature of rurality in it (Ogbazi, 2013). South African government has legislated that every municipality must come up with an Integrated Development Plan (IDP) as a planning tool to provide services and address the development challenges. However, since the inception of IDP in South Africa, housing the urban poor remains the hard nut to crack.
Therefore, the eradication of informal settlements requires a shift in planning paradigm. It was argued that planning has become an important tool in shaping the policy formulation and the growth of a city. In Britain, planning has been viewed as an area of public policy which is rooted and front-loaded from an evidence base perspective (Davoudi, 2015). The evidence base perspective articulates the important of the acquisition of evidence about the areas prior the preparation of the development plan. It was argued that the acquisition of evidence has the capacity to improve planning and eradicate informal settlements in urban areas. Furthermore, it was argued that the acquisition of evidence provide a sound planning. “This view perpetuates the Geddesian dictum of ‘survey before plan’ and assumes a linear and unproblematic process that begins with the collection of often descriptive data and ends with a blueprint” (Davoudi, 2015: 317). In most cases, the policy implementation and impact on the eradication of informal settlement remains to seen on the ground. The 2013 census report on informal settlements indicates that there are approximately 1,29,777 households which continue to house more than 3,306,697 individuals (Housing Development Agency (HDA), 2013). This shows that despite the implementation of IDP, there is a perennial existence of informal settlement in urban areas. Furthermore, it is predicated that better evidence has the potentiality to promote better policy (Davoudi, 2015).

In contrast, evidence alone does not provide sufficient insight in addressing the urban development problems. The acquisition of evidence and planning as a practice of knowing provide a new paradigm in understanding the entrenched predicament that condition the manifestation of informal settlement. The planning theory views knowledge as a bottom-up approach which provides a formidable force for addressing the informal settlement. Davoudi (2015) pay attention to the practise of knowing as an important element that planners needs to address urban problems.

Instead of thinking about knowledge as having an instrumental place in the planning process (i.e. to inform action), it is more useful to think about planning as a process of knowing and learning. This means articulating knowledge and action as recursively interlinked rather than considering the former as a precondition to, or coming before, the latter in a linear, causal chain…. To conceive of planning as practice of knowing requires an understanding of the complex interrelationship between knowing what (cognitive/theoretical knowledge), knowing how (skills/technical knowledge), knowing to what end (moral choices) and doing (action/practice). Together, these multiple forms of knowing provide the foundation for the art of practical judgement (wisdom) (Davoudi, 2015: 317-318).

Therefore, these provide an important insight in understanding planning of a complex phenomenon such as the eradication of informal settlements and addressing urban problems. According to Davoudi (2015), the sources of knowledge as a basis of planning can be viewed from different perspective such as empiricist and rationalist perspective. For empiricists the source of knowledge lies in the bottom-up (inductive), specific observations which can then lead to generalisation and theory building. For rationalists, knowledge comes from top-down (deductive) theories and laws which can then lead to hypotheses and their confirmation or refutation. The application of empiricist view provides important solutions to the perpetuation of informal settlements which can be rooted in the understanding to the real issues regarding residing there.
Bottom up approach can be an important approach to unlock and dislodge the entrenched predicament of this antagonistic urban areas.

The enforcement of policy has been viewed as an important framework to shape and address the image of the city (Shen, Ochao, Shah and Zhang, 2011). The growth patterns of the city are shaped by a robust and knowledge base policy direction. In China and other developed countries have implemented urban villages to redress and mitigate the emergence of informal settlement (Shen et al., 2011, Shen and Zhou, 2014; Zhang, 2015). These indicate that with a robust policy that target the structure of the city can have a profound impact in redressing the development challenges in urban areas. The policy should focus on the bottom up approach to capture the fundamental reasons behinds the emergence informal settlements. The urban planning should focus on knowing as a bottom up approach and integrated planning. However, during the apartheid era, many policies were implemented to control the emergence of informal settlements, but led to their perennial existence. One of the factors the contributed to the perennial existence of informal settlements during the apartheid era regardless of all this contingencies is the discriminatory and forceful control of black population in urban areas. This led to continuous 'cat and mouse chase' in the expedition to solve informal settlements. Therefore, a more collaborative, democratic and inclusive strategy is required to address rurality in an urban context.

The question is: can the legalisation of informal settlement act as panacea to the housing problem in urban areas or will it propel their existence? Can South Africa win the fight against housing backlog within the current economic climate? Can these challenges facing urban population be eradicated against the background of high unemployment and inequality? This are the questions that needs to be addressed if the fight against informal settlements and ruralisation of urban areas needs to be won. The different approaches of addressing informal settlements connote that, provinces are confronted with unique demographic challenges in addressing the rurality and urbanity interface. The provision of title deed to qualifying informal settlers will help to reduce that number of people residing in informal settlements (IMIESA, 2015). Contrary, the provision of title deeds my serve as a pulling factor and increasing complexity of management of urbanisation. Title deeds as a panacea to informal settlements should be reviewed. In order to provide a sustained settlement, the incorporation of people as part of participatory governance system provide an important form of knowledge acquisition for planning. Regardless of the manifestation of informal settlements in South Africa, there are some provinces that dearth clear strategies in addressing the housing problems (Ndinda et al., 2011). Of paramount importance, clear provincial strategy hold an important factor in reducing the proportion of informal settlements than those who lack a clear strategy. For provinces to address the manifestation of informal settlements, there are several aspects that are needed to reduce the housing challenges. Collaboration and holistic approach to planning can be seen as new effective planning to curb the aggregation of rurality in urban areas.
Conclusion

The paper highlighted that informal settlement has mushroomed under the market oriented growth of urban sector resulting in the emergence of urban poverty and housing deficit, thus relegating those who are unable to buy, lease, renting and hiring property. The mushrooming of informal settlement has been responsible to the transference of poverty to urban areas. Urbanisation remain the most complex and difficult to plan and manage in mitigating the emergence of urban environmental problems. With regard to the failure of the conventional urban planning that is rooted in the colonial era, the shift in planning paradigms must be inevitable. Thus, in order to address urban challenges, planning has to be rooted in the notion of knowing as a basis of planning paradigm. Bottom up approach in acquiring knowledge as the basis of providing an effective planning and management of informal settlement and other environmental problems. The paper concludes that the proliferation informal settlement coupled with lack of capacity to effectively planning, cities will continue faces various problems associated with urban centres such as crime, unplanned, dirty, land degradation, informality and most in particular ruralisation of cities. Furthermore, dearth of a clear strategy poses a deleterious ramifications in the expedition to resolve the delinquencies of informal settlements that local government are confronted with in urban areas. Further, the paper concludes that within the current economic climate characterised by high unemployment and inequality, informal settlements will continue to characterise urban centres, thus rurality-urbanity interface with remain an entrenched character of South African cities.

References


Breaking the Traditional Trap: Improving Food and Nutrition Security through Science Technology and Innovation in Zimbabwe

J Tinarwo¹ and D E Uwizeyimana²

Abstract: There is a growing realisation on the importance science, technology and innovation (STI) in improving agriculture and ultimately food and nutrition security. Nevertheless, in spite of the recognition that STImatters, current literature on its contribution to improved food and nutrition security in developing countries is relatively scant. With most developing countries at various levels of socio-economic fragility, STI offers some options to realise the untapped potential of agriculture that is essential in enhancing food and nutrition security, ending hunger and malnutrition and ultimately attain socioeconomic transformation. Improving of food and nutrition security through STI is being ushered as a better approach and it strives to deliver innovation, boost agriculture production and action needed to achieve sustainable development. STI are key drivers of economic and social development. Inherently, if STI policies are well integrated into national development strategies combined with institutional and organizational changes can help raise agriculture productivity, improve the country competitiveness, support faster growth and create jobs. This article analyses how to improve food and nutrition security through Science, Technology and Innovation in Zimbabwe.

Keywords: Food and nutrition security, science and technology policy, biotechnology, Zimbabwe

Introduction and background of the study

The world is under intense pressure to fight food and nutrition insecurity. In fact, an estimated number of the undernourished people increased to 815 million in 2016, up from 777 million in 2015 (FAO, 2017: 1). In essence, world is facing the greatest test of how to feed the projected 10 billion by 2050 (AfDB, 2016:2). Despite the commitments by world governments to achieve zero hunger by 2030 under the ambitious Sustainable Development Goals, hunger proves to be a major challenge. Bain et al, (2013:4) argues that developing countries including Sub-Saharan Africa host the majority of the hungry people.

¹ School of Public Management, Governance and Public Policy, University of Johannesburg
² School of Public Management, Governance and Public Policy, University of Johannesburg. Email: Dominiqueu@uj.ac.za
Zimbabwe continues to face food and nutrition security challenges, which, if left unchecked will have negative impact on national development (FNC, 2013: ix). Food and nutrition security is a complex condition thus calling for concerted effort to address it. Profoundly, for the world to achieve food and nutrition security, Science Technology and Innovation (STIs) must be given a top priority UNCTAD (2017:8). Inherently, STIs hostsa lot of opportunities capable for improving food and nutrition security hence leading to socioeconomic transformation (ACBF 2017: viii). Science Technology and Innovation (STI) has entered the policy domain of many institutions and has the potential to increase agricultural productivity, reducing poverty, and improving food and nutrition security (UNESCO 2015:8). Many countries and institutions strive for STI-led development in recent years and it is regarded as an enabler for socioeconomic transformation.

Zimbabwe is confronted by multiple food and nutrition insecurity that could threaten human survival if not addressed. The country needs to increase food production and move away from subsistence production and weak productivity. Global experiences suggest that the attainment of food and nutrition security requires high and sustained growth, underpinned by enhanced agriculture productivity (AfDB, 2016:3). Inherently, a comprehensive transformation of the agriculture sector in Zimbabwe towards high food production requires investments in science technology and innovation in order to improve the productivity of land and especially labour (e.g. new tools, improved seed, water control, fertilizers) including innovation in the commercialization of agriculture products (AEC, 2016:4). It is imperative for farmers to be given incentives to adopt new technologies by making them affordable in order to raise food production and eventually improve food and nutrition security. If properly embraced, science technology and innovation would raise food production in Zimbabwe and ultimately improve food and nutrition security which will result in socioeconomic transformation.

In Zimbabwe the impacts of climate change and variability are becoming more evident with increased incidences of droughts, floods, hailstorms, more hot days and heat waves. Ideally, climate change is one of the biggest threats to food and nutrition security with the developing countries being more vulnerable due to their low adaptive capacity (ACBF, 2012). Climate change has been widely recognized and accepted as a reality and that it poses serious problems with far reaching social, political, economic and environmental consequences, particularly in vulnerable (GoZ, 2014:3). The impacts of Climate Change in Zimbabwe are likely to stall the country’s development, pose a serious risk to food and nutrition security thus calling for measures to mitigate and arrest the situation. STI provides a window of opportunities through climate-smart solutions including the use of precision agriculture and early warning systems (UNCTAD 2017:3).

Application of STI strategies such as genetic modification, methods for improving soil fertility, and irrigation technologies has the potential to improve food and nutrition security (UNCTAD 2017:3). In fact, post-harvest and agro-processing technologies can address food accessibility while bio-fortification can make food more nutritious. Moreover, STI approaches such as artificial biology, synthetic intelligence and tissue engineering may have potential implications for the future of crop and livestock agriculture thereby improving food and
nutrition security. Nonetheless, the potential of STI for food and nutrition security transformation entails investments in research and development, human capital, infrastructure and knowledge flows.

The analysis in this article is based on the case study of Zimbabwe to understand how food and nutrition security is realised through the use of science, technology and innovation. The next section of the article covers the objectives while section III covers the literature review, the methodology and conceptual framework to identify and study the STI mechanisms for achieving food and nutrition security. The article concludes with a discussion on the results the policy implications as well as the concluding remarks respectively.

Literature Review

According to ACBF (2017:1) the term STI encompasses all systematic activities that are closely concerned with the generation, advancement, dissemination and application of scientific and technical knowledge in all fields of science and technology - the natural sciences, engineering, medical and agricultural sciences, and the social sciences and humanities. On the other hand FAO (2016:1) argues that, ‘Food security exists when all people, at all times, have physical, social and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food to meet their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life’. Food and nutrition security is when all people at all times have physical, social and economic access to food, which is consumed in sufficient quantity and quality to meet their dietary needs and food preferences, and is supported by an environment of adequate sanitation, health services and care, allowing for a healthy and active life (FAO 2017:3). There is in fact a mutual relationship between food and nutrition security and science technology and technology in ensuring socioeconomic transformation as the later can increase the former.

Historical Development of Science, Technology and Innovation in Zimbabwe

Science, Technology and Innovation footprints can be traced back to the period before country’s 1980 independence. Hove and Zinyama (2012:10) argues that the Zimbabwean government set the STI policy proposals in the Growth with Equity policy pronouncement of 1981. It is in this blue print where the government announced its intention to come up with a clear national STI policy (UNESCO 2014:89). Zimbabwe launched its first Science and Technology policy in 2002 with the main objective of providing a comprehensive framework that could promote STI and harness it to economic development. The policy also sought to co-ordinate and direct research and development activities in the country. Moreover, in the same year the government of Zimbabwe established a Department of Science and Technology in the Office of the President and Cabinet with the main objective of enhancing national economic growth and development through systematic application of STI (UNESCO 2014:90). The functions of the Science and Technology Department were to co-ordinate the formulation of STI
development policies, assist the establishment of innovation centres among others promotion of STI and
information, communication and technology (ICT) literacy.

In the year 2005 the government established a stand-alone Ministry of Science and Technology
Development and it strived to make STI an integral part of both individual and national development. The
Ministry had the following STI related departments: Science, Technology and Innovation, Research,
Development and Innovation and Commercialisation of Research, Development and Innovation. This
development led to the creation of the Cabinet Committee on Scientific Research, Technology Development
and Application and it comprised several government ministries. The Ministry of Science and Technology
Development launched the Innovation and Commercialisation Fund to promote research and innovation.
In a bid to address the emerging national challenges, the government launched the second STI policy in
2012. This was also in line with the new technological developments in the world. However, after the 2013
harmonised elections, the Ministry of Science and Technology Development was abolished and merged as
a department in the Ministry of Higher and Tertiary Education, Science and Technology Development and
remains there to date.

