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Note from the Editor

The current issue focuses on the colonial legacy, in terms of the inherited ethnic conflicts, futile attempts at democratization and the continuation of the cultural heritage. N.K. Das looks at the ethnic conflicts raging on in the North Eastern states of India focusing on their roots in the colonial times. Martin Ikechukwu Ifeanacho grapples with the repeated failures of inherited democracy to take roots in Nigeria and suggests a move away from the military rule with power transferred to the civil society. Shams Bin Quader looks at the remaining cultural contacts with the colonies in terms of the diaspora and its influence on the music in the West.

As a matter of policy, Bangladesh e-Journal of Sociology continues to encourage young writers and articles on new and challenging areas. This issue is no exception. Young lecturer Shams Bin Quader takes up the study of the diasporic music in all its verity, with a focus on the Bengali musicians in London. Although an exploratory study, Quader takes immense pains to locate the foundation and the prospects of diasporic music among the Bengali audience in the UK.

N.K Das, with his immense experience of the studies of the “tribal” populations of India looks to the North-Eastern conflict zone of India. After an exhaustive study of the historical roots of the growth of various conflicts in the area, he concludes that in spite of the multifarious sources of conflict in the region, “Their concern for variously perceived threats to their distinct ethnic identities and their anxiety for preservation of culture and language and their demand of autonomy can not be seen as dysfunctional for a healthy civil society”. The author, in the process describes all facets of the conflict in the region, including those of language, immigration problems, religious revivalist movements, self rule and militancy in general.

Democracy has been a far cry for many African nations, even though the professed policies of most countries have been that of “democratization”. “Paradoxically, the history of democratization in Africa, Nigeria in particular has remained the history of national disintegration.” Martin Ikechukwu Ifeanacho examines this paradox within the colonial hegemonic legacies. He concludes that for the true democratization to emerge, power has to transit from the ruling class to the civil society.

Another challenging area, men’s sexuality, almost a taboo topic in Bangladeshi culture, is examined by Shyamal Kumar Das, Ashraf Esmail, and Lisa Eargle. Although they work with a US sample, the scope of the study goes far beyond that and is relevant for all cultures. They test a few hypotheses including that of the “rape myth”, which almost rationalizes men’s sexual aggressiveness. Although sexuality or the studies of the gay and the homosexuals is a commonplace in the sociological literature in the West, they are yet to find a place in the Bangladeshi curricula. To the best of our knowledge, such a topic is being reported for the first time in a Bangladeshi sociology journal. Future contribution in the area is welcomed.

The study of poverty has been a major focus of the BEJS in the past and a collection of the essays published in the previous issues of the BEJS in a single volume is in the press now. A particular area, that of the subjective definition of poverty, has been the central theme among the Bangladesh sociologists. A.I. Mahbub Uddin Ahmed made seminal contribution to such a study in Bangladesh through an article published in an earlier issue of the BEJS. In this issue with the assistance of a junior colleague Ahmed takes up a further clarification of the subjective definition of poverty through the concept of “Normative Deprivation”. It is also interesting to note that the study is done in a rather well to do residential area of Dhaka city and the perceptions of poverty among the “not so poor” presents some very interesting, albeit surprising, findings.
Migration has almost always been studied with the migrants in mind. Very rarely, if at all, studies have focused on the ones who “did not” migrate. I have found this to be a fascinating area and have commented on this before* and currently a student of mine is working this out in her Master’s thesis. Olayiwola O. Fasoranti has a similar concern and decided to look at the non-migrants in the rural area. He seeks to know to what extent the perception of migration is influenced by the socioeconomic factors of the non-migrants. It is interesting to note that in his study of the non-migrants in the selected rural communities of the Ondo state of Nigeria the socioeconomic factors do not influence such perception. However, he finds that, “the perception of non-migrants on benefits and problems from rural-urban migration is influenced mainly by the martial circumstances and length of residence of the rural non-migrant”.

As with the past ten issues, we hope that the BEJS will generate further research in the areas covered here and encourage young and older scholars alike to venture into new and challenging areas. We shall always remain open to such publications.

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Normative Deprivation in Urban Bangladesh: A Case Study of Uttara, Dhaka

A. I. Mahbub Uddin Ahmed*  
Lipon Kumar Mondal**

Abstract: The study focuses on the construction of social necessity by both adults and children in an affluent section of urban Bangladesh. The study has improvised on a British poverty study by Gordon et al. (2000). The data for this study come from a sample survey of 360 respondents (for adult poverty) and 265 respondents (for child poverty) from Uttara, Dhaka in 2008. The normative deprivation index for Uttara shows that 40 items out of 48 appear significant as more than 50 percent respondents consider them as necessary. More than 90 percent respondents agree on the importance of 9 items for adult poverty: three meals a day, fan, celebrating special occasions, television, mobile, good job, medicine prescribed by doctor, refrigerator and household furniture. It is found that more than 90 percent respondents agree on the importance of 10 items for child poverty: three meals a day, major requirements prescribed by school, sufficient baby milk, warm/properly fitted shoes, toys, meat, fish or vegetarian equivalent at least once a day, celebrating birthday, bi-cycle and home computer. It is also found that the extent of adult and child normative deprivation is 30 percent and 26 percent respectively. The chi-square test shows that the deprivation index is significantly related to selected demographic and socio-economic variables like gender, age, marital status, occupation, education and household size. It is argued that the item-wise difference between Bangladesh and British normative deprivation is due to the cultural differences of two societies.

1. Introduction

Poverty is usually defined and conceptualized as absolute poverty. At the core of this lies the notion of subsistence and destitution, which is traditionally measured by the poverty line estimated as a lack of minimum material provisions required for the continuation of physical existence. The requirement for food, shelter, clothing and sundries were converted into monetary units, weekly or monthly income (Booth, 1889; Rowntree, 1901, 1941). However, with the affluence of the western societies, especially Britain, the concept of absolute poverty was replaced by the notion of relative poverty (Townsend, 1954, 1979, 1993; Abel Smith and Townsend, 1965). While absolute poverty is claimed to be defined objectively, the relative poverty is defined subjectively as some element of judgment is involved in determining poverty levels and is viewed as the normative deprivation. It is constructed from a subjectively agreed upon construction of social necessity, which includes items like diet, social activities, and living conditions and amenities (Townsend, 1979).

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The measurement of poverty in the United States and other European countries is done through an official poverty line based on income proxy measures. In the United States, the official poverty threshold for two-person families was computed by applying a multiplier of $1/0.27$, or $3.7$ derived from the 1955 Household Food Consumption Survey, where a food/total-after-tax-money-income ratio of 0.27 was used (Orshansky, 1965). In the 1980s, budget standards method was used following data published by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (Viet-Wilson, 1986). The Watts Committee also used expenditure pattern for measuring the poverty threshold.\(^1\) In most European countries, the poverty line is measured by the income proxy measures as income below 60 percent of the median income (Kangas and Ritakallio, 1998). The Leyden poverty line uses the income proxy measure for various European countries in order to construct an ordinal scale poverty threshold that ranges from very bad to very good consensual standard of living (Van Praag et al., 1982). Unlike the United States and other countries, in Britain there is no official definition of poverty and measurement of poverty line. Drawing on the absolutist tradition of Rowntree, which is based on a list of necessities, the poverty line was measured by the budget standards method (Rowntree, 1901, 1941; Rowntree and Lavers, 1951; Bradshaw et al, 1987). During 1960s Supplementary Benefit\(^2\) was used as an indicator of poverty (Abel-Smith and Townsend, 1965; Bradshaw and Morgan, 1987; Bradshaw and Holmes, 1989; Bradshaw and Ernst, 1990; Piachaud, 1979; Yu, 1992).

Rather than relying on income for measuring poverty in the United Kingdom like income proxy measures or budget standard and supplementary benefit, Townsend (1979) relied on people’s subjective understanding of poverty labeled as relative deprivation index. His measurement is criticized as behavioral and not a consensual as they involve the judgment of experts or researchers in determining acceptable indicators of deprivation (Desai, 1986). These deficiencies were taken into account in the work of Mack and Lansly (1985, 1992), who used a list of indicators and asked their respondents whether or not they thought (a) each potential indicator was necessary to avoid hardship; (b) whether the respondents lacked those indicators, and (c) whether this lack was due to the lack of resources to purchase them. Thus poverty was conceptualized as “consensual” if 50 percent and more respondents agreed that the lack of an item constituted poverty. Accordingly 26 items were listed to measure poverty of which 5 items were suggested by the respondents and 21 items were provided by the researchers. The survey classified poverty into two categories, poor—who lack three or more items, and severely poor—who lack seven or more items.\(^3\) Drawing on this tradition, out of 54 items, Gordon et al. (2000)

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\(^1\) Watts Committee distinguished three levels of expenditure pattern: (i) prevailing family standard, which was fixed at a median income level, (ii) social minimum standard, which was fixed at 50 percent below median income, and (iii) social abundance standard, which was fixed at 50 percent above median income (Alcock, 1993:65).

\(^2\) It is a means-tested cash benefit paid by the state to people whose income did not reach a level deemed appropriate by Parliament for subsistence.

\(^3\) Their methodology was applied in the study of consensual poverty in Sweden as well (Halleröd, 1994).
created a list of 35 poverty items that more than 50 per cent of the respondents considered necessary to avoid poverty. They extended Mack and Lansley’s methodology by adding additional dimensions of poverty and including exclusion as well as child poverty along with adult poverty. Poor is defined by them as those who are unable to afford at least two socially defined necessities.

This methodology is adopted in other poverty studies as in Denmark (Mack and Lansley, 1985), Sweden (Halleröd, 1994, 1995a, 1995b, 1998), Ireland (Callan, Nolan and Whelan, 1993; Nolan and Whelan, 1996a), Belgium (Van den Bosch, 1998), Holland (Muffels et al., 1990; Muffels and Vries, 1991; Muffels, Berghman and Dirven, 1992), Finland (Kangas and Ritakillio, 1998), Germany (Andreß and Lipsmeir, 1995) and Vietnam (Davies and Smith, 1998).

However no study as such is conducted in the Third World countries. In Bangladesh, poverty is basically conceptualized from the perspective of destitution and subsistence rather than of deprivation. A recent study by Ahmed (2007) conceptualized poverty as normative deprivation and measured poverty in the earlier traditions of Townsend, Mack and Lansley, Halleröd and Gordon et al., especially of consensual approach. The study also compares poverty situation of Bangladesh with Britain and Sweden. The normative deprivation index for Bangladesh in 2000 is constructed by 17 items out of 69 items listed. Thus more than 50 percent of respondents perceive the absence of 17 items as constituting poverty. More than 70 percent respondents agreed on the importance of 7 items: (i) three meals a day for children, (ii) two meals a day for adults, (iii) quilt for every member of the household; (iv) milk for babies, (v) celebration of religious festivals, (vi) pillow for every member of the household, and (vii) one pair of all-weather shoes. The chi-square test showed that the deprivation index was significantly related to occupation, education and age followed by residence, income and gender.

However, the study did not include child poverty nor it included items like “items don’t have,” “items don’t have because don’t want” and “items don’t have because can’t afford.” In order to fill this research gap and adopt the poverty approach of Gordon et al. (2000), the present is conceived at a micro level to include the northern part of Dhaka known as Uttara. It is a fast-growing model town under Dhaka City Corporation and is inhabited by cross-section of the population.

2. Objective of Study
The main objective of this study is to measure adult and child poverty in terms of relative deprivation as subjectively perceived and objectively experienced by the respondents in an affluent section of urban Bangladesh.
3. Definition and Measurement of Variables

Adult and child poverty are defined as the multiple forms of deprivation. Following the tradition of Townsend (1979), Mack and Lansley (1985, 1992) and Gordon et al. (2000), it is measured as a consensual poverty, where more than fifty per cent of the respondents agree that the lack of a particular item constitutes a poverty situation. This study adopts measurement of poverty in PSE Survey by Gordon et al. (2000) in the context of Bangladesh. However, while adopting the measurement of child poverty in the PSE Survey, which only asked parents about their children’s relative deprivation, the present study improvised the measurement by directly asking children as well as their parents. The 48 items selected for measuring relative deprivation are an adoption of Gordon et al. (2000) in the context of Bangladesh. Wherever possible, the items used for UK are retained and few items are tailored to the Bangladesh situation.

4. Methodology and Data Source

The data for this study come from a simple random survey (SRS) of 625 respondents from Uttara (sectors no. 4, 7 and 13), Dhaka. This sample size is divided into two sections i.e. adult poverty (360) and child poverty (265). For adult poverty, 189 females and 171 males have been surveyed whilst for child poverty; the number of female child and male child are respectively 126 and 139. The data were collected during January 2008 to July 2008. The survey followed multi-stage stratified sampling procedures. Firstly, Dhaka City Corporation (DCC) has been purposively selected among urban areas of Bangladesh as the only mega city of the country. Secondly, Uttara Thana has been selected randomly through lottery from among its 22 constituent Thanas. Thirdly, from among 14 sectors of Uttara Thana, 3 sectors-- 4, 7 and 13--are randomly selected for this research. These 3 sectors have 5,585 households. From this universe of household a sample household of 360 is estimated by using statistical method of determination of sample size, where .05 errors are allowed. By using a systematic sampling technique, one each adult and child respondents were selected from among 360 households. Though 720 respondents are expected (360 adults and 360 children), due to absence of children in 95 households, 625 respondents, 360 adults, 265 children are selected for survey. It must be noted here that the Interview Schedule for the adult poverty comprises 48 items of which 37 are from PSE Survey and 11 items are constructed from a thorough pre-testing to adapt to the Bangladesh situation. Similarly, the interview schedule for the child poverty includes 23 items of which 18 items are from PSE survey and 5 items are from pre-testing.
5. Characteristics of the Respondents

A: Adult Poverty
The majority of the respondents (53%) are females, and an overwhelming number (85%) are married. They are mostly young adults, 22 percent of the respondents are in the age group of 35-39 and 31 percent come from nuclear family structure of a small household of four. The majority of the respondents are highly educated, about 72 percent have at least a Bachelor's degree. Most respondents (26%) are found to be housewives followed by businessmen (18%). The reported expenditure pattern shows that single majority, 46 percent of the respondents have expenditure above the national average, between Tk.20,000 and Tk.35,000.

B: Child Poverty
There are two types of respondents, children themselves, who are aged above ten (38%) and proxy parents (62%) for children less than 10 years of age. Therefore, the survey does not give the actual gender breakdown of the child respondents; instead, it reports information from parents and children for about 52 percent male children and 48 percent female children. Among 265 children for which data have been collected from both types of respondents, 41 percent are in the age group of 5-10, 37 percent study in Grade I-V; 73 percent children study in English medium schools whereas 20 percent study in Bengali medium schools.

6. Findings

6.1 Adult Poverty

6.1.1 Social Construction of Necessity and Normative Deprivation
Table 1 which gives the normative deprivation index for adults in Uttara contains four columns representing four different poverty features—(a) items considered ‘necessary’, (b) items that respondents have, (c) items that respondents do not have because they do not want, and (d) items that respondents do not have because they cannot afford.

The column 2 of the Table 1 which indicates items considered ‘necessary’ shows that

a. 50 percent and more respondents perceive 40 items out of 48 items as socially necessary, the lack of which constitutes poverty.  

4 A peculiar feature of normative deprivation items in Bangladesh show seven items like (i) washing machine, (ii) dishwasher, (iii) CD player, (iv) cassette player, (v) ownership of motorbike, (vi) carpets in living room/bedroom, (vii) new clothes in a month are viewed as necessary by less than 50 percent of the respondents because they have some alternative means for those items, for example, servant at home, computer, private car, well decorated tiles, and many new clothes in every 3 or 4 months. The item ‘a meal in a restaurant once a week’ is found costly and replaced by arranging cooking of gourmet food at home.
b. More than 90 percent respondents consider 9 items as socially necessary. They are: (i) three meals a day, (ii) a fan at home, (iii) celebrating especial occasion, (iv) television, (v) mobile, (vi) a good job, (vii) medicine prescribed by doctor, (viii) refrigerator and (ix) household furniture.

The column 3 of Table 1 which shows items that respondents have, indicates that
a. All respondents have three items--three meals a day, fan at home and celebrating especial occasions;
b. 50 percent and more of the respondents have 43 items out of 48 items;
c. Between 43 percent and 17 percent of the respondents have five items--motorbike (17%), dishwasher (23%), a meal in a restaurant once a week (21 %), washing machine (44%) and new clothes in a month (26%).

The column 4 of the Table 1 which shows items that respondents do not have because they do not want, indicates that
a. More than 50 percent of the respondents do not have only two items--dishwasher and motorbike--because they do not want them; and
b. Less than 50 percent of the respondents do not have 46 items because they do not want them.

The column 5 of Table 1 which shows items that respondents do not have because they cannot afford it, indicates that between 30 percent and 37 percent respondents do not have 45 items because they cannot afford them, among them the most important items are air cooler (30%), own house (31%), washing machine (34%), IPS/generator (34%), car (35%), and a meal in a restaurant once a week (37%).

Thus Table 1 shows that social construction of the necessities of life is more wide-ranging and multidimensional, which includes food items, clothing, communication, amenities, economic security and sociability.

a. As far as food items are concerned, all respondents think that ‘three meals a day’ is a necessary item but 51 percent and 21 percent respondents consider ‘a meal in a restaurant once a month’ and ‘a meal in a restaurant once a weak’ as necessary respectively. Similarly, 78 percent respondents think meat, fish, and fruits equivalent every other day as necessary.
b. Regarding clothing, ‘trendy cloth’ is followed by ‘new clothes in a month’ as necessary items by 58 percent and 26 percent respondents respectively. Likewise, 71 percent and 51 percent respondents consider owning a house and having three pair of shoes socially necessary respectively.

c. With respect to communication items, degree of necessity varies item-wise, for example, television (96%), mobile (95%), daily newspapers (90%), satellite television (80%), home computer (79%), telephone (77%), and internet (57%).

d. Regarding amenities, degree of necessity also varies item-wise, for example, a fan (100%), refrigerators (92%), replace or repair broken electrical goods (81%), camera (74%), charger light (67%), car (66%), IPS/generator (65%), air cooler (65%), microwave oven (63%) and wrist watch (62%).

**Table 1: Social Construction of Necessity and Normative Deprivation Index (in percent)**

N=360

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Items for the Adults (18+/+)</th>
<th>Considered Necessary</th>
<th>Don't have</th>
<th>Don't have</th>
<th>Don't have</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Three meals a day</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A fan at home</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Celebrating especial occasions</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Television</td>
<td>96.2</td>
<td>98.7</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobile</td>
<td>94.9</td>
<td>96.8</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medicine prescribed by doctor</td>
<td>94.2</td>
<td>95.5</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A good job</td>
<td>94.2</td>
<td>81.4</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>16.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refrigerators</td>
<td>92.3</td>
<td>97.4</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household furniture</td>
<td>91.7</td>
<td>96.2</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Having a daily newspaper</td>
<td>89.7</td>
<td>87.2</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>5.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regular monthly savings</td>
<td>85.3</td>
<td>70.5</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>16.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Visits to friends or relatives</td>
<td>83.3</td>
<td>84.6</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>12.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Servant at home</td>
<td>80.8</td>
<td>85.3</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>5.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Replace or repair broken electrical goods</td>
<td>80.8</td>
<td>89.7</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>9.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A small amount of money to spend on self weekly</td>
<td>79.5</td>
<td>73.7</td>
<td>24.4</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Satellite television</td>
<td>79.5</td>
<td>90.4</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Home computer</td>
<td>78.8</td>
<td>67.9</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>19.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meat, Fish, fruits equivalent every other day</td>
<td>78.2</td>
<td>81.4</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>9.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telephone</td>
<td>76.6</td>
<td>78.8</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>17.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gifts to friends/ family once a year</td>
<td>75.6</td>
<td>85.9</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>7.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collect children from school</td>
<td>75.0</td>
<td>75.0</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>13.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Camera</td>
<td>73.7</td>
<td>84.6</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>11.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attending weddings/funerals</td>
<td>73.1</td>
<td>87.8</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>5.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hobby or leisure activity</td>
<td>72.4</td>
<td>68.6</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>23.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Own house</td>
<td>70.5</td>
<td>59.0</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>30.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charger light</td>
<td>66.7</td>
<td>78.8</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>9.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Car</td>
<td>66.0</td>
<td>55.1</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>35.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPS/generator</td>
<td>65.4</td>
<td>51.9</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>34.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Cooler (AC)</td>
<td>65.3</td>
<td>54.5</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>30.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Holiday away from home once a year with family</td>
<td>64.7</td>
<td>53.2</td>
<td>20.5</td>
<td>26.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Microwave oven</td>
<td>62.2</td>
<td>65.4</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>25.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Having wrist watch</td>
<td>61.5</td>
<td>82.1</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>13.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Having trendy cloth</td>
<td>57.7</td>
<td>76.3</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>10.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access to internet</td>
<td>57.1</td>
<td>51.3</td>
<td>27.3</td>
<td>21.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Replace worn out furniture</td>
<td>53.8</td>
<td>78.6</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>15.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ornaments for special occasion</td>
<td>52.6</td>
<td>75.0</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>11.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Three pair of shoes</td>
<td>51.3</td>
<td>83.3</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>6.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Celebrating wedding day/birth/death anniversary</td>
<td>51.3</td>
<td>75.6</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>12.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A meal in a restaurant once a month</td>
<td>51.3</td>
<td>63.5</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>22.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Having an access to standard coaching center</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>51.9</td>
<td>19.2</td>
<td>28.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Washing machine</td>
<td>43.6</td>
<td>35.3</td>
<td>31.2</td>
<td>33.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CD player</td>
<td>40.4</td>
<td>61.5</td>
<td>32.9</td>
<td>5.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cassette player</td>
<td>35.9</td>
<td>59.0</td>
<td>34.2</td>
<td>6.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carpets in living room/ bed room</td>
<td>28.2</td>
<td>52.6</td>
<td>33.7</td>
<td>13.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New clothes in a month</td>
<td>26.3</td>
<td>37.8</td>
<td>36.5</td>
<td>25.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dishwasher</td>
<td>23.0</td>
<td>17.9</td>
<td>58.8</td>
<td>23.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A meal in a restaurant once a week</td>
<td>21.2</td>
<td>28.2</td>
<td>35.3</td>
<td>36.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ownership of motorbike</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>75.9</td>
<td>13.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
e. The economic items considered socially necessary are: a good job (94%), cost of medicine (94%), monthly savings (85%), servant at home (81%), and a weekly amount of money to spend on self (80%).

f. Sociability also appears an important dimension of social necessity and the degree of necessity varies item-wise, for example, celebrating special occasions (100%), visits to friends or relatives (83%), gifts to friends/family once a year (76%), collect children from school (75%), attending weddings/funerals (73%), hobby or leisure activity (72%), holiday away from home once a year (65%), ornaments for special occasion (53%) and celebrating wedding/birth/death anniversary (51%).

6.1.2 Poverty Categories
The normative deprivation index gives us an indication of the poverty categories as well. On the basis of the number of items that the respondents actually lack, it is possible to construct two different categories of poor—poor and severely poor. Respondents are considered ‘poor’ if they lack at least two socially defined necessities, whereas they are considered ‘severely poor’ if they lack at least seven necessary items. If they lack up to one item, they are classified as ‘not poor’. It must be noted here that the survey findings showed three items—three meals a day, a fan at home and celebrating special occasions—were possessed by all respondents. Thus like Gordon et al. (2000), we dropped these three items in the construction of poverty threshold. As Table 2 below shows, on the basis of these thresholds 30 percent respondents are found as overall poor—17 percent poor and 13 percent severely poor.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Poverty Classifications</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Not poor</td>
<td>251</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poor</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Severely poor</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>360</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6.1.3 Poverty Profile
Table 3 which gives profiles of the poor in terms of gender, household size, age, marital status, level of education, expenditure and ethnicity of the respondents, shows that female (54%), households having eight members (22%), young adults of 35-39 (24%), married (84%), Bachelor’s and above degree holders (42%), families having monthly expenditure
between Tk.15,000 and Tk.19,999 (24%) and Bangladeshis (99%) are more likely to be poor.

### Table 3: Poverty Profile

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Size of household</td>
<td>Eight</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age of respondent</td>
<td>35-39</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marital status</td>
<td>Married</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level of education</td>
<td>Bachelor's</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household expenditure</td>
<td>Tk.15,000-Tk.19,999</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnicity of the respondent</td>
<td>Bangladeshi</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 6.1.4 Correlates of Normative Deprivation Index

Table 4 which gives the summary of the significant association found at chi-value, shows factors that are significantly associated with the items of normative deprivation index. It is found that the deprivation index is significantly related to selected demographic and socio-economic variables like gender, age, marital status, occupation, education and household size. It shows that occupation, education and household size are the key correlates of the normative deprivation in terms of number of items significantly related. Next in importance is monthly expenditure followed by age and marital status. Sex appears to be least influential in the construction of social necessity in Uttara.

### Table 4: Summary of Chi-square Test on Deprivation Index by Sex by Age by Marital status by Household size by Occupation by Education by Expenditure

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Items for Adults</th>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Marital status</th>
<th>Household size</th>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Expenditure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Three meals a day</td>
<td>X²=1.828</td>
<td>X²=4.064</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>X²=2.442</td>
<td>X²=3.247</td>
<td>X²=3.179</td>
<td>X²=8.266</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>df=1;α=.001</td>
<td>df=11;α=.001</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>df=7;α=.001</td>
<td>df=35;α=.001</td>
<td>df=5;α=.001</td>
<td>df=13;α=.001</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A fan at home</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>X²=4.558</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>X²=5.661</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>df=7;α=.01</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>df=7;α=.01</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>df=13;α=.001</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Television</td>
<td>X²=1.191</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>X²=1.131</td>
<td>X²=7.237</td>
<td>X²=45.292</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>df=3;α=.001</td>
<td>df=11;α=.01</td>
<td>X²=3;α=.001</td>
<td>df=3;α=.001</td>
<td>df=7;α=.05</td>
<td>df=35;α=.001</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobile</td>
<td>X²=2.569</td>
<td>X²=6.437</td>
<td>X²=1.131</td>
<td>X²=7.237</td>
<td>X²=45.292</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>df=1;α=.001</td>
<td>df=11;α=.01</td>
<td>X²=3;α=.001</td>
<td>df=3;α=.001</td>
<td>df=7;α=.05</td>
<td>df=35;α=.001</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5 Given the predominance of nominal level of measurement, the chi-square test is preferred for measuring the association. Many associations between independent variables and items of the deprivation index are found significant at α=.001, α=.01 and α=.05 levels of significance.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>df 1, α = .001</th>
<th>df 3, α = .001</th>
<th>df 1, α = .01</th>
<th>df 3, α = .01</th>
<th>df 5, α = .001</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Medicine cost</td>
<td>X² = 1.417</td>
<td>X² = 14.555</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>X² = 7.077</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refrigerators</td>
<td>X² = 1.744</td>
<td>X² = 5.727</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>X² = 5.727</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household furniture</td>
<td>X² = 11.821</td>
<td>X² = 7.405</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>X² = 7.924</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daily newspaper</td>
<td>X² = 5.89</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>X² = 4.018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monthly savings</td>
<td>X² = 13.215</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>X² = 3.942</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>X² = 5.085</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Celebrating occasions</td>
<td>X² = 1.235</td>
<td>X² = 7.457</td>
<td>X² = 2.010</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>X² = 17.301</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Visits to friends</td>
<td>X² = 10.670</td>
<td>X² = 15.767</td>
<td>X² = 3.657</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>X² = 15.767</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Replace broken goods</td>
<td>X² = 6.902</td>
<td>X² = 11.150</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>X² = 6.932</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Servant</td>
<td>X² = 1.726</td>
<td>X² = 11.150</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>X² = 6.932</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Satellite television</td>
<td>X² = 2.261</td>
<td>X² = 10.807</td>
<td>X² = 3.657</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>X² = 14.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Money to spend for self</td>
<td>X² = 2.228</td>
<td>X² = 2.010</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Home computer</td>
<td>X² = 2.261</td>
<td>X² = 2.280</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>X² = 2.262</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meat/Fish every day</td>
<td>X² = 2.261</td>
<td>X² = 2.280</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>X² = 2.262</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telephone</td>
<td>X² = 2.261</td>
<td>X² = 2.280</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>X² = 2.262</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gifts to friends</td>
<td>X² = 13.348</td>
<td>X² = 3.657</td>
<td>X² = 10.946</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>X² = 38.603</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collect children</td>
<td>X² = 13.823</td>
<td>X² = 5.410</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>X² = 10.032</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Camera</td>
<td>X² = 2.232</td>
<td>X² = 4.002</td>
<td>X² = 6.942</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>X² = 18.192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attending weddings</td>
<td>X² = 2.226</td>
<td>X² = 14.283</td>
<td>X² = 4.130</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>X² = 18.192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leisure activity</td>
<td>X² = 1.250</td>
<td>X² = 4.195</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>X² = 13.192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Own house</td>
<td>X² = 1.254</td>
<td>X² = 4.024</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>X² = 13.192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPS/generator</td>
<td>X² = 14.846</td>
<td>X² = 38.623</td>
<td>X² = 20.011</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>X² = 26.566</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air cooler</td>
<td>X² = 1.858</td>
<td>X² = 6.465</td>
<td>X² = 16.424</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>X² = 26.566</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Holiday away once a year</td>
<td>X² = 2.015</td>
<td>X² = 2.015</td>
<td>X² = 2.015</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>X² = 2.015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Microwave oven</td>
<td>X² = 10.554</td>
<td>X² = 2.626</td>
<td>X² = 10.536</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>X² = 20.699</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Having wrist watch</td>
<td>X² = 2.010</td>
<td>X² = 15.844</td>
<td>X² = 15.844</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>X² = 13.261</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Having trendy cloth</td>
<td>X² = 10.554</td>
<td>X² = 2.626</td>
<td>X² = 10.536</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>X² = 20.699</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The Table 4 above shows that:

a. **Gender** is significantly related to 19 items: three meals a day, mobile, medicine prescribed by doctor, monthly savings, celebrating special occasion, visits to friends or relatives, servant, a small amount of money, home computer, meat/fish/fruits or vegetarian equivalent every other day, gifts to friends/family once a year, hobby or leisure activity, own house, car, wrist watch, replace worn out furniture, three pair of shoes, a meal in a restaurant once a month and having an access to standard coaching center.

b. **Age** is significantly related to 15 items: three meals a day, mobile, medicine prescribed by doctor, household furniture, newspaper, celebrating special occasion, repair broken electrical goods, satellite television, gifts to friends/family once a year, camera, car, air cooler, microwave oven, access to internet and a meal in a restaurant once a month.

c. **Marital Status** is significantly related to 14 items: television, mobile, refrigerator, visits to friends or relatives, servant, a small amount of money, meat/fish/fruits or vegetarian equivalent every other day, collect children from school, hobby or leisure activity, charger light, air cooler, access to internet, ornaments for special occasion, having an access to standard coaching center.

d. **Household size** is significantly related to 20 items: three meals a day, a fan at home, mobile, refrigerators, household furniture, monthly savings, celebrating special occasion, repair broken electrical goods, satellite television, a small amount of money, telephone, camera, attending weddings/funerals, own house, air cooler, microwave oven, having trendy cloth, replace worn out furniture, three pair of shoes, having an access to standard coaching center.

e. **Occupation** is significantly related to 20 items: three meals a day, mobile, medicine prescribed by doctor, newspaper, visits to friends or relatives, servant, a small amount of money,
money, home computer, gifts to friends/family once a year, attending weddings/funerals, own house, charger light, IPS/generator, air cooler, holiday away from home, having trendy cloth, replace worn out furniture, three pair of shoes, celebrating wedding day/birth/death anniversary.

f. **Education** is significantly related to 20 items: three meals a day, television, good job, household furniture, monthly savings, repair broken electrical goods, satellite television, a small amount of money, meat, fish, fruits or vegetarian equivalent every other day, gifts to friends/family once a year, camera, hobby or leisure activity, own house, car, air cooler, microwave oven, having wrist watch, ornaments for special occasion, a meal in a restaurant once a month, having an access to standard coaching center.

g. **Expenditure** is significantly related to 18 items: three meals a day, a fan at home, good job, medicine prescribed by doctor, household furniture, celebrating especial occasions, repair broken electrical goods, servant, meat, fish, fruits or vegetarian equivalent every other day, gifts to friends/family once a year, camera, charger light, IPS/generator, microwave oven, having trendy cloth, three pair of shoes, celebrating wedding day/birth/death anniversary, having an access to standard coaching center.

### 6.2 Child Poverty
#### 6.2.1 Social Construction of Necessity and Normative Deprivation

Table 5 which gives the normative deprivation index for children in Uttara contains four columns representing four different poverty features--(a) items considered 'necessary', (b) items that respondents have, (c) items that respondents do not have because they do not want, and (d) items that respondents do not have because they can not afford. The column 2 of the Table 5 which indicates items considered ‘necessary’ shows that 50 percent and more respondents perceive 16 items out of 23 items as socially necessary, the lack of which constitutes poverty. The sixteen items are as follows: three meals a day (100%), major requirements prescribed by school (100%), sufficient baby milk (100%), warm/properly fitted shoes (99%), toys (97%), meat, fish or vegetarian equivalent at least once a day (92%), celebrating birth day (92%), bi-cycle (91%), home computer (90%), at least 4 jumpers/cardigans or sweaters (83%), bedroom for every child of different sex over 11 years (79%), garden to play in (73%), play with peer group at least once a week (73%), visit or invitation to friends (64%), have an access to take music/dance/drawing lessons (60%).

The column 3 of Table 5 which shows items that respondents ‘have’, indicates that

a. All respondents have three items--three meals a day, major requirement prescribed by school and sufficient baby milk.
b. More than 50 percent of the respondents have 15 items out of 23 items.

c. Less than 50 percent of the respondents have eight items—at least 7 pairs of new underpants (45%), house tutor (36%), new clothes in a month (34%), Mp3/Mp4 (33%), at least 4 pairs of trousers (33%), mobile phone (29%), a bed or bedding for self (28%), have an ipod/ipod games/video games (23%).

The column 4 of the Table 5 which shows items that respondents do not have because they do not want, indicates that

a. More than 50 percent of the respondents do not have 5 items because they do not want them. These items are: ipod/ipod games/video games (67%), Mp3/Mp4 (61%), house tutor (61%), mobile phone (60%), and new clothes in a month (57%).

b. Less than 50 percent respondents do not have 15 items because they do not want them.

The column 5 of Table 5 which shows items that respondents do not have because they can not afford it, indicates that between 2 percent and 34 percent respondents do not have 21 items because they can not afford them, among them the most important items are: Garden to play in (34%), bedroom for every child of different sex over 11 years (34%), a bed or bedding for self (27%), home computer (20%), mobile phone (12%), meat, fish or vegetables equivalent at least once a day (11%).

Table 5: Social Construction of Necessity and Normative Deprivation Index (in percent)

\[ N = 265 \]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Items for Children (0-17 Years)</th>
<th>Necessary items</th>
<th>Items you Have</th>
<th>Don’t have Don’t want</th>
<th>Don’t have can’t afford</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Three meals a day</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major requirements prescribed by school</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sufficient baby milk (0-10)</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New/properly fitted shoes</td>
<td>98.6</td>
<td>97.2</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Toys (0-10)</td>
<td>97.2</td>
<td>89.7</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meat, fish or vegetables equivalent at least once a day</td>
<td>92.3</td>
<td>84.6</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>11.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Celebrating birth day</td>
<td>91.7</td>
<td>91.0</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bi-cycle</td>
<td>91.0</td>
<td>84.8</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>8.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Home computer</td>
<td>90.0</td>
<td>64.4</td>
<td>15.9</td>
<td>19.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>At least 4 jumpers/ cardigans or sweaters</td>
<td>82.9</td>
<td>93.8</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bedroom for every child of different sex over 11 years</td>
<td>79.2</td>
<td>50.2</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>33.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Garden to play in</td>
<td>73.1</td>
<td>62.8</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>34.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Play with peer group at least once a week</td>
<td>73.1</td>
<td>70.3</td>
<td>21.4</td>
<td>8.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobile phone (11-17)</td>
<td>67.3</td>
<td>28.6</td>
<td>59.8</td>
<td>11.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Visits or invitations to friends (11-17)</td>
<td>63.5</td>
<td>70.2</td>
<td>23.2</td>
<td>6.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Have an access to take Music/dance/drawing lessons</td>
<td>60.0</td>
<td>53.8</td>
<td>42.8</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
6.2.2 Poverty Categories
The normative deprivation index for child poverty gives us an indication of the poverty categories as well (see Table 6). On the basis of the number of items that the child/proxy respondents actually lack, it is possible to construct two different categories of poor—poor children and severely poor children. Respondents are considered ‘poor’ if they lack at least two socially defined necessities, whereas they are considered ‘severely poor’ if they lack at least five necessary items instead of seven items for adults. If they lack up to one item, they are classified as ‘not poor’. It must be noted here that the survey findings showed three items—three meals a day, major requirements prescribed by school and sufficient baby milk—were possessed by all respondents. Thus like Gordon et al. (2000), we dropped these three items in the construction of child poverty threshold. As Table 6 below shows, on the basis of these thresholds 26 percent respondents are found as overall poor—18 percent poor and 8 percent severely poor.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Poverty Classifications</th>
<th>Number of Respondents</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Not poor</td>
<td>197</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poor</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Severely poor</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>265</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7 compares adult normative deprivation between Bangladesh and Britain for ten most important deprivation items in each society. It shows that

a. Only three items—two/three meals a day, medicine prescribed by doctor and refrigerator—are found to be common in both Bangladesh and Britain, though there are some differences in their degree of importance, for example, two/three meals a day is a number one item for Bangladesh, whereas it is a number five item for Britain. Similarly, refrigerator is number eight item for Bangladesh, whereas it is a number seven item for...
Britain. Interestingly enough, medicine prescribed by doctor has equal rank, six, in both societies.

b. Seven-set of items are found to be differently ranked in two different societies, for example, in Bangladesh seven items ranked from 2-5, 7, 9-10 in order, are: fan at home, celebrating special occasion, television, mobile, a good job, household furniture and daily newspaper. In Britain, seven items ranked from 1-4, 8-10 in order, are: beds and bedding for everyone, heating to warm living areas of the home, damp free home, visiting friends or family in hospital, fresh fruit and vegetables daily, warm/waterproof coat, replace or repair broken electrical goods.

Thus the influence of culture on the adult deprivation index is clearly demonstrated in the ranking and set of poverty items in Bangladesh and British societies. This is also evident in the case of child poverty. The British normative deprivation for child includes items like separate bed, warm coat, shoes, play, leisure activity, owning books, fresh meal and celebration of special occasions, whereas Bangladeshi child deprivation includes items like all kinds of food requirements, school requirements, winter clothes, shoes, toys, bicycle, celebrating birth day and computer. These items clearly reflect the notion of social necessity at a given time.

Table 7: Ten Most Important Adult Poverty Items in Britain and Bangladesh by Rank
(1=highest; 10=lowest)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Items</th>
<th>Bangladesh Rank</th>
<th>Britain Rank</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Two/three meals a day</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A fan at home</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Celebrating special occasion</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Television</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobile</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medicine prescribed by doctor</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A good job</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refrigerator</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household furniture</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Having a daily newspaper</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beds and bedding for everyone</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heating to warm living areas of the home</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Damp free home</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Visiting friends or family in hospital</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fresh fruit and vegetables daily</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warm, waterproof coat</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Replace or repair broken electrical goods</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 8 compares child normative deprivation between Bangladesh and Britain for ten most important deprivation items in each society. It shows that

a. Only four items—two/three meals a day, major requirements prescribed by school, new/properly fitted shoes, meat-fish-fruits or vegetables equivalent once a day—are found to be common in both Bangladesh and Britain, though there are some differences in their degree of importance, for example, three meals a day and ‘major requirements prescribed by school’ are number one and number two items respectively for Bangladesh, whereas they are number six and nine items respectively for Britain. Likewise, a new/properly fitted shoe is number 4 item for Bangladesh, whereas it is a number two item for Britain. Similarly, meat-fish-fruits or vegetables equivalent once a day is a number 6 item for Bangladesh, whereas it is a number four item for Britain.

b. Six-set of items are found to be differently ranked in two different societies, for example, in Bangladesh six items ranked from 3, 5, 7-10 in order, are: sufficient baby milk, toys, celebrating birth day, bi-cycle, home computer and at least 4 jumpers/cardigans or sweaters. In Britain, six items ranked from 1, 3, 5, 7-8, 10 in order, are: a bed or bedding for self, warm/water proof coat, celebrations on special occasions, meat/fish/fruits or vegetables equivalent once a day, books of own, play with peer group at least once a week and hobby or leisure activity.

It must be noted that child poverty indicates basically the adult poverty of their parents as they share the living standards of their parents. The item-wise difference is the reflection of the difference between two cultures. Like mobile in the case of adult poverty, computer has become an important deprivation item of the child poverty under the influence of modernization.

Table 8: Ten Most Important Child Poverty Items in Britain and Bangladesh by Rank
(1=highest; 10=lowest)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Items</th>
<th>Bangladesh Rank in Bangladesh</th>
<th>Britain Rank in Britain</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Three meals a day</td>
<td>X l</td>
<td>X 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major requirements prescribed by school</td>
<td>X 2</td>
<td>X 9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sufficient baby milk</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New/properly fitted shoes</td>
<td>X 4</td>
<td>X 2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Furthermore, the extent of poverty in both societies show interesting pattern. The national adult poverty head count ratio for Bangladesh is 40 percent in 2005 ( ), whereas it is 26 percent for Britain in 1999. The present study reports 30 percent adult poverty for urban Bangladesh. This is pretty close to the findings of the British study. However, the child poverty shows more gap between two societies, 34 percent child poverty in Britain when one item poverty threshold is used, whereas for urban Bangladesh this study finds 26 percent when two items threshold is used. In fine, the normative deprivation for Bangladesh shows the influence of global culture as well as local culture in terms of item preference and the construction of social necessity.

8. Conclusion

Probably, the poverty of Bangladesh is the most researched and widely discussed topic in the world, though the issue of urban poverty is neglected (Ahmed, 2004d). The research gap is more glaring with respect to the study of consensual poverty, which was initiated by Ahmed (2007) and the present study is a continuation of such research tradition. Definitely, more research is required for other parts of Dhaka to present a comprehensive picture of the normative deprivation of urban Bangladesh. Despite the limitation of this research, it can be safely argued that the construction of social necessity in the 2000s is different from the earlier decades. The impact of globalization, especially the process of disembedding, has a serious consequence in continuously redefining and shifting the concept of necessity. As a result, the notion of poverty has become unstable in Bangladesh. This means that in the coming decades, the notion of poverty and the threshold of poverty would shift in Bangladesh along with the extent of poverty.
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Men’s Exploration of Multiple Sexual Partners: Economic vs. Psychosocial Explanation

Shyamal Kumar Das*, Ashraf Esmail**, and Lisa Eargle***

Abstract: This paper examines factors influencing the number of female sexual partners for heterosexual men. Men’s pursuit of multiple female sex partners can be measured two ways: the frequency of purchasing sexual services from prostitutes and the maintenance of sexual relationships with multiple women within a short span of time. Factors influencing the number of sexual partners include male differences in resource attainment, conservative versus progressive views about sexual behavior, and beliefs in stereotypes about “expected” behaviors for women. Findings show that (1) male resource attainment positively influences the men’s preference for multiple partners, despite promoting progressive views about sexual behavior and less acceptance of female stereotypes, and (2) conservative sexual views and acceptance of female stereotypes have only indirect effects on men’s preference for multiple partners.

The present paper addresses certain factors that determine why some heterosexual men have more female sexual partners than others. Men’s exploration of multiple female sex partners can be measured by their frequency of buying sex services from prostitutes and keeping sexual relationships with multiple women within a short span of time. The paper argues that men’s differential resource attainment, their conservatism or progressivism about sexual behavior in general, and their belief system in regard to stereotypes or myths pertaining certain “expected” behaviors for women may result in some men’s preference for temporary relationships to conventional ones, which ultimately makes differences among men in exploring multiple female sexual partners. In so doing, the paper shows pathways among aforementioned social-psychological factors.

The Social Exchange Theory tells us that sex is a resource for women when men want it, and thus men’s having multiple partners for sex is a mere social exchange (Baumeister and Tice 2001). This perspective does not clearly convey, however, why the demand side of the exchange system has put some men in a more advantageous position than others; that is, to explore more sexual partners from the pool of women in society. Therefore, even when there are demands on men’s side, the question remains: why do some men prefer and explore more temporary sexual relationships while others do not? To answer this question, at least partially, we argue that both

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structural (e.g., men’s education and occupation), and cultural factors (that are inherent in the belief systems regarding sexuality) determine this difference to some extent. While men’s ideological and psychological constructs regarding sexuality are shaped by society (e.g. sexual conservatism, believing in various myths and stereotyping) ensuring women’s subordination in men’s minds, only some men take the advantage of this privilege. These constructs are the core in some men’s preferring short-term relationships to long-term ones leading to the exploration of multiple sex partners.