Key Legislative Architecture of the Science, Technology and Innovation in Zimbabwe

Zimbabwe’s overall Science, Technology and Innovation (STI) regulatory framework is outlined in a number
of key policy documents that include the Agenda 2063, Research Act of 1986 and its subsequent
amendments, the Science, Technology and Innovation Policy of 2002 and its upgraded policy of 2012, the

Agenda 2063

In an endeavour to achieve region’s vision, Africa have emphasised STI as a vital pillar to realise
socioeconomic transformation. African leaders including Zimbabwe have adopted the Science, Technology
and Innovation Strategy for Africa (STISA-2024) at the 23rd Ordinary Session of the African Union Heads
of State and Government in 2014. This 10-year strategic frameworks for Agenda 2063 seeks to transform
African governments an innovation-led, knowledge-driven economy. AUAC 2014 in ACBF (2017:4) argues
that STISA-2014 strives to provide a focus on improving Africa’s STI status in human capital, technical
competence, infrastructure, the enabling environment, innovation, and entrepreneurial mind-sets.

Research Act 1986

The Research Act was first signed in 1986 and amended six times to date in line with the developments in
the area of research and development. This Act is crucial because it led to the establishment of the
Research Council of Zimbabwe. It confers on the Council the functions and powers relating to the
promotion, direction, supervision and co-ordination of research. The Research Act also seeks to provide
for the establishment of research councils and research institutes and for the control of such research
councils and research institutes. The Act also provide for the registration of foreign researchers; and also
to provide for matters connected with or incidental to the foregoing.

Science, Technology and Innovation Policy

The enactment of the first Science, Technology and Innovation Policy was done in 2002 and was later
upgraded in 2012 by taking into account the new technological developments and also the emerging
national challenges. The Science and Technology Policy underscore the need to mainstream science in all
sectors of the economy and ensure that Zimbabweans benefit from acquisition and utilization of available
technology in improving the quality of their lives. This policy also aims at developing a more effective
innovative system of partnering all institutions involved in creating new knowledge, producing new
innovations and diffusing them to the benefit of the people of Zimbabwe and our region at large. The Policy
presents six primal goals through which all efforts should be channelled. These are:

- Strengthen capacity development in STI.
- Learn and utilize emergent technologies to accelerate development.
- Accelerate Commercialization of Research Results.
- Search for scientific solutions to global environmental challenges.
- Mobilize resources and Popularize science and technology.
- Foster international collaboration in STI.

The Biotechnology Policy Framework

Zimbabwe’s regulatory framework on biosafety dates back to the early 1990s when the country’s scientists
approached the then Scientific Liaison Office in the Office of the President and Cabinet requesting that
Government put in place legal measures to manage breakthroughs in modern biotechnology. Government
with support from donors developed a comprehensive national policy on biotechnology and its safe use
was developed (2005) and a new Act of Parliament – the National Biotechnology Authority Act passed into
law in 2006. The current national biotechnology regulatory regime (National Biotechnology Authority Act of
2006 and its supporting guidelines, regulations and standards) was developed as a means to implement
the biotechnology and biosafety provisions contained in the National Biotechnology Policy and other
national policy documents, and also to repeal earlier biosafety legal arrangements (The Research
(Biosafety) Regulations of 2000). This Act transformed the Biosafety Board into the National Biotechnology
Authority with the following functions:
To regulate biotechnology research and development in Zimbabwe.

- To enforce standards and any regulations pertaining to biotechnology and its safe use.
- To champion all national efforts towards biotechnology research, development and management.
- To administer the Biotechnology Fund.
- To manage the National Biosafety Clearing House.

**The Information Communication Technology Policy Framework.**

This Information and Communication Technology Policy is a culmination of a review of the 2005 National ICT Policy. The policy seeks to exploit the potential of ICTs in all sectors of the economy for sustainable socio-economic development in Zimbabwe. The National ICT Policy aims to develop an enabling environment for the creation of a knowledge based society that transgresses across all levels of the society. To this end the policy is guided by the following objectives:

a) Facilitate the provision and maintenance of infrastructural facilities necessary for ICT development;

b) Embark on extensive capacity building and training programmes to provide adequate supply of qualified ICT personnel and knowledge workers in all sectors;

c) Establish institutional mechanisms and procedures for determining sectoral application priorities;

d) Promote, support and enhance the development and use of ICTs, and ensure equitable access to benefits offered by ICTs across all sectors of society;

e) Promote the research and development of local ICTs to compete with international products;

f) Establish the necessary governance and regulatory structures that facilitate ICT development and adaptation across all sectors of society;

g) Protect consumers during the dispensation of the rapid adoption and diffusion of ICTs; and

h) Promote Regional Integration in the development and use of ICTs.

**Mapping Key Science Technology and Innovation Institutions in Zimbabwe**

There are numerous policy-oriented organisations, both Zimbabwean and international, working on different programs that aim to enhance science, technology and innovation.
The Office of the President and Cabinet (OPC).

The OPC sits at the helm of science, technology and innovation system in Zimbabwe. In fact, the OPC is mandated to provide strategic policy direction, coordination, monitoring, advisory oversight to all government departments and ministries involved in science, technology and innovation. The OPC is responsible for planning and realisation of efficient delivery of science, technology and innovation in all government ministries and departments. However, there is often duplication of functions between the OPC and the Department of Science Technology and Innovation Development in the Ministry of Higher Education Science and Technology Development.

The Ministry of Higher Education Science and Technology

The Ministry of Higher Education Science and Technology is the custodian of science technology and innovation in Zimbabwe. The STI role within the ministry lies specifically with the Department of Science, Technology and Innovation. The department is mandated to provide leadership in research, science, technology and innovation in Zimbabwe. This is done through the provision of an enabling environment in terms of policy, legislation combined with co-ordination and monitoring. The functions of the department include the co-ordination of STI project implementation and promotion as well as facilitate technology transfer and strengthening of Intellectual Property Assets for effective knowledge translation. It is also the responsibility of the department to co-ordinate higher and tertiary education, science, technology and innovation policy planning, review, formulation, and implementation to meet the transformational agenda. The ministry also has the responsibility of developing policies and programme for human capital development through tertiary education for the country’s transformational needs. Finally, the ministry also facilitate establishment of bilateral and multilateral collaborative researches and development programmes in the area of science, technology and innovation. Notwithstanding these responsibilities, the ministry suffers from limited funding from the government national purse hence limits the potential to discharge its duties.

The Research Council of Zimbabwe

The Research Council of Zimbabwe was established by the terms of the 1986 Research Act which succeeded the Scientific Liaison Office established in the Prime Minister’s Office in 1967. The Research Council of Zimbabwe is mandated to promote, direct, supervise and co-ordinate research for sustainable development. The Council advises the government on matters related to research for the development of the country. In essence, the council provide an exceptional forum for the interaction and discussion of STI and other researches for the benefit of government, academia and industrialists. It is an established conduit for financial and administrative support for collaborative research among institutions.
Scientific and Industrial Research and Development Centre (SIRDC)

The SIRDC was established by the Government of Zimbabwe in 1993, under the provisions of the Research Act of 1986. The Centre provides technological expertise in the diverse areas in which Zimbabwe's industrial enterprises operate. SIRDC is Zimbabwe's Technology Centre whose responsibilities extend to technology development and transfer to Zimbabwe and regional stakeholders in diverse disciplines that include environment, energy, mining, agriculture, food and biomedical, biotechnology, engineering, informatics, electronics and communication, polymer science, metrology, Geographical Information.

Figure 1: Zimbabwe's Science, Engineering, Technology and Innovation System

Source: UNESCO 2014
Systems (GIS) and remotesensing. In an endeavour to improve Zimbabwe’s science, technology and innovation, SIRDC is responsible to carry out strategic research and development for the benefit of the industry, agriculture, health and mining sectors. The Centre also collaborates with other local and international institutions and universities in strengthening research and development capacity and its application to industrial processes. SIRDC also serve as a repository and disseminator of science, technology and innovation information. This is done by adapting imported technology and innovation into local needs. The Centre operates through eleven institutes which all deals with science, technology and innovation to enhance national development.

The Science, Technology and Innovation System on figure 1 above represent a milestone of innovation in Zimbabwe. This system aims at developing a more effective innovative framework of partnering all institutions involved in creating new knowledge, producing new innovations and diffusing them to the benefit of the people of Zimbabwe and our region at large.

Success Stories of STI in Food and Nutrition Security

Zimbabwe has developed several STI initiatives, including research and development centres across the country. The country presents success stories of STI in food and nutrition security as indicated in Boxes 1, 2 and 3.

**Box 1: A new maize seed variety in Zimbabwe: The Sirdamaize Project**

The Scientific Industrial Research and Development Corporation of Zimbabwe (SIRDC) invented a seed variety, Sirdamaize, which is a drought and disease tolerant, and offers higher yields than traditional strains. In 1997, SIRDC (with support from Biotechnology Trust Zimbabwe, Directorate General International Cooperation of the Netherlands, and International Maize and Wheat Improvement Centre) began work on the drought-tolerant maize varieties. This was a four year-phase project: capacity building “market-assisted selection” (a relatively new molecular biology technique at that time), selection of germplasm, development of inbred lines, and development of hybrids. Molecular biologists conducted tests in SIRDC’s laboratories.

Using molecular biology and conventional breeding techniques, they identified 43 inbred lines as processing drought-tolerant genes. After the hybrid development stage, the variety “Sirdamaize 113” was registered in 2009. Farmers from Buhera Birchenough, and Hwedza assessed it, and found that it yielded well, even under tough environmental conditions. The main characteristic of Sirdamaize 113 is its drought tolerance, while its expected yield is up to 13 tons per hectare (although previous years’ trials in communal areas from region two to region four had a yield of 1.5-9 tons per hectare). The variety has a low athesis-silking interval of about -1, taking 66 days to silking and 67 to anthesis, suggesting improved synchronization for pollination, and thereby guaranteeing yield even under water stressed conditions. Sirdamaize takes 136 days to reach maturity and has a tolerance to disease such as maize streak virus, gray leaf spot, rust, and phaeospharia leaf spot.

*Source: Sovadye and Shiri 2012.*
Box 2: Sorghum miracle in Jambezi District Matabeleland North Province

Small-scale farmer Augustine Sibanda has grown resilient tradition sorghum varieties passed down through generations but has increased his yields after he adopted improved seed varieties developed through research. Sibanda, a farmer in the Jambezi District in semi-arid Matabeleland north province, is passionate about farming and is astute in seeking and applying new knowledge. Sorghum – a hardy but nutritious cereal – is suited to arid conditions such as the southern parts of Zimbabwe. Sibanda says improved sorghum varieties such as Marcia have helped triple his average harvests of 500kg of sorghum per hectare. Sibanda says improved sorghum varieties such as Marcia have helped triple his average harvests of 500kg of sorghum per hectare. Marcia is one of 12 improved sorghum seed varieties developed and released by the Zimbabwe station of the International Crops Research Institute for the Semi-Arid tropics (ICRISAT) through the research collaboration between scientists, public and private sector organisations. Fundamentally, investing in science, technology and innovation will help Zimbabwe meet the ambitious Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and improve food and nutrition security of its citizens.

Busani Bafana : January 2016

Box 3: The EcoFarmer ICT Project

EcoFarmer is a revolutionary way of farming using mobile technology throughout Zimbabwe offered by Econet Wireless Private Limited Company. Farmers using the mobile network receive daily weather information, farming tips and information on when and where to sell, and the best price for their produce. With EcoFarmer productivity is increased and food security improved. Therefore the mobile phone as an information and communication tool is extending agriculture extension services to underserved markets. Through the use of the mobile phone, access to technical and market information contributes to increased yields and income of smallholder farmers and other players in the agricultural value chains. Eco cash a payment instrument which is facilitated through the use of the mobile phone goes a long way in assisting smallholder farmers to make and receive payments. When fully registered and paid daily subscription the farmer gets:

- Daily weather data from a weather station linked to your field.
- Farming and market tips
- Free daily rainfall advice
- Free weekly best farming prices
- Free weekly crop data
- Free monthly market pricing requests
- Crop information
- Credit rating
- Free adverts and marketing links
- Financial linkages

Source: Econet Wireless (2017)
Figure 2: Transformation of Science Technology and Innovation for achieving Food and Nutrition Security

Source: Based on Babu and Blom (2014); Babu (2015)
The Methodological and Conceptual Framework

This article was developed based on a qualitative methodology in order to understand the contributions of science technology and innovation to enhanced food and nutrition security for socioeconomic transformation. The article attempts to trace STI as a critical enabler to unlock the potential of food and nutrition security for sustainable development and socioeconomic enhancement. The author understands that the subject of improved food and nutrition security through STI has entered the policy domain of many institutions and is now globally accepted to the extent that the methodological study of this body of knowledge is possible through systematic analysis and critique. This systematic analysis and critique principally take the form of document and literature as well as theoretical prostitution. Key informants and focus group discussions with officials from the Office of the President and Cabinet, universities and Ministry of Higher and Tertiary Education Science and Technology Development we also done to get the practical realities of the matter under investigation.

Conceptual Framework

This section of the article offers a conceptual framework to explain the pathways of science technology and innovation to improve food and nutrition security. Figure 2 below shows the sequence needed to move from low-level science technology and innovation to high level science technology in order to achieve food and nutrition security critical for social and economic transformation. Concerted effort by all the stakeholders is an essential step for enhancing STI capacity to improve food and nutrition security. Ideally, the role of government is to create an enabling environment by formulating the right policies, creating efficient institutions for implementation and follow-up, offering financial resources and improving investments in human resources.

Results of the article and lessons from the Zimbabwe Case study

The Zimbabwean case study provides several lessons for improving food and nutrition security through science, technology and innovation. The development of STI in Zimbabwe is supported by the high adult literacy rate of 90% in sub-Saharan Africa thus providing a window of opportunities for the development of agriculture and ultimately improving food and nutrition security. Zimbabwe is also endowed with abundant arable land and good climatic conditions that give a comparative advantage over other countries and is projected to among those leading growth in sub-Saharan Africa by 2020 (UNESCO 2014:184). The establishment of the Innovation and Commercialisation Fund in 2005 shows commitment on the part of government towards STI. This is despite the limited funding from the national budget.
The development of STI in Zimbabwe is facing numerous challenges including poor co-ordination and harmonisation. The STI legal and institutional frameworks are fragmented resulting in duplication of functions by the various government ministries and departments. For example, the research priorities proposed by the Research Council of Zimbabwe differ from those articulated by the Ministry of Higher and Tertiary Education and STI policies. The priorities are also different from the research and innovation policies proposed independently by the Ministries of Industry and Commerce; Agriculture; Environment, Water and Climate; Energy and Power Development. Since STI is a cross-cutting issue, it is imperative to have a specific national body with overall responsibility for co-ordinating the policy formulation, design, implementation, funding and assessment of all research and innovation in the country.