Men’s preference for short term relationships is reflected in their intention to have temporary partners, perhaps to avoid responsibilities of relatively permanent relationships when they have no time to keep regular relationships. While the hegemonic expression of masculinity is shaped by differential social forms to confirm gender order in society (Carrington and Scott 2008), the sexual conservatism or progressive attitude towards human sexual practices (such as, premarital sex, teen-sex, homosexuality, and extramarital sex) may influence the construction and stereotyping of women’s “expected” behaviors by men (Mankayi 2008). This stereotyping is reflected in believing in rape myths, such as women asking for sex when they are provocatively dressed, do hitchhiking, attempt to defend their reputations, and go men’s homes willingly; the rape myths also include the belief that rapes are always women’s fault, and a source of bad reputation for women. The acceptance of rape myths may contribute to men’s exploration of multiple sexual partners measured by buying/ attempts to buy sex from prostitutes and keeping multiple partners.

From structural point of view, however, it can be argued that when some men have more access to resources than others, they may try to explore multiple sex partners. For men, therefore, the access to resources (such as, higher education and prestigious occupations) is one of the determining factors in exploring multiple partners for a short time-span. Thus, while the belief system pertaining sexuality and stereotypes of women’s behavior encourage men to explore temporary partners, the lack of resources constrains some men’s exploration. This belief system reflects men’s feeling of entitlement to have multiple partners. Also, compared to men who lack the resources, such as education and decent occupations, men with more resources are more likely to be sexually less conservative, but less susceptible to rape myth acceptance because of their “enlightenment” through education and higher occupations. Yet, but they take advantage of their privileges as men by exploring relatively short-term sex partners from multiple outlets. Necessarily, all men have the privileges, but all cannot afford these.

In the present paper, we, therefore, try to establish connections among men’s resources, their sexual conservatism, social-psychological constructs regarding their sexual power reflected in
their stereotyping of women in various myths (e.g. rape myths for the present paper) with their preferring multiple short-term relationships to relatively permanent ones, which results in buying sex and having multiple sex partners. For the ease of interpreting these connections, the first section of the present paper addresses the patriarchal belief systems in relation to men’s acceptance of rape myths, which serves as a proxy for their attitude towards women’s behavior in general. This section also shows how the rape myth acceptance promotes men’s preference for short- term sexual partnerships that ultimately results in exploring multiple partners. The second section analyzes how the feeling of sexual entitlement in men’s minds is reflected in their sexual conservatism and acceptance of rape myths, and how the latter is influenced by the former. After establishing these relationships in general terms, we relate men’s differential accesses to resources to their levels of sexual conservatism, and rape myth acceptance. Also, we argue that these accesses reflect some men’s more structural power over resources than others, and this differential accesses increase their likelihood of taking advantage of their privilege in exploring multiple sex partners, despite being less conservative and less susceptible to rape myth acceptance.

I. Rape Myth Acceptance: A Panorama of Masculine Hegemony in Labeling of Women’s Sexuality

In general framework, buying sex and having multiple sex partners are closely dependent on a belief system that is operative in the minds of the actors, and thus, the analysis of these beliefs also reflects a social system. For men, both taking services from prostitutes and keeping multiple partners are socially acceptable and tolerable in several societies where the consumers of prostitution are invisible (Farley 2004 & 2005; Hughes 2004 & 2005; Hughes & Denisova 2002; Marianne 2004), and for the same reason, men’s search for multiple partners is “naturalized” or “essentialized” in societies. Men are rewarded for having multiple partners while women are penalized by sexual double standards (Mihausen and Harold 1999). We argue that the belief system concerning women and sexuality among men needs to be understood when we explain the differences among men in exploring multiple partners. This system is obvious in men’s differential levels of accepting various stereotyping (e.g. rape myths) about women’s sexuality.

While some studies (e.g. Peplau 2003; Diamond 2004; Lenton & Bryan 2005) explicate that the notion that men have more sexual desires than women is questionable, others (e.g. Hawkins et al. 2004; King and Scott 2005) show that female sexuality is suppressed in many cultures. Although Impett and Peplau (2003) show that men have more sexual desire than women in general, and women are compliant in performing unwanted sex with partners, they do not reject the idea that it is because of social-cultural construction of sexuality in relation to gender. In this
vein, we add that even among men, this belief system varies significantly, and as such, men’s levels of preferring short term partners differ from one to another as well.

As Melrose (2000:1) argues, "'Patriarchy' refers to a system of male domination, which results in economic, social and political inequalities between men and women". This system, thus, creates privileges for men in general. Following Begany and Milburn (2002), we argue that these privileges ensure an existence of a patriarchal world in men’s minds about their entitlements for sex and their control on women’s sexuality. For example, while prostitution refers to the market for men to buy women’s bodies, and as such their sexuality (O’Neil and Berberet 2000), having multiple female sex partners for heterosexual men is normalized by men’s power in society. This normalization is reflected in men’s minds about women’s sexuality, and also, because men can fulfill their sexual needs from multiple outlets, they prefer temporary sexual encounters to permanent ones.

The notion of “power” explicated above is based on what is called “gender privilege” (Johnson 2000; McIntosh 1993), which refers to “unearned” and “conferred” dominance and privileges (McIntosh 1993). These privileges also confirm men’s feelings of entitlements for sex, which are largely unearned. Thus, following Johnson (2000), we argue that labeling of women’s behavior is a reflection of men’s power and dominance. The acceptance of rape myths, first introduced by Burt (1980), is one of such labels that construct how women should behave or they should dress or they should communicate with men. While traditional beliefs and rituals in society validate cultural standards of sexuality (Ayikukuwei et al. 2008), the “prescription”, the term proposed by Glick and Fiske (1999), for women’s behavior in relation to sexuality also tells how women should comply with men’s standards, which essentially normalize men’s view of women’s sexuality. The “prescription”, therefore refers to a type of “stereotyping” of women’s behavior, which is strongly related to male power (Glick and Fiske 1999).

The above-mentioned stereotyping, we argue, is then reflected in several myths about women and their sexuality for justifying and legitimizing male power. The acceptance of rape myths is one of such stereotyping. This exposes a feeling of men about women’s behavior in relation to sex, and this feeling is learned through extensive socialization process of men. This process also provides men the feeling of unearned entitlements for sex.

The above discussion also points to the psychological constructs of men about women in general. Many men believe that the rape of a prostitute, for example, cannot be called “rape” (Kurtz et al. 2004; Miller and Schwartz 1995). These men are found to be more likely to believe in “rape myths”. For example, when women wear provocative dress or they agree to go to someone’s
home voluntarily, they really mean to have sex with men (Monto 2000). Thus, the term ‘rape’ is a ‘myth’. The difference among men in believing rape myths largely explains the difference in their exploration of sexual partners.

If the above analysis is valid, then men’s labeling and identification of women’s sexuality opens up avenues for themselves to prefer short term relationships to long term conventional ones, because any violation of the label(s) and identification marks (e.g. rape myths) means that the women involved are exposed for violating social norms. For instance, if a woman wants to visit a friend’s (presumably a man) home, it may “mean” to the man that she wants to have sex with him!!! For the man, then, it is not “unnatural” to believe that he can have a temporary sexual relationship with the woman. This belief is also enforced when he does not have “enough time” to explore a permanent partner. Also, when men have multiple outlets available, they might not want any permanent relationship particularly for sexual encounters to avoid the responsibilities attached with such relationships. This feeling encourages men to have multiple partners and buy sex from prostitutes. In a logical framework, then, a man, conversely, does not feel this way if he is less likely to believe in rape myths.

We argue that the patriarchal notion of men’s sexuality is a combination of feelings of control (power) over sexuality, which is reflected in acceptance of rape myth that ultimately encourage men to prefer temporary partners. While Monto (2000) contends that avoidance of conventional relationships is one of the reasons for men going to prostitutes (and as such, seeking multiple partners), he does not explicitly explain why men may avoid conventional relationships.

Following Mänsson (2001), we argue that having multiple sexual partners (e.g. prostitutes) within a short span of time is an exposure of men’s abuse of sex, because men see women as available when women violate the “standard codes of conduct” (e.g. wearing provocative dress, wanting a ride, visiting a man’s home alone etc.). This attitude of men is also a reflection of what Baylies and Bujra (2000) calls the “hegemony of masculinity”. The hegemony of masculinity actually enforces men’s feeling of entitlements for sex that helps them to satisfy both their usual and unusual sexual desires (Hughes 2004; Marttila 2003; Pitts et al. 2004; Faugier and Cranfield 1995; McKeganey and Barnard 1996; Sawyer et al. 2001-02), which is reflected in the dualism of “embodiment” and “disembodiment” of women as prostitutes (Carpenter 1998) and also as sexual partners of men in society. This feeling among men encourages their preferring temporary sexual partners to relatively permanent relations, which is activated in men’s buying sex and having multiple sexual partners within a short span of time.
II. Rape Myth and Sexual Conservatism: Are Conservatives Really Conservatives?

The above discussion reveals rape myth acceptance as a form of social-psychological construction that is also determined by the feeling of power and sexual conservatism. Monto (2000) found that the level of rape myth acceptance is relatively low among the clients of prostitution, and also, the direct correlation is very low between rape myth acceptance and sexual encounters with prostitutes. We argue, however, on the basis of our discussion presented above, that the level of rape myth acceptance may have indirect effect, via men’s preferring short term non-conventional relationships to permanent ones, on men’s actual sexual encounters with prostitutes and having multiple sexual partners. Men’s multiple sexual encounters are also associated with their feeling of entitlements to have multiple sex partners. Therefore, at general level, the feeling of entitlement among some men is exposed in their sexual conservatism and rape myth acceptance. Following scholars (Monto 1999 & 2000; Farley and Kelly 2000; Browning et al. 1999), we argue that these are the core values in some men’s minds regarding the control over women’s bodies. Men may justify their preference for relatively temporary partners to permanent ones by saying “no time” and by expressing inability to bear “responsibilities” of regular permanent relationships.

While men are conservative in their beliefs about human sexual activities (e.g. extramarital sex, teenage sex, premarital sex, homosexuality etc.), they are more likely to establish the control over women’s bodies by objectifying them through regulating women’s sexual behaviors. Since these men have feelings of “unearned” entitlements or privilege over sex, they want to enjoy this privilege by preferring short term to long term mating and end up having access to multiple outlets for satisfying sexual pleasure. This is the contradiction of the system itself. As scholars (e.g. Young 1990; Connell 1999; Glick and Fiske 1999) argue, the predominance of masculine hegemony in society actually enforces male supremacy by controlling women’s bodies, but this system has its own contradictions (Frank 2003; Harrio-Mannila & Kontula 2003; Xantidis et al. 2000; Kurtz et al. 2004). The conservative views about sexual encounters (e.g. extramarital, premarital etc.), therefore, do not confirm that the conservative believers would really prevent themselves from taking “advantage” of female subordination in sexual sphere of society; thus, even though they state their conservative views in the form of “morality”, in practice, they believe in enjoying multiple female bodies through materializing their unearned entitlements of sex.

Taking the above stand, we argue that the more a man is conservative about sexual activities, the more he takes the advantage of his power and privileges by preferring short term relations. Conversely, men with opposite beliefs (progressive) are less likely to take these advantages. If this argument has merit, we can establish a pathway from men’s conservatism to accepting rape...
myths, and this path leads to preferring temporary partners and ends in buying sex and having multiple partners.

The above discussions are congruent with scholars (e.g. Fromm 1973; Luhmann 1986; Brown 2000; O’ Neil 1996; Zurbriggen & Yost 2004) who argue that the notions of male power and sexuality are socially constructed as mentioned earlier. As we argued earlier, in the one hand, the rape myth acceptance is a reflection of men’s power to decide women’s sexuality, while on the other, the rape myth acceptance is also an effect of men’s conservatism about human sexual activities (e.g. extramarital sex, premarital sex etc.). We argue as such that while men are more liberal about sexual activities, they are less likely to believe in rape myths.

In summary, the psychological make up of men regarding sexuality, therefore, is the reflection of patriarchal socio-cultural system. This psychological construct is reflected in multiple belief systems, such as, the rape myth acceptance. This myth acceptance is also validated by men’s ideological basis of sexuality. The more the men are conservative, the more they accept the rape myths. When they accept rape myths, they do not find it unusual to choose short time mating, which is less troubling for them. This preference or choice leads them to buy sex and having multiple short term partners. Therefore, sexual conservatives are not “real” conservatives; their “conservatism” confirms their privileges only.

III. Wealth, Sexual Liberalism, Rape Myth acceptance, and Men’s Exploration of Multiple Female Sexual Partners

Since men have access to multiple temporary outlets to fulfill sexual desires, they may avoid conventional relationships. According to Melrose (2000), in capitalist society, there is a pervasive influence of individualism. This individualism, in our view, may be reflected in men’s choosing short-term relationships instead of long-term ones. We argue, however, that men’s resources or roughly their socio-economic positions (e.g. wealth and education), for example, may provide more avenues for exploring multiple partners, because they have resources useful for such exploration. Kimuna and Djamba (2005) did not find significant influences of wealth, in general, on men’s extramarital sex, and as such on men’s having multiple sex partners in Zambia, an African society. However, it can be generally argued though that when men are more educated and financially successful, they are less likely to be conservative and believe in rape myths, but they may not avoid the privileges of their “uneared entitlements”.

The above-mentioned privileges are linked with their power and domination of acquired resources, and this is how men can identify themselves with the “men’s world” (Johnson 1997 &
2001). Therefore, sexual liberalism and fewer acceptances of rape myths by this group of people does not prevent them from taking advantage of the privileges that society assigns for them (Johnson 2001). This is the intersection of class and gender. Men with upper social standing in relation to their income and education are more likely to have multiple sex partners. They may explore multiple partners to have sex since they can afford that, while the lower stratum continues to be conservative and believing in the constructs mentioned above. Because of the lack of education and resources in comparison to upper stratum men, lower stratum men may be less able to take fewer advantages of their privileges as men.

We summarize the above discussion in Figure 1.

![Figure 1: Socio-economic Status, Sexual Conservatism, Rape Myth Acceptance, Preference for Conventional Relationships, and Men’s Multiple Sexual encounters](image)

**Hypotheses**

From the above discussion, we have formulated the following hypotheses:

H1: Socioeconomic status is inversely associated with conservatism.

H2: Socioeconomic status is inversely associated with rape myth acceptance.

H3: Socioeconomic status is positively associated with multiple sex partners.
H4: Conservatism is positively associated with rape myth acceptance.
H5: Acceptance of rape myths is positively associated with multiple sex partners.
H6: Conservatism is positively associated with short-term relationships.
H7: Conservatism is positively associated with multiple sex partners.
H8: Preference for short-term relationships is positively associated with multiple sex partners.

The heuristic model presented in Figure 1 outlines the hypotheses in the form of pathways.

Data and Methods

Data:
For the present study, we use the dataset on clients of street prostitutes in Portland, San Francisco, Santa Clara, and Las Vegas. These data were collected between 1996 through 1999, and deposited for ICPSR (Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research, Study# 2859). The project was directed by Dr. Martin A. Monto, and funded by US Department of Justice and National Institute of Justice. We choose to use this dataset, because this is a unique source of information where the respondents reveal their sexual encounters measured by number of sex partners and how many times they had sex with prostitutes.

A total of 1342 clients of street prostitution were interviewed. For the present study, we examine only those cases that are primarily heterosexuals. This reduced the original sample size significantly. The missing values, and the responses “Do not know” on all observed variables for the present study are deleted, and as such the sample size came down to 487. According to Allison (2002: 84), “Listwise deletion is the least problematic…Although listwise deletion may discard a substantial fraction of the data”…However, one concern in this regard is that the sample size used in the study is much smaller than the original dataset, but there are some demographic justifications to show the representative merit of our sample size.

First, the cleaned dataset, which deleted cases with missing values and “Do not know” responses, used for the present study shows that 35% of the respondents were from the minority groups, whereas in the original dataset it was 40%; while the whites were 60% in the original dataset compared to 56% in our cleaned dataset. Second, in terms of marital status, in our dataset we have 47% married respondents. There are 41% in the original dataset. Our estimate is closer to the national sample (56% cited in Monto 2000). Third, when work and educational backgrounds are considered, we are closer to the original dataset; the classes are more evenly distributed, such as, workers and middle range job-holders are 54%, and the upper class represents 46% of the respondents. Fourth, considering the recommended large limit of the sample size (>200) for Structural Equation Modeling (Schumacker 2004; Kline 2005), 487 is fairly
acceptable. Kline (2005) mentions that the acceptable ratio of the number of cases to the number of free parameters is 10:1. In the present study, this ratio for each of the models (initial, re-specified, and final) is within this range, and therefore, our sample size is acceptable. We recognize, however, that the larger sample size is always helpful for better generalization. Our sample size is non-random, which is more likely to hold back generalizability. Lastly, following the rationale of Higgins and Ricketts (2004), we argue that the generalization on any survey data should be considered in relative terms.

Technique of analysis:
We use Structural Equation Modeling (SEM) to test our hypotheses. The measurement part of our model has used Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA), because theoretically, the variables we have depicted in Figure 1 are actually latent in combinations of some beliefs. Therefore, the usual path analysis cannot be used to measure these latent constructs. Moreover, the use of CFA examines the construct validity of our measurements. The structural part of the model estimates the effects of the independent latent constructs on the dependent latent ones. For this part, we use Maximum Likelihood method, because this method “maximizes the likelihood of a sample that is actually observed” (Kline 2005:112). In most SEM research, this is the most popular method of analyzing data.

However, the first condition to do maximum likelihood is to confirm the normalcy of data. Following the guidelines of Kline (2005), we checked this, and found that the skew index is below 3, and the kurtosis is below 8 for each variable. Thus, our data in the analysis are normal, and also, we do not have any outliers.

Measures:
We mentioned earlier that we need to assess latent constructs based on observed indicators for the present study. Let us elaborate these latent constructs and their corresponding observed indicators.

1) Socio-economic Status (SES) of men: Our first three hypotheses outline the effects of men’s socio-economic status on their beliefs about sexuality and rape myths as well as on their exploration of multiple sex partners. As we argue, one’s socioeconomic status is associated with one’s progressive or conservative views about sexuality and rape myths while access to resources creates avenues for men to explore multiple sex partners, and thus men enjoy the privileges in society. The access to resources in society can be determined by one’s education and occupational status. Instead of taking income as one of the variables, we opt for occupational status, which counts on both income and status. Therefore, the most acceptable measure for Socio-economic status (SES) is comprised of two variables: occupational status and education.
The occupational status is constructed by Hollingshead’s SES-scale that included 10 professions in the original dataset. For simplicity and the popular perception of a 3-tier class system (upper, middle, and lower) we recoded them into three. The recoding of the categories was as follows: Unskilled employees=1, Clerical/Sales/Technicians=2, and Executives/Proprietors/Major Professions/Business Managers/Medium Proprietors/Administrative Personnel/Small Business Owners=3. Thus, the higher scores indicate higher occupational status. Education is coded as follows: Did not graduate from high school=1, Graduate from high school=2, Some college after high school=3, Bachelor’s=4, and Masters=5. The bivariate positive correlations among these two observed variables are moderate and statistically significant. The internal consistency (Cronbach alpha) is .66, which is close to adequate (.70) value, and therefore, this reliability is acceptable for our model.

(2) Sexual Conservatism (SEXCONS): The tests for hypotheses 4, 6, and 7 require a meaningful measure that captures the underlying features reflecting men’s beliefs about sexuality. These major aspects of sexual attitudes are addressed in the following questions: (a) “Do you think that premarital sex is ok?”; (b) “Do you think that extramarital sex is ok?”; (c) “Do you think that homosexual sex is ok?”; and (d) “Do you think that teenage (below the age of 16) sex is ok?”. The scores for the opinions were measured by a 1-4 point scale for each opinion on the just mentioned questions. The answers were “Always wrong”, “Almost always wrong”, “Wrong only sometimes”, and “not wrong at all”. The scores for these just mentioned answers ranged from 1 through 4 respectively. Thus, the respondents with low scores were considered more conservative than the high scorers on the scale. There were positive- moderate and significant bivariate correlations among the indicators. Although the internal consistency (Cronbach alpha is .67) is little lower than adequate (.70 as suggested by Kline 2005), we accept the scale, because our alpha is close to adequate value.

(3) Rape Myth Acceptance (RAPEMYHTS): Our fifth hypothesis suggests that men believing in rape myths are more likely to avoid conventional relationships; the choice for avoiding permanent relationships lead one to explore for temporary sex partners. Therefore, rape myths are some attitudes that are highly conducive for men to have multiple female partners while in between these two edges, men have tendencies to avoid permanent relationships. We have indentified six observed measures for this latent construct. The analysis based on the original dataset (Monto 2000), used two more observed indicators, which we do not include here, because of multicollinearity in our cleaned dataset. Our indicators included six separate statements. These were: (a) “Women report rape to protect own reputation”; (b) “When a woman wants to go home with a man, this implies that she is willing to have sex with that person”; (c) “Provocative dress asks for trouble”; (d) “Rape victims have bad reputation”; (e) “Forced sex after necking is the woman’s fault”; and (f) “Women hitchhiking deserve rape”. The scores for the opinions were measured by a 1-4 point scale for each opinion on the just mentioned statements.
The answers for the first two statements were “Almost all women”, “About three fourths of women”, “About half of women”, and “About ¼ of women or none”. These responses for the first two statements ranged from 1 through 4 respectively. The responses for the rest four statements were: “Agree strongly”, “Agree somewhat”, “Disagree somewhat”, and “Disagree strongly”. As for other two statements, these responses ranged from 1 through 4 respectively. Thus, the respondents with low scores were considered more susceptible than the high scorers on the scale to accept rape myths. The positive and significant bivariate correlations among the observed variables just mentioned were moderate. The internal consistency (Cronbach alpha) is .76, which is higher than adequate (.70 as suggested by Kline 2005).

(4) Preference for short term relations (SHORTREL): This construct is composed of three observed indicators. The indicators included three separate statements. These were: (a) “Prefer prostitution to regular relationship”; (b) “No time for regular relationship”; and (c) “Do not want to bear responsibilities of regular relationships”. The scores for the opinions were measured by a 1-4 point scale for each opinion on the just mentioned statements. The responses for these three statements were: “Agree strongly”, “Agree somewhat”, “Disagree somewhat”, and “Disagree strongly”. Thus, the respondents with low scores were considered more susceptible than the high scorers on the scale to prefer short term sexual relationships. The positive and significant bivariate correlations among the observed variables just mentioned were moderate. The internal consistency (Cronbach alpha) is .75, which is higher than the adequate range (.70 as suggested by Kline 2005).

(5) Having Multiple Partners (MULTPART): This construct is composed of two (2) observed indicators. The indicators included three separate statements. These were: (a) “Number of sex partners in the last 12 months”; and (b) “Number of times sex with prostitute during the last year”. We recoded the original data. In our coding, the first indicator contains the following scores: 0-1 partner=1; 2 partners=2; 3-4 partners =3; and 5 through more than 5 = 4. For the second indicator, we used the following coding principles: Never to only 1 time sex in the last 12 months=1; Less than once per month =2; 1 to 3 times per month =3; and Once or twice a week to 5 or more times a week =4. Thus, the respondents with high scores were considered having more sexual partners than the low scorers on the scale. The positive and significant bivariate correlation between the observed variables just mentioned was moderate. The internal consistency (Cronbach alpha) is .70, which is just within the adequate range (.70 as suggested by Kline 2005).
Analysis:
The data analysis has three parts. We present information on means, standard deviations, and correlation matrix for the variables used in our model. This descriptive section is followed by the measurement part of our model. As the first step for Structural Equation Modeling (SEM), we perform the assessment of our measurement model. Finally, the structural part of the model explicates the relationships among the latent constructs as mentioned before. We run SEM using AMOS 5.0.

Results:
Table 1 presents means and standard deviations for all the observed variables used in the model. Both means and standard deviations for the observed variables that compose the dependent latent construct (MULTPART) are close to each other. Among the observed variables for the independent constructs, other than the sexual conservatism (SEXCONS), both means and standard deviations are close enough to replicate men’s minds. In case of sexual conservatism, the differences in means are little larger than those of other constructs, but considering the range of standard deviations, these means are within the acceptable limits. The observed variables of SES represent middle class group in relation to both education and occupation.

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<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Standard Deviation</th>
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<td>Number of Sex Partners in Last 12 Months</td>
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<td>2.21</td>
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<td>Times of Sex with Prostitutes in Last 12 Months</td>
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<td>Provocative Dress Asks for Trouble 1-4 point scale</td>
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<td>Forced Sex After Necking is Women’s Fault 1-4 point scale</td>
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<td>Women Hitchhiking Deserve Rape 1-4 point scale</td>
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<td>No Time For relationships 1-4 point scale</td>
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<td>Do not Want Relationship Responsibilities 1-4 point scale</td>
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<td>Occupational Status 1-3 point scale</td>
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### Table 2: Correlation Matrix for Observed Variables

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<th>SXPAR</th>
<th>PROSS</th>
<th>PREMS</th>
<th>TEENS</th>
<th>HOMS</th>
<th>EXTMS</th>
<th>TEMPRE</th>
<th>NOTMRE</th>
<th>AVOIDR</th>
<th>RPREP</th>
<th>HMRA</th>
<th>DRSPR</th>
<th>BADRPU</th>
<th>FRCRP</th>
<th>EDUC</th>
<th>OCCP</th>
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<td>TEENS</td>
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<td>0.77***</td>
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<td>HOMS</td>
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<td>0.384***</td>
<td>0.352***</td>
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<tr>
<td>EXTMS</td>
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<td>0.321***</td>
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<td>0.356***</td>
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<tr>
<td>TEMPRE</td>
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<td>0.273***</td>
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<td>0.128**</td>
<td>0.059</td>
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<tr>
<td>NOTMRE</td>
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<td>-0.139**</td>
<td>0.064</td>
<td>-0.063</td>
<td>0.027</td>
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<tr>
<td>AVOIDR</td>
<td>0.157***</td>
<td>-0.223***</td>
<td>0.025</td>
<td>-0.109*</td>
<td>0.036</td>
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<td>RPREP</td>
<td>0.079+</td>
<td>0.113*</td>
<td>0.116*</td>
<td>0.022</td>
<td>0.299***</td>
<td>0.039</td>
<td>0.017</td>
<td>0.082+</td>
<td>0.110*</td>
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<td>HMRA</td>
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<td>0.064</td>
<td>0.026</td>
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<td>0.132**</td>
<td>0.077+</td>
<td>0.024</td>
<td>0.058</td>
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<td>BADRPU</td>
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<td>0.265***</td>
<td>0.141**</td>
<td>0.040</td>
<td>0.044</td>
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<td>0.270***</td>
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<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.056</td>
<td>-0.036</td>
<td>0.184***</td>
<td>0.030</td>
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<td>0.068</td>
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<td>HITRAP</td>
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<td>0.103*</td>
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<td>0.098*</td>
<td>0.108*</td>
<td>0.234***</td>
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<td>EDUC</td>
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<td>0.109*</td>
<td>0.188***</td>
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<td>0.250***</td>
<td>0.203***</td>
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<td>OCCP</td>
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<td>0.123**</td>
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<td>0.183***</td>
<td>0.107*</td>
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</table>

**Notes:** *** = p<.001, ** = p<.01, * = p<.05, and + = p<.10

SXPAR = Number of sexual partners in last 12 months; PROSS = Number of times sex with prostitutes in last 12 months; PREMS = Pre-marital sex is ok; TEENS = Teen sex is ok; HOMS = Homosexuality is ok; EXTMS = Extramarital sex is ok; TEMPRE = Prefer temporary relations; NOTMRE = No time for regular relations; AVOIDR = Avoid responsibility of regular relations; RPREP = Report rape to protect reputation; HMRA = Going home deserves rape; DRSPR = Women wearing provocative dress deserve rape; BADRPU = Rape victims have bad reputation; FRCRP = Forced sex after necking is the woman's fault; EDUC = Education; OCCP = Occupation
Table 2 shows that the items in each scale are significantly correlated. The squared multiple correlations (not presented here) suggest that there was no multicollinearity. All correlations coefficients are below the value of .50.

Turning to the measurement part of analysis, Figure 2 presents the standardized values for measurement. We have 44 distinct parameters to be estimated (17 observed variables with corresponding 17 errors, and 10 covariance estimates), which determines the number of distinct
sample moments at $153^6$. The degrees of freedom is 109, which is larger than the total free parameters to be estimated. Thus, the model is identified.

In Figure 2, we have specified the measurement part of our mode. The model is a good fit ($X^2 = 217.643$, $p=.000$, $\text{RMR} = .048$, $\text{GFI} = .95$, $\text{AGFI} = .93$, $\text{NFI} = .887$, $\text{CFI} = .939$, $\text{RMSEA} = .045$, Hoelter=301 & 327 at .05 and .01 respectively) for our analysis. However, one concern might be the significant chi-square value. Although the chi-square being significant in SEM implies the model’s poor fit, it is not unlikely for large sample size (e.g. >200), because large sample size may inflate the chi-square (Kline 2005; Schumacker and Lomax 2004). Since other than chi-square and NFI, all fit indices are within the acceptable limits, we accept the measurement model as a good fit. For other fit indices, the scores for AIC (.305.643 compared to 306 and 1960.670 for saturated and independence models respectively) and ECVI (.629 compared to .630 and 4.034 for saturated and independence models respectively) for our model are smaller than both saturated and independence models. These ensure the cross-validation of our measurement model. Overall, the measurement part of our model is a good fit for analysis.

We also ran a model by taking the modification indices into consideration. The errors between “When a woman wants to go home with a man, this implies that she is willing to have sex with that person” (GOHMRAPE), and “Provocative dress asks for trouble” (DRESRAPE) are correlated. In the same vein, the errors between “Forced sex after necking is the woman’s fault” (FRCXWF), and “Women hitchhiking deserve rape” (HITCHRAP) are correlated as well. We accept these modifications for re-specification of the model, because errors attached to the observed variables may emerge from the same sources. For example, men who believe that women willing to go home with them actually deserve rape may not believe in women’s responsibility in this affair by wearing “provocative” dress, and vice versa, whereas the same pattern of responses are expected from the researcher’s point of view. The same argument can be made about the other two correlated errors. Another cause of any correlated errors is that sometimes some respondents want to hide their actual opinion, which may result in emergence of correlated errors. Respondents may intentionally hide their opinions on one set of items, yet express their genuine opinions on other items. Theoretically, however, we argued earlier that all these possibilities exist in men’s minds when they are studied. Further, the use of instruments in collecting this type of information always has the potential for misunderstanding by respondents. Based on these rationales, the re-specification of the model with the just mentioned correlated errors does fit with our theory.

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$^6$ The formula is $p(p+1)/2$, where $p$ refers to total observed variables (Schmacker and Lomax 2004).
Now, in Figure 3, we have re-specified the measurement part of our model. We have 46 distinct parameters to be estimated (17 observed variables with corresponding 17 errors, 2 correlated errors, and 10 covariance estimates), which determine the number of distinct sample moments at 153, and as such the degrees of freedom is 107, which is larger than the total free parameters to be estimated. Thus, the model is identified.

The model is a good fit ($X^2 = 191.439$, $p=.000$, $RMR=.046$, $GFI=.956$, $AGFI=.937$, $NFI=.901$, $CFI=.953$, $RMSEA=.04$, Hoelter=336 & 366 at .05 and .01 respectively) for our analysis. Clearly, all fit indices have improved significantly, and this is a better fitting measurement model than the one presented in Figure 2. The NFI has within significant level now compared to earlier one (.901 vs. .887), and thus other than chi-square, all fit indices are within the acceptable limits. Even in relation to chi-squares in two models, there is a significant reduction in values (217.643-191.439=26.20). For other fit indices, the scores for AIC (283.439 vs. 305.643 compared to 306 & 1960.670 for saturated and independence models respectively) and ECVI (.583 vs. .629 compared to .630 and 4.034 for saturated and independence models respectively) of the re-specified model exhibit better fitting model. These ensure the better cross-validation of our re-specified measurement model. Overall, the measurement part of the model is a good fit for analysis.

Now let us look at standardized solutions of the measurement model presented in Figure 3. Most factor loadings for observed variables are above .50, whereas only the loading for “Women willing to go home” is only .49, but we accept it in the model since the loading is close to .5, and several scholarly articles accept this type of loading. In the measurement model, however, the covariance estimates between Rape Myth Acceptance and Having Multiple Sexual Partners, and between SES and preferring temporary relationships are not significant, while variances among other latent constructs are found to be significant. In our theoretical discussion, we did not confer any direct association between rape myth acceptance and men’s multiple sexual partners either, but we anticipated an association between these two while the preference for short time relations has space in men’s psychological state. The same argument is applicable for the non-significant covariance between SES & preferring temporary relationships. All other associations among the latent constructs are statistically significant as expected.
On the basis of our measurement model, the structural part of our model does not include the direct paths from rape myth acceptance to men’s multiple sexual partners, and from SES to preferring temporary relationships. Figure 4 has presented standardized estimates of our structural model. We have 44 distinct parameters to be estimated (17 observed variables with
corresponding 17 errors, 2 correlated errors, and 8 direct paths), which determines the number of

Figure 4: Structural Model for Relationships among Latent Constructs
distinct sample moments at 153, and as such the degrees of freedom is 109, which is larger than the total free parameters to be estimated. Thus, the model is identified.

In Figure 4, we have specified the structural part of our mode. The model is a good fit ($X^2 = 192.628$, $p=.000$, $RMR =.046$, $GFI = .956$, $AGFI=.938$, $NFI=.90$, $CFI =.953$, $RMSEA=.040$, $Hoelter=340$ & $370$ at .05 and .01 respectively) for our analysis. The chi-square value is little higher here compared to our measurement model, and it is because we have not included the paths from Rape Myth Acceptance to Men's Multiple Sexual Partners, and from SES to Preferring Temporary Relations. Since other than chi-square, all fit indices are within the acceptable limits, we accept the structural model as a good fit. For other fit indices, the scores for AIC & ECVI of our model are smaller than both saturated and independence models. Thus, the structural part of our model is accepted.

The Squared Multiple Correlations (SMC) suggest that the model explains 16, 20, 16, and 6% of the variances in men's having multiple sexual partners, sexual conservatism, rape myth acceptance, and preferring temporary relationships respectively by their predictors concerned. While the size of the variances are small, they are acceptable, because any sociological research using SEM puts emphasis on testing hypotheses explicating complex mechanisms among variables, not focusing much on the total variances explained. Above all, while the total variance is small, the statistical significance makes them valid to proceed on.

Other than the direct link between sexual conservatism and men's multiple sexual partners, all expected direct links are found statistically significant. The links between SES and Sexual Conservatism, Rape Myth Acceptance, and men's multiple sexual partners are statistically significant. The unstandardized coefficients (Figure 5) suggest that when men have a one-point increase in SES, their both sexual conservatism and rape myth acceptance decrease 7 by .33 and .14 respectively, while exploring multiple partners increases by .22. These show positive coefficients, which means that if SES increases, men are less likely to be conservative, and accept rape myths, but are more likely to explore temporary sexual partners. Thus, hypotheses 1 through 3 are supported.

Sexual conservatism has direct links with rape myth acceptance and preference for short term relationships. One point increase in sexual conservatism scale, i.e., men become more progressive, leads to .17 unit increase in denying rape myths, and thus, the hypotheses 4 and 6 are supported. The direct link between sexual conservatism and men's multiple sexual partners is statistically non-significant. We will conduct the alternative model deleting this path to check whether that model is better fitting. However, the hypothesis 7 is not supported in relation to direct

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7 The parameters show positive directions since the higher scores in sexual conservatism and rape myth acceptance mean less conservatism and less likelihood of accepting rape myths.
Figure 5: Structural Model Unstandardized Solutions
effects on men’s multiple sexual partners. We notice, however, that the preference for short term relationships have significant direct links to men’s having multiple sexual partners (the hypothesis 8 is supported). Also, rape myth acceptance has direct significant effect on the preference for temporary relationships, which influences men’s exploring multiple short term partners, and thus hypothesis 5 is supported. When there is a 1-point increase in denying rape myths, men are less likely to choose temporary relationships by .25. In the same vein, when men prefer temporary relationships to permanent ones by 1 point, they are more likely to explore multiple partners and buy sex from prostitutes by .52.

Tables 3 through 5 show the decomposition of the standardized direct, indirect, and total effects in Figure 4. Sexual conservatism has indirect significant effects on men’s exploration for multiple partners. Thus, this hypothesis is partially supported. Rape myth acceptance has indirect effects, through preference for short term relationships, on men’s taking multiple sexual partners (the hypothesis 2 is supported). Clearly, sexual conservatism significantly influences preference for temporary relationships in both direct and indirect ways. Although rape myth does not have any direct effect on men’s sexual encounter, we find an indirect effect on men’s taking multiple sexual partners. Clearly, men who believe more in rape myths are more likely to prefer short term relations to long term ones, and this later proposition leads them to take services from prostitutes and have multiple partners.

Examining the total effects (Table 5), it is obvious that the preference for temporary relations has more effects than other predictors on men’s multiple sexual partners, followed by SES, sexual conservatism, and rape myth acceptance. Overall, SES is a very important predictor in determining sexual conservatism and rape myth acceptance. In preferring temporary relationships, it is highly influenced by rape myth acceptance.

Table 3: Standardized Direct Effects

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LATENT CONSTRUCTS</th>
<th>SES</th>
<th>SEXUAL CONSERVATISM</th>
<th>RAPE MYTH ACCEPTANCE</th>
<th>Preferring Temporary Relations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SEXUAL CONSERVATISM</td>
<td>.449</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAPE MYTH ACCEPTANCE</td>
<td>.250</td>
<td>.221</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PREFERENCES TEMPORARY RELATIONS</td>
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<td>-.192</td>
<td>.235</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PROMISCUITY</td>
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<td>.103</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>-.283</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Table 4: Standardized Indirect Effects

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<th>SEXUAL CONSERVATISM</th>
<th>RAPE MYTH ACCEPTANCE</th>
<th>PREFERRING TEMPORARY RELATIONS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SEXUAL CONSERVATISM</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAPE MYTH ACCEPTANCE</td>
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<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PREFERENCES TEMPORARY RELATIONS</td>
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<td>.052</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PROMISCUITY</td>
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<td>.040</td>
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### Table 5: Standardized Total Effects

<table>
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<tr>
<th>LATENT CONSTRUCTS</th>
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<th>SEXUAL CONSERVATISM</th>
<th>RAPE MYTH ACCEPTANCE</th>
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</tr>
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<tr>
<td>RAPE MYTH ACCEPTANCE</td>
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<tr>
<td>PREFERING TEMPORARY RELATIONS</td>
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<tr>
<td>PROMISCUITY</td>
<td>.244</td>
<td>.143</td>
<td>-.067</td>
<td>-.283</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Overall, the hypotheses presented earlier are found tenable in the present study.

**Alternative/ Equivalent Models:**

To estimate the alternative model, we delete the non-significant path to assess whether the re-specified model is better than our original one. Since the direct link from sexual conservatism to men’s multiple sexual partners is non-significant, we run a structural model deleting this path. The model has the following fitting statistics: $X^2 = 194.401, p=.000, RMR = .048, GFI = .955, AGFI = .938, NFI = .899, CFI = .953, RMSEA = .040, Hoelter=339 & 369 at .05 and .01 respectively. In general, these statistics are a little worse than our proposed model, and therefore, our model is considered more acceptable with the non-significant path from sexual conservatism to men’s multiple sexual partners.

Another model we compared with our proposed one is by testing the reverse paths from promiscuity to preference for temporary relationships, from temporary relationships to rape myth acceptance, from rape myth acceptance to sexual conservatism, and from promiscuity to sexual conservatism. The theoretical foundation of this model lies in the fact that multiple outlets for men’s sexual exploration encourage them prefer short term mating. In the same vein, men’s preference for temporary relationships leads them believing in rape myths, because their preference for temporary relationships can easily put the blame on women themselves, and thus, women’s behavior can be controlled. The acceptance of rape myth obviously increases sexual conservatism.

The fit-statistics for the above model are as follows: $X^2 = 199.918, p=.000, RMR = .049, GFI = .949, AGFI = .935, NFI = .896, CFI = .949, RMSEA = .041, Hoelter=332 & 361 at .05 and .01 respectively. Although the fitting statistics are not bad, the stability index for sexual conservatism, preferring temporary relationships, and rape myth acceptance for this model is .019, and
therefore, the model is unacceptable until further modification is done. Since this model with further modification needs more research, and the overall fitting statistics are not better than our proposed model, we prefer our model to this one for the present research.

In general, our model is more acceptable than the two alternative models presented above.

**Discussion and Conclusion**

The results presented above clearly indicate that the men's belief system regarding sexual ideology and their own stereotyping about how women should or should not behave largely affect their sexual preference, and hence their sexual mating. We argue that men's differential psychological and behavioral traits are mainly influenced by social-structural causes. One of these structural causes includes men's differential accesses to resources. This control influences their overall psychological constructs related to sexuality of women, also their structural capacity (controlling resources) facilitates exploring multiple sexual partners. The present research did not target providing any fundamental addition to the existing body of literature, but, in short, it intended to reconfirm the view that men's psychological constructs about women are largely affected by their beliefs about sexual behavior, the level of their sexual conservatism or liberalism, and ultimately the combination of these as affected by their structural power measured by access to resources lead several men to take services from prostitutes and multiple women instead of having regular relationships.

In our findings, evidence suggests that men's structural power (e.g. access to resources) influences their ideology about sexuality (e.g. conservatism). The more they have accesses to resources, as shown above, the less they are conservative; however, because of their structural power, they take the advantage of their privileges as set by society. Although we did not find any direct significant effects of sexual conservatism and rape myth acceptance on men's search for multiple partners, our analysis suggests that these have significant indirect effects on men's exploring multiple sexual partners, because these both influence men's preference for short term relationships to long term ones. Also, our analysis indicates that higher resource attainment (and as such control) may make men less conservative and less susceptible to rape myth acceptance. Therefore, following Johnson (2000), we argue that men do not abandon their privileges in exploring partners from multiple outlets in society, even when they are even less conservative and less susceptible to rape myths.

However, the study suggests prospects for research combining more aspects. Because of the lack of a combined dataset on both men and women's having multiple partners, we could not test the differential belief systems in relation to gender, but any future research of this sort may be
attempted to have more comprehensive view on the issue. Also, on policy implication, any future research can also check whether the multiple sexual encounters with multiple women make men believing in progressive ideas about women and prostitution, such as legalization and decriminalization of prostitution. While comparing an alternative model with the present one, we indicated that a research might be attempted to investigate whether the existence of men’s opportunity structure in getting multiple partners influence their preferences for short term relationships. Going further, it is also possible to inquire whether multiple sexual mating creates less conservative attitude in men’s mind about sexuality and rape myths. While attempting this, we believe that a more comprehensive analysis of the relationships between men’s structural power and their psychological make up regarding women’s sexuality is possible.

References


Democratization and National Integration in Nigeria

Martin Ikechukwu Ifeanacho

Abstract: Nigeria has been democratizing since 1975. Democratization is closely associated with the enabling environment for political integration and development. Paradoxically, the history of democratization in Africa, Nigeria in particular has remained the history of national disintegration. In this paper we have situated the paradox within the colonial hegemonic legacies and their imperatives for the indigenous ruling class that must necessarily contented with a weak economic base by using the instruments of the state to acquire surplus. Simultaneously the same ruling class makes pretences at democratizing. We therefore posit that power has to transit from the ruling class to civil society for true democratization to emerge.

INTRODUCTION

Nigeria's efforts at achieving national integration have remained largely unrealized. The integration crisis facing Nigeria is manifest in the minority question, religious conflicts, ethnic politics, resource control youth restiveness and the call for a sovereign national conference. These have jointly generated the disintegration of the productive sector, and the institution of food insecurity, social insecurity, deterioration of the physical and social infrastructures, fall in the living standards of a vast majority of Nigerians and their alienation from the political system.

The entire social matrix in Nigeria is characterized by inter community/intra-community, inter-ethnic and intra-ethnic, inter-religious and intra-religious strife. Some of these conflicts are as old as the history of the Nigerian nation. Armed quasi militia youths have been combating detachments of the Nigeria army in the Niger Delta region. On Tuesday May 4th 2004, Yelwaq in Bauchi state was turned into a theatre of death and horror as Christians battled Muslims. The inferno quickly spread to Kano where more lives and property were destroyed. This orgy of violence has become a permanent feature in the northern states. The influenza is threatening to penetrate the East in the form of reappraisal attacks on Muslims. The magnitude of the problem caused president Obasango to declare a state of emergency in the plateau state.