The STI system in Zimbabwe comprises of three pillars that is the funders, knowledge generation and users of research results, it remains complex. Through key informant interviews the Deputy Chief Secretary in the Office of the President and Cabinet argues that linking STI system pillars is highly complex. He further stressed that each pillar within the STI system has its own expectations and complications. In effect, is imperative for policy makers to foster collaborations and memorandum of understanding between industry and the academia for science, technology and innovation to thrive. Government should accelerate technology and innovation transfers and foster commercialisation of research and development. Focus Group Discussions with officials from the Ministry of Higher and Tertiary Education Science and Technology Development unanimously agree that the lack of effective coordination and linkage among ministries and agencies tend to limit innovation within the STI system. In Zimbabwe, the weak linkage is ubiquitous among public sector, research institutions and private sector. Building a capacitated STI system is a cross-cutting issue that requires effective public-private sector linkages and a coherent STI strategy at national level (ACBF 2017:49).

The Zimbabwean STI system is confronted with low funding to support institutions and also research and development programmes. Responses from one University lecturer at National University of Science and Technology key informant interview indicate that due to limited fiscal space most programs are supported by donors and private sector leaving STI isolated from the national agenda. Despite the government’s commitment to invest 1 per cent of gross domestic product (GDP) in research and development, funding remains very low. Budgets for STI remains low across institutions making it difficult for government mobilise additional funding to follow up of donor funded STI programs after their withdrawal. Moreover, most institutions including agriculture research institutes and universities face critical shortage of technical staff and researchers. Zimbabwe is among the countries facing serious gaps in critical technical skills to implement the Science, Technology, and Innovation Strategy for Africa (STISA-2024). Ideally, lack of capacity building to develop critical technical staff and researchers means the country will continue to rely on imported skills this slowing down the development of STI (ACBF 2017:46).
The STI system in Zimbabwe is faced with weak monitoring and evaluation (M&E) due to lack of capacity, resources and missing framework. Monitoring and Evaluation of STI policies and programs is critical for policy makers to stay up to date with new scientific and technological transformations, to anticipate emerging developments, and to use these outcomes to prioritize areas for innovation and investment (ACBF 2017:50). Preferably, monitoring and evaluation was supposed to collect data on specified indicators to track progress as well as to determine the impact of the policy but unfortunately there is no framework for that within the STI policy. While the OPC and the Department of Science and Technology Development in the Ministry of Higher and Tertiary Education assumes the monitoring and evaluation role, it is not clear on duties and responsibilities. This has created a lot of problems as activities of multiple stakeholders are not monitored and directed. Ideally, the monitoring and evaluation is supposed to demonstrate cause and effect, but this is difficult without capacitating the institutions and staff on the M&E issues. The implementation of the STI policy is also confronted with lack of demand for monitoring and evaluation thus making it difficult to measure success.

Policy Recommendations

Zimbabwe has regarded STI a critical enabler for the achievement of both the Agenda 2063 of the African Union and also the Sustainable Development Goals. In fact, building STI is a driver in achieving socio economic transformation and development goals such as food and nutrition security and poverty eradication (ACBF 2017:72). The following suggestions are for the Zimbabwean policy makers to consider:

- Attaining socioeconomic transformation in Zimbabwe requires the country’s commitment in bridging the STI investment gap. Ideally, countries with strong and effective STI invest up to 3.5 percent of their GDP in research and development (UNCTAD 2017:8). To close this gap Zimbabwe must strive to meet its 1 per cent of GDP STI target.

- The Zimbabwean government should curb brain drain by developing strategies to retain, monetizing and utilizing the STI capacity built in the country. The country have experienced mass exodus of skilled laborforce due to deteriorated socioeconomic and political environment for the past decade. The brain drain should not be viewed as a menace but as an opportunity to harness the skills and expertise skills from the diaspora. The Zimbabwean government should adapt a model where researchers and scientists are encouraged to return home for a period through a specifically designed program to contribute to its development of STI.

- Given that Zimbabwe is confronted with limited fiscal space, assistance from development partners and private sector is very important. The country must craft an enabling regulatory framework that is needed to foster public-private partnerships in all the sectors of the economy. Zimbabwe must enthusiastically pursue new and innovative funding ways involving bilateral and multilateral donors, governments, private sector.
• In order to transform Zimbabwe’s food and nutrition security, the country should make staid commitments to develop human and institutional capacities by creating substantially in high quality universities, state of the art equipped laboratories, ICT infrastructure, and research funding mechanisms.

• Investing heavily in science, technology, engineering and mathematics (STEM) is important for Zimbabwe to achieve a critical mass educated human resources, to catalyze innovation, promote competitiveness, and to nature next generation of innovators, entrepreneurs, and scientists.

Concluding Remarks

In this research we used Zimbabwe as a case study to appreciate the importance of STI in improving food and nutrition security. Key informants were conducted to find out the opportunities for policy process that is well capacitated including sound and sustained investment in STI in order to boost agriculture production, ending hunger and malnutrition and reducing poverty. The Zimbabwean case study can assist in drawing important lessons for other developing countries in improving food and nutrition security through the application of STI. Further studies are needed linking natural and social sciences to appreciate the factors that influence the uptake and sustained use of STI in food and nutrition security. The factors that affect the adoption of STI in improving food and nutrition security are complex thus further research may focus on understanding the local level, economic, and policy barriers.

References


Examining Age, Pay Satisfaction and Intent to Leave in Counterproductive Work Behaviour among University Support Staff

Abiodun Musbau Lawal¹, Sunday Samson Babalola² and Uzor Friday Ordu³

Abstract: Workplace behaviour, including Counterproductive Work Behaviour (CWB), continues to attract scholarly enquiries. This is because it has implications in workplaces. Workplace behaviour in Nigerian tertiary institutions has largely focused on the academic staff. The present study focuses on the supporting staff as it investigates gender difference, predictive ability of age, pay satisfaction and intent to leave in counterproductive work behaviour. Two hundred (107 male & 93 female) university support staff participated in a cross-sectional research survey for this study. Questionnaire comprising reliable measures of CWB, pay satisfaction and intent to leave along with some demographics was used as an instrument. Their ages ranged from 20 to 55 years (M = 33.16; SD = 6.34). Data were analysed using hierarchical multiple regression. No gender difference was found in CWB among supporting staff. Age, pay satisfaction and intent to leave significantly predicted counterproductive work behaviour with age and intent to leave recording higher contributions. This study highlights the importance of being human capital variables in reducing incidence of counterproductive work behaviour, while such factors are suggested for inclusion in the strategic policy for implementation.

Keywords: counterproductive work behaviour, gender, age, pay satisfaction, intention to quit, university support staff

Introduction

Counterproductive Work Behaviour (CWB) can be described as any behaviour that employees engage in that goes against or hinders organizational goals and negatively affects fellow employees. In view of the obvious negative connotation, CWB is detrimental to both co-workers and organizations (Cowen & Marcel

¹ Department of Psychology, Federal University Oye-Ekiti, Nigeria.
² Department of Human Resource Management &Labour Relations, University of Venda, Thohoyandou 0950 South Africa
³ Department of Psychology, Federal University Oye-Ekiti, Nigeria.
Corresponding Author’s Email: abiodun.lawal@fuoye.edu.ng
2011; Czarnota-Bojarska, 2015; Umesh, Kumari & Nagendra, 2015). Umeshi et al. (2015) categorised gossiping, spreading rumours, avoiding work or assignment, littering and inappropriate intent or printer usage in workplace as minor CWB, while damaging resources, different forms of harassment and physical harm or violence are grouped as severe CWBs. Uche, George and Abiola (2017) affirmed that apart from the differences in CWB across different organizations, CWB also varies according to some socio-demographic factors. In asserting the imperativeness of CWB in realising organisational goals, Oge, Ifeanyi and Gozie (2015) noted the need for continuous research in understanding some of the salient determinants of CWB in different organizations, towards the provision of effective interventions. It is on this premise that the present study examines age along with pay satisfaction and intent to leave as possible psychodemographic factors predicting counterproductive work behaviour among supporting staff in a university is timely and relevant.

Existing studies have identified a range of factors that were associated with CWB in distinct categories of organizations and in different countries. For instance, some of the mostly reported factors associated with CWB include job satisfaction, organizational justice, work stress, propensity to aggressive behaviour (Czarnota-Bojarska, 2015) and organizational politics (Muhammad, Muhammad & Tahira, 2015). Other studies described factors such as job stress (Hira & Anam, 2012); employee engagement (Ariani, 2013); work stressors, intention to quit, mediating role of organizational climate (Aldea-Capotescu, 2012); guilt proneness, intention to turnover, interpersonal conflict at work, negative affect at work, age, and gender (Cohen, Panter & Turan, 2013); climate, occupational status and leader-member exchange (Chernyak-Hai & Tziner, 2014); family incivility, self-esteem and emotional regulation (Bai, Lin & Wang 2016) as possible factors relating to counterproductive work behaviour among employees.

Specifically related to the Nigerian workplace terrain, studies conducted across the country revealed some psychological variables such as big five personality factors (Mase, 2016), organizational justice (Oge et al., 2015); cynical behaviour, work life conflict, compensation and supervisor support (Lasisi, Okuneye & Shodiya, 2014); psychological contract breach and job stress (Onyishi & Onunkwo 2014); work locus of control, perceived organizational justice and workplace deviant behaviour (Olabimitan & Alausa 2014); surface acting and distress tolerance (Amazue, Onyishi & Amazue, 2014) as factors associated with counterproductive work behaviour among different categories of employees. Other studies view counterproductive work behaviour in relation to gender, organizational reactions (Fagbohungbe, Akinbode & Ayodeji, 2012); age difference, perceived organizational support and job burnout (Ugwu, Enwereuzor, Fimber and Ugwu , 2017; Onuoha 2013) as well as job insecurity and entrepreneurial intention (Joe-Akunne, Oguegbe & Aguanunu, 2014). In recent time, Ugwu et al., (2017) investigated the moderating role of emotional intelligence in the relationship between experience of burnout and counterproductive work behaviour in nursing population. Despite the enviable strides recorded, these studies also indicate that investigations on salient psychological variables such as age, pay satisfaction and intent to leave as
predictors to CWB are still understudied in Nigeria, especially among support staff in a critical setting like universities.

Pay satisfaction is described as the satisfaction which an employee derives from the payment earned in their workplace. However, while satisfaction with pay is important to employees, the importance to individual employees differs. A cursory analysis of existing literature reveals that pay satisfaction and counterproductive work behaviour have been understudied. Only a few studies, such as Saqib Usman, Akbar and Ramzan (2013), confirmed the relevance of pay or salary satisfaction in job-related attitudes among employees. Similarly, Fapohunda (2012) investigated pay disparity and pay satisfaction in public and private universities and reported higher pay satisfaction among employees of private universities compared to their public universities’ counterparts.

Quitting a job, whether in private or government-owned organizations, is low among Nigerian employees, considering the high level of unemployment in the country. However, although employees might not actually quit the job, they may harbour the idea of leaving if better opportunities come their way in future. This becomes a problem due to the strong link between intention to quit and actual quitting (Cho & Lewis 2012; MorBarak, Levin, Nissly & Lane, 2006). Undeniably, engaging in counterproductive work behaviour by an employee can be regarded as an expression of his or her intention to quit the job. This is because an unrealized intention to quit a job could result in counterproductive work behaviour-related activities such as absenteeism (Chang, Wang & Huang, 2013). Intention to leave is therefore defined as the tendency for a support staff to leave his or her organization in a definite period in future. Mbah and Ikemefuna (2012) reported a link between intention to leave and other psychological variables such as job satisfaction. Cohen et al., (2013) stated that intention to turnover is one the variables that predicted counterproductive work behaviour among employees.

Age and gender differences were investigated as possible demographic variables that can influence extent at which employees express counterproductive work behaviour. Earlier studies conducted on age difference in counterproductive work behaviour have reported mixed findings. For instance, Onuoha (2013) reported no age difference in counterproductive work behaviour among employees. Others stated that age is one of the socio-demographic variables predicting CWB (Uche et al., 2017; Cohen et al., 2013). Therefore, further investigation of age difference in CWB is still germane in literature. Also, existing literature indicate that the gender of employees influences their level of engagement in CWB (Cohen et al., 2013). Spector and Zhou (2014) also affirmed that gender moderated the relationship between job stressors and personality with counterproductive work behaviour. With these results, examining gender difference in counterproductive work behaviour among support university staff as another group of employees is important for detailed and robust explanation on the possible differences. This study investigated the extent of separate and combined contributions of age, pay satisfaction and intent to leave in explaining
counterproductive work behaviour among support staff in a Nigerian university setting. Examined also is
the role/implication of gender in counterproductive work behaviour among university support staff.

Materials and methods

Research Design

The study utilized cross sectional survey quantitative research to evaluate data on age, pay satisfaction,
tention to leave and counterproductive work behaviour. The research design was chosen because the
researchers only observed existing conditions that could not be manipulated. In the study, independent
variables are age, pay satisfaction and intent to leave, while the dependent variable is counterproductive
work behaviour. The actual age of respondents was measured. In addition, pay satisfaction, intent to leave
and CWB were also measured with interval scale.

Description of Setting and Population

The study was conducted at Federal University Oye-Ekiti, Ekiti State, Nigeria. The institution, owned by the
Federal Government of Nigeria, was established in 2011. It is in the south-western part of the country. The
institution offers undergraduate programmes in seven faculties which include Faculties of Arts, Agriculture,
Engineering, Social Sciences, Sciences, Education and Agriculture and has about 1,350 employees
(academic and support staff).

Participants

Two hundred support staff members comprising 107 males and 93 females were sampled in the study
using the convenience sampling method. Participants’ ages ranged from 20 to 55 years ($\bar{x} = 33.16$; $SD =
6.34$). Year of work experience ranged from 1 year to 28 years ($\bar{x} = 5.24; SD = 4.67$). One hundred and
eighty (90%) of the respondents were Christians, 18(9%) were Muslims and 2(1%) indicated other religions.
In terms of the educational qualifications of the respondents, 17(8.5%) had Senior Secondary School
Certificate, 47(23.5%) had Ordinary National Diploma, 42(21%) had Higher National Diploma, 68(34%) had
a first degree and 26(13%) had postgraduate qualifications. The majority of the respondents, 142
representing (71%), were married; 57(28.5%) were single while 1(5%) was a widow.