Most of the socio-political problems which are threatening the foundations of the Nigeria nation have lingered through the ages. For instance, the chiefs of the people of the Niger Delta region protested the exploitation of the resources in the area in 1899. Kuka M.H. (2000) has stated that the current discussion about Sharia is 95% about power and perhaps about 5% about religion. He

* Department of Sociology, University of Port Harcourt
related this current resuscitated quest for power to the Anglo-Fulani hegemony established in 1903 after the British overran the Sokoto caliphate. Ethnic anxieties are also as old as the nation itself.

The contradictions of the conflicts and anxieties fuelled by these problems have culminated in a major civil war, several military coups, fragile attempts at democratizing, religious, ethnic and tribal crises, and the rise of ethnic militias. Civil society in Nigeria through all these processes has been subjected to considerable pain, anxiety, fatalism, poverty, cynicism, frustration and disillusionments. Recently Enahoro identified “justice and fair-play” as two elements that could ensure Nigeria as an indivisible whole. He added, “with flagrant abuses of the judiciary and other organs of the state, our future is unpredictable” (cited by Lawrence B. in FORUM TEL No. 21 may 2004:56).

Democratization has been closely associated with national integration. Recent surveys of ethno nations conflicts around the world, cited in Kynlicks (1999:185), contend that self government arrangement diminish the likelihood of evident conflict, while refusing of rescinding self-government rights, is likely to escalate the level of conflicts. Babawale (2000) made this same point when he argued that political liberalization allows for open expression of dissent even in unusual forms, for him, the beauty of a democratic environment is that it allows for a negotiated resolution of conflicts either ethnic or otherwise. Ake (cited in Kukah 2000:1) portrayed the beauty of democracy by contrasting it with the military. He emphasized that:

The military addresses the extreme and the extraordinary while democracy addresses the routine, the military values discipline and hierarchy, democracy values freedom and equality, the military is oriented to law and order while democracy to diversity, contradictions and competitions, the method of the military is violent aggression, that of democracy persuasion, negotiation and consensus building.

It is a fact that the military has dominated Nigerian politics since 1960. It is also true that Minorities Commission listened to all Nigerians grievances forty years ago. More striking is the civil war that was fought to keep Nigeria one over thirty years ago. Then followed the several democratization experiments which midwifed three republics. Most recently Nigeria embarked on yet another democratizing experiment that supposedly marked the end of military rule in Nigeria on May 29, 1999. Yet there is no end the shades of crises which have rendered the Nigerian democracy palpable. While the Uba- Ngige saga in Anambra state; the rise of ethnic militia in all the geo-political regions, the assassination of key political players, the alleged Mustapha led coup etc represent the socio-political perspective on the crisis of democratization, the declaration for Sharia and the spate of religion motivated attacks portend the religious version of the crisis.

Several questions become pertinent at point. For instance, why has democratization not signalled the end of militarism in Nigeria? Why are we still far away from freedom and equality? Why has cultural diversity continued to be a burden on national integration? Why is it still extremely difficult
to define, in primary terms, the meaning of indigeneship in Nigeria? Why are Nigerians members of minorities that do not constitute any form of majority?. What are the factors militating against the use of persuasion, negotiation and consensus building for national integration? Is Nigeria really democratizing? Does Nigeria still need the Sovereign National Conference (SNC), true federalism, and restructuring?

We will adopt the historical materialism approach to relate the democratization process to the hegemony of the ruling class which has converted the entire political system in Nigeria into a mechanism for extracting surplus from civil society. Part of the contradictions of this process is that civil society should necessarily be balkanized by the same ruling class minding democratic structures to avoid any broad-based civil resistance.

DEFINITION OF CONCEPTS

Legitimacy and Authority
Authority is power based on general agreement; (1) that a person or group has the right to certain sorts of commands (2) that those commands should be obeyed (Shively 2003:47). It therefore implies that persons who fail to obey the commands of government are participating in socially unacceptable behaviour. This is why authority is backed up by persuasion and threat of coercion.

Legitimacy is closely related to authority. If authority exists because it is generally agreed “on” the person/s exercising authority shall expect obedience by those to whom the commands apply. It is crucial to a government that large numbers of its people should believe that it has authority and that it properly should have that authority. We call the existence of this sort of feeling to the extent that it does exist, the legitimacy of the government (Shively 2003.147). It is important to note the word properly because a government that rigs itself into power may not be deemed to properly have authority. This may prevent the government from achieving a reasonable degree of legitimacy.

Democracy
When we refer to Nigeria’s political system as “Nascent democracy”, we input that democracy is new in Nigeria. This is erroneous. The term democracy may be more closely associated with Western political thought, its varying connotations have global application. Literally, democracy signifies “the rule of the people”. Abraham Lincoln’s definition of democracy is close to its literal meaning. It reads: democracy is the government of the people, by the people and for the people (Guaba 2005:421). The simplicity of the definition does not do justice to the extremely controversial notions of the concept.
Guaba (2005:440-460) provides an array of interpretations of democracy beginning with elitist version typified by Mannheim who argued that the people cannot directly participate in government, but they can make their aspirations felt in certain intervals. And this is sufficient for democracy. The pluralist version finds expression in Dahl's interpretation who insists that: the policy making process, however centralized it may appear in form, is in reality, a highly decentralized process of bargaining among relatively autonomous groups. There is yet the participatory theory of democracy. McPherson, its major apostle conceptualizes democracy as the active involvement of individuals and groups in the government processes affecting their lives.

There are certain principles which are implied in the different interpretations. For instance (a) Government by consent (b) Public accountability (c) Majority rule (d) Recognition of minority rights; (e) Constitutional government (f) Freedom of association (g) Existence of opposition ; and (h) The upholding of civil liberty and rights. Democracy therefore can at best be said to be relative. Traditional Igbo society was democratic and contrasted significantly to the Hausa-Fulani and Oduduwa kingdom where power was centralized. Turing to contemporary Nigeria, we face the dilemma of fitting current political practices into existing theories of democracy.

McPherson (in Guaba 2005:460) opined that third world countries, which have no experience of Western individualism, could also conform to the ideals of some historical theories of democracy as far as their governments are legitimized by mass enthusiasm. What exactly does McPherson mean by mass enthusiasm? The hounding of civil society into rallies? The 1 to 10 million man march? Solidarity rallies? The market women's march to Government House to plead with Mr.A. to run for a particular position? Discussion on which of the retired Generals is more qualified to rule? Seriously speaking we are of the view that McPherson's assertion accounts for the way and manner the ruling class contrive the role of members of civil society in a democratic setting.

**Democratization**

Democratization is more difficult to pin down than democracy. It is easy to note that the fall of the Iron Curtain in 1989 signaled a resurgence of democracy. We could go further to point at such countries as Ecuador and Peru in 1978, Bolivia in 1982, Argentina in 1983, Chile in 1989, Algeria, Egypt and Tunisia between 1989 and 1991 and posit that the exit of the military in politics amounted to democratization. This could be misleading. After establishing democracy in Algeria, the military was afraid that the fundamentalist Islamic party would be victorious, and it abruptly banned elections in 1992 (Shively 2003:470). This shows that democratization does not simply connote change of government. It goes beyond the organization of political parties and elections.
Democratization is more appropriately viewed as the institutionalization of democratic principles as part of everyday culture in a society. It finds expression in the channeling of behavioural patterns towards democratic ideals. It permeates all facets of community life from religion through the economy, marriage, family to politics. These institutions legitimize the activities of those who exercise authority. If these institutions are absent militarism might be misconstrued for democratization.

Colonialism and National Integration
The problem of national integration in Nigeria is not remarkably different from that of most of the nations that were colonized in Africa. The constitutional changes introduced by the ruling National Liberation Front (FLN) in Algeria after the 1988 crisis were designed to accommodate multipartism. Yet cancellation of democratic elections imposition of “high security councils” led by military men, religiously motivated attacks particularly on Islamic Salvation Front (FTS), violence and heightening of terror, massacres and political trauma have trailed the nations history. The military in Algeria has since 1992, appointed and removed four presidents namely Chedli Benyedid Mohammed Boudiaf, Alikhaf and Liamanine, Zeroual (the Guardian Friday, may 1999:16).

Ghana’s political history since independence has been as checkered as that of Algeria. Ghana registered her first military coup in 1966 and a second in 1976. By 1993, Ghana has experienced four republics and several periods of military rule. What characterized both military and democratic experiments were imposition of authoritarian rule, accompanied by rhetorical/espousals of popular participation and the empowerment of the down trodden (see Gyimah-Boadi 1994). This pattern of clinically manipulated attempts at democratization of authoritarianism has been noted in other countries such as Sierra Leone, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Congo, and others.

Nigeria was not spared this path to political development as the process of decolonization was the same as the cited examples above. The Nigeria elite who were groomed by the colonial masters accepted modernization as development and displayed unbridled enthusiasm in importing Western values, institutions, technology manpower and policies. It was for this particular reason that it failed to institute an indigenous and independent economic base. Consequently, the transition from colonialism to independence made little economic sense because the vestiges of the colonial economy were left intact and transferred to the post-colonial political era.
The British had in 1899 revoked the charter of the Royal Niger Company. By 1914, it completed the process of bringing together several hundreds of ethnic, linguistic and cultural groups and communities which then had attained different levels of economic and political development. These strategies produced a state structure that was to become the servant of imperialism and all those metropolitan interests which owed their existence to the continuance of imperialism (Ekekwe 1986:26). This state structure did not necessarily emphasize integration. Rather it encouraged specialized regional production to meet the needs of the metropolitan economy. Shively (2003:62) noted this when he observed that Nigeria, like most colonies, was not constructed for internal coherence but rather for the administrative convenience of the British. With such a balkanized social formation, the state assumed the status of a supreme institution that was capable of intervening, forcefully in most cases in the three major regions i.e., the North, South and West

The Nigeria ruling class inherited this state structure without any form of modification or moderation. They rather became so preoccupied with the use of the state paraphernalia for accumulating surplus without through the processes of producing surplus. The resultant contradiction was an institutionalized myopic and visionless ethnic centered leadership with separatist and particularistic political outlook (Nnoli 1979). Such a ruling class can hardly engineer democracy. It must compulsorily strive to consolidate its economic base. Ake (1981:145) acknowledged this when he observed:

So we have indigenous leaders who are in political offices but with little economic base. This contradiction between economic and political power becomes a source of further interesting development as the rulers try to use the only tool they have, political power, to create an economic base in order to consolidate their economic power.

The use of political to capture economic surplus has had the peculiar effect of heating up the political system and marginalizing civil society economically. These were the exact processes which led to the collapse of the first republic. The civil society in the West registered its dissatisfaction with federal elections in 1965 by refusing to pay taxes, thus depleting government revenue. The government recourse to skimming off the surplus which accrued to cocoa farmers with devastating consequences. As Dudley (1982:73) notes:

The first act of the new government was thus to cut the price paid to the farmer form £110 per ton of cocoa to £60, but in thus almost halving the income of the farmers the government opened the floodgates for violence and revolt.

The violence and revolts which ensued quickly spread from the rural areas to the urban centers. The anarchy completely eroded they legitimacy of the state and gave impetus to the five young army majors who led the first military coup in Nigeria in 1966.
The collapse of the first republic demonstrated clearly the inability of the Nigerian elite to integrate Nigeria. The Northern People’s Congress (NPC) which dominated the federal government lacked legitimacy in the West and so could not restore social order within the West. Furthermore the Nigeria National Democratic Party which won the elections in the West equally lacked legitimacy in the area as a result of the manner in which the elections were won and lost. The Deputy Leader of the NNDP and also Deputy Premier of the West, had in fact said before the elections that whether the electorate voted for the NNDP or not, NNDP would win the elections. (Dudley 1982:72). This is basically the tragedy of the Nigeria democratic system. It operates over and above members of civil society. At the same time, it raises serious legitimacy crisis for the state and creates a big gap between the ordinary Nigerians and their leaders. This is the gap the military has pretended to fill.

The Single versus the Military System

Nigeria has been transiting form a military state to a democratic social formation since 1975. General Murtala Mohammed kick-started the process by setting up a Constitution Drafting Committee charged with engineering:

- A free democratic and lawful system of government which guarantees fundamental human rights; a stable system of government through constitutional law; public accountability elimination of over-centralization of power in a few hands; and as a matter of principles, decentralize power wherever possible as a means of diffusing tension (Ake 1994:9-10).

Many African countries shared these commendable political goals. They equally placed much premium on the potentials of the multi-party system for achieving them. The basic assumption was that the multiplicity of political parties in the end will determine the success or failure of democratic experiments. Thus the history of democratization has been the history of transition from the single party system to the multiparty election system in Kenya, Cameroon, Zambia, Ivory Coast, Burkina Faso, Ghana, and Nigeria etc.

Ironically the experiments were manipulated by the same elite controlling a state structure basically designed to encourage authoritarianism to the detriment of consensus building. Political pluralism is a mirage in Africa, Nigeria in particular. The hegemony of the ruling class supercedes it. From 1983 to 1999, Nigeria was ruled almost continuously by the military. Generally the military teased the public with promises of democracy while continually delaying its implementation (Shively 2003:63). The democratizing attempts by generals Ibrahim Babangida, Sani Abacha and Alhaji Shehu Shagari illustrate this. All the democratic experiments were characterized by intra-class conflicts which were often elevated to national issues such as, lack of clearly defined ideological differences between the competing political parties, and a tacit agreement by members of the elite to compete within the existing state structure. This of course rendered every democratizing experiment an attempt to devise a new way of democratizing the
one party system. This clearly manifested the dictatorship of the ruling class, who do not necessarily belong to a single political party. Dudley (1982:196) has observed that political beliefs (within the ruling class) are characterized more by their fluidity than by any consistence with which they are adhered to. Certainly for the political leadership, political beliefs are more a matter of convenience than one of commitment. The convenience is commitment. The convenience is determined by the individual economic interest of the politicians who strategically position and reposition themselves in anticipation of spoils of converted political position. It is for this reason that Ake (1994:8) posited that in most of Africa, state power is constituted in such a way as to render democracy impossible. There may be as much political pluralism as we presently have in Nigeria yet it hardly translates to a matter of choice for civil society. Presently it is either the Peoples Democratic Party or PDP for most Nigerians.

The major factor underlying this interventionist and coercive state structure in Nigeria is the centrality of the state in the distribution of surplus in Nigeria. The state plays the central role of determining the distribution of financial resources in the forms of loans, contracts and revenue from oil; thus accumulation with state power is the norm for members of the political class. Power and wealth are fused together and the premium for political power is therefore very high (see Turner 1976, and Ihonvbere 1989).

The major thrust of the economic policies pursued by the elite lends credence to the above assertions. The indigenization programme was aimed at increasing indigenous ownership of capital in Nigeria. The policy created ample opportunities for the elite to acquire increased control over surplus generated in the country. The austerity measures which followed enabled the elite maintain levels of profit by cutting down labour. The Structural Adjustment Programme followed and further entrenched the gains of the austerity measures for the elite. In Nigeria SAP dotted the socio-political terrain with wage freeze, roll back of subsides, rise in unemployment, wide spread disillusionment, despair, poverty and malnutrition. The sense in, and gains of SAP were euphorically chronicled by the elite and their chorines in academics. They were at every stage confronted by the fact that for the vast majority of the people in Nigeria the primary issues remained poverty, food, employment, basic medicare, education and transport.

These are usually converted to electoral promises by civilians or used to rationalize coups by the military. Which ever, the insincerity of purpose crystallizes sooner or latter and precipitates mass democratic agitations. The operators of the state civilian and military usually resort to violent repression as a response to these agitations. The massacre of Bakolori peasants during Shagari’s civilian regime, the arbitrariness of Buhari/Idiagbon and the killing of Nigerians in their
hundreds during agitations under Babangida and Abacha demonstrate high handedness in the use of security apparatus for repressive ends in Nigeria (see Odion Akhaine 2002).

The Yorubas say "a drum sounds loudest just before it breaks" this does not seem to be true in relation to undue insensitivity of the operatives of the state apparatus towards democratization and national disintegration in Nigeria. The contradictions which have been exhumed by the false starts have not constituted any lessons for the elite. The empirical evidence of this can be deduced from the current "CARRY GO" democracy in Nigeria.

**Carry Go Democracy**

Ake insists that the grammar of politics which is central to the solidarity and identity of the political community is an instrument of inclusion and unity as well as exclusion and disunity (1994:15). This is very true of the concept of carry go democracy in Nigeria. The concept "Carry Go" was made prominent during Abacha’s military regime by motor –park touts (Agbero).

The government had decided that motor parks should be rid of touts. The touts were accused of increasing the cost of transportation by imposing charges on drivers for loading their vehicles. The touts, “agberos” solicit for travelers by shouting out the destinations of the vehicles thereby enabling travelers to locate and board vehicles. The drivers of the vehicles usually rest in small kiosks while the agberos coerce travelers into sitting arrangements that are far from comfortable, charge and collect fares from the passengers and hand over to the drivers in kiosks. The drivers thereafter, board the vehicles and drive off.

A combined team of military and civil police battled with the agberos for a few weeks. It finally dawned on the government that the task was impossible. After a few weeks of inactivity, the agberos resurfaced in motor parks with invigorated dexterity. They will load the vehicles, charge and collect fares and pocket their commissions. The final ritual will be a big bang, using their hands on the vehicle and simultaneously shouting “Carry Go” “No shaking”, “NO YAWA” obviously referring to the drivers of the vehicles. For the touts, this was the shout of victory and a celebration of their ability to stand a face-off with a repressive military regime.

A sociological analysis of this motor-park politics illustrates a few things about democratization in Nigeria. The travelers were called to vehicles, offered seats and told the prevailing fares. They bargained with agbero’s and finally paid to them. The social contract was between the agberos and travelers. The agberos stay in the parks while the driver and passengers who do not have much in common embark on the journeys.
Frequently, the vehicles break down half way through the journey giving rise to paradoxical situations. The travelers will want their fares back. But they did not pay to the drivers. The agberos collected money from them. The agberos by this time, will be busy loading other vehicles in the parks. Gradually the travelers will devise individual coping strategies to complete the journey. Indeed some drivers use this strategy to stop halfway pretending that the vehicles are out of order. Once the passengers are gone they will return to the parks, and load again.

Ordinary Nigerians have been short-changed just like the passengers above. In his concept of the social contract Jean-Jaques Reousseau postulated that sovereignty not only originates in the people, it continues to stay with the people in the civil society .... Sovereignty cannot be represented .... government shall be constantly accountable to the people for fulfilling the instructions of the general will. By the illustrations above the agberos institute a social contract and thereafter substitute themselves with drivers. In the same manner, restive youths, hooligans and political touts institute social contracts with civil society and substitute themselves with “big men” who provide the funds. There is no social contract binding the office holders to civil society. Public accountability is therefore not tenable. Nigerian politicians compete among themselves using youth militias. These gangs organize political rallies at which promises are made. At the end, there is a massive chorus of “CARRY GO” “NO SHAKING” “NO KAI”. Thereafter the gangs rig the elections, threaten and silence people who question the “free and fair” elections and celebrate electoral victories for their sponsors who only emerge as occupants of sensitive political positions. The politicians who emerge know very well that they captured state power without the consent of the people.

If there is any form of social contract, it is between the restive youth gangs and the rest of civil society. The judiciary has no place in this form of social contract. It is regularly informed that major political crises are mere family problems that the party can resolve, be it in Anambra, Abia Imo, Delta or Bauchi State. The fact remains that the euphoria with which Nigerians welcomed the 1999 “very peaceful elections” as the end of militarism in Nigeria politics has evaporated as the state intensifies the processes of accumulation through deregulation and privatization. Once more this has clearly demonstrated the economic essence of political contraptions of the Nigeria ruling class.

A more critical examination of deregulation for instance, reveals that is an extended version of indigenization, austerity measures, SAP, and now privatization. The mopping up of surplus has developed from very subtle to more aggressive techniques. Thus the poverty level continues to gravitate between 65.6 percent in 1996 and 75 percent in 2000. A World Bank report titled World
Bank Atlas, says Nigeria is the 21st poorest nation whose gross national product (GNP) is $300. Privatization in such a country will only increase the gains of the power elite and correspondently reduce the gains of the masses that are poor.

It is therefore pertinent to emphasize that the current democratization experiment is merely a change in techniques adopted by the elite in Nigeria to entrench the economic interests of metropolitan an indigenous capital. Privatization has intensified this process and resulted in the severe economic marginalization of the urban an rural poor. Kokah (2000:10) observes that:

> It is against this background, Nigeria and Nigerians must situate the outgoing confusions in the explosions of cross cutting ethnic tensions, violent cultural resurgence, negative atavism ethnic belligerence, religious begottery. What passes for democracy seems to have given us licence to take the law unto our hands. Unleash on one another prejudice which our cowardice have battled for so long.

The forgoing clearly shows that democratization managed by the power elite in Nigeria is anti democratic, very repressive and highly divisive. It corrodes the tenets by consensus building and sets in motion such dangerous whirlwind that forces society to degenerate to dangerous levels of breakdown of law and order. This triggers the adoption of varying coping strategies by those who democratize authoritarianism and the civil society. Thus religious and ethnic crises, traditional patron-client relations, youth restiveness, excessive commoditization of relations, all configure to deny Nigerians any prospects of sharing their universality of democratic consensus building and in the collective enterprises of asserting a corporate identity.

**CONCLUDING REMARK**

We have sustained the thesis that the fundamental problem of democratization in Nigeria stems from a state structure designed to extract surplus and suppress agitation from civil society during colonialism. This same structure has been retained by the power elite. The dynamics of this state has continued to necessitate concessions and reforms in techniques used for achieving the same old goal, living civil society traumatized.

There are therefore no prospects in any National Sovereign Conference orchestrated under the same state structure. It will simply transform into another “Carry Go” conference. There is equally no prospects in re-structuring the nation into many geo-political zones while retaining this faulty state structure. Nigeria will be merely exchanging expanded party pluralism and formal access to democratic participation for intensified economic disempowerment thus setting the stage for more vicious cycle of violence and national disintegration. What is required in Nigeria is true democratization of culture. Power must be handed over to civil society in Nigeria. Alternatively civil society most retrieve power from the power elite so as to determine the political processes that will evolve a legitimate state in Nigeria. Thereafter autonomous communities will produce
representative to a “true national sovereign conference” that will bestow on Nigeria an identity, a spirit and, a focus. Such a conference will:

Ensure democratic participation in decision making, such that the needs of people will receive high priorities and be made the targets of policy. It will empower people form below and make transformation a self development a self process. (Tomor in Onimode and Singe (eds) 1995:245).