Measurements

Survey questionnaire was used as a tool for the collection of data. It included socio-demographic
information such as age, gender, religion, marital status, highest educational level, and years of work
experience. The tool also included standardized scales assessing variables of interest in the study as follows:

**Counterproductive work behaviour** was assessed by a 32-item counterproductive work behaviour checklist (CWB-C) as specified by Spector et al., (2006). The evaluation was done on a Likert response scale from Never (1); Once in a week (2); Twice in a week (3); Thrice in a week (4); Four or more times in a week (5). This means that high score on the scale is indicative of higher counterproductive work behaviour. For the scale, Cohen et al., (2013) reported internal consistency of 0.97, while alpha coefficient of .90 was obtained in the current study.

**Pay Satisfaction** was assessed using an 18-item version of pay satisfaction questionnaire (PSQ) developed by Heneman and Schwab (1985). It is a 5-point rating scale, ranging from Very Dissatisfied (score 1) to Very Satisfied (score 5). A high score indicates higher level of pay satisfaction while a low score indicates lower pay satisfaction. The authors reported coefficient alpha reliability estimate of 0.89 for the scale. This scale has a reliability coefficient of Cronbach’s alpha of 0.97 in this study.

**Intent to Leave** was assessed using the 8-item coined for the study. Examples of items in the scale include, “As soon as I can find a better job, I will quit this organization”, “I often think about quitting my job”, and “I will probably look for a job outside this organization within the next 3 years”. It is a 5-point rating scale, ranging from Strongly Disagree (score 1) to Strongly Agree (score 5). A high score indicates higher intention to quit the job, while low score indicates lower intention to quit the job. This scale has a reliability coefficient of Cronbach’s alpha of 0.67 in this study.

**Ethical consideration and Procedure**

Institutional-based ethical approval was obtained from the Research and EthicsCommittee of the Department of Psychology, Federal University Oye-Ekiti, Nigeria. Informed consent was sought from individual respondents and self-report questionnaires were distributed to them in their offices during working hours. In order not to disrupt the working activities, respondents were asked to submit the questionnaires to their heads of unit after completion; after which the researchers came to collect them. Respondents were assured of anonymity and confidentiality of their information and were promised that the information would be used solely for research purposes. In all, 250 questionnaires were distributed across the five faculties with 50 for each faculty. Of the 213 copies of the questionnaire retrieved, the 200 that were properly completed were used for data analyses in the study; this constituted a response rate of 80% of the number distributed.
Statistical Analyses

Data obtained in the study were analysed using IBM-SPSS version 24. The statistical methods used involved both descriptive and inferential statistics. Demographic characteristics of respondents were analysed using descriptive statistics such as mean, standard deviation and percentages. To achieve the study's objectives, inferential statistics of bivariate Pearson correlation, hierarchical multiple regression and t-test for independent samples were conducted. Specifically, bivariate correlation analysis was performed in order to examine the relationships between independent and dependent variables in the study. A three-model hierarchical multiple regression was computed in order to determine the contributions of each of the predictor variables (age, pay satisfaction & intent to leave) in the criterion variable (CWB). In addition, t-test for independent samples was computed in order to compare male and female support staff on counterproductive work behaviour. Results obtained in the study were significant at 0.01 and 0.05 levels of significance.

Results

To access the association between the predictor variables (age, pay satisfaction & intent to leave) and the criterion variable (counterproductive work behaviour), bivariate correlational analyses were performed (See Table 1). Results of the bivariate correlational analyses showed that age has a significant negative correlation \((r = -0.18; p < 0.05)\) with counterproductive work behaviour but no significant relationship with pay satisfaction \((r = 0.04; p > 0.05)\) and intent to leave \((r = -0.01; p > 0.05)\). Furthermore, pay satisfaction negatively correlated significantly with counterproductive work behaviour \((r = -0.15; p < 0.05)\), but not with intent to leave \((r = -0.05; p > 0.05)\). Intent to leave positively correlated significantly with CWB \((r = 0.17; p < 0.05)\). Interpretations of these results infer that as support staff grow old, their engagement in CWB reduces. Also, as support staff are more satisfied with their pay/salary, they are less likely to involve in counterproductive work behaviour. Finally, support staff who have less intention to quit their jobs are less likely to be involved in counterproductive work behaviour.

Table 1: Mean, standard deviation and co-relational matrix between variables in the study

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pay Satisfaction</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intent to Leave</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CWB</td>
<td>-0.18*</td>
<td>-0.15*</td>
<td>0.17*</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(M)</td>
<td>33.16</td>
<td>65.28</td>
<td>24.24</td>
<td>38.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(SD)</td>
<td>6.34</td>
<td>17.20</td>
<td>8.35</td>
<td>9.33</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: ** = \(p < 0.01\) level; * = \(p < 0.05\) level; \(CWB\) = Counterproductive work behaviour, \(M\) = Mean; \(SD\) = Standard deviation
A three-model hierarchical multiple regression analyses of counterproductive work behaviour on age, pay satisfaction and intent to leave was also performed (See Table 2). Age was entered in step 1 as a control variable, pay satisfaction was entered at step 2, and intent to leave was entered at step 3. The analysis indicated that at first model of the regression, age was a significant predictor of counterproductive work behaviour $\beta = -.18$, $p < 0.01$, with contribution of $F(1, 188) = 6.58$, $p < 0.01$ and accounted for 3.4% of the variation in CWB. At second model of the regression, pay satisfaction was a significant predictor of counterproductive work behaviour $\beta = -.14$, $p < 0.01$, with contribution of $F(2, 187) = 5.27$, $p < 0.01$ and accounted for 5.3% of the variation in CWB. With the addition of pay satisfaction, the result showed an increase of 1.9% in CWB. Finally, at third model of the regression, intent to leave was a significant predictor of counterproductive work behaviour $\beta = -.17$, $p < 0.01$, with contribution of $F(3, 186) = 5.49$, $p < 0.01$ and accounted for 8.1% of the variation in CWB. It means that addition of intent to leave resulted in a significant increase of 2.8% in CWB among the university support staff.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 2: Summary of hierarchical regression analysis for variables predicting CWB of University Support Staff</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Predictors</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pay Satisfaction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intent to Leave</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R^2$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adj. $R^2$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R^2$ Change (%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$F$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$F$ Change</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: ** = $p < 0.01$ level; * = $p < 0.05$ level; B = unstandardized regression coefficient; $\beta$ = beta weight; SEB = standard error of regression coefficient; $R$ = multiple correlation; $R^2$ = coefficient of determination

The examination of gender difference in CWB showed that male support staff ($\bar{x}$ = 38.68) were not significantly different in counterproductive work behaviour compared to female support staff ($\bar{x}$ = 37.94), $t(198) = 0.56$; $p > 0.05$ (See Table 3). The implication is that there is no sex difference in counterproductive work behaviour among support staff of the university.
Table 3: t-test showing gender difference in University support staffs’ counterproductive work behaviour

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>$\bar{x}$</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>T</th>
<th>P</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CWB</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>38.68</td>
<td>9.41</td>
<td>198</td>
<td>0.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>37.94</td>
<td>9.26</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: CWB: counterproductive work behaviour; $N =$ number of respondents; $\bar{x} =$ Mean; $SD =$ standard deviation; $df =$ Degree of freedom; $t =$ t-value; $p =$ probability-value

Discussion

The present study set out to investigate the separate and combined contributing of age, gender, pay satisfaction and intent to leave to the problem of counterproductive work behaviour among support staff in a Nigerian university. This was hinged on the hypothesis that as support staff grow older, the tendency to engage in forms of CWB would reduce compared to those who are younger. Confirming this expectation, results of the first regression model showed that age independently predicted counterproductive work behaviour. This finding showed that older support staff reported lower counterproductive work behaviour than younger ones, thus suggesting that counterproductive work behaviours were mostly reported among young support staff. This finding contradicted Onuoha (2013) which identified that age difference was non-significant in engagement in counterproductive work behaviour among government workers. It is however in tandem with Cohen et al. (2013) which reported that age was a significant factor in the prediction of employees’ engagement in counterproductive work behaviours. The motivation for lower counterproductive behaviour among older support staff is adjudged to be because these older support staff see themselves retiring in their present job. On the other hand, young supporting staff might believe that there could still be other opportunities of securing a better job elsewhere; thus, they engage in more forms of workplace deviant behaviour.

The second regression model focused on pay satisfaction. The analysis showed that age and pay satisfaction independently and jointly predicted counterproductive work behaviour. In other words, apart from the direct relationship between age and counterproductive work behaviour as well as between pay satisfaction and counterproductive work behaviour, the two predictor variables (age and pay satisfaction) also mutually explain the extent of counterproductive work behaviour among the participating employees. Specifically, the addition of pay satisfaction with the age of employees led to a significant increase in the extent to which employees exhibit CWB. The implication of this finding is that being satisfied with the salary/pay influenced employees overall attitudes towards their jobs. This is in line with existing studies which assert the relevance of a salary or pay in employees’ job-related attitudes (Fapohunda 2012; Saqib Usman et al., 2013). The probable reason why pay satisfaction significantly contributed to CWB among the employees could be the value they attached to money. Satisfaction with payments such as annual increase, promotion, end of the year bonuses, etc. could lessen the possibility of counterproductive work behaviour.
In third regression model, Intent to Leave was aggregated to Age and Pay Satisfaction. This led to a significant increase in the display of counterproductive work behaviour in the University. Intention to leave was found to have a significant contribution to CWB. This finding is in line with Chang et al. (2013) that employees who had intention to quit their jobs were prone to engaging in CWB-related activities. On other hand, employees with less intention to quit their jobs were less likely to engage in CWB. Staying on one’s job could be due to the love one has for his or her job, the fear of losing it and the uncertainty of securing another one in the event of losing the current job, especially when the high percentage of Nigerian unemployment rate is reckoned with.

In this study, there was no distinction between male and female university support staff in their engagement in counterproductive work behaviour. In other words, gender did not have a significant influence on the exhibition of CWB. This finding contradicts previous studies that reported significant influence of gender on CWB (Cohen et al., 2013; Spector & Zhou, 2014). A plausible reason why the non-significant difference existed in level of CWB being displayed by male and female support staff might be linked to the fact that both sexes were exposed to similar working conditions.

Many previous studies have identified some personal and organizational variables other than Age, Pay Satisfaction and Intent to Leave as factors predisposing employees to CWB in government-owned universities. Most of these studies were based on corporate and private organizations as settings, neglecting academic institutions. The present study's focus on support staff is with the belief that these staff are as important as the academic staff in the universities. Therefore using the group of people as a population in a study on counterproductive work behaviour is vital for the implementation of holistic measures in reducing/controlling cases of counterproductive work behaviour at government-owned universities.

**Conclusion**

This study has drawn attention to the situational and organizational climate within the Nigerian tertiary education system. Some of its significant conclusions are that age significantly and independently predicted counterproductive work behaviour since younger support staff reported engaging in more counterproductive work behaviours than older ones. In addition, Pay satisfaction significantly and independently predicted CWB; suggesting that support staff are less likely to engage in forms of counterproductive work behaviour when they are satisfied with what they earn. Intent to leave significantly and independently predicted CWB; indicating that support staff are less likely to engage in counterproductive work behaviour if they hold less intention to quit their jobs. Finally, there was no difference between male and female support staff when it came to the engagement in counterproductive work behaviour at the University.
Recommendations

Outcomes of this study are essential considering the preponderant practice of counterproductive work behaviour or workplace deviant behaviour among employees; especially in government owned organizations. Therefore, based on the present findings, the following recommendations are made: First, young support staff of universities requires proper orientation regarding possible consequences of engaging in various forms of workplace deviant behaviours. Second, since employees generally appear to attach a high degree of value to money, management should endeavour to reward their employees by disbursing unexpected bonuses from time to time. More importantly, promotions should not be delayed since it attracts an increase in salary. Furthermore, salaries should be paid as at when due. Availability of these could lessen involvement of employees in forms of workplace deviant behaviour. Finally, working at government owned universities should be made attractive so that employees would want to stay in their longer and possibly until retirement.

Limitation of Study

In the study, hierarchical regression analysis was employed to probe the contributions of age, pay satisfaction and intent to engage in counterproductive work behaviour by support staff. Statistics enable us to identify the level of association between each of the predictor variables and CWB among employees. However, what serves as a limitation in the study is that the results do not show any form of causal inferences. Another potential limitation of the study is the relatively small sample size of the university support staff sampled. This limits the generalization of findings to the entire population. Therefore, future researchers are encouraged to use larger samples to take of this inadequacy. Only self-report instruments were used for data collection. To augment this, observation methods might be included to have a comprehensive understanding of the extent of CWB among employees. Nevertheless, it is important to note that despite the limitations, findings of this study are relevant in predicting variables which seek to explain levels of counterproductive work behaviour among employees.

References


Blowing the Anti-Graft Whistle with Rewarding Rigour and Legal Vulnerability: A Turning Point in Nigeria’s Democratic Space?*

Mike Omilusi¹

Abstract: Upon inception, the President Muhammadu Buhari-led government identified corruption as the bane of Nigeria’s socio-economic development and vowed to nip it in the bud. The federal government, in its newly found zeal and determination to confront the menace of corruption headlong, adopted a new and largely effective strategy to aid its effort. This essay contributes to a growing effort to understand the effectiveness, mechanisms and hazards associated with the whistle blower policy, particularly in a country globally known for its corruption toga. The Federal Government’s anti-corruption drive in that last two years essentially remains the focus of this essay as it emphasizes a novel set of posers capable of probing into the motive and agenda behind the whistle-blower strategy. It also explores the anti-corruption mechanisms/policies put in place by successive administrations in the country with a view to properly locating the gap, that is, why corruption has remained endemic in spite of them. While the discourse on how to dismantle the monster through legal and institutional frameworks - that will make it impossible for corruption to thrive- has always met a brick wall in the rapacious elite, the whistle blower strategy can become one of the most effective tools to be possessed by the Buhari-led administration in its anti-corruption war. A compelling step however, as advocated in this study, is to complement the whistle-blower policy by establishing the special courts needed to expedite corrupt cases while necessary legislations put in place to protect whistle blowers, as a matter of necessity, should be methodically enforced, and not be hindered by the Nigerian factor.

Keywords: Anti-Corruption, Whistle-Blowing, Democratic, Strategy

Introduction

There is a growing academic literature on the nature and character of the socio-political ecology that facilitates the degree or variant of corruption that exists in a particular society. Indeed, as would be discussed in this study, there are many factors that combine to nurture corruption. Given experiences, the root of corruption has often been deeply and rightly located in the independence and interplay of

---

* This paper was first presented at the Lien International Conference on Good Governance, jointly organised by the Nanyang Centre for the Public Administration from the Nanyang Technological University (NTU), American Society for Public Administration (ASPA), and International Institute of Administrative Sciences (IIAS). Singapore, October 27-28, 2017

¹ Department of Political Science, Ekiti State University, Nigeria. Email: watermike2003@yahoo.co.uk
bureaucratic, corporate and socio-political institutions. With reference to Nigeria, corruption has almost become a culture; a situation which has tolled heavily not only on the country’s development but even on its image. Indeed, it has retarded its development to such an alarming point that the vast majority of the populace now live in abject poverty, having serially lost their commonwealth to a deeply connected and entrenched band of thieving elite. Little wonder, corruption has assumed the most topical issue of discourses on governance in Nigeria today.

Corruption and its discourse in Nigerian public life are central to the country's political history. Over the years, in spite of popular anger against corruption and bad governance, which have robbed the collective wellbeing of the people of Nigeria, there has been a lack of national consensus on repulsion against the perpetrators (irrespective of their ethnicity, religion, class and gender) and emergence of a popular movement that is capable of galvanizing the palpable rage of the people and channel it to series of actions and outcomes that challenge the status quo. Indeed, the country’s main problem has been the unwillingness or inability of its leaders to rise to the challenge of managing resources honestly to develop the country and enrich its citizens.

Upon inception, the President Muhammadu Buhari-led government identified corruption as the bane of Nigeria’s socio-economic development and vowed to nip it in the bud. The federal government, in its newly found zeal and determination to confront the menace of corruption, headlong, adopted a new and largely effective strategy to aid its effort. President Muhammadu Buhari’s new policy on whistle-blowing is revolutionary. Its goal is to broaden the attack on corruption by encouraging the general public to expose corrupt practices. The hope is that the whistle-blower policy would provide agencies like the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) with actionable tips to track and recover stolen government funds. While the discourse on how to dismantle the monster through legal and institutional frameworks that will make it impossible for corruption to thrive has always met a brick wall in the rapacious elite, the whistle blower strategy can become one of the most effective tools to be possessed by the Buhari-led administration in its anti-corruption war.

Legislation particularly aimed at protecting whistle-blowers in Africa has evolved over recent years and as a result many countries in the region have adopted Anti-corruption and whistle-blower protection laws (e.g. RSA, 2000; Ghana, 2006; Nigeria, 2008; Uganda, 2010; Tanzania, 2015 etc.). The legal trends developing in the different African countries have made whistleblowing an important part of organizations' overall ethical code. In Nigeria, the whistle blowing programme is designed to encourage anyone with information about a violation of financial regulations, mismanagement of public funds and assets, financial malpractice, fraud and theft to report it (http://whistle.finance.gov.ng). Suffice it to say the a whistle blower is a person who exposes any kind of information or activity that is deemed illegal, unethical, or not correct within an organization (or community) that is either private or public (Wikipedia)
The importance of whistleblowing in the drive for a corruption-free society is underscored by the fact that the institutional mechanisms put in place to check corruption may not be effective without whistleblowing, especially from insiders who identify and draw attention to corrupt acts that other mechanisms may fail to pick up (Oakley and White, 2006). Oakley and White (2006) submit that anticorruption campaigns may not be successful without effective whistleblowing. Thus, whistle blowing, as rightly observed by Transparency International (2010), is increasingly recognised as an important tool in the prevention and detection of corruption and other malpractice. By disclosing wrongdoing in an organisation, whistle-blowers can avert harm, protect human rights, help to save lives and safeguard the rule of law. This essay contributes to a growing effort to understand the effectiveness, mechanisms and hazards associated with the whistle-blower policy, particularly in a country globally known for its corruption toga. The Federal Government’s anti-corruption drive in that last two years essentially remains the focus of this essay as it emphasizes a novel set of posers capable of probing into the motive and agenda behind the whistle-blower strategy. It also explores the anti-corruption mechanisms/policies put in place by successive administrations in the country with a view to properly locating the gap, that is, why corruption has remained endemic in spite of them.

**Background to Anti-Corruption Policies in Nigeria**

Corruption is broadly understood as the abuse of resources, theft, fraud, mal-administration, favouritism, nepotism, embezzlement and conflict of interest. Within the public sector, corruption can be described as any conduct or behaviour in relation to individuals entrusted with responsibilities in public office which violates their duties as public officials and which is aimed at obtaining undue gratification of any kind for themselves or for others (Department of Public Service and Administration, 2006:3). Corruption, which violates the public service code of conduct; deters foreign investment, increases the cost of public service delivery undermines the fight against poverty and unnecessarily burdens the criminal justice system. Thus, any act which promotes self-interest at the expense of public interest against the overall objectives of government can be construed as corruption. Corruption results in the ineffective and inefficient use of public service resources while it undermines public confidence in the public service.

Nigeria’s progress has been significantly impeded by its inability to distribute the country’s immense oil wealth to citizens. This is corroborated by a recent report from the Legatum Institute, a London-based think tank, which measured “prosperity delivery” to citizens in comparison to a country’s actual wealth. Of the 38 countries covered by the research, Nigeria ranked 26th, with the report saying it was “under-delivering” prosperity to its citizens (Kazeem, 2017).

Corruption, according to the United Nations Development Programme, has atrophied development and kept over 60 per cent of the population in poverty. The 40 per cent of all contract sums that the US Department of Commerce estimated to be lost to graft 10 years ago is believed to have climbed to 100 per cent in some instances as in the Niger Delta Development Commission, where some N183 billion is alleged to have been paid out for fictitious contracts (The Guardian, January 18, 2016). According to Osuntokun
(2016:17), “the kind of looting we are being told happened is enough to depress any sane and patriotic Nigerian. The level of looting poses existential threat to this republic. In China some of what happened in the recent past would have attracted ultimate punishment. People walk into the office of the National Security Adviser, sign a piece of paper, and walk out with a mandate to go to the CBN or banks where government has money to go and collect billions for some spurious work for government or the ruling party or for no work at all!”

Since the return to civil rule in 1999, Nigeria government has taken some steps to address the twin problems of corruption and bad governance in the country. These measures include public service reform (monetization to reduce waste and reduction of over bloated personnel, reform of public procurement); establishment of anti-corruption enforcement agencies such as the Economic and Financial Crime Commission and Independent Corruption and other Practices Commission (Chukwuma, 2010: ii). However, it has always been alleged that these agencies are selective in their prosecution of corruption cases. Corruption cases are hardly ever pursued to a logical conclusion. There are so many inconclusive cases, and many instances of corruption that the agencies declined to prosecute. In many of these glaring cases, successive governments in the country failed to convince anyone that Nigeria is committed to checking graft (Point Blank Editorial, 2014:10).

While most countries have established a legal framework to fight corruption, they often struggle to enforce their laws. Far too frequently, perpetrators are able to evade their national judicial system in direct proportion to the magnitude of their illicit wealth and power (Ramasastry, 2015:710). However, as observed by Enweremadu (2012:15), the conception of an independent, specialised commission against corruption as an indispensable tool for fighting corruption is an idea that has proved successful in some countries (notably Hong Kong and Singapore) and is now well rooted in global academic discussions on corruption. Nevertheless, its emergence in Nigeria immediately raised at least two important sets of questions. First, is the idea transferable to countries such as Nigeria, with its multiple experiences of weak or failed institutions? If yes, under what specific conditions? Second, given the fact that a considerable number of other institutions dealing with corruption in one form or the other were already in existence at the time these institutions were created, what role exactly were these new institutions expected to play? And what would their relationship be with the hitherto existing institutions? According to Human Rights Watch (2007), for all of the publicity the Nigerian government’s anti-corruption war has generated, its victories have in fact been rather limited.


Generally, before now, it is argued that the Acts establishing the Anti-Corruption Agencies, had been weak and ineffective. The agencies had been poorly funded and there were evidences of lack of political will by the crusaders to actualize an objective anti-corruption campaign. Apart from this, the fight has been of vindictive, selective, biased, one-sided and falsely attractive (Ademola, 2011). The former chairman of the Independent Corrupt Practices and other Related Offences Commission (ICPC), Justice Emmanuel Ayoola, once pointedly accused the Executive branch and the National Assembly of frustrating the commission’s efforts through inadequate funding. In fact, the Information Minister, Lai Mohammed, on a radio programme attested to the fact that these agencies are underfunded (FRCN, Radio Link, March 12, 2016). According to Osipitan and Odusote (2014), there are multi-dimensional challenges inhibiting the fight against corruption in Nigeria. This can partly be ascribed to incompetence of enforcement officers; lack of political will on the part of government; and political interference with the work of enforcement agencies.

Buhari Administration and the Fillip to Anti-Corruption War: Body Language, Policies and Strategies

Nigeria has been synonymous with corruption for many years now. Repeatedly, governments have been characterized by wayward spending and a lack of accountability. But many people hoped the country had taken a turn for better when, in May 2015, Muhammadu Buhari took office as Nigeria’s president. A former military dictator known for an austere lifestyle and strict anti-corruption stance, Buhari was seen as the perfect man to rid government of its excesses and instil a semblance of financial responsibility (Kazeem, 2016).

Thus, President Buhari was given tremendous leeway and was lauded across the world upon entering office. Many observers – and even those in the human rights community – were willing to give him the benefit of the doubt, desperately wanting to believe his claim of being a “born again democrat” (Smith, 2016). Upon entering office in May 2015, Nigerian president Muhammadu Buhari faced the daunting tasks of living up to exceedingly high international expectations and meeting the needs of a nation that was clearly yearning for change. According to Tijani (2016), “Nigerians expect President Buhari to redirect the cause of our nation’s history by reinforcing the fight against corruption; freeing Nigeria from the narrow and selfish agenda of tiny elites, rebuilding our moribund institutions, bring back the abducted Chibok girls, and the total rejuvenation of our social, economic and political paralysis”.

Buhari campaigned on a promise to address alleged multibillion dollar corruption scandals, which stem largely from mismanagement of the country’s oil reserves. These kinds of scandals weaken Nigeria’s legitimacy both domestically and abroad (Albright and Carson, 2015). Thus, a significant building block of democracy is confronting the scourge of corruption, which has severely stunted socio-economic progress
in Nigeria since its independence from the United Kingdom in 1960. A widespread concern in Nigeria that actually helped to push Buhari’s predecessor out of office was the billions of dollars of oil revenue that disappeared under his administration, in addition to credible allegations of graft and runaway illicit outflows. Unsurprisingly, Buhari was elected on an anti-corruption ticket and has since cracked down on graft in various sectors of the government.

At the White House meeting with President Barack Obama, the host president praised his guest as someone with high integrity, a quality much needed at this time in Nigeria’s history; a commendation that was celebrated back home by supporters of this president as if Nigerians needed any confirmation from abroad on that score (Okuofu, 2015). To fulfill his anticorruption pledges, Buhari initiated a series of reforms, including the reorganization of the notoriously opaque state oil company. Nigeria’s main anticorruption agencies launched investigations into several high-profile politicians, including the Senate president and top officials from former president Goodluck Jonathan’s administration (Freedom House, 2016). Although no high profile corruption conviction has been secured, certain indicators point to considerable progress. In all, as pointed out by Campbell (2016), some 140 have been prosecuted, tried, and convicted of corruption -- far more than in any previous administration. However, it is unclear how many have actually been jailed.

According to a report by Buharimetre (CDD, 2016), a civil society monitoring report tracking the implementation of the president’s campaign promises, “there had been visible efforts to combat corruption since the inauguration of the present administration, naming the arrest and prosecution of some notable persons and the efforts to recover looted funds”. Within two months of assumption of office, the fear of his name alone worked wonders in several areas of national affairs. Accountability rose in government departments and agencies. The nation’s account was singularized for the remittance of funds by public institutions and leakages blocked in several areas. Quiet ‘carrot and stick’ persuasions flushed some stolen funds back into the treasury while many now sing openly on the cause and scope of the large-scale looting that reigned uncontrolled under Goodluck Jonathan (Larr, 2015). Thus, from the beginning of the present administration, Buhari’s body language was certainly perceived as a new formula for governance by many Nigerians.

The administration has earned the people’s confidence with its anti-corruption efforts. The President has seized every opportunity to reiterate his disapproval of the ills that bedevil the nation while warning officials working in his government that he would not tolerate corruption in any form. Nigerians have witnessed in this dispensation criminal charges levelled against professional politicians, amongst whom are legislators. They have read of reorganisation of public enterprises that have inculpated public officials of corruption (The Guardian, February 9, 2016). President Muhammadu Buhari made it clear that the fight against corruption will be a top priority of his government. He has done this effectively by setting the tone at the top, what commentators has dubbed body language. Setting the tone at the top is very important in fighting
corruption. It is the way that the top leadership will show from posture, statements and action that corruption will not be tolerated (Igbuzor, 2016).

The administration started making good its pledge to probe the big-time financial transactions of the previous administration with the on-going investigation of arms deals between 2007 and May 29 2015. Already, a 13-man committee constituted to examine the transactions has unearthed what it described as large-scale scams totaling N643.817 billion and $2.193 billion after a preliminary inquiry (Vanguard, December 25, 2015). With the anti-corruption drive, a number of highly placed government officials, politicians and former officials had been handcuffed and brought to trial to answer corruption charges.

Revelations emerging from the on-going trial of some notable individuals detail how $2.1 billion of recovered loot was surreptitiously taken, ostensibly for arms procurement, but apparently liberally shared out among party stalwarts under the corrupt Goodluck Jonathan government (The Punch, January 25, 2016). Indeed, the country is currently gasping for breath on account of the debilitating corruption which has, for far too long, thrown the most populous Black Country in the world into an asphyxiating coma (Agekameh, 2015). Emails leaked by anti-corruption charities Global Witness and Finance Uncovered suggested that a $1.3 billion payment by oil giants Shell and Eni in 2011 for a lucrative but undeveloped Nigerian oilfield never went to the public trust for which it was intended. Instead, almost all of the money (nearly half of that year’s national education budget) was divvied up as kickbacks between high-ranking government officials (Kazeem, 2017).