Currently, democratization is aimed at economic development determined by the power elite whose only obligation to civil society is explanations. This is basically why the Nigerian society approximates a society in disarray. Nigerians hate each other, they fear each other, they do not know each other because they cannot communicate with each other. They are separated strategically by a power elite that arrogates powers to itself and exercises and retains such power by upholding the principle of divided and conquer.

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Identity Politics and Social Exclusion in India’s North-East:
The Case for Re-distributive Justice

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Abstract: This paper examines how various brands of identity politics since the colonial days have served to create the basis of exclusion of groups, resulting in various forms of rifts, often envisaged in binary terms: majority-minority; sons of the soil-immigrants; local-outsiders; tribal-non-tribal: hills- plains; inter-tribal; and intra-tribal. Given the strategic and sensitive border areas, low level of development, immense cultural diversity, and participatory democratic processes, social exclusion has resulted in perceptions of marginalization, deprivation, and identity losses, all adding to the strong basis of brands of separatist movements in the garb of regionalism, sub-nationalism, and ethnic politics, most often verging on extremism and secession. It is argued that local people’s anxiety for preservation of culture and language, often appearing as ‘narcissist self-awareness’, and their demand of autonomy, cannot be seen unilaterally as dysfunctional for a healthy civil society. Their aspirations should be seen rather as prerequisites for distributive justice, which no nation state can neglect.

Colonial Impact and genesis of early ethnic consciousness:

Northeast India is a politically vital and strategically vulnerable region of India. Surrounded by five countries, it is connected with the rest of India through a narrow, thirty-kilometre corridor. North-East India, then called Assam, is divided into Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Nagaland and Tripura. Diversities in terms of Mongoloid ethnic origins, linguistic variation and religious pluralism characterise the region. This ethnic-linguistic-ecological historical heritage characterizes the pervasiveness of the ethnic populations and Tibeto-Burman languages in northeast. North-East mountain ranges and river valleys indeed divide up South-East Asia from South Asia. This predominant tribal region, replete with protracted records of isolation, difficult terrain, and lack of intense inter-ethnic contacts, had witnessed formation of three types of society and polity such as ‘tribe’, ‘chiefdom’ and ‘state’ (Das 1989). The clans and age set systems within them had often functioned hierarchically involving unequal statuses (Das 1993). Full-fledged state-formation took place in the 4th century A.D.. Hinduism remained confined to some pockets, including the royal families, among the Kachari, Ahom, Jaintia, Koch, Tripuri, and Meitei. Penetration of Sarania dharma of Shankar Dev was felt in some plains tribal societies, who became followers of Sarania even while simultaneously pursuing tribal religions often replete with ‘animal sacrifices’ (Das 2003).

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The British colonisation process of Assam started in 1826 and ended in 1898. The colonial regime, at the beginning, resorted to the policy of non-intervention in most of then larger Assam. Two administrators J.H. Hutton and N.E. Parry advocated for separation of hill areas from general administrative scheme. In 1873 was introduced “The Inner Line” in hill areas, beyond which no person could pass without a license. Local tribes-people resisted colonial interference in their midst, and thus they often attacked the British. Their resistances were depicted as ‘raids’ and ‘uprisings’ (Das 1989, 1993:28). There is long chronology of such resistance. In 1860 and 1862 entire Jaintia tribe and the Garos (1852-57, 1872) rose against imposition of taxes. The Lushai-Kuki, Manipuri and many plains-Assam tribes raided British posts in 1860-90, 1891 and 1892 -1894 respectively. There are records of Aka / Khamti resistances -1835-1839; Naga resistances -1835-1852, and even an agrarian movement in 1893-94. The Sonaram (1902), Kuki (1917) and Jadonang- Gaidinliu movements (Singh 1982, Das, 1989) symbolized early ethnic struggles. Consequent upon the visit of the Statutory Commission in 1920s, further apprehension of marginalisation, had grown among the tribespeople and minority communities. Colonial rulers allowed missionary activities. Association with the Christian missionaries and gradual spread of education amongst the tribes and other communities infused a sense of self-esteem. This factor is crucial to understand the birth of ethnonationalism eventually among the Nagas, Mizos, and the Manipuris. In some hills and the Brahmaputra valley, there was simultaneous revulsion for Assamese linguistic-cultural domination. This perception alienated a few tribes and thus grew discontentment among the Bodos, the Karbis, the Ahoms and many others. Under the relatively peaceful period of 1930s, which may be called ‘the silent phase of identity consciousness’; the tribespeople had demanded ‘participative representation’ in the principal Legislative Assembly. The Khasi, Ahom, Naga, Mizo, Bodo-Kachari, Miri and Deuri were the first to demand “ethnic representation”. Lalungs established a Durbar in 1967, and Koch people had similarly been conscious about their minority status. In a memorandum submitted to Assam Government the Assam-Koch-Rajbanshi-Khatriya Sammilani demanded proper representation in all bodies, quota in employment, scholarships to students and publication of their history and culture. The All Assam Garo Union was established in 1983. The Hajongs in Assam urged the Government to recognize them as a scheduled tribe.

In the long history of this region the feelings of in-group-out-group, perceived marginalisation, and ‘minority-consciousness’ have variously surfaced as key factors causing ethnic unrest. Depending on varied influences of marginality and ethnicity some movements remained more explicit and specific than others, in articulating and defining their objectives. Strategies of operation correspondingly varied. Ethnic conflicts in northeast originally grew essentially through primordial affiliations. The distinctive ethnicity factor amongst communities led to steady expansion of aggressive binary categories of in-group and out-group (Das 1989, 1994, 2004, 2007).
Linguistic and Religious Revivalist Movements:

Language has always been in the centre-stage of ethnic turmoil in northeast. Making Assamese as the compulsory language from class VIII onwards led to massive agitation in the Barak valley, reminiscent of the agitation launched earlier over the issue of the medium of instruction. In 1972 the Bodo led plains tribes council of Assam (PTCA) complained that the plains tribes have been “uprooted in a systematic and planned way from their own soil” and that the “step motherly” treatment of the administration, dominated by the Assamese-speaking people has reduced them as “second class citizens” of the state. The Bodo Sahitya Sabha (established in 1952) and PTCA however ultimately succeeded in making the Bodo language the medium of instruction (up to the secondary level). In doing so the Bodo-leaders opted for the Roman script - though they were ultimately convinced to accept the Devanagari script. The Mishing Agom Kebang (Mishing Sahitya Sabha) formed in 1972 and several other Missing organizations had also worked consistently and succeeded in 1987 to introduce Mishing language as a subject of study in primary schools. The rejection of the Assamese script by the Miris, the Bodos and others dismayed the Assamese, who thought, without their tribal counterparts they may become minority, overwhelmed by the Bengali - speaking population (Miri 1993: 71). Following the recognition of native languages at primary level in Bodo -Kachari and the Karbi areas, the Mishing perception marginalisation sharpened. This led to the formation of Mishing Literary Association in 1972. In order to maintain a distinct minority linguistic identity vis-à-vis the majority Assamese, the Mishing were in favour of the Roman script. The Assam Sahitya Sabha insisted that the Assamese script should be retained for ‘Mishing language’. The Mishings were ultimately facilitated to use Roman script, and their text books came to be printed in the Roman Script, so also some newspapers and journals. The Bishnupriya Manipuri language issue, particularly in Assam, has also acquired the shape of an ethnic movement.

The Ahom, Meitei, Zeliangrong, Seng Khasi, and Zomi communities had all felt threatened by the near extinction of their original language and religion (Das and Gupta 1982, Das 1989). In Manipur Valley the Meitei revivalist leaders (before the formal inclusion of Manipur-Meitei in the Eighth schedule to the Constitution), had demanded that the Manipuri language be named “Meeteilon”. The Zeliangrong movement grew as a religious-cultural movement, originally against the spread of Christianity, but it assumed an anti –colonial political overtone. It actually came out to be the only tribal movement of north east which maintained links with the national freedom struggle (Das 1989). The Zeliangrong People’s conference (ZPC), demanded the recognition of ethnic nomenclature ‘Zeliangrong’, an acronym ( Ze-Liang- - Rong), who are spread in contiguous
areas of Manipur, Nagaland and Assam. In our report submitted to the government through the
director – general of the anthropological survey of India, we had suggested recognition of
common nomenclature as ethnographic facts supported the claims. It was recommended that an
inter-state autonomous regional council for the Zeliangrong areas will be best suited to protect the
cultural and economic interests of these tribes. In 1905, when the spread of the Christianity was
widely felt in Meghalaya, the Seng Khasi organization took upon itself the responsibility of
defending the Khasi religion. The members of the association called themselves the ‘Khasi-
Khasis’ so as to distinguish themselves from those ‘Khasis’ who had adopted the Christianity.
Having initiated the process of revivalism and reformation of the Khasi religion, the Seng Khasi
encouraged the people to abide by the matrilineal system of descent, to respect the kith and kin
on the maternal and paternal side, to believe in God, and to serve God through service of
humankind. The Seng Khasi flag came to depict a crowing cock in white and red setting. The red
signifies courage and white represents the world. The Seng Khasi started organizing archery
compositions and traditional dance performances such as ‘Ka Shad Suk Mynsiem’ and ‘the
Nongkrem Dance’.

Ethnic Conflict and Militancy:

On the eve of Independence of India, several ethnic groups had variously made effective use of
the factors of ethnicity and regionalism as basis of ethnic rage, and democratic struggle for self-
rule, greater autonomy and militant actions. Other factors such as frontier location, development
process, rise of Christianity and democratic process, partition of country, influx of ‘infiltrators’ and
minority syndrome variously led to claims of separatism among the communities. The more
assertive tribes who consistently rebelled against their incorporation within the new Indian nation-
state such as the Nagas and Mizos ultimately succeeded in attaining status of ‘statehood’ and
greater autonomy. Thereby they also succeeded in changing their minority status to that of a
majority status in respective hilly states. Even after the formation of Nagaland, however, the Naga
movement had not died, as A.Z Phizo, who had originally given the call for a ‘long Naga struggle’
movement, in which both ‘ethnicity’ and ‘extreme nationalism’ were used as operational
strategies, is regarded as the mother of all movements in northeast India. The origin of ethnicity
among the Nagas may be traced first in the formation of a Naga Club in 1918, which consisted of
the Naga headmen and members of English educated Naga middle class (Das 1982). The Nagas
formed the Naga Hills District Tribal Council in 1945, which was renamed as Naga National
Council in 1946 (Das1993: 33). NNC had gradually articulated the sense of “Naga nationalism”
(Das1982, 2001). It also emphasised the theme of Naga oneness as ‘a moral category’ (Imchen
1993), NSCN (IM) led the Naga movement in its modern phase. In order to globalise the Naga cause, NSCN (IM) took a delegation to the UN Conference of ‘Indigenous Peoples”, held in July 1994. Muivah established links with the Asia Indigenous People’s Pact and the Belgium-based Flemish Support for Indigenous People. The Nagaland Assembly also passed a resolution in 1994, extending support to the demand of the greater Nagaland - Nagalim. Outside the hills, the Ahoms (who formed the Ahom League, in the wake of 1935 Act) and the Bodos (by forming PTCA) had consistently raised the questions of ‘tribal self-rule’ right from the colonial era. The All Assam Ahom Association (formed originally in 1893) was perhaps the earliest ethnic association of its kind (Das 2001). From the 1980’s onwards, virtually the entire Northeast was plagued by various ethnic movements. Most of the movements were non-violent in earlier stages, but gradually assumed severe militant nature. In the seven states of the Northeast India reportedly more than 30 ‘insurgent’ groups operated, carrying on protracted armed-struggle. Among them the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN -IM, NSCN-K) and the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) remained prominent ones. Even though some scholars have tried to apply typology of class-formation to describe the ethnic conflict in the region, it may be argued that there are innumerable ethnic – regional factors buttressed by typical tribal features, which seem to influence the escalation of unrest.

The following list provides names of the outfits, some of which are no more active, as they used to be.

Arunachal Pradesh:
United Liberation Volunteers of Arunachal Pradesh (ULVA),
United People’s Volunteers of Arunachal Pradesh (UPVA),
United Liberation Movement of Arunachal Pradesh (ULMA),
National Liberation Front of Arunachal: Koj Tara Dragon Force (ADF).

Assam:
United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA),
Bodo Security Force (BDSF),
National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB),
Dimasa National Security Force (DNSF),
Bodo Liberation Tiger Force (BLTF),
Dima Halim Daogah (DHD),
Karbi National Volunteers (KNV),
Rabha National Security Force (RNSF),
Koch-Rajongshi Liberation Organisation (KRLO),
Hmar People’s Convention- Democracy (HPC-D),
Karbi People’s Front (KPF),
Barak Valley Youth Liberation Front (BVYLF),
Birsas Commando Force,
Adivasi United Liberation Front of Assam
Cobra Force.

United Liberation Front of Barak Valley
Muslim United Liberation Front of Assam (MULFA),
Muslim Liberation Tigers of Assam (MULTA),
United Social Reform Army Of Assam (USRAA),
United People’s Democratic Solidarity (UPDS)

Manipur:
National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN-I M.),
People’s Liberation Army (PLA),
Revolutionary People’s Front (RPF),
United National Liberation Front (UNLF),
People’s Revolutionary Party of Kangleipak (PREPAK),
Kuki National Organisation (KNO),
Kuki National Front (KNF), Kuki National Army (KNA),
Kuki Revolutionary Army (KRA) Kuki Defense Force (KDF),
Kuki Front Council (KFC). Manipur People’s Liberation Front (MPLF),
People’s Republican Army (PRA),
Kangleipak Communist Party (KCP),
Kanglei Yawol Kanna Lup (KYKL),
Manipur Liberation Tiger Army (MLTA),
Iripak Kanba Lup (IKL)
Kangleipak Kanba Kanglup (KKK)
North East Minority Front (NEMF)

**Mizoram**:
- Hmar People's Convention (HPC)
- Hmar People's Convention- Democracy (HPC-D)
- Hmar Revolutionary Front (HRF)
- Zomi Revolutionary Army (ZRA)
- Zomi Revolutionary Volunteers (ZRV)
- Indigenous People's Revolutionary Alliance (IRPA)
- Kom Rem People's Convention (KRPC)
- Chin Kuki Revolutionary Front (CKRF)
- Bru National Liberation Front,
  Bru National Front (BNFM) of Mizoram,
  Bru Welfare Association of Mizoram (BWAM)

**Meghalaya**:
- Hynniewtrep Volunteer Council (HVC),
- Hynniewtrep Achik Liberation Council (HALC)
- Hynniewtrep National Liberation Council (HNLC)
- Achick Liberation Matgrik Army (ALMA),
- A'chik National Volunteers Council (ANVC),
- People’s Liberation Front of Meghalaya (PLF-M)
- Hajong United Liberation Army (HULA)

**Nagaland**:
- National Socialist Council of Nagaland (Isak-Muivah) - NSCN(IM)
- National Socialist Council of Nagaland (Khaplang) - NSCN (K)
- Naga National Council-NNC (Adino), Naga Federal Government (NFG), Naga National Council (Khodao) – NNC (K).

**Tripura**:
- TRIPURA: National Liberation Front of Tripura (NLFT), All Tripura Tigers Force (ATTF),
  Bru National Liberation Front (BNLF).
- National Liberation Front of Tripura (NLFT):
  Biswamohan Debbarma,
  Nayanbashi Jamatia
- All Tripura Tiger Force (ATTF) : Ranjit Debbarma
- Tripura Tribal Volunteer Force (TTVF)
- Tripura Liberation Force (TLF)
- All Tripura Volunteer Force (ATVF)
- Tripura National Army (TNA)
- Borok National Council of Tripura (BNCT)

**West Bengal**:
- Kamtapuri Liberation Organisation (KLO)

The larger inventory provided above highlights the severity of the ethnic dissent prevalent in the region. Amongst the above-mentioned outfits, some are non-operational; some are actually active, and some are no more active, as they used to be. It is amazing to note that at one point, more than 120 militant groups operated in India's northeast. Their demands ranged from autonomy to outright secession. In recent years, the Indian state has had considerable success in achieving stability in the region, using tactics from negotiations to military operations to root out militants. Militant outfits also used various tactics. They even joined hands as early as 1989 forming the Indo-Burmese Revolutionary Front (IBRF), which consisted of NSCN, ULFA, KNF (from India) and Chin National Front (Myanmar). The influence of IBRF diminished gradually. Until recently, the NSCN (IM), NSCN (K), Bodo Security Force (BSF), National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB), United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) and Kamtapur Liberation Organisation (KLO) remained the most forceful and assertive groups. In the meantime quite a few Muslim extremist outfits too became active in the region (Das 1994). In the Manipur Hills, the most powerful defiant groups, besides the NSCN, are UNLF- (Meghen), PLA, KNO, KNF, KNA, KDF and KFC. The Kuki-Naga conflict rocked the state of Manipur in the mid-nineties. When the Naga claim of “proprietorship” over the vast hilly region of Manipur was endangered by demands for a ‘Kuki Homeland’, the NSCN quickly asserted its dominion. The Kuki Impi and the Zomi Council had worked tirelessly to bring about a permanent settlement. In Mizoram areas, the Reangs came to form Bru National Liberation Front whose leaders held talks with the Mizo Chief Minister. The population of displaced Reangs rose to 40,000 in camps in Tripura. The Mizo were
specially perturbed when the Bru National union, formed in 1994 to protect the rights and privileges of the Reang minorities called for Autonomous District Council under the Sixth schedule of constitution. What gives strength to the demand of the Reangs (Brus) is their position as the second largest ethnic group in Mizoram. Both in pre-Independence and post-Independence eras, Tripura witnessed regular inflow of emigrants, and land alienation of tribals was rampant. The tribespeople thus became a minority in their own homeland. Tripura National Volunteers therefore did not target the state, but it opposed a community. In this respect, Bhaumik, says, “The TNV’s anti-Bengali violence created a general climate of ethnic hatred, which were sharpened by large-scale alienation of the tribal lands and actual marginalization in jobs, professions and politics (1996). Prior to TNV, the Seng-krak (Clenched Fist) surfaced as a tribal insurgent group in 1967. It maintained close links with the Mizo National Front (MNF). Tribal leaders of Tripura, right from 1974, voiced demands of reservation, restoration of tribal land, and specially the restoration of native Kok-Borok as one of the official languages, and lastly the Autonomous District Council. The language and script issue, which engulfed Tripura for a long time, has hardly been addressed in right earnest.

Illegal Émigré, “Anti-Infiltrator - Movement” and Terrorism:

There is a long history of incursion of outsiders, emigration and resettlement in Assam. One can see this broadly in four spheres; tea plantation related manual labour, Bengali Muslim emigration (mostly occupying agriculture), Hindu Bengali migration (mostly occupying service sector), and Marwari migration in trading sector. Bangladesh war resulted in over 10, 00,000 ‘refugees’ taking shelter, who never returned. Modern Bangladeshi “infiltration” is however said to be a more severe phenomenon. It was alleged that Bangladesh Char area dialects spoken by the migrant Muslims, were declared as Assamese dialect to the census enumerators. Politicians too encouraged the Bangladeshi Muslims and other minorities into Assam, giving voting rights. This was a narrow exercise in electoral politics (Dixit 1998, 2003). This last wave of illegal-exodus from Bangladesh is a more dangerous phenomenon, as some among these infiltrators are said to have gotten involved in terrorist activities in parts of urban India. It is said fear within the native Assamese community of being overwhelmed by the unabated influx of illegal Bangladeshi migrants from across the porous border triggered off the long-drawn “Anti-Foreigner mass uprising -1979 - 1985”, spearheaded by the All Assam Students’ Union (AASU). It ended by arriving at an agreement, Assam Accord- 15 August 1985. The Accord fixed 25 March 1971 as the cut-off date for detection and expulsion of the illegal foreign migrants. The Assam movement was led by AASU. All Assam Gana Sangram Parishad- AAGSP, which was umbrella organization of several outfits, including Asom Sahitya Sabha, emerged as the political forum the
AASU. In 1985, AAGSP swept the elections on the wave of anti-foreigner sentiments. The ULFA's inception dates back to the frenzied years of the Assam Movement when a section of the militant youth lost faith in peaceful programmes of AASU and the AAGSP. According to Baruah (1992) ULFA combined Naxalism, with a strong dose of “sub-nationalism”. In 1990, the ULFA had forged links with various insurgent outfits inside and outside the country, including the PLA, NSCN and even JKLF in Kashmir. In 1986, ULFA first established contacts with the then unified National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN) and the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) of Myanmar for training and arms. Subsequently, links were established with Pakistan’s Inter Services Intelligence (ISI). The ULFA, according to Gohain, ‘advocated a line of “de-nationalization” or “divesting oneself of ethnic identities except that of Assamese identity”. It characterized India as a “colonial state” and the northeast as the ‘colony’, though no serious economic analysis substantiating this assertion had come to light’.