The Presidential Advisory Committee Against Corruption (PACAC) in its report of activities from August 2015 to July 2016 presented to civil society organisations (CSOs) by its Executive Secretary, Prof. Bolaji Owasanoye, revealed that fifty-five people stole N1.3 trillion from the national treasury in seven years under President Goodluck Jonathan’s watch. PACAC said corruption is Nigeria’s greatest challenge and is directly associated with the current economic decline, poverty rates, reduced life expectancy, mortality and deteriorated living standards (The Nation, October 21, 2016). Overall, it is estimated that Nigeria has lost over $400bn to large-scale corruption since independence in 1960. According to Ndikumana and Boyce (cited in Falana, 2015), more than half of the money borrowed by African states, including Nigeria, in recent decades was misdirected within a year, transferred in many cases to private accounts in offshore tax secrecy jurisdictions.

Public office holders in Nigeria are notorious for looting the treasury. This fact is well documented by the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, African Union and other anti-graft watchdogs such as the Global Financial Integrity, a US-based group. The GFI, in a report it prepared based on World Bank and IMF data, asserted that $182 billion was illicitly taken away from Nigeria and laundered offshore between 2000 and 2009 (The Punch, 2017).
A report by AU’s special committee, which a former President of South Africa, Thabo Mbeki, headed, also confirmed in 2014 such financial heist. Out of every $60 billion illegally transferred out of Africa, the AU said, $40 billion was traced to Nigeria, in a haemorrhage that has been on for over four decades. President Muhammadu Buhari, who took the loot recovery campaign to the global stage during the 70th General Assembly of the United Nations last October, said in the 10 years to 2015, about $150 billion was looted. This explains why Nigeria is ranked 136th out of 168 countries, in the Corruption Perception Index of 2015 (The Punch, 2017).

According to Falana (2015) the criminals who stole the huge funds and western countries which are keeping the funds have violated the human rights of Nigerians with respect to development. If a large chunk of the stolen funds is retrieved and earmarked for socio-economic development, the government can create jobs, guarantee security and ensure infrastructural development. As President Buhari puts it, “The fight against corruption is in reality a struggle for the restoration of law and order. Corruption and impunity become widespread when disrespect for law is allowed to thrive in society. Disrespect for law also thrives when people get away with all sorts of shady deals and the court system is somehow unable to check them. Ability to manipulate and frustrate the legal system is the crowning glory of the corrupt and, as may be expected, this has left many legal practitioners and law courts tainted in an ugly way” (cited in Falana, 2015).

Interestingly, some measures have been put in place by the government to checkmate corrupt practices in the system. For instance, the Federal Government started the implementation of Treasury Single Account (TSA) with the e-payment component since 2012, while the e-collections components of commenced in January 2015. Larson (2007 cited in Ocheni, 2016) explains that TSA is bound to improve transparency and accountability in Public Financial Management. First, it will remove organisational/MDA secrecy around the management of public finances. The second is that revenue generating agencies that have been depriving the Treasury of due revenue through a plethora of bank accounts under their purview unknown to the authorities will no longer be able to defraud government since all funds will be swept into the TSA. However, it should be noted that the effective implementation of these policies in Nigeria is yet to materialise until recently.

Many Nigerians are concerned to find out that many government agencies that remitted peanuts to government coffers annually under the previous administration are now declaring billions of naira revenue due to the implementation of the Treasury Single Account (TSA). With the TSA in place, they could no longer divert and steal their internally generated revenue. As a starter, the Minister of Finance disclosed that the Joint Admissions and Matriculation Board (JAMB), which has been remitting N3 million annually, remitted N5 billion in 2017 alone (as at August) and still had another N3 billion to remit to government purse that same year. She was also worried that the Nigerian Maritime Administration and Safety Agency
(NIMASA), which remitted N4.95 billion only in 2015, remitted a whopping sum of N24 billion in 2016 (Ehikioya, 2017).

Other reforms aimed at improving the quality of the nation’s Public Financial Management (PFM) systems are Government Integrated Financial Management Information System (GIFMIS); Automated Accounting Transaction Recording and Reporting System (ATRRS); Integrated Payroll and Personnel Information System (IPPIS); and International Public Sector Accounting Standard (IPSAS). Also, President Muhammadu Buhari has requested the National Assembly to consider two executive bills as part of improved legal framework to fight corruption. The bills are Money Laundering Prevention and Prohibition Bill 2016 and the Criminal Matters Bill 2016. The bills are believed to be part of the enhanced legal approach to Mr. Buhari’s anti-corruption war.

Earlier, in August 2015, the administration inaugurated a Presidential Advisory Committee Against Corruption (PACAC). The duties of the PACAC headed by Professor Sagay include the following: promotion of the anti-corruption struggle by developing comprehensive interventions in Nigeria’s Administration of Criminal Justice System; Engendering Inter Agency Cooperation and Information sharing; promoting the efficiency and effectiveness of the anti-corruption agencies; Examining the workings of the present system of the Administration of Criminal Justice; Seeking to put an end to all orders of Perpetual Injunctions against the investigation, interrogation, arrest and prosecution of anyone for corruption with the objective that such persons must defend themselves in court and such cases must go through the full trial process; the lifting of all existing injunctions protecting anyone from investigation, interrogation, arrest and prosecution for corruption; and revisiting outstanding cases of egregious corruption and impunity which have been stalled or suspended.


Whistle Blower Policy and Chain of Looted Funds
Nigeria’s problems with corruption are well-documented. In a bid to buck the trend, Nigeria’s ministry of finance decided to try a new approach: allowing citizens who report corruption-related offenses earn a cut from the recovered loot. President Buhari’s new policy on whistle-blowing is revolutionary. Its goal is to broaden the attack on corruption by encouraging the general public to expose corrupt practices. The government will in turn reward those whose revelations result to recovery of funds or assets (Ogbonnia, 2017). The term whistle-blowing is a relatively recent entry into the vocabulary of public and corporate affairs, although the phenomenon itself is not new. Recently, whistle-blowing has become common from government agencies to business corporations world over. Whistle blowing has been regarded as a Western idea, being perceived as abandonment of cultural traits and of the norms of social behavior and loyalty.

The policy, co-ordinated by the Ministry of Finance, requires anyone with information about a violation, misconduct or improper activity that impacts negatively on Nigerians and the government to report it (The Nation, 2017). To report corruption, whistle-blowers need to provide key information via a secure online portal. Offenses that can be reported include mismanagement of public funds and assets, violation of financial regulations, solicitation of bribes, and manipulating data and records. The ministry of finance also promises whistle-blowers that “confidentiality will be maintained to the fullest extent possible within the limitations of the law”(Kazeem, 2017). The subject matter of the report may include mismanagement or misappropriation of public funds and assets (e.g. properties and vehicles), financial malpractice or fraud, collection/soliciting bribes and corruption. Others are diversion of revenues, fraudulent and unapproved payments, splitting of contracts and procurement fraud (kick-backs and over-invoicing etc.).

The Federal Government spelt out the benefits awaiting whistle-blowers as it also pledged their protection. Any whistle-blower whose information leads to the recovery of up to N1 billion will receive five per cent of the amount. The reward for any amount between one and five billion naira would be five per cent for the first N1 billion and four per cent of the remaining N4 billion, and any amount over N5 billion will attract 2.5 per cent reward. The Federal Government had promised that any whistle-blower, whose information led to the recovery of cash or assets worth N5 billion, would earn N210 million (Vanguard, 2017). According to the Minister of Finance, Kemi Adeosun (2017):

> Any person who voluntarily discloses information in good faith about a possible misconduct or violation that has occurred, is ongoing, or is about to occur will receive a certain amount of financial reward from 2.5 to 5 per cent of the amount recovered. If you whistle-blow in public-spirit and in good faith, you will be protected. If you feel that you have been treated badly because of your report, you can file a formal complaint. If you have suffered harassment, intimidation or victimisation for sharing your concerns, restitution will be made for any loss suffered.

Among the selling points of the policy are (a) the possibility of increased accountability and transparency in the management of public funds and (b) the possibility that more funds would be recovered that could be deployed in financing Nigeria’s infrastructural deficit. In the final analysis, it is hoped that the more accountable the government becomes, the higher will be Nigeria’s ranking on the indicators of openness.
and ease of doing business. The ultimate goal is to develop a corruption-free society and attract more and more foreign investors (Akinnaso, 2016). For the finance Minister, Adeosun (2017) the purpose of the initiative is to increase exposure of financial or financial-related crimes, improve level of public confidence in public entities, enhance transparency and accountability in the management of public fund and improve the country's Open Government Ranking and Ease of Doing Business Indicators. The minister notes further that whistle blowers are expected to report mismanagement or misappropriation of public fund and assets, financial malpractice or fraud, collecting or soliciting bribes, diversion of revenues, fraudulent and unapproved payments, splitting of contracts and procurement fraud (kickbacks and over-invoicing etc.).

The Federal Government said that its Whistle-Blower policy is greatly yielding fruits as it has recovered US$151 million and 8 billion Naira looted funds. The Minister said the looted funds, which do not include the $9.2 million in cash allegedly owned by a former Group Managing Director of the NNPC (which was also a dividend of the whistle-blower policy), were recovered from just three sources through whistle-blowers who gave actionable information to the office of the Minister of Justice and Attorney-General of the Federation. The biggest amount of $136,676,600.51 was recovered from an account in a commercial bank, where the money was kept under an apparently fake account name, followed by 7 billion Naira and $15 million from another person and 1 billion Naira from yet another (Vanguard, 2017).

The Nigerian government says its whistleblowing platform received a total of 2,251 communications – enquiries, tips, compliments and general advice from the public. In essence, 282 Nigerians provided 154 actionable intelligence in three months (December 22, 2016 to April 2017). Not to be outdone, the Inspector General of Police, Mr. Ibrahim Idris once urged whistle-blowers to report the misconduct of policemen to the appropriate quarters. Members of the public can report malfeasance and corrupt tendencies of Nigeria Police personnel to the Police Complaint Rapid Response Unit (PCRRU), through any of these – phone lines, SMS, WhatsApp, Blackberry Messenger (BBM), Emails, Facebook, Twitter platforms (Okereke, 2017).

![Table 1: Looted Funds Discovery](image)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Looted Funds Discovery</th>
<th>Progress Report/Reactions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The commission said a special operation conducted by its operatives on 3rd February on a building belonging to Andrew Yakubu, a former Group Managing Director of the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation, in Kaduna yielded the staggering sum of $9,772,800 (Nine Million, Seven Hundred and Seventy Two Thousand, Eight Hundred</td>
<td>On February 8, 2017, Andrew Yakubu reported to the Commission’s Zonal office in Kano and made statement wherein he admitted ownership of the recovered money,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States Dollars) and another sum of £74,000 (Seventy Four Thousand Pound Sterling) stuffed in fireproof safes. claiming it was gift from unnamed persons.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Economic and Financial Crimes Commission, EFCC, on March 16, docked Yakubu on a six-count criminal charge, following which the court ordered his remand in prison custody pending ruling on his bail application.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Ibrahim Bappa, the Kaduna zonal head of the EFCC, while addressing journalists in Kaduna, said the money was stashed in five large 150 kilogramme coloured sacks (Premium Times, March 14, 2017).  
Mr. Wilson Uwujaren, Head, Media & Publicity of EFCC said the interception was carried out following a tip off.  
The owner of the money later showed up but couldn't state the exact money in the sack or present any document authenticating the genesis of the money.  
"However, his inability to give any concrete explanation made him become uncomfortable and he disappeared into thin air before the arrival of EFCC operatives," the zonal head said.  
Mr. Bappa said the operatives later found out that the suspect had fled the airport vicinity leaving the sacks behind. |

3. The Nigerian anti-corruption unit discovered more than $43 million in US dollars at an upscale apartment in Lagos. The Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC)
The anti-graft agency said in a statement it raided the apartment after a tipoff about a "haggard" woman in "dirty clothes" taking bags in and out of the apartment. The agency said it also found 23.2 million naira (Nigerian currency worth $75,000) and £27,800 (UK currency, worth $35,000 US) "neatly arranged" inside cabinets hidden behind wooden panels of a bedroom wardrobe (CNN, April 14). The money was found in a residential building on the 7th floor of a four-bedroom apartment at Osborne Towers located at 16 Osborne Road, Ikoyi, Lagos.

4. **The Economic and Financial Crimes Commission** recovered N449,000,860 hidden in an abandoned shop in Lagos. An official of the EFCC who was actively involved in the investigation said: "We received information from a whistle-blower regarding a huge sum of money stashed in an office in Nigerian Air Force complex at Legico bus stop…He said investigation revealed that the shop belonged to a Bureau De change operator (The Punch, April 8, 2017).


Source: Compiled by the Author

The news of the recovered funds signals gains made by president Buhari’s anti-corruption drive as he remains intent on ensuring transparency in state institutions and agencies previously known for being opaque and corrupt. The timing of the recovery of the funds was crucial for Nigeria’s stumbling economy. The recovered funds were set to come in at a time when the government was doubling down on efforts to diversify its oil-dependent economy and fund a record $30.6 billion national budget (Quartz Africa, 2016). While assessing the policy so far, the Information and Culture Minister, Lai Mohammed opines that:

> When we told Nigerians that there was a primitive and mindless looting of the national treasury under the last administration, some people called us liars. Well, the whistle-blower policy is
barely two months old and Nigerians have started feeling its impact, seeing how a few people squirrelled away public funds. It is doubtful if any economy in the world will not feel the impact of such mind-boggling looting of the treasury as was experienced in Nigeria (africanews, 2017).

It is safe to conclude that the average Nigerian is sick and tired of the looting of public funds. Therefore, the whistleblowing policy, which encourages the provision of information in respect of 1) mismanagement or misappropriation of public funds and assets, 2) collection or soliciting of bribes, 3) diversion of revenues, 4) making of fraudulent and unapproved payments, 5) splitting of contracts, and 6) procurement fraud, would be welcome by many Nigerians. A civil servant with key information on stashed funds or a scheme to divert public funds would be more likely to report to the authorities, if there is an assurance his identity would not be revealed (Odude, 2017). Commenting further on enthusiasm with which Nigerians bought into the policy, Lai Mohammed (2017) submits that:

Nigerians, fired by a fervid resolve to help banish corruption from their country, have daily inundated the offices of the appropriate government agencies with valuable information. We have been told how looters have resorted to burying stolen funds in their backyards, in deep forests and even in burial grounds…Yes, there is monetary reward for any information that leads to recovery of looted funds, but from what we have seen, most of the Nigerians who have come forward with useful leads were driven by patriotism rather than reward…As the looters continue to run helter-skelter, many of them are even abandoning their booty at unusual places, including airports (InformationNigeria, 2017).

Beyond the policy however, Shittu (cited in Onanuga, 2017) advocates that there should be a legal framework detailing parameters and guidelines for its operation. This should cover scope, powers, limitations, protections, endorsement and remedies. Shittu described the whistleblowing policy as “an excellent idea that should cover all aspects of our national life to reduce corruption, crime and other forms of impunity”. A cursory look at the recoveries of illicit money after the introduction of the policy showcased the fact that it is very effective and should be extended to other sectors and the government should be faithful in honouring those who give out the vital information that leads to success unless they opt out of being paid.

Whistle Blowing and the Risk in a Corruption-Ridden Society

The clandestine nature of corrupt behaviour means that it may never come to light unless cases are reported by people who discover them in the course of their work. But reporting can come at a high price: whistle-blowers often expose themselves to great personal risks in order to protect the public interest. As a result of speaking out, they may lose their jobs, dampen their career prospects, and even put their own lives at risk (Transparency International, 2010). The risk of corruption is significantly heightened in environments where the reporting of wrongdoing is not supported or protected. Public and private sector employees have access to up-to-date information concerning their workplaces’ practices, and are usually the first to recognise wrongdoings (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime).
Corruption is a notoriously secretive activity and it is usually only those engaged in corrupt deals or those who work with them that are aware of it. Insiders are among the few people who are able to report cases of corruption (past or on-going) and identify the risk of future wrongdoing. By helping to detect corruption cases, whistle-blowers play a critical role in converting a vicious cycle of secrecy into a virtuous cycle (Transparency International, 2010). Major bribery and corruption scandals demonstrate the damage done by the failure to report wrongdoing as soon as it is discovered. Yet indifference, fear of reprisal, and misplaced loyalty as well as an overall culture of silence often deter potential witnesses and whistle-blowers from speaking out (Transparency International, 2010).

Culturally, whistle-blowing has connotations of betrayal. Whistle-blowers were hitherto perceived as disloyal malcontents, troublemakers and villains, not heroes or courageous employees. Speaking out has been difficult, especially in a culture where this is not promoted or even actively discouraged (Ajibola, 2017). Lack of support from others may render institutional mechanisms against corruption ineffective and hinder whistleblowing (Rehg et al., 2008). Whistleblowing is not without consequences. It has adverse effects on the public confidence in the organizations concerned, the profession of the corrupt person (Oakley & White, 2006), and the whistle-blowers (Cortina and Magley, 2003). Rehg et al. (2008) reported that whistleblowing was strongly connected with retaliation from culprits, which culminated in strained relationships between whistle-blowers and supervisors. Whistleblowing may also have adverse effects on the whistle-blowers' access to work-related benefits (Rehg et al., 2008).

Whistle blowers could commonly “face discipline or dismissal” because they are being seen as “particular threat to, and thorn in the side of, an employing organization.” They may also earn more negative labels such as informants, snitches, rats, squabbles, sneaks, or stoolies which could have impact on them or their families (Sule, 2014) especially in Nigeria where, more often than not, citizens are wary of reporting suspicious persons or activities to the security agencies because confidentiality is not always guaranteed and bearing in mind that “a typical corrupt Nigerian ‘big man’ is unscrupulous, desperate, vindictive, and bloodsucking; human life means nothing to them hence eliminating anyone who snitches or stands on their way is elementary” (Okereke, 2017). Thus, whistleblowing best practice demands that inter-alia whistleblowers must be safeguarded against any form of retaliation – threats, harassment and demotion, amongst others while also ensuring confidentiality to the fullest extent possible and ability to anonymously report malfeasance and corrupt tendencies (ibid).

Admittedly, considering the state of Nigeria’s economy and given that unemployment and under-employment are on the rise, a veritable investment option as it stands today is whistle-blowing. However, like other forms of investment, there are risks attached to this (Ogunjobi, 2017). Instances now abound where whistle-blowers have been exposed to danger and suffered some harassment and reprimand especially in their work place. For example, in February 2017, a top career civil servant, Mr. Ntia Thompson, was fired after sending a petition to the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), asking it to
probe an allegation of fraud involving some top officials of the Directorate of Technical Cooperation in Africa (DTCA). The move came just two months after the President Buhari-led administration, through the Executive Council of the Federation, approved the whistle-blowing policy, promising full protection and restitution for any informant against harassment, intimidation or victimisation. Thompson had exposed alleged corruption by some officials in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, where he was an assistant director (New Telegraph, 2017). In 2014, former Central Bank Governor SanusiLamidoSanusi was suspended by erstwhile President Goodluck Jonathan for “financial recklessness and misconduct”, after the Kano prince caused shock waves in Nigeria when he alleged that $20 billion in oil revenue had gone “missing” at the NNPC (Ajibola, 2017).

In 2011, a member of staff of National Women Development Centre, Abuja, was dismissed from service for exposing the alleged embezzlement of N300 million meant for poverty alleviation by some top officers. In 2016, three members of staff of the Federal University of Agriculture, Abeokuta - LasunSomoye, AbdulSalaamSobbor and Bimbo Bankole, were suspended by the university and later sacked by its governing council for whistle-blowing. They had written to the EFCC, accusing the institution’s vice chancellor and the pro-chancellor of fraud. By an interesting turn of events, the Vice Chancellor of the University, OlusolaOyewole, who suspended and later sacked three whistle-blowers, has himself been arrested for alleged fraud (Ajibola, 2017).

What is however, worrisome is how the National Assembly seems to be repugnant to such policy/law in its internal operations as manifested in the suspension of its members. For instance, Mr. Ali Ndume, a member of the Senate, was suspended by the Senate for triggering investigations into allegations of forgery against the senate president, BukolaSaraki, and Kogi senator, Dino Melaye. News reports accused Mr. Saraki of importing a Range Rover SUV without paying appropriate import duty, and attempting to clear the vehicle with falsified papers. Mr. Melaye was accused of falsely claiming to have graduated from Ahmadu Bello University. The Senate dismissed both allegations, and sanctioned Mr. Ndume by suspending him for six months (Premium Times, 2017).

Also, the House of Representatives in 2016 suspended the former Chairman of Appropriation Committee, Hon. Abdulmumin Jibrin for a period of 180 legislative sitting days. Jibrin had accused the Speaker of the House, Yakubu Dogara and other principal officers of the Lower Legislative Chamber of padding the 2016 budget to the tune of over N40bn (Daily Post, 2016). Mr. Jibrin began stirring what experts now described as one Africa’s biggest parliamentary scandals in recent memory on July 21, 2016 a day after he was eased out as chairman of the powerful committee. Although the House was taking a two-month recess at the time, Mr. Jibrin remained resolute in his quest to “end the massive corruption in the House” (Ogundipe, 2016). Mr. Jibrin’s suspension would see him banned from the premises of the National Assembly in the course of the disciplinary action. He would also not receive salaries or allowances.
This ugly development may have justified the submission of Adebanwi and Obadare (2011:187) that the gravest threats to anti-corruption campaigns often emanate from a combination of intra-elite rancour and political intrigue, based on corrupt practices which are reflections of deeper socio-political pathologies of a 'normal' post-colonial state. Those pathologies, they argue, are manifestations of the structures of patrimonial domination. This is because anti-corruption campaigns, by their very nature, pose a serious danger to the material basis of elites and the possibility of their continued reproduction.

The Nigerian government is promising whistle-blowers anonymity, but the Whistle blowing portal to expose illegal activity is very prone to hacking. The site lacks basic HTTPS encryption that protects Internet traffic from eavesdroppers (Nigerian Bulletin, 2017). Also, Sahara Reporters spoke to the whistle blower responsible for the recovery of almost $50 million in an Ikoyi apartment. Although the whistle blower was not named in the media report, one is curious as to how the media house got access. The article also reveals that the whistle blower in that case is a security guard. Who will stop his employer from firing him? (Nigerian Bulletin, 2017). This clearly suggests that a whistle blower in Nigeria is still highly vulnerable.

The Needed Institutional and Policy Frameworks

Studies have shown that there can be a huge array of anti-corruption institutions, regulations and laws available in a given society and there have been some success stories in fighting corruption. This study subscribes to the fact that, in curbing the menace of corruption or to ensure effective war against it, there should be a legal framework that encapsulates the applicable strategies to achieve such. These strategies fall into three main categories: “reducing the scope for corruption through policy change; increasing the costs of corruption through external monitoring and sanctioning; and devising systems to induce self-restraint within government organisations” (Hamilton-Hart, 2001:67). Strategies to limit corruption have to be realistic and achievable and tailored to the needs of particular countries. Corruption is essentially a governance issue. Increased governmental accountability and transparency, enhanced public participation in decision making, strengthened public sector and civil society institutions and greater adherence to the rule of law will not only improve governance but will help counter corruption (Policy Forum - Document on Corruption and Development in Africa, 1997).

Over the years, scholars, activists and international organizations have identified elements which when present can assist in winning the war against corruption. These elements include: (a). Legislative framework for transparent and accountable government and for fighting corruption including Freedom of Information Act (FOI Act), Budget law, Fiscal responsibility law, Whistle blowers Act e.t.c. (b). Political will and commitment to fight corruption; (c). Comprehensive strategy that is systematic, comprehensive, consistent, focused, publicized, non-selective and non-partisan; (d). Protection of Whistle blowers (e). Political Reform
to curb political corruption; (f). Reform of substantive programmes and administrative procedures; (g). Mobilisation for social re-orientation with participation of civil society and faith based organisations; (h). Effective parliamentary oversight through the Public Accounts Committee; (i). Independent media; (j). Adequate remuneration for workers to reflect the responsibilities of their post and a living wage; (k). Code of ethics for Political office holders, business people and CSOs; (l). Independent institutions; and (m). Mass Movement for Anti-corruption (Igbuzor, 2016). For Nigeria, two pillars for the anti-corruption coalition in the on-going fight against corruption, as noted by the Vice President, Yemi Osinbajo (Cited in Ademolekun, 2017), are: (i) President as anti-corruption champion (ii) the provisions in the 1999 Constitution that mandate fighting corruption and (iii) a National Anti-Corruption Strategy that needs to be adopted through a participatory process involving all three tiers of government, the private sector, civil society organisations and concerned citizens.

Interestingly, the Nigerian Senate on July 18, 2017 passed another anti-corruption bill: ‘the whistle blower protection bill,’ after its third reading at plenary. The bill amongst other things aims at ensuring that persons who make disclosures about corruption do not suffer reprisals in relation to such disclosures and are duly protected by law. Previous bills passed by the eighth Senate in the fight against corruption include: the witness protection bill and the mutual assistance in criminal matters bill (Okakwu, 2017). The Bill, which was read the first time on the floor of Senate on 15th of March, 2016, according to Daily Post (2016), “seeks to protect persons making disclosure for the public interest (Whistle-blowers) to be protected from the knowledge or aggression of the accused”. Others are; the Office of the Financial Ombudsman Bill 2015, National Convicts and Criminal Records Bill 2015, Electronics Transactions Bill 2015, and the Nigerian International Financial Centre Bill 2015. The 2015 version of the Whistle-Blower Protection Bill was one of the 46 bills that the Seventh Senate passed into law within 10 minutes on the eve of the end of its tenure in 2015. They were not signed into law by former President Goodluck Jonathan. Senator Biodun Olujimi (SeeDaily Post, 2016) argues that the effectiveness of Nigeria’s legal framework and fight against corruption/fraud depends on the quality of the country’s whistle blowing standards/protection. She opines further:

Although the anti-corruption agencies have internal mechanism and made provisions for the protection of Whistle-blowers, this protection has appeared insufficient, given the country’s poor performance in the fight against corruption. The enactment of a comprehensive and dedicated law as the basis for providing Whistle-blowers protections is generally considered the most effective legislative means of providing such protection.

Suffice it to say that the role of legislation in the fight against corruption cannot be undermined because the risk of corruption is significantly heightened in environments where the reporting of wrongdoing is not supported or protected by law. The law, in fact, improves co-ordination among relevant players in the fight against corruption and monitors progress of the war. Put differently, while whistle-blower protection is essential to encourage the reporting of misconduct, fraud and corruption, providing effective protection for
It is in this light that the whistleblowing Bill, passed by the Senate, becomes a potent instrument in the fight against corruption in the country. It is apposite to state that the whistleblowing bill, when fully assented to, should be diligently enforced with a view to supporting a culture of compliance and integrity. Several international conventions recognise whistleblowing as an effective tool for fighting corruption, fraud and mismanagement, and commit the signatory countries to implement appropriate legislation (Transparency International, 2010). However, existing legal provisions are fragmented and weakly enforced in most jurisdictions. Only in rare cases do they provide sufficient protection for whistle-blowers. Many laws may cover only the public sector or may be not tailored to the specific needs of whistle-blowers.

It is therefore pertinent to probe into how the whistle-blowers will be protected under the new law in Nigeria. Otherwise known as “An Act to Protect Persons Making Disclosures for the Public Interest and Others from Reprisals, to Provide for the Matters Disclosed to be Properly Investigated and Dealt with and for other Purposes Related Therewith”, the Bill also seeks to ensure that persons who make disclosures and persons who may suffer reprisals in relation to such disclosures are protected under the law.

The Bill also specifies who is qualified to make disclosure of improper conduct; the procedure for making disclosures; and the protection due to ‘whistle blowers.’ Under the newly passed Bill, a person who makes a disclosure shall not be subject to victimisation by his or her employers or by fellow employees. Additionally, a person who makes a disclosure has the right to take legal action if he or she is victimised, dismissed, suspended, declared redundant, transferred against his or her will, harassed or intimidated in any manner (The Punch, 2017).

With the passage of this Bill, the Senate has concluded work on three anti-corruption Bills. In May 2017, it passed the Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Bill, while in June 2017, it passed the Witness Protection Bill (The Punch, 2017). The Bill will now be sent to the House of Representatives for concurrence. If passed and assented by the President, Nigeria will join other countries like United States, United Kingdom, New Zealand, South Africa, Ghana, South Korea, Uganda, Netherlands, Canada with comprehensive whistle blower laws.