Identity Politics of ‘Small ethnicities’ and ‘minority syndrome’ in Assam:

After its partitions, Assam was left with 23 tribes, comprising of 14 hill tribes of Karbi Anglong and North Cachar Hills; and nine plains tribes inhabiting the plains of the Brahmaputra Valley. Seeing development in the hills, some tribes became conscious to develop their sub-regions. Some tribes who had earlier launched movements rushed to renew their agitations. Thus the Ahom renewed the demand for the re-scheduling their scheduled tribe status. In order to push forward the demand of a separate Ahom State, the ‘Tai-Ahom Land Committee” was formed, by merging old organisations. In 1995 the Ahoms placed a 17-point charter of demands. Showing his concern for the Ahoms, the then Ahom Chief Minister of Assam, Hiteshwar Saikia, highlighted the unique cultural heritage of the Ahom people. The Karbis, have been conscious about their minority status vis-à-vis the majority - Assamese. Notwithstanding the gradual incorporation of the Karbis into the Assamese society, culturally and linguistically, the cultural incorporation was never conceded. What is more the kinship based tribal political system, territorial affiliation (Mikir hills), survival of Karbi folksongs and fable of their distinct origin, tribal mortuary rituals, and tribal costumes which survive in vibrant manner helped the Karbis to put forward their autonomy demand (Das 1989:188-90). Though the Karbi National Council demanded in 1986 only an autonomous district, but last two decades have seen the growth of the Karbi Students Association and the Autonomous State Demand Committee (ASDC) spearheading a movement for creation of a separate Karbi state. Seeing ever growing demands of the minority tribes the administration had granted the Sixth Schedule status to some plains tribes, such as the Mising, Rabha and Tiwa.
The Bodo movement is the longest social movement in the plains of Assam. The first two phases of the Bodo movement were concerned with social reforms (1947 – 1967) and consolidation of the Bodo identity vis-à-vis the Assamese community (1967 – 1987). Earlier phase of the Brahma movement (1907 onwards) was a short-lived ‘Sanskritization movement’ led by the Mech-Bodos. The early cultural awakenings had led to birth of the Bodo Sahitya Sabha in 1952, which demanded Bodo language as the medium of instruction at secondary level. In its modern phase (1967 onwards) a new section of Bodo elite emerged which demanded a greater share in political power. A call was given for carving a separate region called Udayachal. After second phase of mass protests, there was a Bodo Accord signed in February 1993 that had led to the creation of a Bodoland Autonomous Council (BAC). The BAC was a non-starter, as the territorial boundary issue remained unresolved. The movement for maximum autonomy by the Bodos, succeeded ultimately in securing a new politico-administrative structure within the existing State of Assam following a memorandum of understanding with the Government of India on 10 February, 2003. The Bodo-majority areas have now come under the new Bodoland Territorial Council (BTC), an elective body. The BTC Accord is seen as a fulfilment of the sub-national aspirations of the Bodos of Assam. Under the BTC understanding, the Government of India provides financial assistance of Rs.100 crores per annum for 5 years for projects to develop the socio-economic infrastructure.

The North East Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Forum, comprising fifteen diverse tribal organisations in its meeting in October 1994 resolved that “The entire region has been swamped by alien people migrating from neighbouring countries and also from other parts of India” (The Telegraph, 6 October, 1994). Similarly Tribal Students Federation (TSF) was constituted by several tribal students’ organisations such as Karabi Students Union, All Tiwa Students Union, Takam Miashing Porin Kebang, All Assam Deuri Students Union, Maan-Tai Students Union, Sonwal Kachaari Students Union, Dimasa Students Federation, and All Assam Tribal Students Union. The main objective of the TSF was to provide coherent direction to the various tribal movements of the region for “the right of self-determination”. An important aspect of TSF was its abhorrence to militant –armed actions. TSF failed to achieve its goals.

In view of extensive demand of Chakma and Hajong for Indian citizenship, the Arunachal Pradesh Legislative Assembly passed a unanimous resolution to deport these émigrés settled in the state. To protect the cultures of indigenous tribes the Legislative Assembly passed the Bill called “The Aarunachal Pradesh Protection of Customary Laws and Socials Practices Bill, 1994” for protection of the native tribal institutions. The All Arunachal Pradesh Students Union (AAPSU) also opposed such demands of citizenship. The Nepalese of Assamese origin demanded ‘special protected status’ under the constitution. They aimed to thwart attempts at branding them as
‘foreigners’ /illegal infiltrators. Fact remains that the Nepalese did face the Khasi anger manifested in the ‘ethnic cleansing’ of the sort in late 1980s, and which had triggered the larger Nepalese demand of the Gorkhaland (Das 1989, The Statesman, 18 July 2002). In September 1994 the North-East-Students-Organization (NESCO) alleged that the Illegal Migrants (Determination of Tribunal) Act 1993, was full of loopholes and which had made detection and expulsion of illegal migrants in North East difficult. There have been strong reactions to threat of infiltration of outsiders in varied manners. Thus, the National Socialist Council of Nagalim (Isak-Muivah) made it mandatory for non-Nagas living “all over Nagalim” to make identity cards for themselves and their families.

In Assam, the Adivasis today can broadly be divided into two communities, the tea garden workers and those who came out of the tea gardens at the end of their contracts and settled in and around the tea gardens after procuring some land. Through gradual expansion these Adivasis, form nearly 20 per cent of the state population, but their representation in the legislative assembly is said to be markedly lesser (Other Backward Class, 5 May 2008, India Together News Service). Hiren Gohain has discussed the Adivasi Militancy in Assam. The All Assam Adivasi Students’ Association along with Assam Tea Tribal Students’ Association (strong in Sibsagar, Dibrugarh and Laximpur districts of upper Assam) have been agitating for years demanding recognition of tea tribes and Adivasis as scheduled tribes. The Adivasis have been neglected by the state. Only special measures, like the campaign against poverty, can win their hearts. The state Congress leaders failed to muster political will to fulfil that demand. The latest response from the Registrar General is that some relatively homogeneous groups among this population may be considered for inclusion under this list if the state government agrees. (Gohain, 2007, Economic and Political Weekly, December 8, 2007).

Reconciliation for Self-Rule and Autonomy:
Cease Fire and Peace Accords

Noteworthy peace initiatives were undertaken during the 1960s and 1970s involving several militant outfits of the region. However it was during 1994 that several underground organisations came ‘over-ground’ and surrendered before the government authorities, particularly in Assam, Meghalaya and Mizoram. These organisations were the Dimasa National Security Force (DNSF), Achik Liberation Matgrik Army (ALMA) and Hmar People’s Convention (HPC). The Dimasa Kachari generally live in North Cachar Hills, Cachar, Karbi-Anglong, Nowgong (all in Assam ) and Dhansiri region of Nagaland. Prior to 1961 Census they were identified as a ‘Sub-tribe’ of Kachari. In the 1971 census and afterwards they projected themselves as a distinct tribe. The ‘Dimasa Jalairaoni Hosoma’ was established in 1972 to promote their distinct cultural identity.
The Dimasa National Organisation (DNO) was born in 1979. In March 1979 the Dimasa demanded the proper preservation of ancient Dimasa monuments and relics. In 1980, Nikhil Hidimba Barman Samity, Cachar, demanded reorganization of the Dimasa speaking areas of Northeast India. Even though the Dimasa National Security Force (DNSP) had close ties with the NSCN its leaders realized the futility of their actions and thus they had surrendered before the Assam State government authorities in 1994. A breakthrough achieved during 1994 was the signing of the Hmar Peace Pact. An accord was signed at Aizal on 27 July 1994 between the Hmar People's Convention (HPC) and the Mizoram government, bringing an end to seven years old Hmar insurgency. The accord envisaged the setting up of a Hill Development council in Hmar inhabited north Mizoram. In Meghalaya also the Achik Liberation Magrik Army (ALMA), trained by the NSCN, and inspired by the ULFA, surrendered before the Meghalaya Chief Minister at Tura, on 25 October 1994. The Garo Baptist Convention (GBP) played a major role in bringing the militants to the negotiating table. In Assam, Hiteswar Saikia (Congress) led government declared “grant of total autonomy to several major ethnic tribes”. Besides the Bodo Accord (1993), his government signed accords with the Karbi and Dimasa tribals. Self ruling bodies were provided to Rabhas, Mishings and Lalung (Tiwas). In Assam, many organizations have ceasefire agreements with the government: U.P.D.S. since January 1, 2004, the U.P.D.S. since May 23, 2002 and the N.D.F.B. since May 25, 2005. Similarly, in the state of Meghalaya, the Achik National Volunteer Council has had a ceasefire agreement with the government since July 23, 2004. U.L.F.A. in Assam in 2005, too, has appointed a People's Consultative Group to prepare the groundwork for eventual dialogue with the government.

The Naga peace initiative has a long tradition. Diverse perceptions surrounded the earlier 19-point Agreement of 1960 and the Shillong Accord of 1975. In recent times the Naga Hoho convened a series of meetings of Church leaders and NGOs from all Naga areas culminating in a call for “journey of conscience” to seek reconciliation and to rebuild the Naga society. A Declaration was adopted in 2001 to pursue the cause of peace. Since 1998-99 peace parleys particularly with the NSCN (IM) has been generally successful. The NSCN (IM) has been demanding a homeland for all Nagas living in North East, which will be called ‘Nagalim’. These peace initiatives have led to what is termed as bilateral cease-fire whereby belligerence and hostility is halted. Even during cease-fire the cause for worry has been the fratricidal schisms between the different factions of the Naga National Council, the Isak-Muivah group and Khaplang faction of the National Socialist Council of Nagaland. There has been success of peace talks with the Khaplang faction too. It is also pleasing that 'substantive issues' have been discussed. At the same time in a statement titled “Journey for Peace” the NSCN (I-M) has recognized the ‘legitimate aspirations of all neighbouring people including the Meiteis, the Assamese and others’
and appealed to them to ‘let us end tension between us’ (Navalakha 2003). NSCN (I-M) has appreciated the government of India’s understanding of the “unique history of the Naga people”. The Kamtapur movement, initiated by the Kamtapur People’s Party (KPP), involves the Koch and Rajbanshi communities, who call themselves Kamtapuris. The Kamtapuri ethnicity and language question gave birth to this movement, which started as a peaceful movement, but turned violent after the movement came in contact of the some Assam based militant outfits such as ULFA in 1999-2000. Apart from the demand for a separate state to be carved out from five north Bengal districts, the Eleven-point charter of the KPP includes the recognition of the Kamtapuri language, introduction of Kamtapuri programmes in TV., and ‘re-settlement’ of the people who arrived after 1971. The KPP supporters, mostly of Rajbanshi origin consider themselves indigenous to the region and they feel they have the right to self-determination. Today indeed the situations mainly in Manipur, Assam and Tripura remain disturbing. The Manipuri militants have shown no inclination for peace talks. All Tripura Tiger Force and the National Liberation Front of Tripura, which operate from camps in Bangladesh, will be weakened by the Naga peace accord, if reached (The Statesman 23 November 2002). The NLFT has link with the NSCN and the ATTF has links with the ULFA. Though the NLFT talks of secession, the state is not their enemy. Their targets are the settlers who have migrated from former East Pakistan after partition and subsequent settlers who have reduced the indigenous tribes of Tripura into minority (K. Chakraborty, The Statesman 23 November 2002).

A Recapitulation

In North-East India cultural differences and incongruity sharpened the ethnic boundaries and generated cleavages along ethnic conceit, leading to inter-ethnic discord. Ethnic unrest in northeast is as old as the country’s independence. The Indian independence along with the partition, influx of émigrés, suspected fear of linguistic –cultural subjugation, economic negligence, and failure to value approaching political institutions variously infused in the minds of the ethnic communities a ‘sense of narcissistic self-awareness’. The spectre of social exclusion, minority-syndrome and ethnic rivalry remained the driving force for protests demanding autonomy in the shape of homeland/state/ or autonomous district council, within constitutional framework. Some of the movements followed the violent paths. While the former opted for constitutional path, the later sought an extra-constitutional / secessionist ideational path. Ever increasing evidences, however, now indicate that most of the militant outfits in North-East have now transformed themselves into terrorist entities, empty of their original objectives and ideology. For example, U.L.F.A. in Assam, since 1990s, has repudiated its earlier anti-Bangladeshi position. Vested interest and quarrel over interests led militant groups to clash among themselves. It will be
incorrect to attach terrorist label to N.S.C.N., but the media reports suggest that most fatalities in Nagaland are the result of the infighting between the two factions of the N.S.C.N., rather than from government forces. Despite several successful peace initiatives, the security force operations are in place by utilizing the army, state police forces and the paramilitary forces to contain militancy.

Poor governance has been a major problem in the region. Wasbir Hussain says the region is caught in a vicious cycle of lack of economic development and then militancy and the resultant violence further retard economic growth. Under the circumstances, it is natural to find the people of the region harbouring a sense of alienation from the Indian mainstream and feel neglected. We have noted above how the state of Assam is under siege with the aspirations of different communities and groups showing no signs of a decline despite attempts at devolution of power to the grassroots level. B. P. Routray of the Institute for Conflict Management, has rightly observed that ‘this is primarily a governance issue. Poor governance is the main trigger factor for ethnic groups clamouring for autonomy. Such demands from newer groups are here to stay.’ Special provisions for self-governance and autonomy are provided for people of North East within the Constitution of India, particularly through such Acts as the Sixth Schedule, NEC and Department of North Eastern Region (DONER). The DONER and the North-Eastern Council, under the central control need more effectively to tackle the problems of unemployment, underemployment, and economic backwardness of the region. Let the people’s representatives monitor the activities of these institutions. The DONER has an annual budget of Rs.550 crores. The NEC has another Rs.500 crores earmarked for the region. These are apart from the enormous amount of funding available to the States through different central schemes, one-time packages announced by successive Prime Ministers, ‘Peace Packages’ provided to States like Nagaland and Mizoram, grants by international development agencies like the World Bank, and the Asian Development Bank (ADB), which in 2003 approved a master project of Rs.2, 000 crores for the Northeast. These institutional arrangements and provisions need to be appropriately regulated to assuage ethnic misgivings. In more recent years the peace initiatives, such as the bilateral cease-fire, and the peace talks held between militant leaders and government representatives, symbolize the determination of the Nation-state to resort to a broad -spectrum consensus on vital issues by adhering to flexibility and extendibility. These are basic foundations aimed at the national-consolidation, which should be strengthened. Peace, development and proper linkages are bound together and are intrinsic to harmony in the region. Gradually the region has increasingly witnessed not only naturalisation of electoral politics, but also slow adaptation of national political parties.
Resurgence of ethnic identity and persistence of ethnicised politics does not indicate repudiation of the political state. Their concern for variously perceived threats to their distinct ethnic identities and their anxiety for preservation of culture and language and their demand of autonomy can not be seen as dysfunctional for a healthy civil society. Their aspirations should be seen rather as prerequisites for distributive justice, to which no nation state can neglect. Indian path of institutional adjustments aimed at wining over and changing the opinion of hostile ethnic groups and extending special safeguards to hill States have helped solve ethnic problems to a great extent. These need to be endured.

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Impact of the British Bangladeshi Musicians of London:
A Brief Look at the Popular Musical Styles of
Postcolonial Migrant Peoples.

Shams Bin Quader*

Abstract: This article focuses on the British Bangladeshi professional musicians of London, whether or not their music has any sort of impact on the local music industry. To be more specific, I investigated whether their compositions, lyrics and music genres have had any influence on the musical scenario of London, and has their brand of music been modified due to exposure to the local industry and surrounding environment. Five professional British Bangladeshi musicians based in London were interviewed and their responses serve as the primary data for this research. A brief summary of the globally popular and influential genres of music (namely reggae, hip hop, rai and bhangra), which originated from the diasporic postcolonial migrants, are presented in this article. The results of my investigation are analyzed in accordance to the musical discourse relating to these genres and their diasporic pioneers.

Music is one of the elements that define a culture. Whether we look at its creative and expressional aspect or its commoditised form, it is safe to suggest that music is intertwined with the culture of a nation residing at a certain geographical location. The music that is considered local to a certain nation contributes to the uniqueness of the culture of that nation. However, culture is ever changing. The individual culture of a nation changes over time when it encounters other cultures. Patrick Calm Hogan concludes, “Contact leads to widespread modification or even loss of basic culture. But it leads simultaneously to a reification of that culture” (6).

For example, when people of two different cultures start to coexist, they tend to share values, beliefs and customs, out of necessity of communication and because of human’s social nature; people from both cultures influence each other and both their cultures are altered. One of the reasons behind this change of culture is when the people residing at a certain area go abroad to live in a different location. Among these people, some will consciously try to hold on to their roots and cultural heritage, while others will adapt – that is a part of human nature. To quote Simon Frith, “Music is the cultural form best able to cross borders – sounds carry across fences and walls and oceans, across classes, races and nations” (269).

Music is thus an important vessel to carry the experiences and cultural practices associated with migration. John Connell and Chris Gibson state that the global distribution processes of music are significantly based on the movements of people instead of goods or money, although “...
technological changes, marketing strategies and changes in taste and style" (160) are crucial as well (160). They also state that a huge number of migrants from postcolonial nations had brought with them their musical traditions to new destinations (mainly North America and England) since the 1970s (and even from 30 or 40 years before that) and these migrants all experience a sense of dislocation; thus music is a part of this experience, and provides the medium through which their culture and identity can be conveyed and resettled in a new location. (Connell and Gibson 160 - 161).

In this article, I try to find out whether the musical stylings of the British Bangladeshi Professional musicians settled in London, have had any impact on the local music scene. That is, I would like to investigate whether their compositions, lyrics and music genre have had any influence on the musical scenario of London, or have their brand of music been modified due to exposure to the local industry and surrounding environment. By the term British Bangladeshis, I mean people whose ancestors migrated from Bangladesh and came to England and also Bangladeshis who migrated to England more recently.

The alteration of music and cultural identities of migrants from postcolonial nations is not an uncommon phenomenon. Through the nineteenth, twentieth and twenty first century, people from Asian and Caribbean regions and from European countries as well have migrated to the British cities. The migration of these groups of people is sometimes termed as Diaspora. Stephen Constantine defines Diaspora as, “etymologically, derived from the Greek, the term only means scattering” (Bridge 17). Connell and Gibson make interesting connections between the music and cultural text of Paris with that of Francophone centres such as Montreal, Algiers and Abidjan; New York with Puerto Rico, Havana and Miami; Caribbean cities with London and Kingston (160); and “Indian diasporic networks link cities as diverse as Mumbai, Birmingham, Chicago and Kuala Lumpur” (160). Obviously, the music, which pertains to the culture of the migrated group of people, changes as well and it has an effect on the musical environment of their new surroundings. Some examples of these are the rai and mbalax of France, Haitian konpa of New York, Asian bhangra of English and North American cities (Connell and Gibson 160), Caribbean music in the United Kingdom and America, just to name some of the many. The music, which originated from migrated peoples, may sometimes converge with the local music to create a new hybrid genre. Through this research, I will try to unravel whether the music of British Bangladeshis had evolved in similar ways or has it gone through a different process of development.

Connell and Gibson state that in some rare cases, the music of the migrants doesn’t change, and it stays just as it was when the migrants left their home land (164). As examples, they point out
Mikis Theodorakis who found authentic Greek music in Melbourne and the Chieftains brought back traditional Irish music from New York (164). Furthermore, migration is not simply the relocation of certain individuals, and when it comes to their music, there are diverse and complex processes acting on it thus shaping and reshaping it (Connell and Gibson 164). There is no simple way to view this matter, and according to Mark Slobin, a worldwide viewpoint on the music of diasporic communities does not exist yet (3: 243 – 52).

A qualitative approach has been selected for this research, since it is assumed that this approach will be most relevant and fruitful. The method of ‘semi structured interviews’ (112) have been applied, following Arthur Asa Berger’s terminology. In this type of interview, there is a set of questions, which the subjects of the research will be asked to answer in a casual setting, and the researcher may try to go beyond the set of questions, if the conversation leads to further insightful information (Berger 112) and that is exactly how the interviews were carried out. The questionnaire developed for this research is given in the Appendix.

The focus of this questions was to explore the nature and altitude of the musical endeavours of the British Bangladeshi musicians. I tried to find out: whether they were playing traditional Bangladeshi music; were they heavily influenced by the music of their local media and the industry; did they experiment with new hybrid forms of music reflecting their postcolonial backgrounds; did they ever feel any pressure to change their musical style; what are the common obstacles; what sort of success have they achieved and most importantly, did their music styles have any influence or impact on the local music scene of London? The responses from these interviews serve as the primary data for this research.

A sample size of five British Bangladeshi professional musicians, based in London, was randomly chosen for this research. A sample is, as stated by Ranjit Kumar, a set number of people, whose ideas, opinions and knowledge, among other characteristics have been chosen to represent a much larger group of people who all share at least one defining characteristic (148). A random sampling method has been chosen in order to minimize bias and achieve the most accurate results possible (Kumar 152). There should have been ideally an equal ratio of males and females among the research sample, but this fact was considered while choosing the respondents for this research. The role of gender in determining the interview results were not focused upon and this research revolved around the British Bangladeshi musicians of London but ideally, it would have been better if the sample size was bigger, and it included individuals from all over the United Kingdom.
The interviews were conducted by the researcher in London in 2007. The summary of the responses made by the respondents of this research are presented and analyzed a bit further on in this article. But before that, it is important to look at some popular forms of music originating from migrants of postcolonial nations and diasporic communities, which have had a tremendous impact not only on the local music scene, but on the global mainstream music plane. The music of the Caribbean nations and the Indians, among others, demand attention as a huge number of migrants from these locations moved to the UK and the US, especially in the period between 1920s to the 1970s, and their music certainly influenced the overall history of musical discourse.

The most well known form of postcolonial diasporic music would have to be ‘reggae’. Originating from Jamaica, “Reggae ultimately combined western technology with African and African American culture, and evolved from earlier local musical forms such as mento, ska and rocksteady, which in turn developed from the music of African slaves” (Connell and Gibson, 174). As suggested by Cooper, the meaning of the word reggae can be interpreted into something that comes from the people or it may also be used a term to mean a new sound or dance (Cooper 44.1: 153 – 68). During the immigration boom of the 1950s and 1960s, a large number of West Indian migrants moved to England, bringing with them their culture and reggae music (Connell and Gibson 176). During this period, reggae music was ignored by the mainstream radio but it received incredible acceptance at a more underground level, being adopted by Caribbean themed clubs and punks and skinheads. (Connell and Gibson 176). However, Connell and Gibson believe that reggae started getting mainstream attention when popular artists like Blondie and The Clash began to incorporate this type of music to their songs in the 1970s: Blondie’s ‘Heart of Glass’ (1978) and The Clash’s ‘Police and Thieves’ (1977) and ‘London Calling’ (1979) was influenced by reggae music.

Hebdige states that an audience for reggae music developed who were essentially young Brits, and they found this type of music appealing because of its rebellious nature (95). He also points out that most reggae musicians stayed true to their roots (Hebdige 95). This is very interesting because the migrant musicians brought their own brand of music to England, which was not immediately modified in the process of relocation. These Caribbean migrants came at such a time when there was a growing crowd of white English youth who could relate to the themes brought forward by the reggae songs, as around that period there were ongoing social, economic and political problems in the country.

By the latter part of the 1970s, white British groups like UB40 and Madness began to exclusively play ska and reggae, gaining a much stronger foothold in the mainstream music of the British society (Hebdige, 98; Alleyne, 24: 15 – 30). One thing to notice here is that migrant musicians
and bands can usually reach the mainstream only when their music is adapted by other white western bands, or when their music is modified to suit the western ear (Huq, 77). This idea is debatable, because Jamaican reggae music became popular in the 60s and 70s and is still popular in the UK as well as in the rest of the world. By the end of the 70s, reggae was being commoditised and Bob Marley’s ascendency into pop stardom sort of personified the whole process (Cushman 25.3: 16 – 61; Gilroy 169 – 170).