Another anti-corruption bill passed by the Senate is the bill for mutual assistance in criminal matters between Nigeria and other foreign countries to facilitate the identification, tracing, freezing, restraining, recovery, forfeiture and confiscation of proceeds, property and other instrumentalities of crimes. The bill, sponsored by the executive arm, would provide a legal framework that would strengthen the fight against
corruption, terrorism, economic and financial crimes, money laundering and other related offences. It would also facilitate the voluntary attendance of persons in the requesting state. It is also intended to effect the temporary transfer of persons in custody to assist in investigations or to appear as witnesses, facilitate obtaining and preserving of computer data, and providing any other assistance that is not contrary to the law of the requesting state (Okocha, 2017).

For the anti-graft agencies, they should painstakingly ensure that there are robust and independent investigations of high-level corruption cases by engaging quality investigators, prosecutors and adequate witness protection that could potentially assist in ensuring that admissible evidence against powerful, rich and high-ranking members of government (Kupoluyi, 2017). Also, there should be better coordination and synergy among the various security agencies in the country such as the Police, EFCC, the Department of State Services (DSS), the Code of Conduct Bureau (CCB), Independent Corrupt Practices and other related offences Commission (ICPC) and the Office of the Attorney- General of the Federation, among others, for a better anti-corruption fight (Kupoluyi, 2017).

While making a case for effective anti-corruption war, the Presidential Advisory Committee Against Corruption Chairman, ItseSagay (SAN) advocated “stiff punishment for counsel, particularly Senior Advocates, who have turned obstruction and frustration of proceedings on high-profile corruption cases into an art” (The Nation, July 27, 2017). He said such punishment for SANs must include denial of right of appearance in such high profile corruption cases. According to Sagay, prosecuting authorities must “insist on full application of Sections 306 and 396 of the Administration of Criminal Justice Act, namely: No stay of proceedings under any circumstances – S. 306. Any preliminary objection must be taken together with the substantive issue – S. 396(2), and hearings shall be on a daily basis, but in exceptional cases, adjournments not to be in excess of 14 working day, may be granted. Such adjournments not to exceed five in any proceedings – S. 396 (3) and (4)” (ibid). He recommended that “a High Court judge, who is elevated whilst presiding over a criminal case, should be allowed to conclude the case without any effect on his new status” (ibid).

Similarly, there are calls that public officers convicted of looting public funds even in the current war on corruption by anti-corruption agencies should be barred from partaking in partisan politics and holding any public office. As a corollary to the ban law, Sule (cited in The Guardian, October 6, 2016) for instance, also suggests that recovered loot should not be left to the vagaries of public expenditure framework that are not supported by specific provisions of the law. Thus, the authorities, as opined by the Leadership Editorial (2017), must punish the act of stealing for the lesson it tends to teach. The recovered item, in this instance, the money, will serve as exhibit during trial to be used to implicate, prosecute and jail them. There must be a price to be paid for the betrayal of public trust, for getting involved in an odious manipulation of officialdom for one’s pecuniary gains.
Accordingly, there should be another law to enable the government utilise the recovered funds to improve the living standard of Nigerians. Obviously, the issue of ban on convicted looters of public funds is not new. There have been laws and white papers from reports of administrative and judicial panels suggesting same. But since 1999 when democracy returned, no institution of governance including the election management agency has been able to secure any tangible conviction of any candidate who corrupted even the electoral process. Suffice it to say that the only way to prevent criminals and state thieves from getting elected and appointed into power is to enact a law that will prevent them from buying their way into office. And there is need for a fresh law to prevent indicted treasury looters from holding public offices. This is the least that can be done to sanitise the nation’s leadership recruitment process.

It is argued that maximizing the advantages offered by the Administration of Criminal Justice Act 2015 is crucial to the success of this new war against corruption. Some of its details are: day-to-day trial of an accused person upon arraignment until the conclusion of the case; or granting maximum of five adjournments if need be; and giving no room for objections on the grounds of flawed charge, among others. The 2013 practice directions issued to federal courts had the same provision for speedy dispensation of justice. But for some inexplicable reasons, as observed by Falana (2016:16) “the practice directions have not been applied by any of the courts”. In view of this, the need for special courts for the prosecution of financial crimes has also been advocated by some Nigerians just as the Federal government sent a proposal to the National Assembly in respect of that. Those who hold this view contend that the establishment of special courts to handle corruption and related cases will buttress the seriousness of the government in its campaign against corrupt practices.

A compelling step, according to Ogbonnia (2017) is “to complement the whistle-blowing programme by establishing the special courts needed to expedite corrupt cases. The anti-graft agency can follow by recruiting and training tens of thousands of jobless graduates adequate to wage a full-scale offensive combing from the 774 local governments upward. After all, the corrupt proceeds have been so overwhelming for the agency that many visible ill-gotten assets, such as the shady castles located in the various villages, are ironically ignored”. Available indicators show that most corruption cases being prosecuted by the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission, (EFCC) so far have been traveling with the speed of a snail through the regular courts. That has raised the argument in favour of special courts, and the fact that such facility would remove the vexatious frivolous adjournments that rob the cases of their real essence (Fanoro, et al, 2015). It could be deduced that within special courts, cases stand great chance of being disposed of quickly. Moreover, trials within special courts would be more rapidly processed than within a court of general jurisdiction. Again, by its ad hoc nature, special courts may not follow the same procedural rules as general-jurisdiction courts. Suffice it to say that why special courts are being proposed is the failure of the court system to facilitate prompt prosecution of suspects. Judges in the regular courts are fond of questionable long adjournments, frivolous injunctions and undue emphasis on technicalities that detract from the essence of corruption trials.
Nigeria’s leaders have consistently and progressively failed the nation in the areas of building strong institutions to fight corruption in the public sector. That is why it is still shameful that even after 18 years of democracy, some leaders past and present are still facing investigations into their alleged corrupt practices. Criminal justice reform would, therefore, entail reviewing our existing laws and court procedures. After the EFCC exhausts the powers of obtaining remand warrants to keep suspects in detention for an extended period of time, it would still have to charge such suspects to court. The suspects will, more than likely, be granted bail because these offences are bailable under our law, although the bail conditions to be imposed are left to the discretion of the judges (Odude, 2017). Odude (2017) submits that:

> Nevertheless, whistleblowing would remain just the nuts and bolts of our anti-corruption war. For the anti-corruption war to effectively work, we must not shelve the task of sanitizing our legal and judicial system as well as our political system. While we must carry out the necessary reforms, we as a people must also change the yardsticks for selecting our leaders.

If adequately implemented, legislation protecting whistle blowers can become one of the most effective tools to support anti-corruption initiatives, and detect and combat corrupt acts, fraud and mismanagement. The absence of appropriate legislation impedes the fight against corruption and exposes whistle blowers to risks of retaliation (Banisar, 2011:7). Protection of whistle blowers may also be provided for by specific provisions in different laws, such as in the criminal code, labour laws or laws regulating public servants. A criminal code may impose a fine and/or imprisonment for retaliation against a whistle blower that provides information about the commission or possible commission of an offence to law enforcement authorities. A labour law may protect workers against retaliation by employers when they report work-related offences and in some countries laws regulating public servants contain provisions aimed at protecting public servants who report wrongdoing in or relating to the public sector from reprisals. Whistle blower protection may also be provided for by specific laws, such as anti-corruption laws, competition laws, accounting laws, environmental protection laws, and company and securities laws (OECD, 2012:7).

It is argued that while the government has shown unmatched commitment to curbing corruption, such effort should be institutionalised. While the persona of the President as a staunch anti-corruption crusader is very important, it must be pointed out that the fight against corruption must be institutionalised for it to survive beyond the term of the present administration. Strategies that could help institutionalise the anti-corruption war include value reorientation, an effective legal and policy framework, strengthening institutions and degrading the conditions that currently make corruption attractive to the populace. Furthermore, the state governments must join in the war against corruption at the state level (CDD, 2016). For Suberu (2016), it is imperative that “Buhari goes beyond personal example to implementing some institutional reforms and building the institutions for fighting corruption.” Corruption is like water seeping into the ground; it will find any crack or crevice and make use of it. The only way to fight it is with a system of horizontal accountability that is vigorous, comprehensive, independent, and interlocking (Diamond, 2014).

**Conclusion**
President Buhari’s government has been learning from other crusading countries, such as Georgia. But not everyone is impressed. His political opponents, who ruled Nigeria for 16 years until 2015, call the campaign a witch-hunt (The Economist, July 26, 2016). It is a great challenge to President Buhari and the judicial order at the present time to bring respect for the rule of law into a fruitful and transformative relationship with justice (Jeyifo, 2016:12). The Buhari administration, as rightly posited by Omotseye (2016:48), is a product of law and it cannot overthrow that same process without enthroning hypocrisy. In a democracy, the quality of the law prospers on equality before the law. President Buhari, according to Sekoni (2016), may not have provided a grand narrative of how he plans to govern the country, he has, undoubtedly, clearly stated that no change can come to the economy until looters of the economy and the polity in the past are made to return their loot.

It has become imperative for the President to immediately redeem his campaign promise to create an enabling environment, legal framework and strong institutions to effectively combat the war against corruption. Top of the list is the guarantee of independence to EFCC and ICPC in three areas, namely prosecutorial independence, financial autonomy and guaranteed tenure of office. To support the promulgation of an effective legal framework for the war against corruption, the Money Laundering Prevention and Prohibition Bill 2016 and the Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Bill 2016 (which are presently before the National Assembly) should be expedited and passed into law (CCD, 2016:14).

There is growing awareness about the crucial role of whistle-blowing in fighting corruption and ensuring ethical business behaviour across the African continent in both public and private sectors. Citizens, Civil society organizations, Donors, Investors and other stakeholders are asking for stricter measures to combat corruption and to ensure good corporate governance and enhance corporate sustainability. Thus, the war against corruption should be of major concern to every individual and organisation in the country. Put differently, “civil society groups and various non-governmental constituencies, including youth and student groups, must join the crusade. Committed individuals and groups must make efforts to develop the capacity to source for, and put crucial information at the disposal of relevant anti-corruption agencies and legislative assemblies. The press in particular should devote more energy to effectuating its watchdog function through rigorous investigative journalism” (Ehusani, 2005). The moment it dawns on everyone that sleaze would not go unpunished, no matter from whatever quarters, Nigeria stands the chance of fulfilling its manifest destiny, which, for too long, has been shunted aside by large-scale turpitude.

While the recovery of these funds is a step in the right direction, the EFCC needs to exercise caution in disclosing information of recovered looted funds to the public before investigations are concluded. The Nigerian masses are quick at pronouncing guilt even before trial is conducted, and concocting, implicating and fabricating stories that may hinder the smooth sail of investigation, thereby distracting many from the true position of things (Bulusson, 2017). The rush by citizens for more information about the whistle-blower policy indicates public willingness to report financial crimes and corruption. The Federal Government should
capitalise on this willingness to broaden its anti-corruption fight to states, educational and health institutions, and the private sector. The broader the fight, the more citizens will get involved (Akinnaso, 2016).

References


Ademolekun Ladipo (2017) The missing link in the fight against corruption, Guardian, March 13

Africanews (2017) Nigeria’s whistleblower initiative yields recovery of over $176m, Available at: http://www.africanews.com/2017/02/13/nigeria-s-whistleblower-initiative-yield-recovery-of-over-176m/

Agekameh, Dele (2015) This Dasukigate, The Nation, December 16


Bulusson, Daniel (2017) Whistle blowing in Nigeria, Daily Trust, April 18


CNN (2017) Nigeria’s anti-corruption unit finds $43 million cash in Lagos apartment, April 14


Department of Public Service and Administration (2006) Anti-corruption Capacity Requirements: Guidelines for implementing the minimum anti-corruption capacity requirements in departments and organisational components in the public service, Pretoria: Government Printer


Falana, Femi (2007) Ethics and Governance, the Rule of Law and Anti-Corruption: A Nigerian Dilemma, Sahara Reporters, December 8


Jibueze, Joseph (2016) Sagay Committee Unfolds Strategies to Fight Corruption, The Nation, November 2

Kazeem, Yomi (2016) An $8 million refugee fund scandal shows Buhari’s anti-corruption drive in Nigeria is not going to plan, Quartz Africa, December 9

Kazeem, Yomi (2017) Nigeria’s whistle-blower plan to pay citizens to report corruption is off to a great start, Quartz Africa, February 13

Kazeem, Yomi (2017) Some of the world’s biggest countries have managed to reduce extreme poverty—except Nigeria, Quartz Africa, April 21


Leadership (2017) Magu’s Startling Revelations, February 13


Odude, Funmilayo (2017) The whistleblowing policy is good, but we need deeper reform,


Ogunjobi, Michael (2017) The limits of whistle-blowing, Nigerian Tribune, August 2

Okakwu, Evelyn (2017) Senate passes bill to protect whistle-blowers, Premium Times, July 19


Okocha, Chuks (2017) Senate and Buhari’s Anti Graft War, Vanguard, July 22

Okuofu, Osilama (2015) President Buhari And The Burden Of Integrity! Available at: https://politics.naij.com/517555-president-buhari-burden-integrity.html

Omatseye, Sam (2016) The Marathon, The Nation, February 8


Premium Times (2017) How EFCC intercepted N49 million stashed in sacks at Kaduna airport, March 14

Premium Times (2017) Huge protest at National Assembly over Ndume’s suspension by Senate, April 4

Quartz Africa (2016) Nigeria says it’s recovered $9.1 billion in looted funds, but won’t name the culprits, June 6


Sekoni, Ropo (2016) In the Court of Public Opinion: Anti-Corruption versus Rule of Law? The Nation, October 16

Smith, Jeffrey (2016) Buhari is Treading a Perilous Path in Nigeria, Vanguard Africa Movement, June 20


The Economist (2016) The $20-Billion Hole in Africa’s Largest Economy, February 2

The Guardian (2016) Banning Looters from Public Offices, October 6
The Guardian (2016) Sending Corrupt Judges to Jail, January 28
The Nation (2017) Corruption cases: EFCC not working in concert with AGF’s office, says Buhari’s aide, July 27
The Nation (2017) EFCC recovers N1.25b from public servant, February 10
The Punch (2016) How to Deploy Recovered Loot, January 25
The Punch (2017) EFCC recovers N449m in abandoned Lagos shop, April 8
The Punch (2017) Whistle-blowing in Nigeria’s Anti-graft Crusade, January 15
The Punch (2017) Senate passes Whistleblower Protection Bill into law, July 19
Tijani, Taju (2015) President Buhari and the Anxious Expectations of Nigerians, CounterPunch, January 13
Vanguard (2016) Unravelling The Arms Deals, December 25
Vanguard (2017) Whistle Blowing as Panacea to Corruption, April 15