Rachael Rubin and Jeffrey Melnick state that migrants from Jamaica usually went to England before 1965, but there was a period afterwards where they migrated in great numbers to the United States (188). As Rubin and Melnick suggests, over 10,000 Jamaican migrants entered the US legally in 1967, Bob Marley being one of them (188). His music style may not have changed much since his early days, but his image through the 1970s, 80s and 90s changed from a Rastafarian Outlaw to the Natural Mystic - his music representing ideological notions of national liberation, black power, multiculturalism, universal pluralism and transnationalism (Stephens 12: 139 – 67). Thus reggae became a global phenomenon in spite of the fact that it started out as the music of the Caribbean migrants.

Connell and Gibson suggest that besides reggae, the other genre of music that has captivated a cross cultural worldwide audience is ‘hip hop’ (182). Originating from the Caribbean migrants of the United States of America, hip hop is certainly a very popular type of “transnational urban soundtrack” (Connell and Gibson 182). As Rubin and Melnick notes, the Jamaicans arrived in the US with a “cultural apprenticeship” (178) of American culture and they would use this knowledge to become the “leading innovators in American music” (179). They state that Clive Campbell (later on known as Kool Herc) changed from a naïve immigrant in 1967 to the pioneer of hip hop music in New York by the late 1970s and they emphasize on the fact that his childhood in Jamaica exposed him to American television and musical tastes, enabling him, perhaps, to become an innovator of a new genre of music in his new homeland and pave the road to the future (179). The Jamaican migrant audiences residing in the US contributed to his success a great deal.

Russell A. Potter, in his book Spectacular Vernaculars: Hip hop and the Politics of Postmodernism, state that hip hop was originally treated as a means of giving voice to the deprived inner city African American communities (Connell and Gibson 184), but Flores suggest that Puerto Ricans and whites also contributed to its development (89 – 98). According to Rubin and Melnick, hip hop was ubiquitous in the Black and Hispanic communities occupying the inner-city neighbourhoods of South Bronx, New York in the 1970s (188) and it quickly caught on in other similar neighbourhoods in south-central Los Angeles (188) and in other “urban ghettos in major cities, like Houston’s fifth ward, Miami’s Overtown and Boston’s Roxbury” (Mclaren 25.2: 4).
Hip hop appeared in urban areas of other parts of the globe as well: for example, in France, hip hop developed in the suburbs of Paris and in Marseilles, where the performers and musicians were predominantly of West Indian and African origin; and, in Germany, young people whose parents migrated from Turkey and Morocco started to get involved with rap and hip hop (Connell and Gibson 184). It is very interesting to note that hip hop and rap were being localized everywhere, not only in terms of the language used in lyrics but also the contents of meaning delivered through the lyrics.

Another type of music coming from migrant musicians that has similar postcolonial precedents is ‘Rai’. Tony Langlois defines Rai as popular music originally produced in urban western Algeria, a former French colony that has been transformed since its recognition in the world music scene (Bennet et al 194). According to Langlois, pop-rai was produced for a local market throughout the 1980s in the city of Oran, but it was not until 1983 that rai songs were aired on Algerian radio (Bennet et al 195). One of the characteristics of rai music are its rather direct and unconventional lyrics and would traditionally be “associated with discrete social domains, single sex wedding parties, nightclubs and brothels” (Bennet et al 195). Langlois suggests that among the numerous rai artists of Africa, one performer named Cheb Khaled successfully brought rai music into the popular music scene of Europe, when he moved there in the 1990s (Bennet et al 194; Connell and Gibson 168).

Rai was not performed in public events like open concerts before the mid 1980s due to its devious reputation (Connell and Gibson 167). After his move to Europe, Khaled experimented with his music style, combining western pop patterns with North African ones, as noted by Longlois (Bennet et al 194). Longlois further states that artists like Khaled changed their localized, offensive, small community targeted lyrics, to lyrics which would appeal to a much bigger audience (Bennet et al 197). For example, Khaled took out the dirty lyrics altogether and became world famous. Longlois also comments that the result was the immense success of rai music in Europe, especially in French cities, so much as to suggest that the cultural centre of gravity of rai music moved from Africa to Europe (Bennet et al 197).

Much like the Algerian musicians, Indians have crossed over to the UK and US since the 1920s and 30s, around the same time as people from the Caribbean. The music of Indian migrants may not have created tidal waves in the world music scene like their Jamaican counterparts, but comprehension of their music is as important. Among the musical forms of Indian migrants, Bhangra music is amongst the best renowned. Bhangra by definition, according to Rupa Huq, is a
mixture of Punjabi folk, Western pop and rock n’ roll; it is a subculture which originated from the South Asian youth of Britain in the 1990s (201).

Obviously, Bhangra or Asian underground music has not had nearly as big an impact on the mainstream music scene, as reggae or hip hop. Huq comments:

Bhangra is a musical style of very specific derivations, namely Punjabi folk dance, which by definition cannot carry equal appeal to the inhabitants of an entire subcontinent. The group Joi Bangla, of Bangladeshi descent and based in East London, for example, have expressed reservations about Bhangra’s narrow Punjabi focus and instead use Bengali lyrics, as have the Asian group Dub Foundation. It is something of an oversimplification to see bhangra as the one force uniting the disparate members of British Asian youth (202).

I agree with Huq that Bhangra is not the sole type of music that originated from Indian, Bangladeshi and Pakistani communities based in the UK or the US.

Huq points out that performers like the UK chart-topping Cornershop and Mercury Music Prize Nominee Black Star Liner both had only one Asian member (70). It should also be mentioned, Huq suggests, that Norman Cook’s remix of the track Brimful of Asha, was the song which entered the UK pop charts, not the original version by Cornershop (77). Whether the original song was not authentically Indian enough, or it needed to modified to suit the tastes of the UK audience is open to for debate, but the fact remains that the remix of the song is mainly what made some sort of impact in the mainstream music scene. This argument is debatable because Cornershop’s albums sold well and they were on BBC Radio. Furthermore, Asian artists are burdened with the responsibility to be perceived as the spokespeople for their diasporic communities (Huq, 71).

In an interview conducted by Huq in 1995, Tjinder Singh, Asian front man of Cornershop said, “Other bands are just there. We’ve had to justify ourselves a lot more than anybody else” (qtd. in Huq 71). Singh stated this when talking about how being categorised as a band with an Asian identity affected their style of playing, media representation and their career as a whole (Huq 71). Similar remarks were made by other migrant Asian performers in the UK like Dr. Das of ADF and Inder of Detrimental; they are constantly questioned when they go beyond the usage of sitar, tabla and other Asian instrumental sounds (Huq 71). These musicians all try to explain that even though they are of Indian or South Asian descent, they were influenced by a number of different sounds living in the UK for years, and many were born and brought up there, so their music reflects their upbringing? (Huq 71).

Bhangra has received some attention in the music scenes of major cities like London, Manchester (Huq 71), and Birmingham and in some states of North America (Connell and Gibson 169). I agree with Connell and Gibson when they state that with the introduction of rapping,
sampling, and adding electronica with bhangra music, it has taken this genre far from its original Punjabi folk roots to a more symbolic status, allowing first and second generation South Asian migrants coming from diverse religious and cultural backgrounds to share a common identity (169).

In my opinion, to find the root of Indian migrant music we have to trace it back to the famous Ravi Shankar, who after settling down in the United States, was responsible for introducing Indian music to the hippy crowds of 1960s and 70s America, with the appeal of mysticism, which came to be an obsession for the Americans and the English back in the 1960s (Huq 201). A mass migration from the South Asian subcontinent to North America occurred after 1965, due to the 1965 Hart-Cellar Act, which modified the immigration quotas and professional preferences (Rubin and Melnick 129). Rubin and Melnick suggest that the way these Indian migrants were received and their culture perceived had a lot to do with “popular icons, styles and religious adaptations, and not through social realities produced” (130) by the migrants themselves (130).

Shankar was a Sitar player, who never viewed himself as a popular musician and always played very classical based compositions and ragas (Rubin and Melnick 133). Just like the case of reggae music, the music of Shankar got most attention after the massively popular white band of that era, the Beatles embraced his style in a couple of songs. Even then, the music of sitar in the context of popular culture, were usually associated with the notion that “something freaky is about to happen – whether in the realm of spirituality, drugs or sex” (Rubin and Melnick 160).

Coming back to the main focus of this research, let us now proceed to short introductions of the respondents of this research, followed by the summary of their interview responses. Farhan Shah has been involved professionally with music in Bangladesh since 1994, but he moved to London in 2001. He is a singer/song writer/ keyboard player who currently plays fusion. Idris and Zoe Rahman are siblings, and they were born and brought up in London. Idris plays the Clarinet and Zoe the Piano, and they started professional music from 1999. They play classical music, but are also involved with jazz and Afro styles. Shila Chowdhury is a student of Westminster University, but she is also a professional singer of “Rabindra Sangeet” and “Nazrul Geeti”, which are traditional Bengali styled songs. Her family moved to London in 1999, and ever since she has been performing at Bangladeshi community programmes and festivals. Back in Bangladesh she was trained in a renowned music school from a very young age. Kishon Khan is the front man of the fusion band ‘Lokhi Tera’, but he is a session player by profession and so he plays a lot of different types of music, including African jazz, classical, pop, hip hop, reggae and latin. He himself categorized his style as ‘World Music’. Kishon was born and brought up in London, but he
traveled to Bangladesh and many other countries like South Africa, to study and experience different styles of music. He has been involved with the music business since the early 1990s.

Among them only Farhan Shah had the ambitions of getting into the mainstream music business while the others were content in playing their style of music in their respective music scenes. However, irrespective of their backgrounds, ambitions and genres of music involved with, there are certain things that they all agreed upon. All the musicians stated that London is a great place to do music. It is probably one of the few cities in the world where almost any type of music can be performed and recorded. This is obviously because the population of London is highly varied, with people from a number of different cultures and ethnicities residing here. There is a wide variety of audiences who enjoy many different genres, so the support is there for diasporic musicians to play different styles of music here. Kishon Khan comments that Indian musicians probably get more support than their Bangladeshi counterparts, both financially and in terms of fan base, mainly due to the stronger infrastructure of Indian immigrants in London. But overall, all the respondents of this research agreed that Asian musicians get a lot of support to have a career in music here.

When asked whether Bangladeshi migrant musicians get proper support, Farhan Shah said, “They do, but it is tough. It is very competitive since my music has to stand out from all the other fusion bands coming from Pakistan, India and other parts of Asia” (2007). When asked this same question, Idris and Zoe Rahman replied:

There is a lot happening in terms of music in London, a lot of different styles is appreciated here and the opportunity is there to become a professional musician because of the growing market for diasporic music. It is a financially lucrative profession but we cannot stress enough on how difficult it is (2007).

When asked about the obstacles and difficulties faced in being professional musicians here in London, all agreed that it is the similar case with doing music any where else in the world. They commented that getting recognition for one’s music is never an easy job, and standing out from many other professional artists and musicians is always a challenge, regardless of which city they are based on. Idris and Zoe Rahman specifically talked about the decreasing number of venues for live gigs being a major problem as of late. This is because the live music licensing law put to effect in the last couple of years has made it very expensive for entrepreneurs to get this licence. Farhan Shah stated that his biggest obstacle is getting signed with a good record label, as there are not too many companies that would want to sign an experimental fusion artist like himself. Kishon Khan also makes a similar comment stating that the record companies here in the UK and perhaps anywhere else in the world are always very business oriented and they would always have the tendency to sign artists whose music are less experimental and has a higher probability of being commercially successful. However, both Shah and Khan agreed that these are
difficulties that each and every musician must face anywhere else in the world, and to overcome these obstacles are part of the challenge of doing music professionally.

The respondents were then asked whether they ever felt the pressure to change their style of music here in London, bearing in mind the tendency of record companies mentioned above. They all stated that there was no real pressure, although Farhan Shah commented that since he composes fusion music, he would always add some familiar bits of sounds and instruments so that his tracks would get mass appeal to the mainstream UK audience. It has already been mentioned in this paper that Rupa Huq believes that diasporic musicians may have to alter their sound so that it is more suitable to the local audience (77). After hearing the responses of all the musicians, it seems that this modification of music style (such as writing English lyrics and having familiar sounds in compositions) may be necessary only if a foreign artist wishes to be a part of the mainstream scene – but this is the norm anywhere in the world. Just like in the case of rai music as already mentioned in this article, Khaled with his music, gained global popularity when he replaced the dirty lyrics traditionally associated with this genre.

Among the respondents, only Farhan Shah mentions that he sparingly felt the need to improvise with his music in order to produce music acceptable by the UK audience. However, we should bear in mind that Zoe, Idris Rahman and Kishon Khan were all born and brought up here. They do not play Bangladeshi music. Quoting Idris:

> From our parents, we got into Western Classical music, later on, Jazz and Reggae. We just got influenced by our surroundings and we were very open to new styles of music. We also listened to Bangladeshi popular music from our cousins in Bangladesh, but that’s about it. We were always more influenced by English and a whole other variety of styles, since we were born and brought up in the UK. We don’t speak Bengali (2007).

Shila Chowdhury relocated from Bangladesh as well and she sings Bengali songs but she has no ambitions of getting into the popular music business. As already mentioned in this article, Hebdige notes that sometimes the migrant musician’s music does not change after they relocate (95). This is true in the case of Shila Chowdhury.

Speaking about altering their style of music, they were also asked whether they had any pressure to sound Bangladeshi or if lack of influence from their ethnic backgrounds in their music ever came into question. The general response of the respondents was that hardly anyone ever made such comments. Kishon Khan replied that, "Whenever any journalist asks me why my music doesn’t sound Bangladeshi, and this hardly ever happens, I always say that you should close your eyes and just listen to the music I play, and not bother with my ethnic origins (2007).”

This is contrary to the responses made by Tjinder Singh, Dr. Das and Inder when they were interviewed by Huq (71). As already mentioned in this article, these diasporic musicians stated
that they were always questioned when their music went beyond their Asian roots (Huq 71). In my opinion, this is because all of the above musicians were competing for a spot in the mainstream music scene of London, if not the UK, while the majority of the musicians I interviewed had different aspirations. Singh, Das and Inder explains that their music reflects their upbringing, local media and surrounding environment (Huq 71) which can be related with the responses made by the Rahman siblings (Idris and Zoe), who were both born and brought up in London.

The British Bangladeshi musicians that I interviewed were asked whether they were bothered by the narrow view of Asian musicians portrayed by the international media. All the musicians had a common response, and they stated that the media is always going to be a bit stereotypical and narrow in their views, but that is something that doesn’t bother professional musicians as they are used to it.

When asked about what kind of impact the British Bangladeshi professional musicians of London had on the local industry, Farhan Shah said “I think they have had a good impact in the sense that, Asian musicians and artists are slowly getting more and more recognition. We still have a long way to go, but the prospects are exciting for Asian musicians here (2007).” The Bangladeshi musicians have yet to gain international popularity, but as have been stated in this article earlier, many diasporic musicians gained recognition when international bands started to embrace their styles or performed cover versions of their tracks.

This has yet to happen for Bangladeshi artists, especially in the mainstream music scenario. However, Bengali lyrics can be found in some tracks of UK based artists like Nitin Sawhney’s ‘Sunset’, Chicane’s ‘Locking Down’ and in songs of the Asian Dub Foundation and Joi Bangla. As also stated earlier in this article, many Jamaican musicians migrated to the UK and USA in the 1960s and 1970s, equipped with cultural apprenticeships relevant to these regions and they ended up making musical history with reggae and hip hop. The same can be assumed from the Bangladeshi migrants coming to London in the 1990s and 2000s, like Farhan Shah and Shila Chowdhury, who came to their new homes only after being exposed to music and television from the UK and USA, in the form of satellite and cable channels back in Bangladesh.

None of the respondents of this research mentioned this, but there are a rising number of British Bangladeshi rappers and hip hoppers currently in London, who rap with Bengali lyrics especially using the Sylheti dialect. This is because these people are mostly second or third generation British Bangladeshis, whose ancestors migrated to London from Sylhet, a district in Bangladesh (Sandhu). Hip hop became global and gained international success with artists from different parts of the world using different languages and dialects. The British Bengali rappers and hip
hopers are quite popular in the local London music scene, with some of their tracks being played on local Asian based radio and television stations and clubs (“Bangla gangsta rap”; “Bangla Rap/MC”).

I asked the respondents to name some successful Bangladeshi or diasporic Asian musicians of the UK music scene. In terms of commercial success, they put forward some common names of Asian artists like Nitin Sawhney, Asian Dub Foundation and A.R. Rahman. In terms of Asian musicians who may not be famous but are very well recognized within the industry, they mentioned Joi Bangla, Cooljit Varma (Tabla player who played in the theatre production of ‘Bombay Dreams’), Robin Banerjee (Guitar player currently playing for Amy Winehouse) and the Drummer who played for the Spice Girls. Kishon Khan commented that Bangladeshi musicians or artists may not be very famous, but there are many of them working professionally within the UK music business, who are well respected and quite influential within the industry.

In conclusion, the British Bangladeshis have an impact on the music scene of London on a variety of levels. A trademark genre of Bangladeshi music has yet to be as globally influential as the music of the Jamaican immigrants, namely reggae and hip hop, but the prospects look favourable for the near future. The British Bangladeshi professional musicians already play an important role within London and the UK music industry, as mentioned by the respondents of this research.

There is a huge community of Bangladeshis in London, and their numbers are regularly increasing. Many Bangladeshi musicians play their local music within this community and often get some local media attention, even if that is confined to Bangladeshi community based television channels, radio and newspapers. The already mentioned music of the British Bangladeshi rappers serves as an example. I agree with Kishon Khan (2007), that the huge Indian community of London provide some evidence behind the success and influence of Indian music and the music of British Indian musicians, in the local industry. The same hypothesis sheds light on the iconic popularity of Shankar in the US during the 1960s, where a growing Indian community existed and continues to exist today (Huq 201; Rubin and Melnick 130 – 133). The respondents also mentioned that London has a very wide and varied music audience, giving musicians from any part of the globe, the chance to experiment with different styles and genres here.

The point that I am trying to make is that there is an established platform for Bangladeshi musicians in London, allowing them the opportunity to take their music unto the mainstream level of not just London, but of the whole UK music industry in the future. Whether the diasporic
musicians gain commercial success or not, depends on a diverse number of reasons – some of which have been highlighted in this article. But the aspirations of these musicians obviously play a vital role. When I asked the respondents what they consider as success, their common response was that they would consider themselves successful if they were able to continue to do their music, get proper recognition and were able to earn a decent living from their music. Only Farhan Shah stated that he would want all this and commercial success as well.

This article definitely does not encompass an exhaustive research on the impact made by the British Bangladeshi musicians of London. However, there is a lack of substantial academic work on the music of British Bangladeshis, as compared to the music of other postcolonial diasporic communities of London. That is why this exploratory study should hopefully contribute something to this field, paving the way for many further studies.

References


Appendix

Research Questionnaire for British Bangladeshi Music Professionals based in London

1. What is your name?
2. What is your current profession?
3. How long have you been involved with the music business? (What year?)
4. How long have you been involved with the music business in London?
5. What type of music do you play now, and (if applicable) is it different from the type of music you used to play back in Bangladesh?

6. Do you think Bangladeshi or South Asian musicians and artists get enough support to make it in the London music scene?

7. What kinds of difficulties have you faced and what are the main obstacles in establishing a successful career in London?

8. Have you ever felt pressure to alter your style of music?

9. What impact has London based British Bangladeshi musicians had in the local music scene?

10. What are the high points or can you describe some success stories in the music business?

11. What would you consider success?
Book Review

Crime Policy in America

University Press of America, Inc. xii+307

This is an information-packed tome on criminal justice policies in the United States. Written by a former Dhaka University graduate from the Sociology department and now a Professor at Virginia State University, the author traces the historical, philosophical and legal development of policies relating to crime and justice. Divided into seven chapters, it defines and examines crime policy, federal intervention, policies on drug crimes, juvenile justice, sex crimes, cyberspace criminality and emerging trends.

The codes of Hamurrabi, the Sumerian Code and Magna Carta, Hobbes, Freud all find their references. But in the US, it was the Bill of Rights, adopted in 1791, that gave the young nation its first document from which to draw later policies. Amazingly, policy development in criminal justice is still an on-going process, and surprisingly, most of it comes in the 20th century. This has been necessitated by changes that have occurred in society: growing and diverse population, economic prosperity, rapid technological advances, urban societies, shifts in family values, sexual liberties, compassionate attitudes, drugs, etc.

Once dictated by harshness, policies later became realities based on reason and science. As crimes and their nature increased, so did the examination on what basis they were to be drawn up.

At first a matter of the individual states, the criminal justice policies came into the fold of the federal government as society became more complex and rapid industrial and technological advances proceeded. The role of the President of the United States, Congress and Judiciary are all examined. Thomas Jefferson, the third President, emphasized that justice was to prevail in the United States. But the first to piece together a coherent policy on crime and justice was Herbert Hoover (1929-1933).

Particularly interesting is the chapter on juvenile justice. First a matter of the states, it was not until 1970s that it became a federal concern. Dr Shahidullah traces the philosophical, historical and legal antecedents for setting up separate courts for juvenile offenders. Current policies take into cognizance that the State is responsible for the welfare of the children as citizens and also for their correction.

Policies on sex crimes took into account that women and children must be protected against sexual abuse. More importantly, policies were drawn up by men and it was men who committed most of the sex crimes. That sex crimes left permanent scars in the minds of its victims was recognized. In addition to prostitution, pornography, obscenity and child abuse that are the considerations of policy, the current alarming factor is sexual offences created over the Internet.

Having brought us up to speed in the 20th century, the author in the last chapter writes about the latest consideration for policy --- cyberspace crime. In a digitalized society, the Internet has opened up vistas for international crime on identity theft, software robbery, fraud, cyberspace marketing, child pornography, storage and retrieval of data wrongfully. The gamut of areas this applies to is mind boggling. The author’s analytical mind is, perhaps, best shown here.

The book is a must-read for the undergraduate and graduate students. It is as much for experts drawing up legislation on crime and justice and is relevant in Bangladesh’s context. They can rely on no less than 35 tables, with figures and dates, and over 400 reference citations. It is available in hardcover and paper back.
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